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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the characteristics of the Yugoslav economy 
and the implications of the system of workers' self-management as it has 
developed in Yugoslavia. In the post-war period, the Yugoslav economy was 
gradually transformed from a centralized Soviet-type economy to a decentra­
lized 'market-socialist' economy. In the course of this transformation, 
the locus of decision making shifted from planning agencies to the enter­
prises. As a result, Yugoslav enterprises which were once completely 
subordinated to the central planning agencies became autonomous units like 
the corporations in capitalist economies.
What has actually happened in the course of the evolution of this system, 
is the formation of a powerful technical/administrative strata composed of 
the managerial and supervisory personnel of each enterprise, which by 
concentrating the decision making power in their own hands, have in effect 
replaced the planning agencies of the early post-war years and deprived the 
majority of the work force of any significant influence over their conditions 
of work.
On the microeconomic level, the technical/administrative strata has 
increasingly dominated the objectives pursued by the enterprises, the dis­
tribution of their revenue, the remuneration of the work force, and the 
determination of the level of investment as well as its sources of finance.
Of particular importance is the growth-bias in the behaviour of this strata 
which leads to an over-investment tendency in the enterprises and an 
increased reliance on the use of external credit for investment financing. 
These tendencies are, of course, subject to constraints such as the provi­
sion of an acceptable wage level, the maintenance of a healthy balance sheet, 
etc., which limit the management in pursuit of their objectives.
On the macroeconomic level, the major indicators of economic activity 
show a sustained long term growth. In terms of secular trend, two adverse 
developments have emerged. Firstly, the level of unemployment has continually
11
increased and, since the mid-sixties, has been accompanied by inflation. The 
rising level of unemployment, coupled with the large scale migration of the 
Yugoslav workers to Western Europe, casts serious doubt on the ability of the 
Yugoslav system to ever provide enough jobs for its work force.
Secondly, despite government efforts, regional unevenness - a natural 
by-product of a decentralized market economy - has developed and the disparities 
between the more developed and less developed areas have continued to survive.
In the short run, the Yugoslav economy has manifested a significant degree 
of instability and cyclical fluctuations. The industrial cycles in Yugoslavia, 
as in other market economies, originate from the absence of coordination bet­
ween economic units. They are further influenced by the increased sensitivity 
of investment expenditure and the operation of ceilings, floors and external 
shocks. The availability of foreign exchange has been the most important 
ceiling imposed on the expansion phases of the cycles. The major 
economic reforms of 1950, 1960 and 1965 also affected the cyclical pattern of 
growth in an adverse manner due to their untimely implementation. They were 
introduced in the contraction phases of the cycles and resulted in prolonging 
the recessions of the early fifties and mid-sixties.
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Introduction
The object of this thesis is the study of Yugoslavia's economic behaviour 
on both micro and macro levels. This has been done by focusing on the follow­
ing three main areas: the characteristics of the Yugoslav economy, the imple­
mentation of the concept of workers' self-management through the development of 
relevant institutions and the implications of the workers' self-management 
system for the micro and macroeconomic behaviour. While the bulk of the lite­
rature on the Yugoslav economy has been concentrated on the formal and legal­
istic differences between Yugoslavia and other market economies, the present 
work is essentially aimed at analysing the actual behaviour of the Yugoslav 
economy and enterprises and at bringing out the basis of their similarities 
with the modern corporation and capitalist economies.
The characteristics of the Yugoslav economy are:
a. Enterprises are managed by their workers, that is, the decision making power 
is relegated to the representatives of the employees of each enterprise.
b. Enterprises are autonomous and independent units responsible for their own 
profit and loss. Subject to some restrictions, they are responsible for the 
determination of the product prices, wage levels, volume and composition of 
investment and the sources of finance for their investment projects.
c. The central planning apparatus is almost completely dismantled now. What 
is left of planning -the so called 'social plan'- is quite similar to the 
annual economic programmes of the West European governments, i.e., a decla­
ration of the government's wishes.
d. With the abolition of the central planning mechanism, so too was abolished 
the centrally controlled 'social investment funds', a pool of resources to 
which all enterprises contributed and from which investment projects were 
financed. Since then the volume and composition of investment is determined 
by enterprises.
e. Along with economic decentralization, i.e., the relegation of decision
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making power to the enterprise level, there has also developed a significant 
degree of political decentralization. Through this, the constituent republics 
and autonomous provinces have obtained a large degree of autonomy over their 
own economic and social affairs including even certain fiscal and monetary 
powers.
The second area of interest will be the development of the theory and 
practice of workers' self-management. The concept of "workers'management" has, 
of course, been popularized through the Yugoslav experience although the origin 
of the notion goes back to the early nineteenth century. The precursor of the 
idea of workers'participation in deciding on their own affairs was Phillippe- 
Joseph-Baptiste Bûchez who, in thel830s, advocated the setting up of "working- 
man's associations". These associations, according to Bûchez, were to be based 
on the accumulation of capital which was contributed by members and which was 
to become the full property of the association. Similar notions were also put 
forward by a number of utopian socialists of mid—nineteenth century among which 
Louis Blanc's "national workshop", the Pioneers of Rochdale's cooperatives and 
Proudhon's producers'associations can be mentioned.1 Marx and Engels, basing 
themselves on the experience of the historic Paris Commune of 1871, spoke of 
"the free association of producers" that were to be set up in every village, 
factory and hamlet. This last reference to the subject has been extensively 
utilized as a piece of ideological justification by the Yugoslav proponents of 
workers' management.
: "Workers'management", however, must be distinguished from "workers' 
participation". The former notion means the most specific and direct partici­
pation of the workers in the process of control, management and decision making. 
It excludes participation in these affairs through labour unions, collective 
bargaining, etc., which belong to the latter concept. The notion of "workers’
1 For a historical background on workers'management, see Jaroslav Vanek(1975)on. 16-21
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participation" has become very popular in recent years. The developments in 
this field in Sweden and Germany, EEC Commission’s Green Paper on Employee 
Participation and the Bullock Report in Britain have made this subject one of 
the most widely discussed topics in the fields of industrial relations and 
industrial policy. The essence of "workers’participation", of course, is 
that the workers will participate in decision making on a par with other 
groups such as the representatives of the owners of capital. In other words, 
the workers will share the decision making power with others. "Workers' 
management", on the contrary, empowers the representatives of the employees 
of each establishment, and them alone, with the authority to manage their 
firm.
Unlike the idea of workers'management which did not originate in Yugos­
lavia, its practice certainly did so.^ In the post-war period, except for 
a short-lived and unsuccessful attempt to set up a centrally planned economy 
along the lines of the Soviet model, the Yugoslav leaders embarked on a unique 
economic system which subsequently has become known as "market socialism" or 
the Yugoslav "road to socialism". As this "road" was hitherto untraversed, 
its particular features had to be discovered and the specific institutions 
which were necessary or suitable for its advance had to be gradually deve­
loped. The change-over from a centrally planned economy to one characterized 
by labour-management took a long time, nearly two decades. The transformation 
was brought about by a number of major economic and social reforms, one in 
every few years, which consisted of a comprehensive programme of change in 
the way economic decisions were made and in the locus of the decision making 
power. Each of these reforms consisted of measures that increased the power 
of enterprises in influencing the formation of revenue at their disposal as 
well as the division of this revenue into personal income funds and invest- 1
1 This is, of course, if we leave out the politically oriented "factory
committees" that emerged in Russia’s industrial centres in the early years 
of the Bolshevik Revolution, the "workers’councils" (Betriebstrate) that 
developed in Germany in the 1918 revolutions and those that occupied some 
Italian factories in 1920.
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ment funds.
The third area of investigation is the implications of the system of 
workers'management. Here, the difference between the theory and practice 
of self-management has to be studied. In theory, workers'management is an 
step in the direction of furthering democracy at the place of work, and of 
increasing the level of participation and involvement of the ordinary mem­
bers of the work force in the affairs of their enterprises. In practice, 
however, the situation is somewhat different. The organizational structure 
of the Yugoslav enterprises can hardly be described as democratic. The dev- 
lopment of self-management has been accompanied by an increasing concentra­
tion of the decision making power in the hands of a minority of employees 
in the highly skilled and highly educated categories who have also achieved 
a dominating position on the management organs of the enterprises despite 
legal requirements to the contrary.
Furthermore, the dismantling of the central planning apparatus and the 
enhanced autonomy of enterprises, coupled with the hierarchical organization 
of the firms, have resulted in the emergence of wide income differentials 
on the basis of skill, industry and regional location.
From the macroeconomic point of view, the theory suggests that the pur­
suit of self-interest by each enterprise ensures maximum efficiency for the 
economy as a whole and guarantees the superiority of the labour-managed eco­
nomy over the capitalist and centrally planned economic systems.^ The actual 
experience of the Yugoslav economy, again, does not lend support to this 
optimism. The major macroeconomic variables have suffered from a high degree 
of instability accompanied by rapid inflation, increase in unemployment, the 
deterioration of balance of payment, increase in emigration of the labour 
force to the Western European countries and the widening of the gap between
1 B. Horvat(1964), pp. 97, 120-130- Jaroslav Vanek (1970), p. 403, and
(1971), P- 161.
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the less developed and the more developed regions.
The thesis is divided into two parts and six chapters. The first Part 
deals with the microeconoomic characteristics and behaviour. In Chapter One 
the organizational structure of the Yugoslav enterprises and the essential 
features of the system of workers'management are analysed. The implications 
of the adoption of this system in terms of the distribution of influence on 
decision making power among various strata of the work force and the deve­
lopment of a technical/managerial elite as the locus of power and control 
in each establishment are also investigated in Chapter One. At the same 
time, we have discussed the hierarchical nature of the labour-managed firms 
which underlies a system of industrial relations characterized by increased 
labour turnover, absenteesm and strikes. The similarity of these develop­
ments with what goes on in capitalist firms is already causing concern and 
creating alarm.
Chapter Two deals with the theory of the labour-managed firm and its 
shortcomings, particularly in the Yugoslav context. Here, we shall discuss 
the two major variants of the theory of the labour-managed firms, namely 
the income per head maximizing model developed initially by Ward, and the 
profit maximizing model put forward by Horvat. Both variants, however, 
fall within the so-called "constrained maximization paradigm" and, therefore, 
ignore many of the complexities of the functioning of modern enterprises 
under conditions of imperfect competition. The recent developments in the 
area of managerial and behavioural theories of the firm are then used to 
formulate a more comprehensive set of objectives as well as to identify the 
factors that constrain the conduct of managers in pursuit of their objectives 
The Yugoslav managers are stimulated by growth, secure futures, higher emol- 
ments, etc., as much as the executives of the capitalist corporations are. 
However, their environment is somewhat different and they are subject to 
slightly different limitations.
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ChaptersThree and Four discuss the methods of formation and distribu­
tion of enterprise net income. Here, the three-way division of net income 
into the employee's wage fund, enterprise fund and appropriations by the 
State as well as the details of the first two parts are analysed. It is 
shown that along with the development of the system of workers'management, 
the share of the State appropriation has decreased in favour of the other 
two parties and, at the same time, the enterprises have become increasingly 
more autonomous over the way in which they decided on the total as well as 
the details of the enterprise fund and the personal income fund.
Associated with this autonomy is the strengthening of the dependence 
of the personal income on the performance of the enteprise which provides 
the ground for the development of income differentials among workers of 
different enterprises, industries and areas.
With the dismantling of the central planning system and the central 
allocation of investment funds, the decision on the level and composition 
of investment has also been transferred to the enterprise level. This 
would imply that another function of the management in the field of invest­
ment expenditure is to find the most suitable source of finance for their 
projects. The question of source of investment financing is closely rela­
ted to the degree of decentralization and deepening of the system of workers' 
management and the development of autonomous commercial banking.
Part Two of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of Yugoslavia's macro- 
economic behaviour. In Chapter Five, the long run growth pattern and the 
structural changes of the economy in the post-war period are studied. The 
latter will include the changes in the structure of major sectors of the 
economy (primary and secondary, as well as major branches of economic acti­
vity), the changes in the structure of the manufacturing sector and the 
changes in the regional structure of the economy. The growth pattern of 
major economic indicators and the different aspects of the structural change
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are discussed against a background of developing enterprise autonomy and 
the relaxation of the State control.
Chapter Six deals with the short term growth behaviour and the cyclical 
fluctuations in the level of economic activity. In this Chapter we shall 
first review the theories explaining the cyclical fluctuations under the 
capitalist and socialist economic systems. It is particularly pointed out 
that the widely held views on the absence of business cycles under socialism 
are nothing but a myth. Later, the actual experience of the Yugoslav 
economy is used to identify the major industrial cycles in her post- war 
history an analyse the specific factors that have been responsible for the 
cyclical pattern of growth as well as for the different phases, duration 
and amplitude of each cycle.
Finally, a summary of the conclusions of tha whole work together with 
some general comments on the nature and implications of the Yugoslav 'road' 
to socialism shall be presented.
Part One
The Microeconomic Behaviour
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Part One
The Microeconomic Behaviour
In the immediate post-war period, the Yugoslav enterprises were 
organized along the same lines as the Soviet enterprises, both of them 
performed similar functions and behaved in similar ways. The 
organizational structure of enterprises, and their functions in a 
centrally planned economy, as well as the role of the management of such 
enterprises, have been discussed in detail by a number of economists.* 
For the present purpose, the simplest way of describing the functioning 
of a Soviet type enterprise is to treat it on a par with the ’plant' of 
a multi-division capitalist corporation. A plant is a purely technical 
unit in the sense that major decisions regarding its operation and 
performance are made not by it but by the firm of which the plant is a 
part. The prices and output of each plant are determined in the 
corporation headquarters and are based on the assessment of the 
performance of the firm as a whole and not just the plant. The 
expansion of the plant capacity is similarly decided at the level of the 
firm. Although profitability calculations are possible at the plant 
level (and are often made to serve cost accounting and managerial 
purposes), the decisions regarding whether or not a plant is to be kept 
in operation are not made within the plant but at the level of the firm. 
In short a plant is geared to the fulfillment of certain tasks and 
objectives (e.g. production targets) which are decided at the level of 
the firm. Similar to a plant, the post-war Yugoslav enterprise was a 
technical unit of production subordinated to the central planning agency 
as well as one of the ministries responsible for the enterprise’s line 
of operation. In a general sense, the relation between the planning
1 xhe classic text is J. Berliner (1957). Also see A. Nove (1977) 
and P.J.D. Wiles (1977).
2. A similar comparison is also made by J. Child (1969), p. 9.
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agency and the enterprise was the same as that between a firm and its 
constituent plants. Inputs of raw material and labour, choice of 
technology, level of output, prices (and therefore profits) were all 
determined by the planning agencies. The enterprises were founded by 
the federal, republican and local authorities and the agencies founding 
the enterprises retained the right to dispose their profit in accordance 
with their own priorities and preferences. Decisions regarding the 
expansion of enterprises were made at the centre and often without much 
consideration of the profitability of such decisions. The management 
of each unit, represented by its state appointed director, was 
responsible to one of the ministries or their departments. The 
management followed the directives of the planning bureau and performed 
very limited functions such as supervision of labour, the maintenance of 
customary standards of efficiency, the implementation of cost reduction 
methods and arrangement for repairs.
However, the Soviet type enterprises did not survive long in 
Yugoslavia. Not only the enterprises but the whole system of central 
planning and the direction of economic and social affairs by the State 
on the basis of a central plan came under attack on economic, political 
and ideological grounds. Many factors contributed to this attack, but 
the economic difficulties during the period of the First Five-Year Plan, 
expulsion from the Cominform and the new ideological trend can be pin­
pointed as the principal factors.
To take the economic difficulties first: The ambitious First Five- 
Year Plan of 1947-51 (later extended to 1952) had run into severe 
bottlenecks and its fulfillment had become literally impossible.*
The performance of the economy during this period was well below 
expectation and had led to the disillusionment of a large section of the 
leadership from the existing economic organization. Table 1 and Figure
1. The performance of the economy during the First Five-Year Plan will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Five and Six.
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1, on the next page, showing the growth of industrial production, 
agricultural production and national income, demonstrate the seriousness 
of the economic difficulties during this period. As can be seen from 
this table, the average annual rate of growth of these three important 
indicators were well below the planned targets.* In fact, even if we 
disregard the ambitious plan targets, we can easily see that these rates 
of growth, particularly if calculated in per capita terms, show a 
situation of stagnation.
TABLE 1 - Indices of Industrial and Agricultural Production and National
Income, 1947-1952
Year Industrial Agricultural National
Production Production Income
1947 100 100 100
1948 127 117 123
1949 136 119 131
1950 136 85 117
1951 128 128 129
1952 126 84 109
Average Annual Rate of Growth:
Actual (47-52) 4.6 -3.3 1.7
Planned (47-51) 36.8 14.5 7.6
Note: * Based on constant 1956 prices
** The planned rates of growth are rough estimates. The
targets were given in terms of 1939 levels which are not
always known levels.
Sources : Statistidki Godisniak Jugoslavija (hereafter SGJ) (1962)
pp. 92-93 and B. Horvat (1976), p. 43.
1. The targets of this plan for the national income, agricultural and 
industrial production were only achieved by 1954, 1959 and 1964 
respectively. B. Horvat (1976), p. 43.
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Figure 1 ~ Indices of Industrial and Agricultural Production and 
, National Income, 1947-52
Source: Table 1,
Among the political factors the dispute between Yugoslavia and her 
Cominform allies and her expulsion from the organization in June 1948 
was of particular importance.^ The economic relations between 
Yugoslavia and her Eastern neighbours, which included her major trading 
partners, were severed a short time after the Cominform resolution 
expelling Yugoslavia. Disruption of the established channels of 
foreign trade, as we shall discuss in greater detail elsewhere, meant 
that Yugoslavia was unable to obtain raw material, machinery and 
equipment required for the fulfillment of the Plan. The political
1. The dispute with the East European allies and its effects on the 
political and economic trends in Yugoslavia will be discussed in 
Chapter Five. ^ .
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dispute also led to a major shift of emphasis in favour of defence 
industries, which further added to the economic difficulties resulting 
from the severance of foreign trade.
Ideologically, the Yugoslav leaders had begun to assess the 
development of socialism in a way radically different from their 
colleagues in the rest of the Eastern bloc. Although such differences 
can be traced to the period of the National Liberation War and early 
post-war years, it was only after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the 
Cominform that they took an all-round and systematic form and became 
public. In other words, the dispute with the allies strengthened the 
position of those leaders who envisaged socialist development and 
socialist relations to be different from those practiced in the rest of 
Eastern Europe.^-
During 1949 and 1950, prominent Yugoslav leaders suchias Milovan
Djilas, Milentije Popovic, Boris Kidric, Mose Pijade and Edvard Kardelj
formulated their criticism of the Soviet model of organization of
enterprises and the national economy in the period of transition from
2capitalism to socialism and communism. According to them, the 
emanicipation of the working class cannot be achieved unless workers 
actually run and manage their places of work, i.e., enterprises and 
other institutions employing workers. They argued that, "the assertion 
that working people are the sole masters of the means of production is a
3sheer declaration so long as they do not themselves manage these means." 
In its basic essentials, it was argued, the Soviet system is similar to 
the capitalist system in the sense that workers, in both cases, are 
subject to bureaucratic controls imposed by either the State or the 
private owners of the means of production. It was pointed out that:
1. As Horvat puts it, "the savage attack of the Cominform countries 
forced people to reconsider their ideological positions thoroughly." 
B. Horvat (1971a) p. 75.
2. For details of these contributions see Ibid., pp. 75-77 and D. 
Milenkovitch (1971), pp. 62-65.
3. Central Council of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia 
(1957), p.8.
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We consider essential the participation of workers in the 
management of the nationalized property and of the means 
of production. This participation ensures social and 
economic democracy and represents the main barrier to 
bureaucracy and the domination of the state. The 
Workers' Council and the whole system built upon their 
foundations are a specific form of struggle against the 
danger of bureaucracy in socialist socio-economic 
conditions.
The Yugoslav leaders maintained that through their two-fold
innovation of workers' self-management and decentralization of the
decision making, they were going to leave the affairs of each collective
to its members, reducing the bureaucratic control from the centre and
preparing the conditions for "withering away of the State" and
application of the principle of "free association of labourers" to
2which both Marx and Lenin referred.
According to Djilas, the idea of self-management was conceived by
him and Kardelj, with some help from Kidric, soon after the quarrel with
the Soviet Union. As he has put it,
I began to reread Marx's Capital ... I discovered many new 
ideas, and most interesting of all, ideas about a future 
society in which the immediate producers ... would them­
selves make the decisions regarding production and 
distribution.....
One day - it must have been in the spring of 1950 - it 
occurred to me that we Yugoslav communists were now in a 
position to start creating Marx's free association of 
producers. The factories would be left in their hands 
... I soon explained my idea to Kardelj and Kidric....
A couple of days later, Kidrii began to elaborate and 
expound on the whole conception.^
When Djilas and Kardelj put their case to Tito and tried to obtain his 
support, the most important part of their case was that "this would be
1. Ibid», p. 15.
2. The Yugoslavs often use Marxist concepts, or their interpretations, 
to justify their reorientation to the decentralized market economy 
model. One has to remember that Marx's main concern was the 
formulation of the analysis of the capitalist mode of production 
and not the socialist one. His remarks about the socialist society 
are usually partial and sketchy and not fully developed, and as such 
cannot be taken as guidelines for socialist development of a 
particular society.
3. M. Djilas (1969), pp. 157-158. For a slightly different version of 
the development of the self-management ideas see L. Sire (1975)
pp. 1-2 and P.J.D. Wiles (1977), pp. 42-43 and 475.
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the beginning of democracy, something that socialism had not yet 
achieved."^ Few months later the Workers' Management Bill was presented 
to the National Assembly.
Here, we may abk, which of the factors discussed above (economic, 
political and idealogical) played the decisive role in abandoning the 
central planning system and the development of the Yugoslav 'road'? It 
is difficult to ascribe the change to one single factor. Certainly 
economic factors were not the main cause as it is possible to explain 
the poor performance of the economy by factors which had nothing to do 
with centralized planning. Among these factors we may mention: the 
disruption of foreign trade caused by the expulsion from the Cominform, 
the abandonment of Soviet aid and credit, the untimely collectivization 
drive of 1949 resulting in the disruption of agriculture, and the severe 
droughts of 1949 and 1951. As can be seen from this partial list, most 
of these factors have a political tinge to them. The shift from 
centralized to decentralized organisation of the economy cannot be simply 
attributed to the poor performance of the economy. The experience of 
the central planning was so short and so intermingled with other 
fluctuating political developments, that no definite assessment of its 
effectiveness or otherwise can be made. However, if we are to 
identify one factor as playing a significant role in the reorientation, 
it has to be the dispute with the Cominform. By intensifying the 
economic difficulties, the dispute prepared the necessary conditions for 
that section of the Yugoslav leadership opposed to the Soviet model of 
economic development, to gain an upperhand. Marxist polemics were then 
used as the ideological justification for the position taken by this 
section. As Sire points out, the new model of ’socialist development'
1 M. Djilas (1969), p. 158.
2 Milenkovitch also maintains that as far as bhe is concerned, the 
economic motive for the reorientation is still unclear. D. 
Milenkovitch (1971), p. 76.
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was introduced to "provide,ex-post, a plausible Marxist justification" 
for the Yugoslav position in the dispute.*
At any rate, from 1950 the reorganization of the whole economy 
began along the new lines. The organization, functions and pattern of 
behaviour of the enterprises gradually diverged from those of the 
Soviet-type enterprises. In his speech on 26 June 1950, Tito talked 
of "workers managing the factories" and made it clear that the workers’ 
councils (the representative organ of the employees of each enterprise) 
were to become the basic decision making bodies in all enterprises.
The Law on Management of Economic Enterprises and Higher Associations 
by the Workers' Councils was passed the following day and a chain of 
economic and social change (which continue to take place even to the 
present time) started.
In the initial period, of course, the workers' councils were mere 
formalities to which only minor responsibilities were entrusted. At 
the same time the central control on the economy was not loosened 
immediately. In subsequent years, gradually, the areas in which the 
councils exercised decision-making were enlarged and concomitantly 
the central control weakened and the present day labour-managed firms 
operating in a decentralized 'socialist' market economy emerged.
The analysis of these developments as well as their consequences 
in the field of microeconomics are the subject of the next four 
chapters. In the first chapter the organizational structure and the 
decision making process in the Yugoslav enterprises are discussed.
Also in this chapter the degree to which the organs of management of 
the 'new' Yugoslav firms represent the various strata of the work force 
and the pattern of the distribution of the decision making power among
1. L. Sire (1975), p. 5.
2. J.B. Tito (1950).
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these various strata will be taken up for analysis. In the second 
chapter, various theories of the labour-managed firms and their 
applicability to the Yugoslav enterprises are discussed. The applicat­
ion of some of the more recent developments of the theory of the firm to 
the Yugoslav conditions, particularly the importance of the management 
motivation for the objectives and behaviour of the firm, are also 
analysed in the second chapter. The third and fourth chapters deal 
with the distribution of the enterprise revenue, the determination of 
personal incomes of the employees, the determination of the level and 
composition of investment and the sources of investment financing.
Also in these chapters the effect of the gradual expansion of the 
enterprise sphere of influence,in the course of the development of self­
management, on the distribution of enterprise revenue and the factors 
affecting its components are discussed.
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Chapter One
Organizational Structure and Decision Making Power
Workers’ organizations at the place of work have been in existence 
in many countries for quite some time. The "comité d'enterprise" in 
France, "coramissioni interne" in Italy, "joint consultation" in Britain 
and "betriebstrate" in Germany are modern examples of such organizations. 
They perform a variety of functions ranging from matters dealing with 
productivity increase to welfare problems and handling of workers’ 
grievances. In recent decades, the trade unions in the advanced 
capitalist countries have shown increasing interest in participating 
and being involved in the decision making process not only on matters of 
direct relevance to the workers such as wages and working conditions, 
but also on matters affecting the long term position of the firm such as 
the investment plans of the firm, mergers and take-overs. In fact in 
some European countries, like Sweden and Germany, the participation of 
the employees in the running of the affairs of the firms has already 
reached the level of representation at the company board (in the former 
country) and at the supervisory board (in the latter). The EEC 
Commission's Green Paper on labour participation in management endorsed 
this idea as a "democratic imperative" and recommended a specific 
programme for its implementation to the member states.* In Britain, 
recently, the Bullock Committee on Industrial Democracy recommended the
# t\
statutory representation of the employees on the company boards.
The Yugoslav experience, however, has taken an entirely different 
route. Here, an enterprise belongs, in a legal sense, to its workers.
A separate category of non-worker owners, with whom the workers need to
1. A.Bullock (1977), p. 25.
2. Ibid. This is of course, the recommendation of the majority of the 
committee members. The minority, producing a separate report 
supported the idea of representation but disagreed with making*it 
statutory.
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deal, negotiate or consult in the affairs of the firm, does not exist.
As a result the power of the workers' organization in a Yugoslav firm 
is not constrained or limited as is the case in other countries 
mentioned above. The organization of workers in other countries are 
either restricted to certain matters, or at best, have to share the 
decision making power with other groups such as the representatives 
of the shareholders, management, etc. In Yugoslavia, the right to 
manage an enterprise is vested in the organization of its workers and 
they do not share this right with any other group. Here, the 
representatives of the workers of each enterprise decide on the level 
of output, price, employment, investment, expansion, etc., with 
increasingly little intervention on the part of the government. The 
system of "workers' self-management" thus developed, has been implemented 
not only in economic activities where some kind of goods or services are 
produced, but is also applied to all work organizations including those 
in social, cultural, health and educational activities.* Relegation of 
decision making power to the level of the individual establishment and to 
the representatives of the employees of each establishment distinguishes 
the Yugoslav firm from its counterparts in the market or the planned 
economies. In the market economies, although such decisions as regards 
output, pricing, expansion, mergers, etc., are made at the level of the
t
firm, they are not made (or agreed upon) by the representatives of the 
firm's employees. In the planned economies, on the other hand, although 
the workers' organizations perform a large number of functions regarding 
the internal affairs of each enterprise, the above decisions are not made 1
1. The recently developed term is "organization of associated labour" 
covering all fields of activities. This arrangement, the Yugoslavs 
claim, is the realization of the Marxist conception of the 
organisation of socialist enterprises. Their often used, but rare 
source of reference is Marx's sketchy comment on the historic Paris 
Commune of 1871 to which he referred as the free association of 
"self-government of the producers" which was to become "the 
political form of even the smallest country hamlet". K. Marx (1871) 
P. 221. For the use of this ideological justification in the *
Yugoslav literature, see, e.g. B. Horvat (1964), p. 97 and (1971a), 
p. 76. *
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by them - and in most cases they are made at much higher levels.'1'
In Yugoslavia, the representatives of the workers of each enterprise
form its Workers' Council which, legally, constitutes the most important
2organ of management and the highest source of power in the enterprise.
According to the Yugoslav legislation, the all-powerful councils are
empowered to an unlimited degree to carry out the activities of their
production units in such areas as production, employment, investment,
wage and price determination, integration, etc., according to their own
choice and as they see fit. In the early days of the system of workers'
management the western economists were highly sceptical of these formal
pronouncements. The legislations pronouncing the sweeping devolution
of decision making power were treated as mere formalities with which
Yugoslavia was trying to distinguish herself from the Soviet Union.
Ward, for example, regarded the actions taken by the councils as "the
sort of rubber stamp function exercised by parliamentary bodies in most
3communist countries."
But as the economic reforms in the area of decentralization proceeded 
and as the government policies emphasized the determination to go ahead 
with devolution of decision making power to the enterprise level, the 1
1. Even in Hungary, where microeconomic planning is practically non­
existent, such decisions are not made by the workers of the factory 
or at the factory level. Here the important decisions are made at 
the headquarter of the big industrial enterprises (which comprise 
many establishments in a particular line of activity) in coordination 
with various ministries (or inter-ministrial commissions) to which 
the firms are subordinated. For the situation in Hungary as well as
G.D.R. and Rumania, see D. Granick (1975) specially, pp. 295-300.
In China, the organization of workers in each enterprise is marked by 
the requirement to fulfil two basic functions: maintenance of the 
Communist Party's political power, and, running the normal operation 
of the enterprise according to the national or provincial economic 
plan. Bodies such as "revolutionary committees* and "workers' 
management teams" in each enterprise are very different from the 
Yugoslav institution in the sense that in terms of the major decisions 
they are subordinated to the planning agencies. C. Bettelheim (1974) 
pp. 13-43, and 0. Laaksonen (1975).
2. The others being the management board (comprising also of workers' 
representatives) and the director. These will be discussed in 
greater detail shortly.
3. B. Ward (1957), p. 381. For similar assessments also see J.
Bombeless (1968), p. 72.
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tone of the majority of early critics changed. The institution of 
workers' management began to receive increasing attention in the economic 
and sociological literature, and the observers, one after another, 
pointed out that the enterprises were gaining increasing autonomy from 
the government and that they did not operate as a facade for Party rule. 
Workers' councils and management boards, it was maintained, were 
independent in deciding on the quality and quantity of output, and were 
gaining more and more influence on the distribution of profit and wage, 
and price determination.*
These views, in essence, are along the same lines as the official
pronouncements and express the formal and legal position of the organs
of management of the enterprise and their functions. Here is an
example of the formalistic nature of these assessments:
If the workers do not control the factories, what sense does 
it make to turn the whole economic organization upside-down 
to make them behave as if they did? Would it not be much 
easier to copy an already established system, say, the 
American or the Soviet one?^
The legalistic and formal appraisal of the system, provided in the 
Yugoslav as well as the Western literature , maintains that the 
decisions made by the management organs are the crystalization of the 
short and long term interests and aspirations of all strata of the 
enterprise work force. Accordingly the system of workers' management 
provides the workers with the opportunity to participate in the 
determination of the conditions of their labour and running of the 
affairs of their work place. They would think themselves the dirèct and 
main beneficiaries of the success of their enterprise. The feelings 
of involvement, participation and job satisfaction should then lead to 1
1 See for example, G.W. Hoffman and F.W. Neal (1962), p. 238; F.W.
Neal (1966), p. 30; S. Pejovich (1966), p. 90; B, Horvat and V. 
Raskovic (1959), p.^194.
2 B. Horvat and V. Raskovid (1959), p. 194.
3 The works of Jaroslav Vanek on the "general theory" of the labour 
managed economy are the most developed example of such approach. 
Jaroslav Vanek (1970), (1971) and (1975).
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a great improvement in the system of labour relations, and inter-firm 
conflicts of interest, typical of the capitalist forms, would be largely 
done away with.
In this chapter, we intend to avoid the legal and formal approach 
to the behaviour of the Yugoslav enterprise, and instead, concentrate on 
its actual performance. We will try to show that there is a big gap 
between the actual and the legal (or formal) aspects of the organization 
and management of the Yugoslav enterprises. In the first section the 
organs of management and their inter-relation are discussed, and it is 
shown that the organs made up of the workers' representatives do not, 
in practice, have the power they are formally equipped with. They do 
not run the enterprise as they wish to because, in reality, they lack 
the necessary tools of analysis and information which are required to 
make intelligent decisions on complicated matters such as investment 
financing, cost accounting, mergers, etc.
In the second section we turn to the question of "who is represented 
on the organs of management?" Here we shall present data clearly 
showing the unequal representation of various sections of the work force 
on the management organs. Of particular importance is the over­
representation of a small group of the enterprise employees - the 
technical/administrative strata — who are also shown to wield greater 
influence in the operation of the enterprise than any other strata of 
the work force.
The consequences of this state of affairs is far from the "community 
of interest" and the feelings of "involvement", "participation in 
decision making", etc., on the part of the work force. In reality the 
Yugoslav enterprises face the same conflicts, though on a smaller scale, 
that the capitalist firms have been beset with for more than a century. 
The "new" system of labour relations has not been able to prevent work 
stoppages and even strikes which, in a formal sense, are completely
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inconsistent with and alien to the system of workers' management.
I. Organs of Management
In general, the managerial organs of a Yugoslav enterprise comprise 
of the following: the workers' council, the management board and the 
director. Briefly, the workers* council, composed of the elected 
representatives of the work force, is responsible for final decisions 
on the long and short term policies of the enterprise while the 
management boards, as the executive committee of the council, is 
responsible for the preparation of plans and proposals and their sub­
mission for approval to the council. The director is an outside person, 
employed by the council, responsible for the day to day management of 
the enterprise and executing decisions made by the council and the board. 
As each enterprise is subdivided into departments, plants and finally into 
work units (or economic units), the extension of the system of self­
management has meant that these subdivisions also enjoy a large degree 
of autonomy over their own internal affairs. This autonomy and self­
management is exercised through the elected organs of management at each 
level of the subdivision. With the on-going process of integration of 
smaller firms and expansion of larger ones, the multi-level system of 
workers' management is gradually becoming the standard form of 
organizational structure.
In larger enterprises, the organs of management are supplemented by 
expert commissions attached to the management board or the director's 
office. Their function is to provide expert analysis and advice to 
aid the management organs in the formulation of various policies.
Figure 1, below, is the schematic representation of the multi-level 
management structure of a large enterprise.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that Figure 1 and the 
following discussion are based on the general structure and net-work of
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Figure 1 - Management Structure of an Enterprise
the system of enterprise management. In practice, many enterprises may 
differ in their management structure from the standard form due to 
variations in technical and business conditions. This is to be 
expected given the differences among enterprises with regard to their 
size and the nature of their operation. The need for the development 
of different forms of management network in different enterprises was 
legally sanctioned by the Constitutional Amendment XV in December 1968 
(and the pursuing legislations) which authorized each of the enterprises 
to set up their own formal organizations according to their own 
particular conditions. The result was that some organizations were 
led to modify their network and retain only one collective executive 
body, the workers' council or the management board.1 2 In short, the 
workers of each establishment were not only given the legal power to 
manage their own work place but also the power to decide the way in
1 According to this amendment, "working people in work organizations 
shall determine the organs of management of their work organization." 
Quoted in I. Paj (1971), p. 32, footnote 5.
2 L. Sire (1975), p. 108 and I. Paj (1971), p. 47.
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which to manage their affairs.
With this qualification in mind, we can now discuss the structure, 
functions and the inter-relations of the organs of management with 
particular emphasis on the scope and limits of the power of each of the 
organs of management in actual practice.
A. The Workers* Council
In theory, the workers’ council is a sovereign body in that all the 
powers concerning the management of the enterprise are vested in it.
With a membership of 15 to 120 depending on the size of the work force, 
the council is a body of the representatives of the employees of each 
enterprise elected from amongst its work force. In cases where the 
number of employees of an organization is less than 30, the whole body 
of employees constitutes the workers’ council. The term of office 
was originally limited to one year, but in the 1963 Constitution it was 
extended to two years. The members of the council cannot be elected 
for more than two subsequent terms to the office and they are not 
remunerated for the time they spend in serving as councillors. The 
period of the office of council members does have a significance which 
will become clear later when we- compare it with the length of the office 
of the director and other executive staff.
The legal provisions regarding the representation of various strata 
of the enterprise work force on the council are rather vague and do not 
clearly determine who are actually represented. The law requires only 
that at least three quarters of the members of the councils be elected 
from amongst the production workers, as distinguished from the adminis­
trative and technical employees. Even though this provision is not 
clear enough, it is still an important guideline since it is aimed, 
theoretically, at preventing the administrative and technical staff (the 1
1 H.M. Wachtell (1973), p. 64.
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so-called white collar workers) from gaining a dominant position in the 
decision making process. The implications of this provision and the 
failure to implement it in practice will be discussed later.1
The Basic Law of Enterprises has defined the functions of the 
workers’ council in such a way as to make it the most powerful and all- 
embracing body at each establishment with full authority to lay down 
the structure of the organization and determination of the path which 
the establishment is to follow in its functioning. This, however, is 
true only in a formal sense. Although such issues as: approving the 
Statute and Bye-Laws of the enterprises, development programmes, the 
statement of accounts (including the income distribution scheme and 
wage-skill classification), amalgamation, affiliation and division of 
the enterprise, establishment of lower level decision making units, 
hiring and firing, and the details of disciplinary measures have been 
formally relegated to the competence of the workers' councils1 2 *, it does 
not - and cannot - actually decide on all these issues. Usually, a 
great deal of authority and decision making power is delegated to other 
management bodies. The council is, in the main, restricted to general 
supervisory function and approving of the proposals and submissions of 
the higher-up management bodies regarding the above issues. This kind 
of role, one may note, is very similar to that which the shareholders of 
a modern capitalist corporation play in approving the statement of 
account presented by the board at the annual general meeting.
The exact duties of the council differs from enterprise to enterprise 
depending on their size and the nature of operation. Detailed studies 
of the work of councils in specific circumstances (which can shed light
1 We shall show later, in Table 3, that the proportion of blue collar ' 
workers on the councils, which was slowly increasing in the
began to fall during the sixties and seventies. The pronorïin. ’ 
changed from 75 per cent in 1956 to 77 and 65 per cen^i/lQfin ,,
1972 respectively. More on this point at a l a t «  sta« a"4
2 Article M o *  the Basic Law of Enterprises, Federal Charnier of
Economy (1967), pp. 44-45. * ot
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on the actual performance of these bodies) are very rare. A brief
glance at the few available case studies will help clarify some of the
ambiguities. At Rade KonSar Enterprise, a large Croatian electrical
equipment manufacturer (with 9000 employees in 1968), for example, the
Central Workers' Council has been concerned with approving the basic
rules, annual plan, financial statement, large scale purchases, income
distribution, disciplinary rules and disposition of enterprise assets.^
At Energoinvest Enterprise of Sarajevo, another large conglamorate
made up of more than 20 separate enterprises, the Central Workers'
Council, according to its director, "gives consideration" to the balance
sheet, "adopts" the short and long term plan and decides on the short
2and long term loans for the enterprise as a whole.
The management system within the enterprises have been increasingly 
decentralized too. An important step in this process has been the 
gradual evolution of lower level management organs (particularly in 
larger organizations) in the departments, plants and divisions down to 
the lowest economic units. The Statute of enterprises allow the 
formation of work unit or work team "wherever there is an identifiable 
stage or division in the activity of the business" , or simply, "where 
job performance is measurable"^. If the number of employees at each
level is small then the functions of the unit's council will be 
performed by the unit assembly. In order to get an idea of the 
magnitude and relationships in enterprises with multi-level management, 
the situation in several big enterprises can be mentioned.
At Rade Koncar Enterprise, a three level workers' council system, 
i.e., the Central Rade Koncar Workers' Council, the divisional workers' 
councils and the working unit councils, are in operations. In 1968 1234
1 M. Bogosavljevic and M. Pasakovii (1959), p. 31.
2 E. Blum (1970), pp. 30-31. For some examples of the decisions of the 
workers' council at Energoinvest, see Ibid., pp. A0-41.
3 J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), p. 23.
4 E. Blum (1970), p. 32.
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the employees of this firm were organized in 16 workers' councils and 
75 workers' assemblies at various levels. The councils at each level 
are basically concerned with the affairs of their particular division 
or unit and send delegations to the Central Workers' Council.1
At Energoinvest Enterprise, as early as 1960, thirty workers’ 
councils were operating in the factories, departments, research and 
development centres, and planning and design bureaus. The Central
Workers’ Council was responsible only for fundamental questions relating
2
to the whole enterprise.
The decentralization of management within the enterprises has been 
in response to practical problems that cropped up in the course of 
expansion, especially in the larger organizations. Many enterprises 
were beset with problems arising from the failure of the majority of the 
work force to show interest and to participate in decision making on 
matters relating to the enterprise. This meant that in order to arouse 
the interest of the workers, the proposals submitted for their consider­
ation would have to change and become more related to their experience 
and more relevant to them. This, in turn, led to the formation of lower 
level units with increasing decision making power. One of the enter­
prises facing this kind of problem in the sixties was the very large 
Jesenice Ironworks (employing 62225 people in 1965) whose case was 
submitted, as an example, to the Second Congress of Self-Managers of 
Yugoslavia in 1971. After much study and analysis, the Ironworks 
Workers' Council adopted a decision to form "work teams" in April 1969. 
The members of the work community would exercise their right of self­
management in the work teams and by means of referendum. The work team 
was to be a collective of workers engaged on a "specific narrow sector 
of work", whose number did not exceed 30 and was usually headed by a 1
1. J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), p. 23. 
2 E. Blum (1970), p. 30.
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foreman or some other member of the supervisory staff. By 1971, 265 
of such work teams had been formed at Jesenice. It was argued that 
the small size of the work team and the personal acquaintance of its 
members and the fact that they performed the same tasks and duties, 
would help overcome problems such as the participation of individuals 
in discussions, and group interests would stimulate "active participation 
of direct producers in self-management."*
The establishment of lower level workers’ councils may seem to 
solve the problems arising from the large size of the enterprise and 
absence of close contact among the work force, but at the same time, it 
gives rise to new problems. Modern production processes are character­
ized by the division of labour which means that each person (or small 
group of persons) is concerned with only a small part of the organization 
and therefore his interests and concern lie within that part. Only the 
upper echelon of the technical and administrative strata of the 
organization are concerned with the performance of the enterprise as a 
whole and the coordination of the activities of various parts. As we 
shall discuss later, the extension of the power of the technical, 
managerial and supervisory staff, which to an extent is based on the 
division of labour within the factory, poses a serious threat to the 1
1 Work Organization of Jesenice Ironworks (1971), pp. 110-111. It 
should be noted that the above discussion on the lower level 
management organs does not exhaust all the different arrangements 
in use in different Yugoslav enterprises. To give one example, 
in the Sisak Ironworks (whose report was also submitted to the 
Second Congress of Self-Managers of Yugoslavia), in addition to 
the elected bodies such as 42 workers’ councils and numerous 
management boards, other bodies such as the Meeting of the Working 
People (assembly of all employees) also exists at various levels. 
For details see Work Organization of Sisak Ironworks (1970), p. 
130. It is interesting to note that other enterprises at the 
same Congress maintained that the Sisak practice, in comparison to 
the practice of having work-lunits, is a rather inefficient form 
and that the meetings of the working people "at least in large 
production units, resembled more to a rally than an assemble."
Work Organization of Jesenice Ironworks (1971), p. 112.
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system of self-management.
A second problem is that within the smaller units, there will also 
be a division of labour between those who know or plan the totality of 
the unit’s operation and those who take care of the smaller and 
individual parts of the operation - a division between the unit's 
workers and supervisors. As we shall discuss later, the polarization 
within large enterprises will also be accompanied by a polarization within 
their lower level units. The supervisors and heads of the economic 
units will gradually become part of the upper echelon of the enterprise 
employees holding considerable power and influence.
The question to which we should now turn is the 'scope' of the work 
of workers' councils. The issues taken up by the councils and the 
interest shown towards different issues by the councillors reflect the 
scope of the activities of the councils. Although detailed study of the 
minutes of the councils and boards are extremely rare, the few available 
pieces of evidence are sufficient to show the diversity of emphasis put 
on different topics discussed at the council meetings. Wachtell's 
summary of the minutes of the meetings of the workers' councils of 
enterprises in Manufacturing and Mining sector is a useful piece of 
evidence. He classified the discussions into major categories such as 
income related issues, sales, investment, etc., and computed the 
frequency of occurrence of each category as percentage of total items 
discussed. Although Wachtell's data is aggregative for all Manufacturing 
and Mining enterprises, and wide divergences exist between different 
enterprises in this sector, nevertheless it provides a general idea of 
the relative importance of the issues discussed by the councils. Table 
1 represents the revised summary of Wachtell's study.
Comparison of the relative importance of the issues on the agenda 
of the councils in the two years shows a fairly stable pattern. It is 
strikingly clear that the issues dealing with workers' direct interests
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Table 1 - Relative Impgr^ance _pf Various Issues Discussed ,byL.the Workers * 
Councils in the Manufacturing and Mining Enterprises in 1962 and 1964
Issues
Relative Importance of Each Item on the
*Agenda as Percentage of Total Items
1962 1964
. **Income related issues 35 33
Labour productivity 22 27
Investment 14 14
Sales 13 12
Work of management 
board and director 10 8
Cooperation with other . *** firms 6 6
Notes: * The total number of issues discussed in 1962 and 1964 were
96004 and 77569 respectively
** Includes income distribution, fringe benefits such as 
vacation, housing, etc., and vocational training 
*** Includes contracts for intermediate goods, mergers, 
affiliation, amalgamation, etc.
Source: H.M. Wachtel! (1973), p. 68.
(income distribution, fringe benefits and vocational training) comprise 
more than one third of the total issues discussed in the meetings 
while long term issues such as investment and other topics which do not 
directly affect the workers' present situation, though crucial to their 
long term interests, drew less attention.*
1 Lavigne's study of the Eastern European economies also confirms 
these conclusions. She maintains that the interest in those 
functions of workers' management related to "the drafting of plans 
and production programmes and the approval of balance sheet" are 
far less than the interest in matters such as "distribution of 
bonuses or the allocation of residential construction." See 
M. Lavigne (1974), p. 91. Similarly Wiles argues that except for 
income distribution and conditions of work (with which the council 
members are well acquainted), other issues are handled by the 
experts and the councils deal with them only formally. See 
P.J.D. Wiles (1977), pp. 545-546.
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It is essential to note that varying interests towards different 
issues facing the enterprise is not limited to members of the councils 
alone but engulfs the whole of the work force. In fact the scope of 
the work of the workers' council is directly connected and follows the 
interests shown by the work force. A study by Vladimir Arzensek dealt 
with the interest shown by the employees of several enterprises towards 
participation in decision making over various issues. The results of 
this study, as reported by Rus, are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 - Percentage of Employees Wishing to Participate in Decision
Making About Various Issues
Issues Percentage
Discipline and labour relations 59
Conditions of Working Place 50
Distribution of personal income 48
Hiring and firing in Organizational Units 40
Investment 28
Public Rfelations 21
Marketing 17
Source: V. Rus (1970), p. 159.
The advocates of the system of self-management have always maintained 
that given the chance and right conditions, the workers of each establish­
ment would become interested in participating in decision making over 
issues related to their work place. Some years of experience proved that 
this assumption was essentially baseless. Then, as we pointed out a ¡.little 
earlier, the attention was concentrated on the development of the system of 
multi-level management as a means of involving a larger number of employees 
in the decision making process. What seems to have been ignored is the 
'form' of organization of the production process. An ordinary workers' job 
is not to look after the affairs of the enterprise as a whole. That is 
left to the managers. This division of duties, accompanied by the expanding 
gap between the managerial functions and non-managerial functions, has 
resulted in a division of issues and problems into those which are of direct 
relevance to workers and those which are of direct relevance to managers 
(see Table 2).
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The 'fonn’of the organization is not neutral and if the employees are to 
participate actively in the affairs of the enterprise, then new forms of 
organization and management must be found. So far, little attention has 
been paid to this and very few experiments have been undertaken.
The answer to our question regarding the scope of the work of the 
councils is now clear in general terms. Although, legally, the councils 
are empowered to decide on everything relating to the enterprise, in 
actual practice their authority is limited to a few areas only. This 
is partly because they have delegated some of their power to other 
management organs and partly because they, and most of their clients, are 
familiar with only a minor section of the affairs of the enterprise and 
do not possess the knowledge of the working of the whole enterprise 
which is necessary for efficient decision making. As a result, they 
mostly approve and give considération to the proposals submitted by 
the higher management organs; they pay greater attention to subjects 
relating to the short term interests of the workers and less attention 
to matters which are of great significance for the whole of the enterprise. 
In short, they assume the role of a 'general supervisory' body overseeing 
the enterprise affairs butiwith very limited ability to alter its 
functioning. This, of course, poses another major question as to how 
other decisions (such as investment, technical change, obtaining bank 
loans, etc.) are made. To this question we shall turn shortly. For 
the moment, we should return to the discussion of the organs of 
management other than the workers' council.
B. The Management Board
The management board is the operational representative or the 
executive organ of the workers’ council. Its members, ranging from 5 
to 11, are elected by the workers' council from among the council members
or other employees of the enterprise.* The director of the enterprise
Î Before 1966 the size of management board ranged from 3 to 11. For 
these and other details see H.M. Wachtell (1973), p. 69; S. Pejovich 
(1966), p. 28; and I. Paj (1971), p. 40.
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is the ex-officio member of the board. The election for board member­
ship takes place annually and each member can only be elected to office 
for two successive one-year terms. At each annual election only up to 
one third of board members can be re-elected to their posts. The 
length of office of the board members, like that of the council members, 
is also of significance. The majority of board members remain in office 
for only one year which is too short a period to accumulate information 
and build up knowledge of the various affairs of the enterprise. In 
contrast to the short terra of office of board members, the director's 
term of office is at least four years (in great majority of cases much 
longer) and the members of specialist management committees enjoy a kind 
of permanent position in their advisory role. Here is a basic built-in 
inequality in terms of opportunities to learn about and competence to 
decide on the different aspects of the enterprise operation. The 
majority of board members, like the majority of council members, are not 
in a position to question the correctness or otherwise of the proposals 
put to them by the technical and administrative specialists.
The law has defined the functions and responsibilities of the 
management board so as to make it into a body serving the workers' 
council in an executive capacity. According to Article 49 of the Basic 
Law of Enterprises, the management board must supervise the work of the 
director, prepare the drafts of the statement of accounts, production 
targets and other proposals and submit them for approval to the workers' 
council. As with the workers' council, the law only determines the 
formal position of the management board vis-a-vis the council and other 
management organs. In practice, however, the board has much greater 
power and, in fact, formulates the enterprise policy on most of the 
issues. The information on the actual functions of some specific 
enterprises illustrates this point. At Rade Kon^ar Enterprise, the 
management board prepares annual and monthly production plan, draws up
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proposals for internal organization, prepares discussions for the 
council meetings, and approves expenditures of the enterprise.* At 
Energoinvest Enterprise, the board submits proposals on all matters 
under its jurisdiction to the workers’ council, follows up the enforce­
ment of the decisions approved by the council and selects the members
2of specialist commissions to help the director.
In large enterprises where the decentralization of management has
been extended to lower levels down to the work units, these units may
(as in the case of Energoinvest) have their own management board with
3functions similar to those of the enterprise management board.
We now turn to the question of the scope of and limit to the power 
of the management board. The board is the organ which puts proposals 
regarding output, investment, income distribution, etc., to the workers' 
council and implements the decisions taken by the council. The exact 
formulation of these policies requires expert knowledge and detailed 
information which are possessed by only a small group of employees. In 
addition to the expert commissions (to be discussed shortly) which are 
wholly made up of specialists, the management boards must also include 
some of these specialists in order to function efficiently. In fact, 
the specialists with high professional qualifications are more heavily 
represented on the boards than on the councils. As far as the decisions 
made by the board are concerned, we should emphasize that the boards, 
like the councils, consist of some worker members without much knowledge 
of the overall functioning of the enterprise, and some non-worker 
members whose expertise and knowledge guarantees them a real position of 
power. We shall come to the important question, ’who is represented on 
the management boards?' shortly. It suffices at this stage to point out 
that, legally, three quarters of the board members are required to be
1 M. Bogosavljevid and M. Pesakovic (1959), p. 36.
2 E. Blum (1970), p. 31.
3 Ibid., p. 32 and I Paj (1971), p. 43.
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production workers (like that of the councils), the aim of the 
requirement being that the views and interests of the direct producers 
be well represented on the boards. In practice, however, not only has 
this requirement not been observed, but also the proportion of 
production workers has continuously fallen over time. As we shall 
show later, in Table 3, the proportion of production workers on the 
management board fell from 68 per cent in 1960 to 47 per cent in 1972.
The concentration of specialist technical and managerial staff becomes 
greater as we move upward along the management network, from the 
workers' council to management board. This also supports our previous 
assertion that the more important questions are usually settled by the 
management board and not by the council whose members are not competent 
to question the decisions of the board. The remarks of an enterprise 
director puts this in a nutshell. She told Kolaja that "during her 
several years of work, there had not been one instance of the workers’ 
council rejecting any of the points the management considered important."* 
In a later section of this chapter we shall return to the question of 
representation again. But now, we must continue with our discussion of 
other organs of management.
C. The Director
The director is the chief executive officer of the enterprise 
responsible for the day to day operation and affairs of the organization. 
According to the Act on Employment Relationships, the director is "the 
highest disciplinary authority while work is in progress." This 
provision seems to be somewhat at odds with the legal pronouncements on 
the all-embracing nature of the power of the workers' councils.
Formally, the workers' council is the source of authority; and the 
director is appointed and his duties determined by the council. In
1 J. Kolaja (1961), p .  28.
2 Sluzbeni List» December.25, 1957.
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practice, however, the legislature has deemed it necessary to lay down 
the responsibilities of the director. Article 53 of the Basic Law of 
Enterprises defines the functions and responsibilities of the director 
which include: supervising and conducting the operation of the firm; 
executing the decisions of the council and board; seeing to the lawfulness 
of the decisions of the council and board; representing the enterprise in 
relation to other socio-economic organisations and bodies; and discharging 
specific functions prescribed in the enterprise Statute.* This article 
of the law is an implicit acceptance of the fact that the workers' 
councils do not have an unlimited and automatic authority over all matters 
related to their enterprise and that other discretionary measures are 
needed to strengthen their position vis-a-vis other management organs.
The exact role of the director varies from one enterprise to
another. At Energoinvest Enterprise, for example, the director has the
right to "issue orders" to other executives on various matters; arbitrate
between production units; intervene directly if a unit has not fulfilled
its obligations; annul the decisions of the executive if they are at odds
with enterprise provisions; make proposals for a unit to be placed under
receivership (for a limited period such as one year), etc. Moreover,
as a result of the developments following the Amendment XV to the
Constitution, in some enterprises, certain other executive functions,
usually in the domain of the work of the councils or boards have been
entrusted to the directors and the managers (supervisors) of the economic
3units and work teams.
What is the relationship between the director and other management 
organs? Formally, the director is an officer selected and appointed by 
the workers’ council, an ex-officio member of the management board, a 
hired executive who is to oversee the operation of enterprise as 1
1 Federal Chamber of Economy (1967). o 46
2 E. Blum (1970), pp. 32-34.
3 1. Paj (1971), p. 48.
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2 E. Blum (1970), pp. 32-34.
3 I. Paj (1971), p. 48.
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enterprise responded to a question about his relationship with the 
workers' council in the following way:
There is a Yugoslav statute stating that the director must 
keep the law and is responsible for enterprise performance. 
In fact, in some contracts only the director is responsible. 
Directors can make many many decisions. Their power is 
very very large. The councils approvet not make, policy 
but in this way do participate in the making.*
Similarly, another director (this one from a technical consulting
enterprise) remarked that "ideas come from educated people; the director
2uses these ideas and the workers' council accepts or approves them."
The procedure for the appointment of the director is also of great 
significance in terms of understanding the unequal position of the 
managerial and supervisory staff, on the one hand, and the rest on the 
other. The director is chosen by a selection committee of the workers'
council on the basis of his skill, professional qualifications and
experience. Applications for the job are invited through advertisement
in the press. The director's term of office is four years with the
3possibility of unlimited reappointment. 1
1 Ibid., p. 28.
2 Ibid-t p. 27. The same conclusion was obtained by Zupanov and 
Tannenbaum when they interviewed a group of 56 workers attending Mose 
Pijade Workers University of Zagreb. According to the interviewees 
the director was the most influential of the three organs of management, 
and that in great majority of the cases of conflicts, he was the most 
important arbitrator. J. Zupanov and A.S. Tannenbaum (1968), p. 100.
3 The procedure for the appointment of the directors has undergone many 
changes. In the initial stages of decentralization, the directors 
were appointed by the state authorities and formally had a strong 
voice in the decisions made by the enterprises. From 1953, the 
workers' councils were authorized to take part in the proceedings for 
selection of directors. Appointments were studied by a selection 
committee, one third of whose members were chosen by the workers' 
council and the remaining two thirds by the local commune. After 
1957 the proportion of members of selection committee appointed by 
the workers' councils increased to one half with the proviso that the 
final decision of the committee had to be ratified by the authorities 
in the local commune. The 1965 reforms extended the competence of 
the enterprises in this area as well so that the final ratification 
of the selection committee's decision is made by the workers' council 
and not by the commune authorities. The 1968 Constitutional 
Amendments legally sanctioned the full autonomy of all enterprises 
(with the exception of banks, newspapers and insurance companies) to 
appoint their own directors. See L. Sire (1975), p. 109; H.M.
Wachtell (1973), pp. 70-71; J. Dirlan and J. Plummer (1973), p. 26.
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The much longer term of office of the director compared with that
of the council and board members is an important element in the
consolidation of the influence of the director vis-a-vis the other
management organs. While the terms of office of the councillor varies
between two to four years and that of the board members between one and
two years, the director retains his post for at least four years and in
the great majority of cases for a longer period. Dirlam and Plummer
maintain that despite the legal requirement for open competition in the
appointment of directors, the vast majority of them are re-elected at
least once with no serious competition while others keep their job
until retirement. They also point out that "it is not difficult for
the selection committee to describe the qualifications for directorship
in such terms that only the incumbant can satisfy them."* The
information available on the appointment of directors in 1968, 1970 and
1972 support this assertion. In 1968, 89 per cent of the vacant posts
2went to previous incumbant directors, while in 1970 and in 1972 this 
ratio was 83 per cent for the economic organizations. The wide 
difference between the terms of office of the directors on the one hand 
and the board and council members on the other, automatically strengthens 
the advantageous position of the director because he is able to 
accumulate the knowledge of the different aspects of enterprise operation.
p. The Supplementary Organs
The Basic Law of Enterprises provides for standing commissions such 
as the commissions on production, investment, financial operations, 
personnel, etc., to be set up by the workers' councils or other management 
bodies. Most of these commissions have the character of 'expert 
committees' since they are made up of the technical/administrative experts
1 J. Dirlan and J. Plummer (1973). p. 26.
2 SZS (1969), p. 24, cited in Ibid,t pp. 30-31.
3 SGJ (1972), p. 70 and SGJ (1973), p. 80.
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who advise various organs of management. As a result of the implement­
ation of the Constitutional Amendment XV, even some of the functions of 
the management organs in some enterprises have been relegated to these 
supplementary organs.^" The role of these commissions, particularly in 
large scale enterprises where the complexities of the over-all work 
requires heavier reliance on the experts, is of utmost importance since 
most councils’ decisions are formulated and suggested by them and 
these suggestions, being "expert suggestions", are hardly turned down.
The comment of a director of a banking enterprise reflects the 
importance of the role of the expert committees:
The workers' council elects experts because they realize 
that this must be a 'professional' group. Corrmittees often 
have a greater role than the workers’ council.
They can made some decisions apart from the council.
The unskilled worker occasionally presents problems for 
workers' self-management.1 2
The expert committees are the core of the influential managerial 
strata in the Yugoslav firms. Their influence stems from the technical 
and administrative expertise which is instrumental in the formulation 
and implementation of the short and long term policies of the enterprises.
To sum up the discussion on the organs of management, it is 
important to emphasize the difference between the formal and the actual 
scope of work of each of these bodies. The workers' council formally 
represents various strata of the work force and enjoys full power in 
determining the policies of the enterprise in the interest of its 
constituency. In reality, however, neither of these aspects are quite 
correct. The councils do not represent all strata of the work force (as 
we shall discuss in greater detail shortly) and do not determine the firm’s 
policy autonomously since they are not competent enough to do so. The 
management board, which relies more heavily on specialist members and 
expert commissions, is much more influential in determining enterprise
1 I.Paj (1971), pp. 48-49.
2 R.P. Farkas (1975), pp. 27-28.
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policies. The decentralization of the management system down to the
lowest level of the organization has meant that the knowledge of
ordinary workers (and those of their ranks on the council) about the
whole organization and its overall problems is limited. In arriving
at policies and solutions, therefore, there has been increasing
reliance on the small strata of the technical and managerial staff.
Although studies of the actual conditions in which this reliance is
manifestly expressed are very rare, nevertheless the few available case
studies corraborate our conclusions. Kolaja's study of the minutes of
the meetings of the council and the board of two enterprises in 1957 and
1958 clearly show that only around 8 per cent of decisions adopted by
the councils and 16 per cent of decisions adopted by the boards were at
the initiative of the ordinary worker-members. The rest of the
decisions were put forward and discussed at the initiative of the
director and other management personnel who were not full members of
these bodies.^- More recently, in the late sixties and early seventies,
Obradovic has studied the situation in 24 enterprises for a period of
three years and shown that a similar pattern has continued to exist.
He maintains that top management dominated the whole decision making
arena by: making most of the proposals; having most of their proposals
accepted; speaking at the meetings of the workers* councils more than
2other groups and for longer period of time.
Under such circumstances, the provisions dealing with the rotation 
of the council and board members (aimed at preventing the domination of 
a small group of management personnel being perpetuated) and minimum 
representation of the production workers - even if properly observed - 
become largely pointless. The organizational set up is such that the 
technical/managerial strata possess the knowledge and ability which are 
required for decision making while others do not. Neither has the 12
1 J. Kolaja (1961), pp. 28-29. Also see J. Kolaja (1965).
2 J. Obradovic (1975), p. 30.
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situation changed for the better in the last two decades. Although it 
is estimated that some 7-8 per cent of the industrial work force have 
been taking part in self-management organs annually, the degree of active 
participation, in the sense of being able to influence decisions, has 
been basically limited to issues which are of direct concern to the 
workers and with which the worker-members of the councils and boards are 
familiar. Otherwise, as Dirlam and Plummer point out, even in the most 
developed areas like Slovenia, "most members of the workers’ councils 
would hesitate to question the technically complex proposals of the 
management."^
Having emphasized the considerable difference between the formal set­
up and the actual behaviour of a Yugoslav enterprise, it is interesting 
to compare, very briefly, the management system of these enterprises with 
that of the modern corporations. This comparison is very useful as the 
pattern of management and behaviour of the modern corporation are fairly 
well developed in the Western economic literature. There are, of course, 
considerable legal differences between the two. The Yugoslav firm is 
entrusted to its workers who are the principal beneficiaries of the 
successes, and victims of the failures, of the firm not because they 
personally own the firm but because they work for it. The capitalist 
corporation on the other hand, has a group of shareholders who receive 
a portion of profits by virtue of their possession of shares. Here, 
the labour force is not generally entitled to participate in the 
management of the firm, and even when it is (as is the case in some 
Swedish and German firms and as proposed by the Bullock Committee), it 
has to share the managerial power with the representatives of the 
shareholders. In the Yugoslav case, non-worker beneficiaries are 
absent and the employees of the firm do not share their legal right to 
manage the firm with anybody. Despite these and other differences, 1
1 J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), p. 246.
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there are strong similarities in the actual working of the management 
system of the two types of organizations. The workers of a Yugoslav 
enterprise do not in fact own the firm just as the shareholders of a 
corporation do not own the corporation. Both groups elect their 
representatives to oversee the work of their firm. The workers' council 
is very much similar to the company board of directors. They are both 
formally empowered to make various decisions about such issues as 
development programmes, production plans, investment policy, the 
supervision of the executives, etc. Both bodies delegate most of their 
authority to other organs of management, and to the technical/ 
administrative personnel who formulate the policies of the firms and 
direct their operation. Both bodies, in the main, move into the back­
ground of the active management scene and take a general supervisory 
role as bodies which are legally necessary to approve the proposals and 
submissions of the executives. The board of directors is legally 
expected to act as the watchdog over the managers. In practice, however, 
this is not so.1 In the Yugoslav enterprise too, the workers' council 
and management board are supposed to supervise the director and other 
management personnel but their ability is greatly constrained by the 
insufficient information, experience and expertise which they have.
In both types of organizations the managers play the central role. In 
short, despite formal differences, the Yugoslav enterprise and the
capitalist corporation are very similar in terms of the form of
2organization and management hierarchy.
The mechanism by which the technical/administrative strata come to 
hold such decisive power in enterprises of a formally different set-up 12
1 R. Marris (1964), p. 14.
2 The workers' council in Yugoslavia, of course, exerts a moderating 
influence on the managerial tendencies of the executives at least 
on such issues as income distribution and conditions of work. As 
a result, the executives are more involved and concerned with these 
questions than their counterparts in capitalist corporations.
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remains to be explained. In the next section we shall trace the 
development of this strata over time and the reasons for their 
increasing influence.
II. The Technical/Administrative Strata 
and Decision Making Power
Although the Yugoslav enterprises are governed by their employees 
the control and decision making powers are not evenly distributed among 
them all. In legal terms, it appears that the control and power should 
be distributed in relation to the numerical strength of different strata 
of the work force. This is only fair if various groups and therefore 
various interests are to be democratically represented. This criterion 
has found its legal expression in the provision that at least 75 per 
cent of the council and board members should be from the ranks of 
production workers. But in fact, while production workers constitute 
the great majority of the work force (nearly 80 per cent), they do not 
wield a similar proportion of the decision making power. The first 
question to be posed is: to what extent do the organs of management 
represent various strata of the employees? We shall use the information 
available on the qualification and skill grading of the members of 
councils and boards to show that the white collar workers, particularly 
the technical/managerial strata, have been increasingly over-represented 
on the workers' councils and management boards, and the extent of the 
over-representation has increased over time. This bias in representation 
also implies that the interests of one group receive more attention than 
those of other groups. This, potentially, has an important significance 
in the area of industrial and labour relations.
The over-representation of particular groups of employees on the 
organs of management, however, does not lead us directly to the location 
of power,control and influence within the organs of management. In the 
second part of this section therefore, we shall investigate the question
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of the distribution of influence between various sections of the board 
and council members. Here we find that the technical/administrative 
strata of the employees - whether they are members of boards and councils 
or merely members of advisory committees - wield a greater degree of 
influence than the representatives of the non-managerial groups. Like 
the bias in representation of various strata on the managerial organs, 
the bias in distribution of power and influence between various sections 
of the work force will also have serious implications for labour relations. 
These implications will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
A. Who is Represented on the Organs of Management? The Professional 
Qualification of the Members of the Workers' Councils and Management 
Boards.
In legal terms, under the system of workers' management, all 
employees have an equal say in the working of the enterprises. It is 
meant to be an exercise in democracy at the place of work. In practice*. 
however, the workers are not a homogeneous entity. On the contrary, the 
category of "workers” is composed of most hetrogeneous elements ranging 
from unskilled labourers just come from the countryside at one end of 
the spectrum to the highly educated management personnel at the other end. 
These different groups do not have similar interests and objectives, 
and their representation on the organs of management' has not been based 
on some democratic criterion such as their numerical strength in the 
work force. Table 3, next page, summarizes the qualification of the 
members of management organs in the period of 1956-72.* Before 
discussing Table 3, a few explanatory remarks are called for. 
i The employees of the Yugoslav enterprises are divided into two 
distinct categories (well familiar to the Western economists):
1 Table 3 is compiled for the enterprises which are engaged in economic 
activities, and which employ more than 30 people. According to the 
Yugoslav methodology, the social product originates in the economic 
activities alone and the value of the services produced in the non­
economic activities (health, education, social services, etc.) is 
not computed as part of the social product.
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Table 3. Qualification Structure of the Members of Workers' Councils
and Management boards of Enterprises in Economic Activities (in Percentages)*
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members of the workers' councils
1956 24 3 12 9 76 14 38 14 10
1958 24 3 11 10 76 13 39 15 9
(21)** (3) (8) (10) (79) (7) (31) (20) (21)
1960 23 4 12 7 77 15 41 13 8
(20) (4) (8) (8) (81) (8) (30) (20) (23)
1965 26 6 13 7 74 17 38 11 8
(17) + (2) (7) (8) (83) (6) (28) (16) (33)
1968 30 8 15 7 70 17 35 10 8
(20) (4) (9) (7) (80) (8) (30) (16) (26)
1970 32 10 16 6 68 17 34 9 8
(20) (4) (10) (6) (80) (8) (30) (15) (27)
1972 35 12 17 6 65 17 32 9 7
(21) (4) (11) (6) (79) (8) (31) (16) (24)
members of theï managernent boards
1956 34 8 16 10 66 18 33 9 6
1958 34 8 15 11 67 16 36 10 5 .
1960 32 11 15 6 68 19 35 9 5
1965 38 14 17 7 62 20 31 7 4
1968 45 18 19 7 55 19 27 5 4
1970 56 27 23 6 43 18 20 3 2
1972 53 25 22 6 47 18 23 4 2
Notes: * The data for management organs and total labour force relates to econo­
mic activities alone. Organizations in non-economic activities and 
their employment are excluded. Also enterprises employing less than 
30 workers are excluded. The figures may not add up to 100 due to 
rounding.
** The data in brackets () show the qualification structure of the 
total work force in the economic activities.
+ This line shows the situation on 30 December 1964
Sources: The data.on management organs: SGJ(1960), p.29; SJG(1970), p,67; and 
SGJ(1973), p.77. The data on total work force: SGJC1959), p.94- 
SGJ(196i), p.88; SGJ(1966), p.99; SGJ(1970), p .91; SGJ(1972)! p’,93; 
and SGJ(1974), p.121.
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workers and staff, or, blue and white collar workers. The 
qualifications of the former group are always described in terms of 
their 'skill' while the latter group is always described in terms 
of their educational or professional attainment, 
ii Alongside the qualifications of the members of the management organs, 
the qualification structure of the labour force employed in the 
economic activities is also provided in Table 3. This data helps 
us to assess the representativeness of various organs of 
management.^
Table 3 clearly shows that in the period under consideration the 
representation of the white collar workers, particularly those with high 
education and professional training, has considerably increased. The 
representation of the employees with "high ând higher levels of professional 
ceducation" increased from 3 per cent of the membership of the councils 
in 1956 to 12 per cent in 1972. The change in the representation of 
this group on the management board was even more pronounced. During the 
same period their representation increased from 8 per cent to 25 
per cent of the members of the boards. The above proportions should be 
contrasted with the proportion of the labour force which belongs to 
this category - 2 to 4 per cent.
The employees with secondary school or equivalent level of 
professional education also enjoyed increasing representation on both 
organs of management, though the increase was not as sharp as that of the 
previous category. The proportion of seats occupied by this group 
increased from 12 ' per cent of the council and 16 per cent of the 
board: seats in 1956 to 17 per cent and 22 per cent in 1972 
respectively. During this period, the proportion of labour force 
belonging to this category had increased^only from 7 to 11. per cent.
1 The Statistical Yearbook series provide information regarding the 
qualification of the members of the management organs only up to 
1972. This is the reason why Table 3 shows the situation from 
1956 to 1972 and not later.
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The representation of the "highly skilled" category of workers on 
both councils and boards increased marginally; from 13 to 17 per 
cent on the councils and from ¿6 per cent to is per cent on the 
boards.
The representation of all other categories of workers (skilled, semi­
skilled and unskilled) and the lower grade administrative staff on both 
organs (particularly on the boards) fell sharply during this period.
The case of the unskilled workers should receive special attention.
While they constituted between 21 to 3 per cent of the work force in the 
years of observation, they occupied only between 7 to jpper cent of the 
council seats and 2 to 6 per cent of the board seats.
The results of Table 3, so far discussed, clearly show that the 
technical/administrative strata of the work force has been represented 
on the organs of management (particularly on the more influential manage­
ment boards) more heavily than their numerical strength in the work force 
warrants. The three to four-fold increase in their representation on 
the management bodies has been, over the past twenty years, at the 
expense of other groups, in particular the unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers.
Table 3 also shows the trend of the representation of the white and 
blue collar workers on the management organs - the subject of the legal 
provisions regarding the representation of white collar workers up to a 
maximum of 25 per cent. The second and sixth columns of the table show 
the position of the two groups. In terms of the workers’ councils, 
the legal provision seems to have been observed until 1960. In fact ' 
from 1956 to 1960, it seems that there has been a marginal tendency for 
the blue collar workers to increase their representation on the councils 
while the representation of the white collar workers slightly fell.
But after 1960, the trend reversed and notably since the 1965 reforms 
the non-production workers have constituted increasingly larger than 25
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per cent of the membership of the councils.
In the case of management boards the legal provisions have been 
ignored altogether tight from the beginning. The proportion of white 
collar workers on the boards which was around 30 per cent in late fifties, 
has passed the 50 per cent mark in the early seventies.*- Within the 
white collar workers, the trend of representation indicates a continuing 
shift in favour of the upper strata of this group. The apparent dis­
regard for this legal provision is not surprising. The law may require
such representation but it would be difficult to enforce it as it is 
inevitable that in many places the form of the organization and the 
concentration of decision making power, control, information and 
knowledge of the firm lead to over-representation of the technical/
administrative strata. The managerial group will be in a dominant
2position irrespective of the law.
1 Wachtell had put this non-observance of the legal provisions to many 
Yugoslavs and inquired about the reason for such a pattern, but as 
he points out, "no adequate explanation was offered for this... in 
fact, the data were typically greeted with disbelief." See
H.M. Wachtell (1973), p. 73.
2 At this point, we should mention something regarding the underestim-» 
ation of the representation of the white collar workers as shown in 
Table 3. One source of bias is the way the work force is categorized 
according to its qualifications at different points in time.
According to Benson in the industrialization drive of the fifties and 
early sixties, which led to a great shortage of the professional and 
administrative staff, a large number of the then skilled workers - 
particularly the veteran communists - moved into these positions 
without formally having the qualifications needed for these posts.
For statistical purposes, however, they continued to be classified as 
production workers while in fact they do not perform such duties as 
production workers anymore. A survey of the directors retiring in 
1966 showed that 54 per cent of them had former manual skill classif­
ications. (Statisticki Bilten, no. 447, Tables 3-2 and 4-2). If 
this is taken into account, the proportion of actual production 
workers on management organs will be even less than what appears.
The second source of bias, to which we have referred, is the 
involvement of the members of expert commissions in the work of the 
councils and boards. While all members of these commissions do not 
sit on the organs of management as full members, they do participate 
in discussions, explanations, justification of various policy 
proposals, etc. In this sense, their real participation is more than 
that reflectedin the statistical evidence. Benson estimates that if 
the participation of the specialists is taken into account, the role 
of manual workers in decision making process will be even further 
reduced so that they will be in a minority of one to two. See 
L. Benson (1974), pp. 262-263.
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What is the explanation for the increasing representation of the 
upper echelon of the white collar workers on the organs of management?
The process of economic development in Yugoslavia has been accompanied, 
especially since the 1965 reforms, by a process of mergers and integration 
of small and medium size enterprises and development of large size firms. 
The division of labour is much more complex and detailed in the larger 
organizations and specialists play a more significant role in the 
operation of these firms. For efficient functioning, the medium and 
large firms heavily rely on expert service of engineers, accountants, 
financial specialists, lawyers, administrative managers, etc. The 
technical/administrative strata is composed of the employees who are 
instrumental in performing such expert tasks as: time and motion studies 
for determination of wage schedule and skill categories; the preparation 
of balance sheets; prôfitability analysis of various projects; demand 
forcasting; market analysis; the introduction of new techniques and 
equipment or modification of the existing ones; the preparation of 
investment programmes and expansion plans; cost and benefit analysis;and 
assessment of the benefits or losses of mergers and amalgamations. These 
tasks, by virtue of their technical complexity, are generally outside the 
competence of the mass of the less educated and less skilled production 
workers. It is exactly the possession of these abilities that puts the 
managerial group over and above the direct producers. As enterprises 
expand and the nature of their activities become more complex, the 
position of the managerial group will be further consolidated.
Although as Table 3 shows, the technical/administrative strata are 
still in a numerical minority on the management organs, the amount of 
information at their disposal which is necessary for the efficient 
operation of the firm, more than compensates for their numerical weakness. 
They are a minority without whom large enterprises cannot function. 
Obradovic's study of 24 enterprises in a three year period shows clearly
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how the small managerial group becomes instrumental to the functioning
of enterprises. He demonstrates that although the college educated
personnel constituted only 6 per cent of the employees of the 24
enterprises studied by him, nevertheless they managed to dominate the
meetings of the workers' councils more than any other group of employees.
They comprised over 50 per cent of the number of participants in discussions,
spoke for over 60 per cent of the discussion time, provided over 65 per
cent of the explanations to various proposals and queries, and offered
over 50 per cent of the proposals to the councils.^-
The important point is that the division of labour and separation of
managers and workers (and the separation of managerial and performance
tasks) have created a situation in which the workers are incapable of
exercising effective control or influence. Inequality of information and
knowledge gradually creates a managerial group independent of the workers'
council who can hardly be held responsible and whose authority can hardly
be questioned by the workers. The councils can become mere auxiliary
committees and, due to insufficient knowledge and information, pass
2decisions which may later prove detrimental to workers' interests.
1 J. Obradovic (1975), p. 40. The activities analysed by Obradovic 
included: marketing, inter-organizational matters, finance and control, 
and wages.
2 Two concrete examples to elaborate this point are provided by Benson. 
First, in Partizanka Knitwear factory in Belgrade, the bonus-penalty 
scheme was agreed upon and decided by the workers' council at the time 
of formulating the rules of the enterprise. It was later found 
that, legally, the white collar workers were exempted from penalties 
arising from the fall of production below the targets whereas the blue 
collar workers were not.
Second, a similar situation arose in Zenica Steelworks of Bosnia where 
income amassed was insufficient to cover the planned wage fund arranged 
on a point system and the employees had to receive less than the 
planned incomes. But it just happened that the management received 
their full planned income according to the full point system while the 
remainder of the available funds was distributed among the workers at 
a lower value per point. In both situations the workers protested 
quickly. But, upon detail investigation, it was found that the 
regulations of the enterprise - passed by the councils - contained a 
clause exempting the management from experiencing an unplanned fall in 
income of the type discussed, and it was concluded that the management 
had acted according to the exact rules of the enterprises. Clearly 
the council members had not paid enough attention and care at the time 
of approving the rules. See L. Benson (1974), pp. 260-1.
Clearly if this situation continues, we should expect to see the
management organs of large enterprises completely taken over by the
technical/administrative strata,* and the concept of self-management
2shelved altogether - at least in practice if not in theory. As the 
economy develops and becomes more complex and as the decision making 
procedure becomes more and more technical and intricate, the scope of 
the functioning of the workers' management becomesSincreasingly limited,
1 Already such indications are coming from the large firms. But
Table 3, being the aggregate indicator, conceals the cases where the 
technical/administrative strata are much more heavily represented. 
Table 4, below,.represents the qualifications of the members of the 
Central Workers' Council at Energoinvest Enterprise, introduced 
earlier in this chapter.
Table 4 - Qualification of the Members of the Central Workers'
Council at Energoinvest
Qualification
Percentage distribution
1969
Staff with higher education 27 42
Staff with secondary education 37 22
Highly skilled workers 10 23
Skilled workers 20 12
Others 6 1
Source: E. Blum (1970), p. 31.
The over-representation of the technical/administrative strata at 
this enterprise is clear enough. The lower strata of the work 
force, constituting the majority of the workers, have no represent­
ation on the council at all, let alone be under-represented.
2 In some recent writings, there has indeed been some new suggestions 
casting doubt on the applicability of the self-management system to 
large modern enterprises. Obradovic, for example, has suggested 
that the modern technologically advanced automated enterprises do 
not necessarily benefit from the application of self-management and 
the workers of such enterprises do not derive extra job satisfaction 
because of the formal right of participation in the management 
organs. J. Obradovic (1970), p. 167. (This study was based on 
the investigation of 537 workers with similar qualifications in 
enterprises with different types of technology - automated, mechanized 
and handicrafts). It was later argued by Rus that the study of less 
advanced industries and handicraft organizations show that the 
"existing forms of self-management are more suitable to this kind of 
organization." V. Rus (1970), p. 152.
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and in reality, there would be less and less room for the application of 
self-management. The level of required expertise is so high in some 
large modern enterprises that even foreign management consultants have 
been employed to help the existing management. In such cases there is 
actually nothing that a blue collar member of the workers' council can 
contribute.*
The representatives of the employees other than the technical/ 
administrative strata are in clear majority on the workers' councils and 
hold at least half of the seats on the management boards. The question 
which has to be answered now is: how the decision making power is 
distributed between various members of the councils and boards. The 
answer to this question is the subject of our next section.
B. The Distribution of Decision Making Power within the Organs of 
Management
The settling of the question of distribution of influence and
decision making power between the various strata of the work force
represented on the management organs is an important step in determining
who is in control of the Yugoslav enterprises. In the early days of
the introduction of self-management it was suggested that the management
organs, particularly the councils and boards, were mere formalities and
the real power was vested in the hands of the party branch and trade
2union committee of the enterprises. But as the decentralization on 
economic and political fronts proceeded and gradually engulfed the whole 
of the society, the position of the proponents of the above view was 
considerably weakened. With the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(LCY) spearheading the economic reforms (specially those in the sixties) 
whose final objective was to put the economic criteria - profitability,
1 The import of foreign expertise began in 1970 when Energoinvest 
Enterprise adopted a new organizational structure worked out by the 
consultant firm of McKinsey & Co. Inc. of New York to adjust the 
enterprise's production plan to market demand. See East Europe,
Vol. 19, no. 2, Nov. 1970, p. 62.
2 G.W. Hoffman and F.W. Neal (1962), p. 238.
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efficiency, expertise, etc. - before the political considerations, the 
period of decline in the influence of the party organization at the 
place of work began. Few observers, would, today, hold that the party 
or the trade union branch can dominate the decision making process in 
the Yugoslav firms. In fact the available evidence shows that with the 
development of self-management, the influence of the League of 
Communists has been gradually replaced by that of the technical/ 
administrative strata such as the management personnel, supervisors and 
heads of economic units - a group that has its basis in the particular 
form of management in the Jugoslav enterprises. The process is also 
one of replacement of political factors and considerations by economic 
expertise.
The bulk of the studies relating to the distribution of influence 
among various groups has been undertaken by sociologists and suffer to 
some degree from lack of precision in the measurement of 'influence'. 
Nevertheless, as the sole source of information on the actual conditions 
of a large number of enterprises in different sectors and regions, they 
provide us with at least a general understanding of the distribution of 
decision making power.* Here we shall discuss some of the findings of
these studies.
Zupanov and Tannenbaum's study of the attitudes of 56 workers
attending Mose Pijade Workers' University of Zagreb is of major
'significance. These workers had come from different enterprises
(ranging in size from 200 to 10000 members) and a wide range of
industries, and as such their attitudes reflected the situation in a
2much larger context than the university itself. The result of this
1 One should be sceptical about assigning cardinal numbers to such 
concepts as degree of influence which are expressed only subjectively. 
For our purpose, however, the ordinal expression of the ranking of the 
power of various groups is sufficient. This qualification should be 
kept in mind in the following discussion.
2 The sample also included a large proportion of formally educated, 
highly skilled and socially conscious workers. About 89% of them were 
members of the LCY (compared with 10.6% membership of workers in the 
Zagreb district) and 39% of them were first“line supervisors.J. Zupanov and A.S. Tannenbaum (1968), p. 95.
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survey was that the interviewees, on average, believed that the top 
echelon of management exerts the highest influence on the decisions of 
the workers' councils, followed by the heads of economic units, 
supervisors and the white collar workers.^-
In another study, the attitudes of the employees of four Slovenian 
enterprises towards management heirarchy were investigated by Kavcic,
Rus and Tannenbaum. The general membership (who were not members of 
the management organs) believed that the managers and heads of economic 
units exerted the highest influence in the decision making process, 
followed by management boards and workers' councils exerting some 
influence and the semi-skilled and unskilled workers exerting very little 
influence. The attitudes of the members of the workers' councils of 
these four enterprises towards the extent of influence of various groups 
on the decisions of the councils were very similar to those of the 
students of the Workers' University discussed in the previous paragraph.
KavcicT, Rus and Tannenbaum also asked the employees of the four 
enterprises to express their views about the desired distribution of 
influence between various groups and found that the greatest discrepancy 
between the actual and desired degree of influence occurred for workers, 
and the smallest for managers. This means that the managerial strata 
weilding the highest influence in decision making has little to be 
dissatisfied with while the production workers who are least influential 
in the decision making process are, as would be expected, most 
dissatisfied.^
There are many other studies which corroborate the conclusions of
1 Ibid., p. 99.
2 B. Kavci^, V. Rus and A.S. Tannenbaum (1971), pp. 79-80.
3 Ibid., p. 84.
4 Ibid., p. 81.
5 This finding is also supported by a more comprehensive (and long term) 
study by J. Obradovicf (1975), pp. 38 and 43. These views can also 
be supplemented by another empirical study showing that the unskilled 
workers have been five times more "discontented (with their position 
as workers) than the highly skilled ones." B. Horvat (1969), p. 163.
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the above authors and a detailed survey is not necessary here. The 
summary of a few of these studies, however, will suffice to make the 
point that the hierarchy of power and influence is organized in favour 
of the technical/administrative strata. Table 5, next pag$, fehows this 
summary provided by Rus. It should be re-emphasized that although the 
cardinal ordering of the degree of influence may be regarded as a 
questionable, and even dubious, practice, that is not our prime 
concern at this point at all. We are more interested in the ordinal 
arrangement of various groups in the hierarchy of influence and power.
The executives are considered by all observers to be the most 
influencial group in the decision making process. With minor 
differences, their position is followed by the professional staff and 
heads of economic units. Management boards and workers' councils are 
the next, though not widely apart from each other.
Although each of these studies are particular in respect to the 
nature and size of the sample and the field of activity, nevertheless, 
they have one important aspect in common. The managers are the most 
influential, and the workers the least, in the running of the enterprises. 
Following the top executives are the middle-level management strata such 
as the heads of economic units. This strata owes its influence to the 
development of management decentralization in the sixties when organs 
of self-management were set up in the lower level subdivisions and work 
units of large enterprises. It was thought that by organizing such 
units along the self-management lines, the ordinary workers would be 
able to exercise more control and influence on the organs of management 
and enjoy a stronger sense of participation and involvement. But in 
practice, things did not work out in this manner. The process of 
concentration of power in the hands of managerial group that had been 
developing in the older organs of management, started to develop in the 
new "economic units" as well. Quickly, a managerial strata consisting
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Table 5 - Index of Influence of Various Groups on Decision Making Process 
in the Yugoslav Enterprises: A Summary
* Highest degree of influence is designated by 1 and lower degrees 
by numbers greater than 1.
Source: V. Rus (1970), p. 149.
of supervisors, heads of economic units and technical/administrative
staff in the units emerged. In larger enterprises where numerous
economic units were formed, a new stratum of influence - the "middle
management" as Rus calls them - was created. On the basis of several
investigations in 1964 and 1968, Rus concluded that:
Predictably, the subsidiary councils fell under the control 
of middle management, just as the central councils had fallen 
under the control of top management. As a result, middle
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management's power was increased and communications between 
workers and top management was blocked. The enterprises 
involved became both less dynamic and less democratic.
An important aspect of Table 5, investigated by Rus (1968) and
Kav&ic (1968) only, is the influence of the party branch within the
power structure of the enterprises. Remembering that in the fifties
the party branch was seen as the most powerful force guiding the
enterprise decisions, these two studies show the great decline in the
position of the party branch. This is a significant development in
the context of the development of socialism in Yugoslavia and needs
further elaboration. In all socialist countries, the party branch
in each enterprise is seen as the vehicle of promotion and popularization
of the party policy on all matters, particularly the development policy,
and therefore the tasks facing each enterprise in fulfilling such
policies. At each establishment the major decisions regarding production,
PricinS» expansion, working conditions, etc., are made in accordance with
the requirements of the general orientation of the economy as enunciated
by the communist party and expounded in a central plan. The party
branch is to supervise and ensure that the affairs of each enterprise
conforms with the general requirements of the plan. The appointment of
managers and top executives in each establishment by higher authorities
is seen as one way of making certain that the party line is kept in
command of the management decisions. The management personnel are, to
varying degrees, responsible to the party branch. If the political
control of the enterprise is deemed essential, and if the central plan
is to be implemented, then the branch will become a necessary apparatus.
In short, the party branch is instrumental in maintaining and developing
the communist party's political position in the enterprise. In
Yugoslavia, however, the advent of decentralized market socialism meant
that self-management is to be the prime form of organization, and 1
1 V. Rus (1970), p. 152.
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economic progress is to be the target of social production. Anything 
that interfered with economic growth or with self-management had to be 
swept aside. While the central planning had been scrapped long ago, 
the existence of political influence at decision making level was also 
seen in contradiction to self-management, and therefore as something 
that had to be done away with. One of the objectives of economic 
reforms was to "depoliticise" the decision making process in various 
fields so that economic criteria could be operative. Political 
control was seen as opposing economic optimization, as disregarding 
managerial capacity in favour of political reliability and as wasting 
enterprise resources on unnecessary and superfluous expenditure on 
party organizations.* Depoliticisation was seen as a necessary aspect
# Oof development of the society based on self-management. The effect was 
a general decline in the role of party branch as an organization.
Although most managerial group members belong to the LCY, it is their 
professional position that brings them power and influence. To express 
this differently, although some of the members of the enterprise party 
committee are influential individuals, it is not their party branch that 
determines or directs the enterprise policy but the technical/ 
administrative strata, most of whom are also party members. This is a 
significant difference between the Yugoslav enterprises and those in 
other’socialist1 countries.
So far we have discussed the higher representation of the technical 
and administrative employees than that warranted by their numerical 
strength in the work force, and the inequality of knowledge, information 
and professional expertise that forms the basis of such over-representat­
ion. We have also shown that the decision making power and control 
over the affairs of the enterprise is not evenly distributed between the 
members of the boards and councils. The technical/administrative strata 12
1 R. Bicanic (1966), p. 636.
2 Ibid.% p. 643.
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by virtue of their expertise, weild the greatest degree of power and 
control at the expense of other strata and other institutions such as 
the League of Communists or the trade unions. Despite legal provisions 
putting this professional elite under the supervision of the workers’ 
council, in reality they have achieved a large degree of independence from 
the council and have subjected the enterprise to their own control and 
dominance. This shows yet another significant similarity between the 
actual organization of a Yugoslav enterprise and the capitalist 
corporation.* These developments do not leave the workers and their 
relationship to the managers, as well as to the working conditions, 
unaffected. In the following section we shall discuss the consequences 
of these developments in the area of labour relations.
III. The Development of Self-Management and its Effects 
on Industrial and Labour Relations
The consequences of the present distribution of influence and 
relations of domination developing within the self-management system 
are rather familiar, though unexpected: indifferent attitudes towards 
the organization; absenteeism; a high rate of turnover and an increasing 
rate of work stoppage. (The pattern of reaction of the Yugoslav 
workers also closely resembles that of the workers in the capitalist 1
1 Zupanov and Tannenbaum, for example, clearly maintain that the 
efficient Yugoslav enterprises have a control hierarchy similar to 
that of the capitalist corporations, and that essentially there is 
nothing objectionablevabout this, i.e., this is a 'natural' state 
of affairs. See J. Zupanov and A.S. Tannenbaum (1968), pp.
105-107. On the necessity of avoiding interference in the rank 
order hierarchy of efficient enterprises, see S. Mozina, J.
Jarovesk and A.S. Tannenbaum (1970), pp. 60-68. It is necessary to 
remark that such position is not shared by the people who are 
subjected to this form of hierarchical organization. While one of 
their respondents, a worker-student at the Workers University of 
Zagreb, was discussing her disapproval of the control and influence 
distribution within the enterprises, she was told the managerial 
group in American firms have even a higher degree of control than 
do the Yugoslav managers and that the American workers can exercise 
much less control than their Yugoslav counterparts. Her reply: "Yes 
but there's a difference. It was that way once here too, but we ' 
didn't claim to be a socialist society." J. Zupanov and A.S. 
Tannenbaum (1968).
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economies.) The tendencies developing within the system have serious 
implications which go far beyond the enterprise and extend to the whole 
society. That is, the polarization and differentiation at the 
enterprise level gradually extend to stratification within the society, 
and the relations of domination will be reproduced at all levels of 
society thus threatening the foundation of self-management.* In this 
section we shall briefly discuss the growing reaction of the work force 
to the existing power structure and distribution of influence in 
enterprises.
The inability of the ordinary workers to influence the decision 
making machinery and to control and supervise the management personnel, 
is directly responsible for the lukewarm attitude and indifference shown
towards the enterprise affairs which have been reported for nearly one
2and a half decades. This inability, aggravated in the course of the 
development of large scale industries, produces frustration for the 
majority of the workers which manifests itself in permanent hot beds of 
conflict. The differentiation of the enterprise work force into a 
hierarchical structure predictably meets some form of resistance which 
is sharper and more wide-spread amongst the group which is most numerous 
but least influential: the blue collar workers. The higher rate of 
absentees for semi-skilled and unskilled workers than for other groups 
is only one manifestation of the indifference and frustration of the 
workers."*
In addition to absence from work, the high rate of labour turnover 
is another reflection of the serious contradictions in Yugoslav
1 We shall not go into the social implications of development of an 
influential and powerful professional elite at the level of 
enterprises. Construction of socialism, to which the Yugoslavs 
still formally professes, can be seriously affected by these 
implications. See C. Bettelheim (1974), pp. 78 and 94; P. Sweezy 
and C. Bettelheim (1971), p. 29; and P. Sweezy (1974) and (1975).
2 J. Kolaja (1961), p. 31; Work Organization of Jesenice Ironworks' 
(1971), pp. 106 and 112.
3 See B. Horvat (1969), p. 163.
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enterprises. The workers are more realistic towards their situation, 
they go from one firm to another if it provides them with a higher level 
of earning, if it is more promising than "their" existing firm, and do 
not feel any sorrow over leaving the enterprise in which they have 
ploughed back a part of their earnings as investment. In going from 
one firm to another, the Yugoslav workers also behave like their 
colleagues in the capitalist countries.*
Attitudes of indifference towards the place of work and frustrations 
created by the unequal relations of control, Benson maintains, have been
chiefly responsible for the high rate of defection of manual workers
. 2from the party ranks too, specially after the 1965 reforms.
The final, and perhaps the most important, manifestation of the 
dissatisfaction of the workers with the existing state of affairs is 
their resort to slow-downs and strikes. Along with the implementation 
of decentralization reforms, particularly in the mid-sixties, the 
dissatisfaction and aggravation of the workers have also deepened. By 
the mid-sixties, according to one report, strikes were being organized 
at a rate of over two hundred per year while the unofficial figures put 
the number considerably higher. Another report prepared by the Central
1 The comment by a trade union chief to Zupanov is very illuminating. 
Discussing the problems faced by the workers who turn to the Zagreb 
trade union advice bureau for help, he pointed out:
"There is reason to suspect that a large number of aggrieved 
people do not come (to the bureau) because they are afraid of 
dismissal and the carryings-on which would ensue. Even those 
who do come ask us to keep it a secret from their management 
A worker can be got at not only if he constantly receives 
the most difficult jobs...but also when he gets the easiest, or 
none at all. In that case, if he asks my advice, I tell him 
straight out> get out of that place as fast as you can."
In Croatia, in 1970 alone, the number of workers seeking advice from 
this bureau was about 40 to 50 thousands which comprises 5 to 6 per 
cent of the work force of the republic, and needless to say, these 
are the ones who managed to come forward with their complaints.
See L. Benson (1974), p. 272.
2 Loc. eit.
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Council of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia in 1967 put the number of work
stoppages since 1957 at about 1500. The manual workers have been
either the sole participants or at least the backbone of the strikes
and, among them, the skilled workers have taken up the leadership.
The management personnel are usually at the forefront of the opponents
of strikes and this often brings them into direct confrontation with
the workers - sometimes involving even physical violence. About
eighty per cent of the strikes were organized in the three most
developed and industrialized republics.*
The strikes and other labour problems shed new light on the actual
functioning of the Yugoslav firms. Essentially, if the workers of an
enterprise did in fact manage their enterprise and determine their
conditions of work according to their own interest, there would hardly
be any room for work stoppage. The official reaction to strikes can be
summed up by comments such as "the absurdity of quitting work"^,
3
"against whom" , "the result of the low level of socialist consciousness 
of some sections of the working class..." and ..."narrow, self-centred 
and partial interests."^ These comments are, of course, based on the 
formalistic and legal assumption that the workers own and manage their 
firms. The reality, however, is that the workers do not control the 
firms and are not able to influence the decision making process to any 
reasonable degree. The strikes then become, quite understandably, the 
major means of achieving their aims.
What are the causes of the strikes? As one may expect, the most 
immediate cause is related to the workers' earnings. As it was put 
officially, "the causes of conflicts which culminate in work stoppages 
stem from inadequate income distribution in work collectives."^ The
1 L. Benson (1974), pp. 262-264; Jan Vanek (1972) pp. 62-63; and East 
Europe, Vol. 18, no. 7, July 1969, p. 38.
2 Borba, 16 October 1966.
3 Privredni Pregled, 3 November 1967.
4 Presidency of the LCY (1970), p. 106.
5 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
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working conditions and imposition of unreasonable rules have also been 
cited as the causes of strikes. The economic demands of the workers are 
of course, the reflection of a much wider problem - lack of control in 
the face of pronouncements to the contrary. The workers are expected 
to take their disputes and complaints to the very bodies (councils and 
boards) which have made decisions contrary to the workers’ wishes and 
interests. While management can initiate disciplinary action against 
the workers, the opposite is not true. Therefore they are left with 
one choice, work stoppage. As a report by the LCY Presidency admitted, 
the workers have found themselves in an institutional set-up where 
exercise of control has become difficult, if not impossible, and that 
they are estranged from the "decision making regarding the conditions 
and proceeds of their work."^
The fact that the incidence of strikes and other labour conflicts 
have grown alongside the development of self-management is not accidental. 
The development of self-management has not been along its "ideal" path 
of leaving the workers to manage the factories and increasing the workers’ 
control'of the enterprises. On the contrary, in the Yugoslav context 
and alongside other institutions, self-management has led to polarization 
and differentiation within enterprises and growth of a professional 
elite who has concentrated control and the decision making power in its 
own hands. The objectives of this elite and its interests are not 
unanimous with those of the workers. In the face of unequal of power, 
within the enterprise structure, work stoppage becomes the final weapon 
in the workers’ hands. The solution provided by the LCY leadership seems 
to be the exact opposite of what is needed. They instruct the LCY
Loc. cit. As Kavcic has pointed out:
By striking, workers often achieve what they were unable to 
bring about by normal means. Sometimes workers get negative 
answers to their demands, with the explanation that these demands 
cannot be met because circumstances do not permit it But 
when they down tools everything is immediately put right 
money is found for rises, a way is found of transferring’the 
foreman who doesn't fitand so on... The strike is show? uo »s an 
efficient way of resolving problems, at least as far as th! 
workers are concerned. See B. Kavcic (1966),pp. 203-204.
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members to do more ideological and political work amongst the working 
class in order to mobilize more support for the self-management system.*
One can only forecast a worsening of the situation.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have traced the development of self-management 
within the Yugoslav firms and its effect on the organizational structure 
of the "worker-managed" enterprises since its conception in early fifties. 
The system of enterprise management and the inter-relations of the organs 
of management have been discussed from two points of view: as they are 
defined by legal provisions and as they function in actual practice. The 
actual as well as the formal operation of the decision making apparatus 
have also been discussed. Throughout the chapter we have tried to 
distinguish the actual operation of the system of self-management and its 
various aspects from the way the laws perceive them. We have pointed out 
many areas in which the two aspects - legal and actual - are quite 
different.
The following points are the brief summary of the main conclusions 
of this chapter:
1. The workers' council, as the elected body of the representatives of 
the work force, is legally empowered to manage the enterprise and to decide 
on major issues facing it (output, pricing, investment, income distribution, 
mergers, etc.) Formally, its authority in the enterprise has no limit.
In practice, however, the council is of much less significance and the 
director and the management board - the bodies formally subordinated to 
it - have assumed a much greater power. The council has turned to a body 
with "general supervisory" role whose function is to "approve" the 
proposals worked out by the management personnel. The participation of 
the council members in decision making - formally all embracing - has 
been limited to matters of only direct and short run interests of the
1 Presidency of the LCY (1970), p.108
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workers such as income distribution, working conditions, discipline, etc. 
In short the workers’ councils have been gradually pushed to the back­
ground of decision making apparatus, while other members of the 
management personnel have moved to the forefront.
2. The self-management system was aimed at guaranteeing the 
dominance of the production workers and creating conditions in which the 
workers could participate in decision making in order to safeguard the 
position of the working class and its interests. The system also 
regarded it necessary to prevent the emergence of an elite social strata 
of administrators, engineers, technicians and other experts. Therefore 
the provisions were "legislated" to require that 75 per cent of the 
members of management organs be from among the production workers.
In practice, however, this provision was increasingly ignored so that 
by early seventies the production workers’ representation on the boards 
and councils had declined to 47 and 65 per cent respectively.*
Instead of production workers, the council and board seats were 
increasingly occupied by the employees with higher levels of education 
and professional qualifications. These employees, together with members 
of the advisory expert committees, gradually became the most powerful 
group in the actual running of the enterprises. Available evidence 
dealing with the distribution of influence within various groups in the 
enterprise work force unquestionably puts this group at the helm of the 
firm’s power structure, followed by the management personnel at the 
lower level units of the enterprise such as heads of the economic units 
and supervisors.
3. Despite formal pronouncements, the domination of the Yugoslav 
enterprises by a small professional elite should not be surprising or 
unexpected. The division of labour in modern industry implies 
separation of tasks between various sections of the work force. 1
1 No data was released on the qualification of the members of the 
management organs after 1972 and therefore the developments in the
î K r ï Î î î i S S d ” 4 Vety C U ar' th0Ugh ° ne may the trend to
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Technical design, financial requirements, sales and marketing, technical 
and economic coordination, as well as many other tasks, need to be 
handled by specialists. The ordinary worker is mainly concerned with 
his own particular piece of operation and his own shop floor (work unit).
It is the task of the specialists to be concerned with broader sections 
of the establishment, possibly the whole organization. As the 
enterprise develops, the tasks handled by experts increase in number as 
well as in importance while the part played by the semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers become narrower and less important. The experts prepare 
the short and long term plans for the enterprise operation; prepare 
proposals and analyses for submission to the councils; explain, discuss 
and answer questions related to these proposals and steam-roll the 
submissions through the councils to obtain their mark of approval. The 
technical and administrative abilities of the leading group, their 
greater knowledge of the firm as a whole and their access to information 
put them over and above the workers. Their education and professional 
training bring them power, control and prestige.1 Gradually, not only 
their share of the representation on the management organs has increased, 
but their position of influence has also been consolidated.
The decentralization of the management system within the 
enterprise in the sixties aimed, formally, at involving the work force 
in the decision making process and arousing their interest in the 
affairs of the organization, but, in practice, led among other things to 
the development of the middle strata of management: the heads of economic 
units and supervisors. The decentralization also required improvements 
in the task of coordination within the enterprises. This aspect of the 
enterprise operation had to some extent suffered as a result of the
Many Yugoslav writers freely admit that education and professionalism 
are the basis of stratification in their society today. See for 
example, B. Horvat (1969), pp. 147-150. The social stratification 
of course, has its roots in stratification at the place of work. *
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devolution of authority to lower divisions.
5. The development of self-management also had the effect of 
stripping the League of Communists from the influential position it 
occupied until at least early sixties. The economic reforms of the 
mid-sixties and the explicit policy of "de-politicization" of the 
decision making apparatus resulted in the increased influence of that 
section of the enterprise work force which could promote economic 
growth, expansion, high productivity, higher income, etc. This was 
the technical/administrative strata who, in the previous period, was 
bound by political considerations of varying strength. Here, the 
Yugoslav enterprises differ significantly from enterprises in the 
socialist countries where the party branch is the leading organ of every 
enterprise.
6. The system of labour relations developing under self-management, 
one would expect, should be significantly different from that under 
modern capitalism. This is because, formally, in the absence of private 
property in means of production and proclamation of the dominance of 
workers, the conflicts of interest typical of capitalist economies 
should vanish. But, in reality, it is not the workers who dominate
the firms but a professional elite, and the firm is not run in accordance 
with the wishes of its workers but with that of its managers.
Indifference and apathy are the first signs of declining workers' control 
and influence. A lukewarm attitude towards the enterprise is reflected 
in the absence of active participation in the work of organs of 
management such as assemblies. When the workers' interests are not 
represented at the level of management and their aspirations are not 
taken into consideration, the reaction is more than simple apathy. 
Absenteesm, high rate of turnover and even work stoppage and strikes can 
be the outcome. As the enterprises expand, the separation of tasks 
(widens) and the influence of the managerial elite expands, the labour 
problems which are the outcome of the conflicts between workers and
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management, would also intensify. Self-management cannot be compatible 
with such a system of labour relations. In fact the present state of 
affairs (separation of tasks, increasing influence of the management 
strata, intensification of conflict) would only threaten and undermine 
whatever is left of the self-management "system".
7. Despite formal differences in terms of ownership and property 
rights, the Yugoslav firms are very similar in actual management 
structure and behaviour to the capitalist corporations. The 
composition of management organs, the distribution of influence between 
various strata of the employees and the hierarchical nature of the 
management net-work with the director and the professional administrators 
at the top of the heirarchy and the less influential unskilled workers 
at the bottom, brings out most clearly the similarity of the two types of 
organization. If an enterprise is run on the basis of self-management 
as it formally stands, then one would expect the management system and 
the interrelationships within the enterprise to be fundamentally 
different from the familiar pattern of modern corporations - and this is 
à particularly important reason for the study of the Yugoslav-type 
enterprises. But the virtual absence of study and experimentation with 
new and different forms of organization means that the Yugoslavs are, 
in the main, using the concept of self-management for the old forms of 
organization and management.
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Chapter Two
The Enterprise Objectives and Behaviour
Having discussed the organizational structure of the Yugoslav 
enterprises and the distribution of decision making power among its 
various strata, we now turn to the discussion of the objectives which 
are most likely to be pursued by these enterprises. In the previous 
chapter we compared the Yugoslav enterprise with the capitalist firm in 
terms of their organizational set up and structure of influence. Here 
too, we shall make use of a similar comparison to investigate how 
different are the objectives pursued by these two types of firms. Most 
of the previous work on this subject suffers from an over emphasis on 
the formulation of a single maximand or objective which the Yugoslav firm 
supposedly follows in all circumstances. In the real world, however, 
firms (capitalist, labour-managed or else) operate within a number of 
restrictions and constraints and do not necessarily pursue a single 
objective such as the maximization of profit, sales, etc. Furthermore, 
different firms follow different objectives depending on their size, the 
line of activity and the state of competition in the industry. The 
static profit maximizing traditional theory of the firm too, suffered 
from similar shortcomings (among others) until attention was paid to 
other objectives and constraints facing the firm.1 The theory of 
labour-managed firm-which is said to explain the behaviour of the 
Yugoslav firms better than other theories - is also open to similar 
criticism. In other words the environment within which these firms 
operate and the variables that affect their operation must be analyzed. 
These variables include on the one hand the objectives followed by the 
firms and, on the other, the constraints imposed on them. This chapter,
1 Of considerable importance are, among others i-h«
E. Penrose (1959); W. J. Baumol (1959) and (1962Vf°U °wxtl? w°rks: 
and J. H. Williamson (1966) ' * U962)* Marris (1964)
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therefore, has a two-fold purpose. First, we shall briefly review the 
theories of the labour-managed firm and analyze their shortcomings in 
the context of the Yugoslav experience. Then we go on to discuss the
multiplicity of objectives pursued by the Yugoslav firms and the con­
straints to which they are subject.
I. Theories of the Labour-Managed Firm
The theories of the labour-managed firm have been formulated in a 
variety of ways since 1956. Despite their large numbers, most of the 
models can be regarded as the variations and extensions of Ward's model, 
formulated in 1956.^ While Ward's original contribution dealt with a 
single variable input/single output firm assumed to be operating under 
highly simplistic conditions, the latter theories have extended his 
analysis to more complex situations and have relaxed the restrictive 
assumptions. In this section we shall choose two major variants of 
the theory of labour-managed firms for review and will refer to the rest 
only in relation to specific issues. The choice of the two variants has 
been based on the nature of the objective functions used. To the first 
category belong all theories which in one way or other attempt to 
maximize the income per head of the enterprise work force. While the 
second variant includes those theories which, as in neoclassical theory, 
take the maximization of profit to be the objective of the firm.
A. Income per Head Maximizing Model
Most of the work on the theory of the labour-managed firm (those 
of Ward, Vanek and Meade) deals with firms that decide on the quantities 
on inputs and output with the express aim of maximizing the per capita
Some of the most important works in this regard are: B. Ward (1956), 
(1958) and (1967); E. Domar (1966), Jaroslav Vanek (1969), (1970), 
(1971), (1973) and (1975); B. Horvat (1964) and (1967); D. Milenkovitch 
(1971); J. E. Meade (1972) and (1974); A. B. Atkinson (1973);
S. C. Maurice and C. E. Ferguson (1972); J. R. Shackleton (1976); and S. Pejovich (1976).
- 72 -
income of their work force. The models are usually based on the fol-
, • • 1lowing assumptions:
i Ownership - The assets of each enterprise are held in trust or
in the possession of its employees (but not as their property) who
collectively draw benefits from their utilization. This partnership
right or the right of ’usufruct', to use Vanek’s expression, is non-
2transferable and is dissolved when a worker leaves the enterprise.
ii. Labour-Management - The employees of each enterprise, in addition 
to their ordinary obligations as workers, participate in the management 
of the enterprise. As managers, employees decide on price, output, 
technology and investment. All members of the enterprise have an equal 
voice in the managerial decision making process which is based on the 
democratic rule of the majority.
iii . The Residual Nature of Labour Remuneration - As a result of the 
particular ownership structure and the relegation of managerial/entre- 
preneurial functions to the work force, labour becomes the 'hiring
3factor' - to use Meade's expression - and is remunerated residually.
The employees of a labour-managed firm do not receive wages or salaries, 
but share the residual earnings of the firm (revenue less costs of 
production) on an equitable basis, i.e., equal shares for equal work.^ 
iv Competition - The markets for non-labour inputs as well as for 
products are competitive and in the case of labour there is full freedom 
of employment.
1 B. Ward (1958), pp. 566-571; (1967), p. 183; and Jaroslav Vanek (1970),
pp. 1-2.
2 Ward assumed that the means of production belonged to the State which 
would in turn charge the enterprises a fixed tax (or interest) for 
their use.
3 J. E. Meade (1972), p. 416.
4 Ward introduced a contractual wage, guaranteed by the State, that 
employees would receive as part of their earnings irrespective of the 
performance of their enterprise. The total income of each worker would 
then be equal to the sum of his contractual wage and per capita profit. 
In Domar's analysis of the Soviet collective farm, the notion of con­
tractual wage was absent as in Vanek's formulation. E. Domar (1966)
p. 736.
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v Labour Supply - Each enterprise faces a completely elastic labour 
supply curve.
vi Objectives - The operation of the firm is assumed to be subordinated 
to the 'foaterial self-interests"* of the employees which are best served 
by the maximization of income per worker. This maximization is supposed 
to represent the "natural and rational concern of the participants" in 
the partnership.
In the simple one output/one variable input case, the model in 
formal terms is as follows. Assuming a well behaved production function 
of the type:
y - f(x) (y' > 0 and y" < 0)
where x represents labour and y the quantity of output in physical 
terms. The net income per worker w will be:
w p.f(x) - C x (1)
with p and C representing the product price and the total non-labour costs 
respectively. The level of employment and thus the level of output is 
determined by maximizing w, i.e,,
dw _ p.f*(x).x ~ [p.f(x) ~ Cl
dx 2 " °x
pf'(x).x -Cpf(x) - c]* 0
( 2 )
pf*(x) - Pf(x) ~ C
r  X
Substitution from Equation (1) will result in:
v  -  p f ' (x ) (3 )
Equation (3) means (as one knows from the simple neoclassical theory of 
the firm) that the employment of labour should continue up to the point 
where its remuneration equals the value of its marginal product, i.e., 
the marginal principle that guides the profit maximizing firm under
1 B. Ward (1958), p. 566.
2 Jaroslav Vanek (1970), p. 2.
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capitalism is also applicable to the labour-managed firm.
It must be pointed out here that the income per head maximization 
procedure is not completely new in economic literature. It bears a 
striking resemblance to the capitalist firm, with capital as its 
variable input, which attempts to maximize the rate of profit (and not 
total profit).
The maximization procedure is represented graphically in Figure 1, 
below. Here, using Equation (1), we have drawn two curves of r *
' Figure 1 ~ Income per Head Maximization Model
Cand c ■ —  representing the per head revenue and per head costs res- 
pectively. (Curve ^  should be ignored for the moment.) The vertical 
distance between the two curves shows the net income per head of the 
work force.
Maximization of income per worker would lead to the employment of 
x* number of workers at which level the r and c curves have equal slopes, 
in other words, when the marginal per-worker revenue and marginal
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per worker costs are equal.
What distinguishes this model from that of the competitive firm is 
its comparative static properties, which also create some of the 
difficulties in the model and point to its shortcomings. For example 
a rise in the price of output as a result of, say, an increase in 
market demand should, under competitive conditions, lead to an increase 
in output and thus employment. The situation in this model, however, 
is different. According to equation (2), p[f(x) - x.f'(x)] ■ C, and, 
considering that f(x) is concave by assumption, the term in brackets 
is an increasing function of x. An increase in p will, therefore, 
require a fall in the term in brackets, meaning a fall in the level 
of x, and consequently in the level of y.
Graphically, a change in the price level results in an upward move­
ment of the revenue per man curve r to a new position like r^ (see 
Figure 1). The old equilibrium will not prevail any longer as the 
slope of r^ at x* is greater than that of r and that of c. The new 
equilibrium will be reached at a point somewhere to the left of x*
(a point like x^). Thus, an increase in the output price leads to a 
reduction in the level of employment and output. It also implies a 
downward sloping supply curve for the firm and thus instability in the 
market. A downward sloping supply curve is somewhat unusual in 
economic theory, specially in the case of commodities. The backward 
bending labour supply curve which arises in situations where the supply 
of labour is affected by income/leisure choice is the most widely known 
case in literature.
Similarly unorthodox results are obtained if parameters affecting 
the cost per worker, such as the rate of interest, are altered. A 
rise in the fixed costs leads to an upward shift of the c curve (in 
Figure 1) and a new equilibrium will be attained somewhere to the 
right of x*. In other words, an increase in the fixed costs will lead
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to an increase in output and employment. The addition of new features 
such as multiple inputs, imperfect market conditions, different labour 
supply condition, etc., to this model can make it more general, 
realistic and complex. It is doubtful, however, if the problem of 
instability of the market can be satisfactorily overcome.
In the two variable input case, the equilibrium conditions con­
sistent with income per head maximization would be:
y ■ f(x^, x^) (x^ is labour and x^ non-labour input)
(C is the total cost and R the fixed cost)
w
P2x2 + R
p£(Xl, X2  ^ P2X2 R (w is the income per head of work force)
dw
dh
dw
d*2
pf1.x1 - (py - p2x2 - R)
~2
X1
<Pf2 ' p2)xl
0, and pf^ py " P2X2 ~ R w
• 0 and pf2 “ p2
(4)
(5)
The maximization conditions are very similar to those of the competitive 
firm. The remuneration of each factor will, in the optimum situation, 
be equal to the value of its marginal physical product (Equations 4 and 
5). However, the model still remains unstable. For instance, an 
increase in the product price will lead, most probably, to a fall in 
output and employment. This can ba demonstrated by differentiating 
the income per head w ■ (p.y - C)/x^ with respect to p, arriving at:
dw * (y/x^)dp or = AP dp (6)
with AP representing the average product of labour. From the equilibrium 
condition (Equation 4) we have w ■ p.f^ whose total differential 
would be:
dw * f^.dp + p.f^jdx^ (7)
Using equations 6 and 7, we arrive at the following relation:
dXj
dp"
AP - f.
Pf11 ( 8)
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The effect of a price change on the level of employment (x^) will 
basically depend on the relation between AP and and the sign of f . 
Using a conventional diagram showing the average and marginal product 
curves, Figure 2, we can see that three possibilities may arise.
i Up to the employment level of Lj, AP < f^ and f > 0, therefore
dxi ,of equation (8/ will be negative.
ii After the employment level of L, AP > ^  and f < 0, leading again
dxi
iii Between and L, however, AP < f^ and f < 0, resulting in 
dxi
> 0.dp '
The situation is not always straight forward and the firm can easily run 
into an area where dx^/dp is negative and a downward sloping supply
curve prevails. In fact, as Maurice and Ferguson argue, within the 
economically meaningful range of operation (i.e., in the area where 
AP > fj), the supply curve will always be downward sloping.1
Domar attempted to solve the instability problem by introducing an 
upward sloping labour supply function into the model. Although this is
1 S. Maurice and C. E. Ferguson (1972), p. 23. Jaroslav Vanek, in his 
formulation of two (and three) variable inputs models of the labour- 
managed firm, has essentially accepted the rather unorthodox behaviour 
of the income per head maximizing firms. For firms producing more 
than one product, he maintains that an increase in the price of one 
good would create substitution effects that wholly or partially com­
pensate the fall in output of the single product case. As a result, 
the multi-product labour managed firm will always suffer from a low 
. supply elasticity weakness. Jaroslav Vanek (1970), p. 46 and pp. 55-56
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an interesting theoretical innovation which actually eliminates the 
problem of downward sloping commodity supply curve, it has very limited 
practical value in the analysis of the Yugoslav firms.
This situation is shown in 
Figure 3. The w curve is the 
vertical difference between the 
r and c curves of Figure 1. If 
the labour supply curve S is int­
roduced as a constraint, then the 
maximization of income per head 
will no longer lead to employment 
of x*, but to x^, where labour 
supply conditions are satisfied.
Here, an increase in the product price will lead to an upward shift of 
the w curve to w' resulting in an increase in the employment level from 
to x^. This situation is more like a monopsony (with little mobility 
and little addition to the labour force) than a normal competitive 
market. This assumption was also picked up by Horvat, though his model 
was quite different from income per head maximization.* Under ordinary 
conditions, an enterprise in Yugoslavia - or any other market economy - 
hardly faces this type of supply curve for the great majority of labour 
categories. In fact most Yugoslav enterprises operate in an environ­
ment characterized by excess supply of labour (high unemployment) and 
thus large scale migration to Western Europe. This together with the 
absence of monopsonist trade union organizations, implies that the 
Yugoslav enterprises are very unlikely to face . an upward sloping 
supply curve.
Before discussing the shortcomings of the income per head maximizing 
model, we shall discuss the second major variant of the theories of the 1
1 B. Horvat (1967), part 3.
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labour-managed firm.
B. The Profit Maximizing Model
There are several versions of this variant of the theory of the 
labour-managed firm, though Horvat's formulation is more comprehensive
than others.1 23 The main assunptions of this model as formulated by
„ _ 2 Horvat are:
i 'Kolektiv' Entrepreneurship - The community of the enterprise 
employees, as a collective, perform the entrepreneurial functions (as 
formulated by Schumpeter and Knight) and receive part of the profit as 
return. (This is on a par with the income sharing assumption of the 
previous model.)
,ii. Employment Criteria - The labourers will constantly look to
alternative occupations and move to better paid jobs as the opportunity
arises. The enterprises will, in turn, employ the last worker only
if his contribution to output (marginal product) is greater (or at least
equal) than his total remuneration (wage plus profit share).
iii Efficiency - Decentralization of decision making and the operation
of a market coupled with the incentive system guarantees the efficient
operation of the firm according to neoclassical criteria.
These assumptions, with the exception of the last one, are similar
to those underlying the previous model. What distinguishes Horvat's
contribution is the introduction of a new behavioural characteristic
for the labour-managed enterprise based on the actual practice of the
Yugoslav firms. With almost complete autonomy over their income dist- 
3ribution system, Horvat maintained that, in practice, the enterprises
1 M. Todorovic (1963); V. Rakic (1964); and B. Horvat (1964) and (1967).
2 B. Horvat (1964), chapter*3 specially pp. 114-121.
3 Since the early sixties, the decisions on the distribution of enter­
prise income (i.e., decisions about the division of revenue between 
personal income and enterprise funds) have been relegated to the 
enterprise management. The details will be discussed in Chapter Three.
- 80 -
do not pay their workers residually. The decision on labour remuneration 
is made in advance on the basis of estimates of relevant production data. 
These estimates are, of course, regularly reviewed and the earnings 
adjusted accordingly. The change in the level of earnings in each 
planning period is also planned and decided upon by the workers' council 
in advance. In this way, workers' incomes are not determined ex-post 
(after the production period is over) but ex-ante. Although a final 
adjustment may have to be made at the end of the period, this would only 
concern a small proportion of total incomes. Having fixed labour 
remuneration in advance, Horvat argued, the firms will employ labour up 
to the point where the marginal productivity in value terms equals the 
planned income.*
As a result of this postulate the objective function of the firm
will change drastically. Having made the decision on labour remuneration,
these payments will be treated as part of the production costs and the
objective of the enterprise would be to maximize the residual of net
earnings over costs. This will make the operation of the Yugoslav firm
quite similar to that of the neoclassical firm, or as Horvat put it,
"if this behavioural rule is used in the analysis, the results are again
2the same as in the traditional theory of the firm."
Although no single method of income distribution is used by all 12
1 B. Horvat (1967), part 4, specially p. 28 and (1971a), p. 105.
2 B. Horvat (1971a), p. 105. Of the other versions of profit-maximizing 
model two are worth noting. Discussion of factor usage led Rakic to 
the conclusion that the labour-managed Yugoslav firm will "use the 
resources at its disposal in the same way as any individual business­
man who...wishes to achieve with available capital the best possible 
results in business." This is because under the Yugoslav conditions, 
"the laws of commodity production and the market mechanism act in the 
same way as in an economy based on private ownership of the means of 
production." See V. Rakic (196A), p. 130. Mijalko Todorovic, one
of the leading economist-politician of Yugoslavia,was even more 
explicit when he wrote that in the worker-managed firm "it is also in 
the interest of the workers that profit be at a maximum." See 
M. Todorovic (1963), p. 46.
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Yugoslav enterprises, the legislations in the early seventies regarding 
social agreement on incomes give further credence to Horvat's behavioural 
postulate. These arrangements are designed to ensure that the dist­
ribution of net earnings of the firms are agreed upon, iji advance, by 
the work force of each enterprise as well as by various producers' 
associations and the republican governments.* 
The importance of the profit maximiz ing variant of the theories 
of the labour-managed firm is that it explicitly allows for internal 
financing of investment and makes the formulation of an investment theory 
and policy possible. While under the income per head maximizing variant 
it is possible to plough back some of the present earnings for the 
purpose of increasing future consumption, the amount of the plough back 
and the procedure for investment decision making have not been satis­
factorily worked out. As we shall explain shortly, the assumed struc­
ture of property rights in the labour-managed firm and the contention 
that workers are principally interested in income per head makes it 
difficult to account for investment in the theory of labour-managed 
firms. Though in Horvat's model the nature of ownership is the same as 
that in the Ward-Vanek model, the assumption that incomes are determined
ex-ante implies that income over and above costs can be used for invest-
2ment. In effect, the argument is that the determination of income 
esrante is tantamount to a restriction that the surplus over and above 
costs (including wages and salaries) cannot be distributed among the 
work force.
The two variants of the theory of the labour-managed firm discussed 
above suffer from two basic kinds of shortcoming. The first concerns 
the formulation of the theory itself while the second relates to the 
application of these theories to the Yugoslav firms. In the following
1 See E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich (1973), pp. 289-292. More on income 
distribution methods in next chapter.
2 For the treatment of the theory of the firm from a 'property rights'
• point of view, see E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich (1972).
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section we shall discuss these shortcomings briefly.
C. Shortcomings of the Theory of the Labour-Managed Firm
The shortcomings of the theory of the labour-managed firm discussed 
in this section are applicable to almost all variants of this theory 
although some of them are more pertinent to a specific model than others. 
However, we shall try to content ourselves principally with the defects 
of the two variants mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter. 
Briefly, the theories of the labour-managed firm fail to take account 
of the following.
1. Investment Policy
By and large it is fair to say that the theory of labour-managed 
firms has either neglected investment or has only taken account of 
investment in an ad-hoc way. This weakness is due to the way in which 
these firms are conceptualized.1 Although in the simple model where 
income per head is maximized, all the profit of the enterprise is dist­
ributed to its work force and therefore there is no explicit mention of 
investment out of profit, the more generalized versions of this model 
have allowed for part of the profits to be invested in the firm. It 
is natural to assume that the workers of a labour-managed firm (like 
other people) would want to distribute their expenditure over time so 
as to sustain the accustomed standard of living. This, in usual cir­
cumstances, would require them to save a portion of their present 
earnings, which in turn can take a variety of forms. They may keep 
their savings in the form of financial assets (bank deposits, giro 
accounts, government bonds, and few enterprise bonds); or alternatively *
1 A point of caution must be added here. The study of investment 
problems can be only partial if, as in this section, it consists of 
only those aspects that are related to worker-managers and enterprise 
behaviour. For a complete study of investment problem the structure 
of the economy as a whole and the characteristics of its investment 
function must also be taken into account. In this section, of course
*we are only concentrating on the former aspect.
- 83 -
they may plough back some of their savings into their own enterprise.
But the property rights structure of the labour-managed firm is a barrier 
against plough back investment (internally financed investment). The 
important point is that the partnership rights of the members of a firm 
(which entitles them to a share of profits) are not transferable and 
last for the duration of employment only. This implies that the workers 
of such firms, on the whole, cannot be expected to be very enthusiastic 
about allocating a part of enterprise earnings to investment. For 
they may not stay long enough in the enterprise to reap the returns from 
the foregone earnings.1 2 To explain this differently, the planning 
horizon for investment in financial assets is longer than that for 
internal investment. As a result, one would expect workers to prefer 
financial assets to investing in their own enterprise. It may, however, 
be argued that financial institutions would in turn lend to enterprises 
and thus, in the end, the result would be the same as if the employees 
had invested in their respective enterprises. In this way they will 
be assured of an income stream without having had to commit themselves 
to internal investment.
Furthermore, even if we could assume a single rate of time pre­
ference for the majority of the influential personnel of an enterprise, 
there is still no guarantee that this rate would be the same in all 
enterprises and be in conformity with the society's time preference 
rate. For example, as Shackleton points out, a low growth for some 
enterprises can restrict the alternatives open to others and can also 
affect the size of the proceeds of the society that is spent on public 
goods and services.^
It should be pointed out here that even the second model of the 
labour-managed firm, i.e., the profit maximizing model, shares this
1 Ibid.t specially pp. 1149-1156. Also see S. Pejovich (1969),
pp. 194-5; R. A. Taylor (1974), p. 77.
2 J. R. Shackleton (1976), p. 55. For another version of this conflict,
' see E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich (1973), pp. 275 and 286. On problems
associated with discount rates, see E. Neuberger and E. James (1973), p. 266
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weakness. Although labour is not, in the main, remunerated residually 
and there is an explicit reference to the profits of the firm being 
used for investment, the determination of the actual amount of invest­
ment is not yet theoretically worked out. Considering that the workers' 
councils and management boards have extensive power in proposing and 
deciding on the distribution of net earnings of the enterprise, then 
there is nothing - at least conceptually - to stop them from ex-ante 
apportioning of a higher percentage of earnings to personal incomes.^- 
The self-interest of the members of the collective and their entitle­
ment to a share of profits (even if decided in advance) will subject 
them to the same rigidities in distribution of earnings that were dis­
cussed above.
2. Labour-Management and Debt Financing
Like most firms which cannot finance their investment expenditure 
solely by internal resources and have to rely on external financing, 
the labour managed firms, too, often require debt financing. The 
question of whether or not a firm can raise sufficient funds for its 
investment programme is closely bound up with the ability of its managers 
to satisfy the creditors' requirements. This brings us to the dis­
cussion of entrepreneurial abilities and functions in the labour-managed 
firms. Of the many functions of entrepreneurs expounded by Schumpeter, 
Knight and Arrow among others, is the provision of insurance against 
risk for owners of productive services involved in an economic activity. 
The entrepreneurs, Knight pointed out, "guarantee to those who furnish 
productive services a fixed remuneration" on an ex-ante basis. As 
labour-managers to whom the entrepreneurial functions are relegated, 
the workers of a labour-managed firm are expected to offer this kind of 
insurance to those who provide the firm with productive services (i.e., 12
1 The inadequacy of Horvat's analysis in determining the division of the 
net earnings is also pointed out by H. M. Wachtell (1973), p. 57.
2 F. Knight (1933), p. 271.
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loan capital in the context of present discussion). On the other hand, 
the creditors who provide external financing for the firm can be expected 
to ask for a reasonable security or colateral against possible default. 
While a capitalist entrepreneur can use his own property (shares, 
bonds, etc.) as security, the worker-managers can only rely on their 
own expected future earnings as collateral for debts. The trans­
ferability and mobility of the former type of security makes it superior 
(of higher collateral value) to the latter type. The risk-taking 
ability of the worker-managers (owners of human capital) is therefore a 
major barrier to external financing of investment.^
Taking into account the fact that the property rights structure 
associated with the labour managed firm is not very conducive to 
internally financed investment (as mentioned before), it is clear that 
an inherent tendency for debt financing must develop in these firms.
But as was pointed out in the previous paragraph, the ability of worker- 
managers to obtain external financing is limited by their inability to 
provide sufficient insurance against risk for creditors. The dilemma 
can be resolved either by the direct intervention of the State or by a
change in the myopic behaviour of the worker-managers, i.e., an increase
2in the size of plough back investment. The final outcome would vary 
from one firm to another depending on the distribution of influence 
within the firm and its relationship to the local authority. The 
interesting point about this situation, as one might expect, is that if 
the worker-managers agree to participate in financing investment
1 For a detailed discussion of the unsuitability of the worker-managers 
to undertake entrepreneurial risks, see S. Markowski (1974), Chapter 4.
2 Realizing the restricted nature of the property rights over the benefits 
of plough back investment and, therefore, the attempts of the par­
ticipants to reduce it to a minimum level, Jaroslav Vanek goes to the 
extreme by maintaining that a labour-managed firm will function better 
and more efficiently if there is no internal financing at all as this 
will create anomalities in distribution, allocation, risk bearing, 
entry, research and development, etc. External financing can come 
from banks and other financial institutions that will accept the saving 
deposits of the worker-managers and pay them interest. See Jaroslav 
Vanek (1973), pp. 140-146.
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expenditures, their participation would be looked on as a kind of 
collateral by the creditors. Neuberger and James remarked that as the 
amount of internal resources allocated for investment (the equivalent 
of equity capital) increases so does the ability of the labour-managed 
firm to borrow on more favourable terms, and in addition the position 
of the workers of the firm in terms of security of employment strengthens.^-
3. Diversity of Organizations
As the labour managed firms cover a wide spectrum of organisations 
with diverse characteristics, generalizations regarding their behaviour, 
objective and problem areas are hazardous and must be treated with great 
caution. The labour-managed firm can exist in a peasant economy as 
well as in an industrial economy and there is no reason to expect a 
great deal of similarity between them. If, for example, the members 
of the former enterprise decide to consume all of their product, nobody 
will prevent them from doing so and, after all, the effect of such a 
decision on the whole economy will be very limited. On the contrary, 
if the workers of a giant industrial complex (which may employ tens of 
thousands of workers) embark on such a course of action, the effect 
could be disasterous, not only for workers of that complex who will find 
themselves unemployed very soon, but also for the economy of that par­
ticular region. Certainly the power of State intervention is reserved 
for such an unlikely event.
Questions relating to investment and growth become extremely impor­
tant and complicated when large scale modern industrial enterprises 
develop. The investment decisions can no longer be made on the basis 
of the comparison of future returns to foregone present income by an *
1 These two properties were respectively termed "leverage effect" and 
"employment security effect", by E. Neuberger and E. James(1973), 
p. 261. We should also mention that the criteria for credit worthiness 
used by financial institutions are very important for availability of 
external finance. In Yugoslavia, for instance, they are less rigid
* than those in capitalist economies.
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individual worker and then summing up individual preferences to reach a 
collective compromise. Here is where Horvat’s contribution seems to 
become relevant. At least for modern large scale firms, investment 
expenditure is financed out of the residual earnings of the firm after 
wages are fixed in advance. The theories of the labour-managed firm 
as formulated by Ward and Domar are more relevant to small scale enter­
prises, agricultural cooperatives and to the Soviet kolkhoz than to 
modern industrial firms.^
The diversity of enterprises with respect to size, field of 
activity, the influence of various strata of the work force (more on 
the last factor later), conditions of product market, etc., has a direct 
bearing on the type of objective(s) that the firm pursues. The 
maximization of income per head may be acceptable for an agricultural 
cooperative, but is unsuitable to a large scale firm in modern industrial 
sector. If in explaining the behaviour of the labour-managed firm, 
the theory is to be improved then the enterprises and the type of 
economy in which they function must be divided into sub-groups (large, 
small, capital goods, consumer goods, oligopolies or competitive enter­
prises working under feudal, capitalist or socialist economic conditions) 
and each sub-group must be studied separately. In this way the factors 
affecting the situation in each particular industry can be identified.
4. Application of the Models to Yugoslavia
Apart from the above problems, the second main type of shortcoming 
of the theories of the labour-managed firm arises from their application 
to the Yugoslav enterprises. The difficulties involved in the 
explanation of the behaviour of the Yugoslav firms stem from the simp­
listic analysis offered within the framework of the existing theories 
and their generalization to all Yugoslav firms. The question of diver­
sity of organizations discussed above is even more significant in the
1. A. B. Atkinson (1973), p. 375 and S. Markowski (1974), p. 156.
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Yugoslav context. The great diversity between firms of different size, 
specialization, technical level, field of activity, distribution of 
power between various constituent strata and location makes the app­
lication of any single - and simple - theory very doubtful. In 
addition to the lack of attention to diversity, the theories face the 
following problems:
a. Specification of the Labour Market. The theories of the labour- 
managed firm, in their many variants, have generally paid little atten­
tion to specific characteristics of the Yugoslav labour market. The 
properties of the labour market assumed in the above theories, are very 
similar to those of the labour markets of the competitive model, namely: 
freedom of choice in occupation; mobility; equality of the marginal 
revenue product with labour remuneration; horizontal labour supply 
curve facing each firm; etc. In the Yugoslav conditions, however, the 
labour market has certain particularities which must be explicitly 
recognized if the theory is to have a greater explanatory power.
Compared to a competitive market economy, the mobility of workers 
in Yugoslavia is much more restricted. Firstly, because a*newly 
employed worker will benefit from the fruits of past accumulation in the 
enterprise without himself having suffered for it at all, there will 
develop a tendency to resist extra hiring unless it is absolutely 
necessary and clearly beneficial to the existing work force. This 
fact was recognized long ago by Todorovic when he pointed out that the 
workers would want the "working collective to number as few as possible, 
because ... as 'co-owners', he must share the joint product with them."*
1 M. Todorovic (1963), p. 46. Incidentally, this characteristic operates 
in the opposite direction as well, i.e., within the Yugoslav firm 
there exists a tendency to resist firing and lay off. This is partly 
due to the solidarity of the workers (as admitted by Todorovic, Ibid., 
p. 51) and partly due to the fact that it is in the interests of all 
decision makers to postpone lay offs as long as possible as once firing 
is accepted as a normal recourse, they themselves would lose their 
job security as well.
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One of the consequences of this pattern of behaviour is that an increase 
in the aggregate demand would not directly lead to the same increase in 
employment as it would in a capitalist economy.
Secondly, since the workers of each firm enjoy certain non-pecuniary 
benefits such as the benefits of past accumulation in collective con­
sumption (housing, holiday resorts, etc.), there are further disincen­
tives to their changing jobs.
Similarly, the non-transferability of partnership rights means that
the work force of a Yugoslav firm is not in the position of members of
a cooperative, i.e., able to sell their shares upon leaving the firm.
Rather, they are beneficiaries of the enterprise as long as they stay
with it. The restricted nature of property rights will affect their
mobility in the same way as it affects their attitude towards investment.'
As long as there is some degree of internal financing of investment
expenditure, the present work force will have a vested interest in
remaining in the enterprise. Only the promise of a higher income stream
2over the entire planning period will induce them to change jobs.
3b. The Instability of the Model. A decrease in output and employment
as a result of a rise in the product price, though conceptually possible,
cannot be accepted as a real possibility when the Yugoslav experience
is considered. As Horvat put it, only an econometric investigation
could confirm whether or not this has occurred in Yugoslavia and, to
this date, no such evidence has been produced by any of the proponents
. 4of the theories of the labour-managed firm.
To put this point in a slightly different form, the Yugoslav 
experience cannot be explained satisfactorily by using the income per
1 The possibility of windfall gains or losses for the workers entering 
or leaving the labour-managed enterprise also affects the mobility by 
accentuating the tendencies to resist new hiring as well as firing.
See R. A. Taylor (1974), p. 77.
2 E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich (1973), p. 285.
3 Obviously, this shortcoming applies only to the first variant of the 
' model.4 Cited in Jan Vanek (1972), p. 190.
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head maximizing version of the theory. If the real world enterprises 
were to behave in accordance with the Ward-Vanek model, we would have 
had to expect that a general rise in the level of demand would lead to 
a process of "self-mutilation" .(to use Vanek's expression^) in working 
collectives, ultimately resulting in lower levels of employment, income, 
aggregate demand, and possibly a fall in prices. In other words, any 
attempt to solve such economic problems as demand deficiency or unemploy- 
would be self-defeating.
This brings us to an important macroeconomic implication of the 
income per head maximizing model. An increase in the government expen­
diture, aimed at reducing unemployment, will lead to a general increase 
in aggregate demand and in all probability a price rise. But price
rise, according to this model, results in a fall in output and employ-
„ 2 ment.
One may think that in the event of a fall in output and employment,
the situation would be ripe for the entry of new firms to compensate for
such a fall. For this to happen, the economy must be organized in
such a way that the entry of new firms is relatively simple. In fact,
neither in a hypothetical labour-managed economy (Ward-Vanek) nor in
Yugoslavia, is entry of new firms easy. A firm cannot be started by a
number of unemployed persons just because there is an unsatisfied demand
for the product they intend to produce. The ability of such a group
to raise the initial capital is extremely limited since the only security
they can provide is their human capital which, as mentioned before, cannot
3be regarded as a sufficient collateral. As far as Yugoslavia is
1 Jaroslav Vanek (1970), p. 385. Despite admitting to this weakness, Vanek 
went on to maintain that an economy based on labour-managed firms is 
superior to other forms of organization from the points of view of 
allocation and distribution. Ibid., p. 403 and (1971), p. 161.
2 The "stickiness" of the labour-market becomes relevant here. Although 
we should expect a labour-managed firm to reduce employment (as a result 
of price rise), the inefficiency of the labour market reflected in un­
willingness to lay off workers, actually becomes a virtue from a social 
point of view.
3 .It should be pointed out that it is possible for a group of professionals
(doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.) to start a new firm and raisesuf-; 
ficient capital on the basis of their "human capital". The situation is 
quite different for a group of workers, most of whom are unskilled or
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concerned, there is ample evidence that the authorities have never been 
keen on promotion of large scale new entries even in the fields dominated 
by few oligopolies.*
c. The Hierarchical Nature of the Enterprise. Explicit in the theory
of the labour-managed firm is the assumption that all employees are
equal with each other and there exists a unanimity of interest through-
out the enterprise. This implies that each member is given equal voice
in management activities including direct decision making on major 
2issues. This assumption simply overlooks the fundamental problems of 
inter-enterprise conflicts that have developed in the Yugoslav enter­
prises. In Chapter One, we discussed the hierarchical nature of the 
organization of enterprises and referred to the wide divergence in the 
influence, participation and specially in the interests of various strata 
of the work force. The blue collar and less skilled workers, for example, 
are mainly concerned with job security and higher remuneration whereas 
the executive personnel are more interested in the rapid growth of their 
enterprise. Under these circumstances, it is incorrect to maintain 
that all labour-managed enterprises will follow a similar maximand 
(income per head or profit). The objective function pursued by each 
firm depends on the relative strength of the different strata of 
employees in that particular firm. In Chapter Three we shall explain 
how, after three decades of change and reforms, the Yugoslav enterprises 
have not yet been able to develop a unique system of distribution of 
enterprise income between wage fund and enterprise funds. The absence 
of this unique system in fact reflects the absence of a single objective
1 For example see S. Estrin (1978), pp. 15-17 and J. Dirlam (1968), pp. 3764-73
2 Jaroslav Vanek (1970), p. 1. This situation may exist only in the 
advanced stages of development of a socialist economy where division 
of labour has developed to a stage in which the difference between 
manual and mental labour and that between administrative and performance 
tasks have been in the main eliminated. It also requires the costless 
availability, to every member of the work force, of all information 
necessary for efficient decision making.
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pursued by all firms.
Having discussdd the shortcomings of the theory of the labour- 
managed firm, particularly where its application to Yugoslavia is con­
cerned, we can see that the explanatory power of the theory is extremely 
limited. The models discussed here are, in the main, the simplistic 
extension of text-book models which, at best, as Marris has pointed out, 
"represent a gross simplification of business behaviour."^- The assum­
ption of a unique objective function or a universal maximand for the 
Yugoslav enterprise leaves the theory of the labour-managed firm open to 
the same objections and criticisms that have beset the traditional theory 
of the firm and its application to modern corporations. Taking into 
account the hierarchical nature of the Yugoslav enterprises and the 
lop-sided distribution of power in favour of the technical/managerial 
group, we need to extend the theory into a new arena where the motivations 
of the management and their limitations are explicitly taken into con­
sideration. What is needed is to shift to those explanations that are 
based on an overt assumption of managerial motivation. In particular 
the importance of growth as a major variable in the management's pre­
ference function must be realized. As Marris has pointed out, the 
explanation of the behaviour of the modern firms must take into account 
the assumption that "men who control productive assets which they do not
own are likely to find a personal satisfaction in causing the assets to 
.,3grow.
In recent years, of course, a great deal of attention has been paid♦
to the analysis of the behaviour of modern corporations with the bulk of 
the works falling outside the framework of the traditional theory of the 
firm and the so-called 'constrained maximization paradigm' (to use
4Devine's phrase ). Behavioural and managerial schools, in particular,
1 R. Marris (1961), p. 144.
2 P. J. Devine, et al. (1974), pp. 113-117.
3 R. Marris (1961), p. 145.
4 ■ P. J. Devine, et al. (1974), p. 118.
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have studied extensively such areas as objectives, growth, security, 
effects of the organizational structure on performance, and the constraints 
within which the corporation has to function. The study of the actual 
behaviour of the Yugoslav enterprises, however, has hardly progressed 
beyond the simplistic level. In the next section, therefore, we shall 
attempt to discuss some of the elements which have to be incorporated 
in the analysis of the behaviour of the Yugoslav firm in order that a 
more realistic set of objectives can be formulated and the factors 
limiting the pursuit of these objectives can be identified.
II. The Objectives of the Yugoslav Firms and 
Some of their Constraints
The shortcomings arising from the application of theories of the 
labour-managed firm to the Yugoslav conditions, and the inability of 
these theories to explain and predict the behaviour of the Yugoslav 
enterprises, essentially stem from the use of the traditional theory of 
the firm. Like the firm in traditional theory, the labour-managed 
enterprise has been assumed to be operating in a relatively competitive 
situation, usually producing one output, attempting to maximize some 
objective function (profit or income per head), and expanding or con­
tracting the output level until it reaches an 'optimum*  size. While 
for the capitalist firm, and particularly the modern corporation, these 
shortcomings have been tackled to a certain extent in the past two 
decades, no major inroad has been made for the labour-managed firm. The 
recent works have made it possible to leave the simplistic framework 
and treat the modern firms as dynamic organisms with certain behavioural 
patterns and certain limitations.^- These works have basically estab­
lished that:
i The neoclassical theory has ignored both the system of motivation
1 For example E. Penrose (1959)j W. J. Baumol (1959) and (1962);
• R. Harris (1964); and J. H. Williamson (1966).
- 94 -
of the modern corporation executives and their objectives (economic, 
social and even psychological) by placing the main emphasis on profit 
maximization.
ii The corporation is engaged in production of many commodities and, 
as such, its behaviour cannot be explained by the use of single output 
models that will, among other things, face demand limitation at some 
point. The modern corporations will easily switch to the production of 
new commodities when they begin to feel the restrictions imposed on them 
by demand limitation.
iii The notion of ’optimum’ size becomes largely irrelevant for 
modern corporations. This notion is based on such assumptions as: the 
limited nature of the output market, the treatment of management as a 
fixed factor and the existence of diseconomies of scale leading to a 
U-shaped long run average cost curve. Production of new products 
(diversification) can over-ride the limitations imposed by demand while 
empirical evidence has failed to provide unquestionable support for the 
U-shaped average cost curve.
iv Related to point (iii) above, the standard theory of the firm can­
not explain how some corporations become giant ones. Usually growth 
is seen as the movement of firms towards their 'optimum' size and when 
this notion loses its significance, the process of growth can continue 
almost indefinitely. Obviously, there are restrictions that prevent or 
slow down the permanent growth of firms, but even some of these rest­
rictions (e.g., managerial abilities) can be partially eased or removed 
in the long run.
v Of all considerations, growth has been suggested to be the most 
important element entering the preference function of the corporate 
executives. The executives are themselves salaried employees of the 
firm with none or a very insignificant share in the ownership. They 
are not judged by their ability to maximize profit, reach and maintain
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an optimum size for the firm, but by their ability to promote organiza­
tional growth. Economic factors such as higher earnings and security 
of future earnings; social factors such as the prestige and status related 
to being successful in business; personal factors such as the ability to 
exercise control and power over a large and ever expanding organization; 
and possibly other considerations could all contribute to this growth- 
biased behaviour. Even the dividend policy of the corporation is 
overshadowed by this principle, i.e., instead of allowing the share 
holders to benefit from the fruits of the corporation's success, the 
dividends are reduced to the minimum acceptable level so that resources 
at the disposal of the executives, for expansion, are kept as large as 
possible.^
Despite these developments in the realm of the theory of firm, the 
theory of the labour-managed firm has not made any substantial improve­
ment in nearly two and half decades since Ward's Illyrian firm was for­
mulated in 1956. In order to analyze the behaviour of the Yugoslav 
firm, one has to leave the realm of the neoclassical firm behind and 
employ new tools such as those employed in the above works on the theory 
of modern corporations. Such analysis must start by discarding the 
notion of a single universal maximand and the notion that all firms 
follow the same objective. This should be done for no other reason than 
the absence of any empirical evidence for maximizing behaviour in a 
particular firm.^
1 As Baumol points out, this "will doubtless be abhorrent to the captains 
of industry, whose main concern is surely not at what size their enter­
prise should finally settle down but rather, how rapidly to grow".
W. J. Baumol (1962), p. 1078.
2 See also R. A. Gordon (1945), specially pp. 305-306.
3 As Quinton points out, in a growth situation, the "payouts, under an 
ideal dividend policy ... should exceed the minimum amount necessary 
to maintain the market position and integrity of existing debt and 
equity issues and issues contemplated in the near future." H. Quinton 
(1956), p. 29.
4 "Never have we met ... anyone in Yugoslavia who - as may often be encoun­
tered elsewhere - could spell out in one word the object of his enter­
prise's pursuit, be it profit, plan or even income or bulk of earnings.
„ Consciously or not, every one sees the enterprise as pursuing a large 
number of objectives of all kinds." Jan Vanek (1972), p. 171. See alsoD. Milenkovitch (l9/l), pp. 210-211.
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Also, because of the wide diversity that exists between different 
firms, and the theoretical models have tended to shy away from its 
implications, each Yugoslav enterprise, depending on its concrete 
conditions, is pursuing a set of objectives, sometimes even contradictory, 
that cannot possibly be reduced to profits, income or sales.
In discussing the behaviour of the Yugoslav firms, three different 
sets of considerations must be analysed. Firstly, there is the multi­
plicity of objectives deemed important by some or all members of the 
collectives. Secondly, there is the particular environment within which 
these enterprises operate and which influences their objectives.
Thirdly, the Yugoslav firms are subject to certain macro and micro- 
economic restrictions which have a direct bearing on their objectives 
and without which the analysis of the behaviour of enterprises will at 
best be partial. These three sets of considerations will be the subject 
of the remainder of this chapter.
A. The Multiplicity of Objectives
The management team of a Yugoslav enterprise must pay attention not 
only to the present income of its work force but also to many other 
variables since the long term position of the enterprise and its work 
force are directly influenced by these variables. Broadly speaking, 
the following points must be taken into account:
i. Workers' income and working conditions. Most, if not all, members 
of the collective expect to receive as high an income as possible at 
the end of the month. They are particularly concerned about the com­
petitiveness of their pay scale with that of workers in similar firms.
The workers will also expect their working conditions to improve in a 
systematic way over time. This objective can include elements such 
as reduction in working hours and work intensity’, and improvements in 
the conditions of the labour process.
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ii. Income and employment security. The members of a labour-managed 
firm, particularly the more far-sighted ones, will look for some degree 
of security in the future. This security can be assured so long as the 
firm is expanding at a reasonable rate, meaning that the workers have 
to forego a part of their present earnings in favour of investment.
The distribution of earnings over time (which results from the com­
bination of objectives i and ii) is affected by factors among which the 
age, education, expected duration of employment, possibility of alter­
native employment, possibility of technological redundancy, etc., may be 
mentioned. In any case these two objectives cannot be pursued with 
equal intensity as there is a trade off between them. Higher income at 
present would mean lower earnings in future and greater uncertainty about 
the future.
iii. Social considerations outside the enterprise. In addition to 
purely personal objectives, some of the members of the collective, par­
ticularly those in responsible position?, can be expected to want to 
pursue aims which are more pertinent to local or regional needs. These 
may include areas such as local employment, provision of resources for 
some public needs such as health and education. It should be noted that 
this objective is clearly contradictory to the first and second objec­
tives mentioned above.
As we pointed out in Chapter One, the Yugoslav enterprises are com­
posed of different strata of the work force with sharply different pre­
ference schedules and different degrees of influence over the decision 
making process. Each of these strata would attempt to influence the 
management organs to take up not only the general objectives of the 
enterprise but also subordinate them to the particular goals of that 
strata. If the more skilled and educated section of the enterprise are 
dominant, we should expect the dominance of growth and modernization 
objectives while if the older and less qualified group are strong, then
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we should witness greater attention paid to the level of present incomes 
at the expense of future security. In addition, there are external 
forces which may bid for still different aims. If the local government 
authorities have preserved some influence, then they may want to pursue 
policies such as the expansion of employment. If another enterprise 
has participated in the setting up of the firm in question and has thus 
obtained some say in its affairs, then it may also want to influence its 
objectives in a particular way.
Also, as indicated in Chapter One, in most of the Yugoslav enter­
prises - certainly in the larger and more modern ones in the industrial 
sector - the technical/managerial strata of the work force wields the 
decisive power in the decision making process. We explained that subject 
to providing the less skilled and less qualified strata with an accep­
table wage level and working conditions, the technical/managerial group 
enjoys great latitude in decision making. Through this latitude, they 
can subordinate the objectives of the enterprise to those of their own, 
or*- impose their own wishes on the enterprise. As in the case of 
managers of capitalist corporations, one of the most important variables 
influencing the preference function of the Yugoslav managers is the rate 
of growth of their enterprise. The power of these managers, like their 
capitalist counterparts, stems from their right to take decisions that 
influence and control the enterprise affairs. The larger the enterprise, 
the wider their domain of decision making and control. Therefore, 
increase in the net worth of the enterprise, meaning expansion of the 
assets, would become a major objective. There is also the considerable 
social prestige accompanying successful managers and successful enter­
prises. Prospects of greater power and greater social influence in the 
community and prospects of promotion to higher posts wielding greater 
social prestige are always in the minds of decision makers. And the 
security that accompanies the members of a successful management strata
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should not be overlooked. As awhole, Gordon's remarks regarding the 
motivation of the corporate executives: "the urge for power, the desire 
for prestige and the related impulse for emulation, ... (and) the desire 
for security"^ are true of the Yugoslav managers as well.
It should be emphasized here that, as in the case of capitalist 
executives, the Yugoslav managers cannot pursue a policy of growth and 
expansion without coming across serious constraints and, to these, we 
shall turn shortly. For the moment we must look at the particular 
social and economic environment and the political considerations that 
influence enterprise objectives.
B. Environmental Factors
Since the implementation of the five-year plans in the Soviet Union, 
the international communist movement (particularly the Eastern European 
section) has been committed to the principle that building of socialism 
implies, and corresponds to, the development of the productive forces of 
the society. According to this conception, the underdeveloped and 
backward nature of the productive forces is responsible for the problems 
and obstacles to the building of socialism. Development along the 
socialist path thus requires a high rate of capital accumulation and a 
fast rate of growth of the overall social product. The industrialization 
of the Soviet Union particularly was seen as evidence of the correctness 
of this view by other communist parties and many Marxist scholars.
The Yugoslav leaders were no exception and despite their ideological 
dispute with the Soviet Union, they preserved their attitude towards 
economic growth and continued their policy of emphasizing rapid indus­
trialization and encouraging fast economic growth. The government 
agencies, various chambers, associations of producers and particularly 
the LCY have continually encouraged their associates to adopt measures
1 R. A. Gordon (1945), p. 305.
2 A major exception to this view was put forward by the Chinese
. Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution. See C. Bettelheim 
(1976), Preface.
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and policies conducive to growth. As the large majority of the influen­
tial personnel of Yugoslav enterprises are members of the League,* 
they ensure that the League's policies are carried out in their places 
of work. The result is the build up of a kind of social pressure with 
a relevant incentive/punishment mechanism in the background of enter­
prise policy making. There are, of course, good reasons why the LCY 
or other State institutions such as trade unions would prefer high rates 
of investment and growth. A high investment strategy would guarantee 
a stable and high level of employment which could be crucial for any 
'socialist' government.
With the natural resistance of the work force of a labour-managed 
firm towards plough back investment, it is clear that the political 
factor is the most significant factor in explaining a sustained high 
rate of investment (25-30% of the social product). The experience 
of other Eastern European countries also testifies to the importance and 
decisiveness of the political factor in sustaining a high investment 
economy.
In addition to the political factor, the economic policies of the
government, from the mid-fifties onward, have resulted in the creation
of a low cost, low risk situation in which decisions on expansion can
hardly go wrong and the enterprises are rarely and minimally penalized
for their mistakes. Following Matthews, we shall characterise this
2situation as the existence of a "safety net".
1 In 1966, the LCY members included about 59 per cent of the employees 
with college education and 5 per cent of the unskilled workers.
B. Horvat (1969), p. 201.
2 Matthews employed this concept in dealing with the problems of the 
British economy. Essentially, this refers to a situation where various 
socio-economic forces are operating in a fashion which produces a high 
rate of return on any investment, and/or at the same time, the risk on 
investment is greatly reduced. Matthews argued that in post-war Britain, 
"the belief on the part of entrepreneurs that the government would not 
permit a slump has improved confidence - a safety net theory of the
role of government, implying that although the acrobat has not actually 
fallen, his knowledge of the presence of the safety net has given him 
confidence and improved his performance." R. C. 0. Matthews (1968), 
p. 562.
-  101 -
The existence of this safety net is the result of the combination of 
several factors outside the scope of enterprise jurisdiction which have 
direct bearing on the expansion policies and growth performance of the 
enterprise. Briefly, these factors include:
a. Market Structure - It is generally agreed that the markets for most 
industries in Yugoslavia are highly concentrated and oligopolistic.
The industrial enterprises operate in a seller's market and do not find 
it difficult at all to sell whatever they have produced.^- Furthermore, 
the oligopolistic nature of the markets coupled with various forms of 
import control helps the Yugoslav enterprises to establish themselves 
and consolidate their position without having to worry about competition. 
The market structure guarantees that the investment decisions of large 
enterprises, specially the capital goods industries, unless they were 
hopelessly unrealistic, would not go basically wrong.
b. The Cost of Borrowing - An important aspect of expansion decision 
is the financing of investment expenditure. The relevant factor, here, 
is the cost of borrowing. The consistently low rates of interest, 
even during inflationary periods, has encouraged the firms to borrow 
from external sources. Table 1, below, represents some of the interest 
rates in recent years and compares them with the changes in the retail 
prices.
Table 1 - Interest Rates and Inflation (1967-75)
Rates 1967 1969 1971 1975
Percentage rise in retail 
prices during the year 5.0 10.0 18.0 26.0
Interest rate on sight 
savings deposits 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.5
Interest rate on time 
savings deposits 7.0 7.5 7.5 up to 10
Interest rate on bank credits 8.0 8.0 8.0 12-13
Sources: V. Dubey (1975), p. 328; OECD (1977), p. 23; and SGJ (1977), p. 305.
1 J. Dirlam (1968), pp. 3764-65 and 3772-73; I. Lavrac (1964), p. 150; 
J. Kornai (1971), Chapter 19; and A. Nove (1973), p. 61.
- 102 -
A recent OECD report concluded that the real interest rate on 
borrowed funds is either very low or even negative. Table 1 clearly 
supports this assertion.*
c. Absence of Take-Over Risk - Heavy reliance on external finance can 
subject the modern corporation to the danger of being taken over by 
other organizations. The debt-asset ratio is therefore a significant 
indicator of the financial strength of the firm in a market economy.
But in the Yugoslav case, partnership rights are not transferable 
(restricted property rights) and consequently no market for trading in 
such rights exists. The managers do not, therefore, face the risk of 
take over and are not subject to indirect control by the stock exchange.
d. Limited Penalties for Mistakes. Another aspect of the safety net
is that the consequences of going wrong and making mistakes are hardly
serious. If a firm makes incorrect decisions leading to loss of
revenue to such an extent that even the minimum wages of its workers
cannot be paid, then it will receive aid from one of the many sources
(socio-political communities, solidarity funds, reserve funds, banks,
etc.) to make up for part or all of the loss. Inability to pay back
the bank loans which, technically, should result in liquidation, is
itself penalized by further interest charges. The "notorious laxity
towards debtors", as Dirlam and Plummer put it, has resulted in the
undertaking of very risky and peculiar endeavours such as using the
piled up and unused inventories as collateral for obtaining loans to
2expand fixed assets. This laxity in imposing sanctions against
debtors failing to honour their commitments has also been regarded as
the basic factor causing the illiquidity with which the economy has
3been beset in the past decade. Banks as well as other creditors are
1 OECD (1977), p. 20. This point has been argued by many authors. 
Professor Bajt, for example, maintains that the long run rate of 
interest for the whole economy may be as low as 2 per cent. See
H. M. Wachtell (1973), p. 112.
2 J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), pp. 48 and 183.
3 • L. D. Tyson (1977), p. 287.
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unwilling to press their claims against their customers to the point
of initiating bankruptcy proceedings. Such leniency is generally due
to the political pressure by various government agencies (particularly
the communal level) to prevent closures and unemployment. Furthermore,
even when some firms actually get into trouble, there exists various
financial facilities such as republican or communal solidarity funds to
save them.^ Because bankruptcy is a drastic event in Yugoslavia, a
World Bank report observed, "it invites rescue operation by patron
State units and banks." The result is that while many firms fail to
cover their costs and obligations (including the personal income of
their workers), usually very few go to liquidation. In the first 9
months of 1968, for example, 1715 enterprises (constituting 20 per cent
of all firms in economic activities) did not cover their personal income
fund as well as various interest charges. The firms going into
liquidation, however, were less than 100 and the majority of them were
3artisans, small traders and agricultural supply cooperatives.
Recognizing the existence of such a safety net and its influence 
on investment decision making, the federal government moved in recently 
and passed various laws effective from January 1973 to limit the 
operation of firms which have remained indebted for a long time. These 
measures, reported in a World Bank review, included cutting down on the 
personal incomes of workers in such enterprises and sanctioning laws 
designed to bring some order to procedures for supporting an enterprise
1 Solidarity funds are formed by enterprises contributing a proportion of 
their investment expenditure (4 per cent presently). This fund 
provides financial aid to enterprises in grave difficulties in order to 
enable them to undertake major renovations. An interesting provision 
in the Yugoslav legislation is that in the unlikely case that legal 
proceedings against a debtor enterprise starts, the majority of 
creditors can decide to reduce their claim against the firm and such 
decision would be binding on all other creditors as well. Jan Vanek
(1972), p. 266.
2 V. Dubey (1975), p. 242.
3 J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), pp. 49-50; SGJ (1970), p. 67 and
L. D. Tyson (1977), p. 288. According to another report, in the late 
sixties, some 10 per cent of all Yugoslav enterprises operated at a 
loss with rare cases of bankruptcy. I. Paj (1970), p. 88.
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in financial difficulties.^- How effective these measures will prove 
remains to be seen.
The environmental factors mentioned above (the safety net and the 
political factors) essentially reinforce the preferences and objectives 
most likely to be pursued by the technical/administrative strata of the 
enterprises. However, it should be emphasized that the Yugoslav 
managers cannot pursue their own preferences without facing various 
limitations and constraints. In the following section some of these 
constraints would be discussed.
C. Constraints on Enterprise Operation
Although it is correct to regard the bias towards growth as an in­
built feature of the Yugoslav economy and enterprises, it should also 
be pointed out that there exist a variety of factors limiting the growth 
behaviour. These can be broadly classified as managerial, financial 
and distributive limitations.
1. Managerial Limitations
The managerial theories of the modern corporation have clearly 
pointed out the importance of the entrepreneurial factor in the produc­
tion process. Many of them have even maintained that managerial 
constraint is the principal limit to the expansion of the firms. In 
her work on the theory of growth of the firm, Penrose argued that the 
the limitations to the growth of the firm such as those imposed by 
factor and product markets, uncertainty and risk, generally work through 
the managerial constraint. This is to say that if the managerial 
resources and abilities of a corporation expand and develop, the setting
1 V. Dubey (1975), pp. 242-243.
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in of other limitations will be postponed.*
Marris has also emphasized that the managerial constraint is the
2principle internal limit to the expansion of the corporations.
Similarly, though many years ago, Heller argued that the technical and
managerial abilities constituted a serious bottleneck to expansion and
3constrained the increase in investment in the post-war period.
These considerations hold for the Yugoslav enterprises also.
They operate under conditions of great scarcity of managerial resources, 
a situation even more serious than that discussed by the above authors 
in connection with the capitalist corporation. In Yugoslavia too, 
the leadership and control of the production units are in the hands of 
a 'managerial team' - to use Penrose's expression - consisting of the 
director and other members of the influential strata of the organs of 
management. The team has a limited capacity in performing various 
tasks of innovating, planning, controlling, coordinating, etc. In the 
final analysis the capacity of present members of the management team 
will limit the expansion of the enterprise. An expanding firm must 
of course obtain the necessary resources needed for expansion. Some 
of these resources (such as financial) can be hired on the market in a
1 E. Penrose (1959), pp. 38-40 and 43-64. In discussing the problem
of limitations to expansion with selected corporate executives, she 
tried to find out their views on the ultimate limit. In a large 
number of cases, "businessmen agreed that managerial capacities set 
the limits to expansion. If I was told that expansion was not 
warranted in an existing line for a variety of reasons, and I asked 
why they did not go into new fields, I was almost invariably told, in 
effect, 'we are-slowly. We do not know enough to go outside our 
field fast. We can hire experts, but we have to know a bit about 
these things ourselves'." Ibid., p. 61.
2 R. Marris (1964), pp. 114-118.
3 Heller remarked that: "One of the unforseen - and most interesting - 
investment barriers encountered was the bottleneck in top engineering 
and management talents. In more than half of the companies studied, 
it was flatly stated that either (1) the postwar pace of capital 
expansion had been too fast for top management and engineering staff 
to handle efficiently and digest thoroughly ... or (2) the rate of 
capital expenditure had been, and still was being, held down to what 
the very scarce factor of 'brain' - engineering and managerial - could 
handle." W. Heller (1951), p. 102.
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straight forward manner. But the managerial resources needed for the 
expansion programme of an enterprise cannot be easily hired from the 
'entrepreneurial service' market. For one thing, top managers are 
highly immobile even under modern capitalism, let alone in Yugoslavia. 
Besides, even if proper candidates are found to fill the newly created 
posts as the result of expansion, they cannot be quickly shoved into 
the empty slots and expected to function on a par with the existing 
management personnel. A newly hired executive will need some time to 
learn about the existing management and the affairs of the enterprise 
and develop the habit of working with the existing team as a unit.
As the operation of an enterprise proceeds, the members of its 
management team get better acquainted with the situation and their 
ability to work, plan and coordinate together will be enhanced, and 
thus, new productive potential is created. The growth of such produc­
tive potential, i.e., the rate of increase of managerial ability as a 
result of 'learning by working together' is the factor limiting the 
growth of the firm. Marris rightly points out that the new recruits 
into various levels of management team must undergo a training period 
inside the firm, they must be taught by 'peers', superiors and sub­
ordinates:
At a high level, they must find out the nature of a human and 
material jig-saw puzzle represented in the organization, and in 
particular must find out the shapes into which new pieces will 
have to be fitted if further expansion is contemplated ... They 
must learn (these things) on the job by personal contact with 
old members, and the capacity of these 'teachers’ is necessarily 
limited.*
In the short history of industrialization in Yugoslavia, particularly 
along self-management lines, only a limited number of qualified and 
competent management personnel have been trained and this scarcity 
imposes a serious constraint on the growth motives of the existing 
executives. A glance at the qualification of the directors appointed
1* R. Marris (1964), p. 115.
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to their post in 1970 and 1972 serves to confirm this point.
Table 2 - Qualifications of the Directors Appointed 
" in 1970 and 1972 (%) ~
Qualifications 1970 1972
i Directors Newly Appointed
With a university degree or equivalent 
professional qualification 19 15
With a college degree or equivalent 
professional qualification 51 58
With a secondary level of professional 
qualification 19 20
With very little professional qualifi­
cation - -
Highly skilled worker 10 6
Skilled worker 1 1
Total 100 100
ii Directors Reappointed
With a university degree or equivalent 
professional qualification 23 21
With a college degree or equivalent 
professional qualification 31 29
With a secondary level of professional 
qualification 22 28
With very little professional qualifi­
cation 4 4
Highly skilled worker 16 14
Skilled worker 4 4
Total 100 100
Note - The total number of newly appointed directors and 
reappointed directors were, 199 and 985 in 1970, 
and 238 and 1137 in 1972.
Source: SGJ (1972^ p. 70 and SGJ (1974), p. 101.
Between 23 and 15 per cent only of all appointments in 1970 and 
1972 can be considered highly qualified directors. In a large number 
of cases, the leading figures of the organs of management have only 
modest or very little professional training.
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2. Financial Limitations
The managers' growth desires are closely related to the avail­
ability of resources for investment. Since the abolition of the 
social investment funds in the mid-sixties, the enterprises have had to 
rely increasingly on bank credits to supplement their own internal 
resources earmarked for investment.1 But the resources of the banking 
system are not unlimited and have been allocated according to specific 
criteria. Although the firms which have participated in the setting 
up of a bank, and are like its shareholders, and firms which have 
received special privileges from various government agencies are in a 
better position to secure loan for themselves, such firms are generally 
few in number. In the great majority of cases, the financial position 
and strength of the enterprises are used as the basic criteria. The 
degree of indebtedness as measured by poslovni fond (net worth), the 
difference between the assets of the firm and the debts incurred in 
financing them, is a major indicator (as is the 'gearing ratio' for 
capitalist firms). From the point of view of the creditors, Dirlam and 
Plummer maintain, "the most significant account is the poslovni fond."2 
The volume of internal funds available for investment is another criteria. 
These funds, in essence, constitute a leverage by which the firms are 
able to attract more external financing.
It should be pointed out that the Yugoslav enterprises do not have 
the same channels of fund raising that modern corporations do. The 
latter can raise money by selling equities and bonds or embarking on 
various forms of borrowing including that on the international money 
markets (specially used by the multinationals). For enterprises in 
Yugoslavia, however, most of these channels are closed and their 
external financing comes primarily from the banks with a small amount
1 Sources of investment financing are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Four.
2 J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), p. 45.
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coming from individuals and government agencies.
Clearly, we should expect those industries with a more secure 
market position, more advanced technology, stronger political influence 
and muscle, and more aggressive management to be the main beneficiaries 
of bank credits. Analysis of the distribution of bank credits shows 
that the capital goods industries and some other growth activities fall 
into this category. Firstly, if we look at the total of the bank 
credits used for investment financing and the way it has been distributed 
between various industries, we can confirm the above assertion. From' 
1965 to 1972, out of the total investment credit allocated to Manufac­
turing & Mining, some 70 per cent went to electric energy, coal, iron 
and steel, metals, electric machinery, chemicals and construction 
materials. In the same period, the equivalent share of wood products, 
paper products, textiles, leather and footwear, plastic products and 
tobacco - put together - was about 10 per cent.*
Secondly, we can compare various sectors and industries in terms 
of the degree of their reliance on bank credits. Table 3 represents 
the relationship between investment expenditures financed out of bank 
credits and those financed from internal resources in some selected 
activities.
The first group of activities in the upper part of the table, which 
may be described as 'growth areas', is composed of capital goods 
industries and some services. They rely heavily on bank credits.
For most of the period under consideration, these activities have been 
able to draw on bank resources several times the size of their own 
internal funds. On the contrary, the second group of activities, 
which consists of more competitive consumer goods and services, as well 
as those services generally expected to be provided by the State, *74
1 The exact figures for the former group in 1965. 1969 and 1Q79 . “
74, 73 and 62 per cent and for the laiter group 12, 9 and n  
SGJ (1967), p. 255! SGJ (1970), p. 249; and SGJ (1973), p. 263? '
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Table 3 - Investment Expenditures Financed by Bank Credit as a 
Percentage of those Financed by Enterprises Own Funds (1965-72)
Activity 1965 1967 1968 1971
Electric Energy 382 364 356 183Production of Coal 140 153 120 98
Iron and Steel 660 1727 711 407
Production of Metals 131 90 80 153
Electric Machinery and Appliances 199 181 99 302
Chemical Products 126 179 207 117
Construction Materials 66 85 141 158
Pulp and Paper Products 247 392 226 167
Catering and Tourism 131 90 602 560
Wood Products 69 52 117 118
Textiles 90 59 117 75*
Leather and Footwear 70 30 95 76*
Plastic Products 196 15 74 94
Film Industry 11 177 50 100*
Construction 18 13 49 40
Road Transport 71 28 52 62
Communication 63 53 58 55
* 1972
Sources: SGJ (1967), p. 255; SGJ (1968), p. 257; SGJ (1970), 
p. 249; SGJ (1972), p. 257; and SGJ (1973), p. 263.
have not been able to borrow greatly from the banking system. The 
amount of their borrowed funds has remained much smaller than the 
amount of internal funds used for investment.
The point is that the general desire of enterprises to borrow 
from banks for the purpose of expansion cannot be totally satisfied 
because the volume of bank credits is limited and it has to be rationed 
out according to some criteria. The activities in growth areas will 
obviously benefit from bank credits more than those in other areas as 
they can better satisfy the eligibility requirements.
3. Limitation on the Distribution of Income
The managers of modern corporations must provide their shareholders 
with a reasonable annual dividend as dictated by the conditions of their 
shares and bonds as well as that of their competitors on the stock
exchange.
-  I l l  -
The Yugoslav firm must provide its work force with a reasonable and 
satisfactory income (wages plus bonuses), comparable with that in other 
industries. A growth oriented management, in the case of a corporation, 
will try to retain as much of the profits as possible for the purpose 
of investment. The growth oriented management of the Yugoslav enter­
prise would want to behave in the same way but here an important con­
straint, that of income distribution, sets in. As we pointed out in 
Chapter One, income distribution and wage determination are the areas 
to which the workers and their representatives on the management organs 
pay close attention. They have a greater interest in matters dealing 
with their wages, bonuses and other aspects of remuneration than those 
dealing with investment and growth. The bulk of the employees are 
from the less educated and less skilled category and have a different 
preference schedule than the technical/mangerial strata. The main 
objective of the former group of employees is to press for higher 
present incomes and an income distribution scheme which would certainly 
differ from that desired by the latter group. Iri the discussion of 
Chapter One, we showed that they pursue this objective by relatively 
active participation in decisions relating to income distribution and 
by tight scrutiny of the decisions of the management organs in this 
field. Although in deciding on a wage scale and bonus system, the 
situation in the labour market is taken into account, nevertheless, the 
level of personal incomes in each enterprise ultimately depends on the 
balance of forces and distribution of influence between the various 
strata of the work force in that enterprise.
The influence of the income distribution constraint can be shown in 
another form too. The low wage firms and industries are always in 
danger of losing their skilled workers who may be lured to higher paid 
jobs. This danger actually diverts the attention of the managers from 
other objectives such as growth. On the contrary the high wage
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industries, which do not have any problem in retaining their work force 
or even attracting necessary skills from other industries, can afford to 
pay attention to and pursue other objectives.
III. Conclusions
In the first section of this Chapter we reviewed the theories of 
the labour-managed firm and their relevance to the Yugoslav enterprises.
It was shown that the labour-managed firm will behave similarly to 
the neo-classical firm in so far as employment of inputs is concerned 
but differently in terms of comparative static properties. Specifically, 
the income per head maximizing variant was shown to result in a decrease 
in the level of output as a response to an increase in the product price 
or a fall in the costs of production. The resulting downward sloping
supply curve leads to serious instability for the industry as well as for 
the economy as a whole.
In addition to instability problems, the main shortcomings of the 
theories of the labour-managed firm in relation to the Yugoslav con­
ditions are: weak incentive to invest in assets which do not fully 
belong to the workers; unsuitability of expected future earnings (the 
human capital of worker-managers) as collateral for debt financing; 
and the existence of serious rigidities in labour market resulting in 
low mobility.
The unsatisfactory state of the theory of the labour-managed firm, 
particularly in explaining the behaviour of the Yugoslav enterprises, 
has its roots in the use of simplistic text book models of the traditional 
theory of the firm, i.e., the 'constrained maximization paradigm'.
The solution lies in the use and application of some of the conclusions 
of the modern theories of the firm. These theories help us recognize: 
the multiplicity of objectives, the dominance of growth objective in 
firms controlled by professional executives, and the role of the environ­
ment in encouraging or discouraging the management in pursuit of their
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objectives.
The hierarchical nature of the Yugoslav enterprises, specially in 
the modern industrial sector, means the dominance of the technical/ 
managerial strata and thus that of the growth objective. The political 
factor encouraging a high rate of investment, together with the 'safety 
net' protecting the investment decisions of the firms constitute the 
heavily growth-biased environment of the Yugoslav firm. However, in 
pursuit of growth, the management faces several limitations of which 
those relating to the availability of financial and managerial resources 
and provision of a minimum acceptable income for the employees are the 
major ones.
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Chapter Three
The distribution of Enterprise Revenue and Determination of Wages
In this chapter we intend to analyse the factors which govern the 
distribution of the revenue at the disposal of Yugoslav enterprises. 
Obviously, with frequent institutional changes, these factors have also 
changed. In fact the distribution of enterprise revenue is worth 
analysing only when the enterprises have a measure of autonomy in 
influencing the gross revenue at their disposal and the uses to which 
it could be put. In a completely centralized economy, the funds at the 
disposal of firms are of nominal significance as the firms do not decide 
on how these funds are to be spent. It would then be the central 
planning agency, and not the enterprise, that determines how such funds 
are to be used. Enterprise autonomy, in essence, means freedom to 
influence the level of prices, wages and investment. In a centralized 
economy prices and wages are determined by the planning agencies and so 
is the level of investment and the method of its financing. An 
immediate consequence of decentralization of the economy and granting of 
autonomy to enterprises is the appearance of the problem of wage and 
price determination and investment financing. Although the distribution 
of enterprise revenue and the financing of investment are closely related 
areas, the length of the discussion in each area necessitates splitting 
the discussion into two chapters. The present chapter then will analyse 
the distribution of revenue and the methods of determination of its 
components while the next chapter will concentrate on the financing of 
investment and its details.
Broadly speaking, enterprise revenue is divided into three different 
categories: remuneration of the work force; enterprise internal funds 
(to be used for expansion, replacement and reserves) and appropriation by
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the State.1 An important area of interest is the role played by the 
State in the three-way distribution and the way in which that role has 
changed.
It roust be emphasized here that the introduction of workers' manage­
ment meant that the locus of decisions changed from the planning agencies 
to the enterprises. The development of various phases of workers' 
management has implied that, increasingly, the problems relating to wages 
and investment expenditures have had to be resolved at the enterprise 
level. In terms of the level of wages, we are interested in inves­
tigating the effects of the self-management system on the level of wages 
of workers of different skill categories, different enterprises and 
different regions. As wages have gradually become dependent on the per­
formance of each enterprise, one would expect to observe an increase in 
income differentials across various regions, enterprises and industries, 
and skills.
The essential point that emerges, again and again, in this chapter 
is that the gradual transfer of the decision making power to the enter­
prises has led to a continuous rise in the share of enterprise revenue 
distributed as personal incomes on the one hand and to the development of 
wage differentials on the basis of skill, industry and location on the 
other hand.
On the whole, this chapter would provide answers to such specific 
questions as; how, and on what basis, does the three-way distribution of 
enterprise revenue take place?, how is the wage fund divided among the 
employees of each enterprise?, how has the transfer of decision making 
power affected the level of wages and wage differentials in different 
enterprises, industries and regions?, what is the extent and form of 
State intervention in the determination of the actual wages of the work
1 The details of the last part and their variation in different periods 
v i U  n°t be discussed here as the, (all outside the scope of t C p ^ e n t
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force?
The nature and size of the three-way division of enterprise revenue 
have undergone many changes in the past three decades and it would be 
outside the scope of the present work to review each and every change. 
Instead, we have divided this thirty years into three strategic periods 
and analysed the pattern of distribution arrangement during each period. 
We have used the form of the State intervention in the economy as the 
basis of distinguishing different periods. The first period covers 
1947 to 1951 - the phase of central planning. This period will be 
discussed very briefly to serve as a background to later periods. The 
second period, covering 1952-60, was the period of transition from 
central planning to self-management. During this period most of the 
elements of state intervention were gradually dismantled and enterprises 
obtained increasingly greater degree of autonomy. The third period, 
from 1961 onwards, is the self management period, when the central 
planning apparatus was completely dismantled and economic reforms of 
1961, followed by the major reforms of 1965, completed the process of 
decentralization and granting of autonomy to enterprises.
A. Central Planning Period (1947-51)
As indicated earlier, under central planning, the enterprises were 
subordinated to the State Plan and had very little autonomy of their own. 
They were not considered as independent economic or legal entities res­
ponsible for their own revenue. They were rather regarded as technical 
units of production owned by the State which would provide funds for 
their expansion and other needs if such activities were deemed desirable. 
Major decisions affecting the enterprise were reached not at the enter­
prise level but at the district, republican or national levels where the 
State Plan was formulated. With wages determined centrally, the wage 
bill for each enterprise was known and what was left of the revenue after 
payment of operating costs and the wage bill flowed into the State
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budget. A small part of the revenue, determined by the Plan, flowed 
into a 'management fund' which remained at the disposal of the enterprise 
management and could be used for rewarding the outstanding workers and 
innovators, the promotion of workers' training or the development of 
cultural and social facilities for workers.*
The one area in which the enterprise had some influence was the 
remuneration of its work force which depended on the following:
i Basic rates of pay (and its range) for each category of skill and 
qualification,
ii Classification of the work force according to their skill and 
qualification, and
iii 'Bonus' (if any) for various members of the work force.
The first was fixed by the central planning agency alone and the 
enterprise had no say in deciding this national wage scale. As far as 
the second was concerned, although there existed national guidelines 
relating a worker's classification to his experience, years and type of 
training, etc., the management of each enterprise enjoyed a small degree 
of freedom - particularly in the case of more skilled workers - in 
deciding on the classification of each individual. The third was also 
determined by the government in a general form while its specific app­
lication was left to the enterprise management. The workers on the 
production line could get a bonus for the over-fulfilment of the norms 
set down by the superior Ministry or Directorate. The managerial 
personnel received premiums for over-fulfilment of the relegated enter­
prise quota. For the former group the volume of bonus was relatively 
small and did not constitute an important element of their earnings.
For the managerial personnel, however, the premiums constituted an 
important part of their incomes. As a whole, we may conclude that the 
enterprise had a very limited degree of freedom (formal or actual) in
1 I. Paj (1970), p. 68
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determining the earnings of their employees.
The adherence to the national wage scale was,however, less than 
complete and this created certain difficulties. Though wages were fixed 
nationally, workers were employed by individual enterprises. Since the 
performance of each enterprise could affect the remuneration of its 
employees (specially the managerial strata) and since there existed a 
shortage of skilled labour and qualified personnel, the above discrepancy 
meant that the firms would compete against each other for the skilled 
workers and would try to find loop-holes in the national wage scale in 
order to offer higher wage and attract the particular skill that they 
needed. This competition among managers led them to offer what Bicanic 
has termed "black wages over and above the stipulated l e v e l . T h e  
problem of non-adherence to the national wage scale was not a peculiar 
phenomenon of postwar Yugoslavia. It exists in one form or other in 
all centrally planned economies where wage scale is determined nationally 
but labour is employed by individual enterprises and not by the central 
planning agency. ! Unless labour is allocated to different enterprises 
by administrative means, the enterprise management will be forced to 
subvert the national tariff by means of "nonrwage" incomes such as bonus, 
fringe benefit in cash or kind, etc. Ilorvat maintains that for some
categories of workers, in this period, the ’non-wage* income was greater
t . . 2than their wage incomes.
As basic wages were determined by the Plan, there was no systematic 
attempt to relate them to the work performed. Efforts to increase 
production and productivity heavily relied on moral incentives rather 
than material rewards. Moral incentives took the form, familiar in 
Eastern Europe, of trophies, flags and titles to model factories and 
workers. In the immediate post-war period, it seems that this type of 
incentive did have the desired effect as there was a great deal of popular 12
1 R. Bicanic (1973), p. 103.
2 B. Horvat (1971a), p. 114.
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enthusiasm for the new government and the new-socio-economic system.^- 
But by late fourties and early fifties, the social and political con­
ditions for continued reliance on moral incentives were eroded. The 
events after the expulsion from the Cominform created the conditions for 
increased reliance on market forces and the granting of autonomy to 
enterprises. These developments also marked the end of the reliance on 
moral incentives for work stimulation.
As far as the ’bonuses' are concerned, their significance lay in 
their contribution to the development of differentials between the 
earnings of the workers of same skill category employed in different 
enterprises. Since the degree of over-fulfilment of planned quotas 
varied from one enterprise to another and from one branch of production 
to another, it meant that bonuses varied in different establishments. 
However, considering the relatively narrow range of planned wage rates 
and small bonuses, earning differentials had considerably decreased from 
their pre-war levels. The range of employee remuneration which had been 
about 1:16 before the war, was reduced to 1:3.5 during the central 
planning period.2
To sum up: the main characteristic of this period was that enter­
prises, being owned by the State, were not regarded as independent 
entities. They had very little control over the formation and dist­
ribution of their revenue. By and large, their revenue was divided into 
two categories: payment to the workers and appropriation by the State.
The former was only marginally affected by their performance and influenced 
by the enterprise management. However, compared to the majority of 
work force, the skilled workers and qualified employees, who were in 
short supply, enjoyed a better bargaining position and could manage to 
receive a higher level of non-wage income.
By 1951, the Yugoslav government had taken various measures in the 12
1 Log. ait.
2 Cited in B. Horvat (1976), p. 179.
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direction of decentralizing decision making and relegating more autonomy 
to the production units. Two aspects of this autonomy are of particular 
relevance to our discussion in this chapter. Firstly the State intended 
to leave as large a share as possible of the enterprise revenue to the 
enterprises themselves and secondly to leave the enterprises alone in 
deciding the division of their share between present income of the work 
force and the internal funds. The newly formed workers' councils and 
management boards were to handle these and other aspects of the distribu­
tion process. But to move towards this arrangement, a transition period 
was necessary during which the gradual relegation of autonomy could take 
place.
B. The Transition Period (1952-60)
During the transition period the formation of enterprise revenue was
quickly handed over to the individual enterprises while the distribution
of this revenue passed over to the management organs more slowly and
gradually. The important measures taken in regard to the former were the
abolition of production quotas and the freeing of the prices from central
control. As far as the latter was concerned, the process took longer and/
was carried out through several steps. In 1952 and 1953, the earnings of 
enterprise employees became partly dependent on the enterprise performance 
and by 1954 the principle of variation of wages in different enterprises 
and industries was formally accepted. The power to determine the basic 
wage rates for different categories of workers was handed over to the 
enterprises in 1955 subject to various constraints that lasted until the 
end of this period. The power to decide on the level and type of invest­
ment in the enterprise was partially relegated to the organs of enterprise 
management only after the 1958 reforms, while the central authorities cont­
inued to control the bulk of investment resources until the early sixties. 
The significance and implications of each step are briefly discussed in 
the following pages.
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i. The System of Accumulation and Funds (1952 and 53). The abolition of 
the production quotas and the abandoning of the central determination of 
prices were the most significant changes of this period. The prices were 
left to be determined in the market. Of course in the seller's market 
situation which prevailed in Yugoslavia •. and under conditions of largely 
imperfect competition, this meant that the prices would be determined by 
the enterprises. The government, as one would expect, had not given a free 
rein to the enterprises in setting the price level; it subjected a large 
number of commodities to a maximum ceiling price. In 1952 and 1953, however, 
the prices rose very sharply and this influenced the revenue of many enter­
prises. There were several reasons for allowing the enterprises to set the 
prices and at the same time allow the sharp price increases. Essentially, 
the "new economic system" was aimed at the development of a "socialist" 
market economy and as such the government could not continue its price 
fixing operation any longer. The rapid increase in some prices was also 
necessary as some commodities such as raw material and agricultural products 
were previously underpriced and had to be allowed to rise in order to reach 
their market level. Besides, some prices had indeed got out of line with 
the cost of production. This did not matter very much in the central 
planning period as most of the transactions - particularly those involving 
means of production - were of a nominal nature only. But as enterprises 
began to assume their new role as independent units, which would be seriously 
affected by the transaction with other firms, the prices had to be related 
to production costs and this required their determination in the market.
Given the fact that the price elasticity of demand is different for 
different products, the degree to which enterprises could raise their 
revenue varied from one enterprise to another. The immediate effect of the 
end of central price fixing was the emergence of differences in the 
financial position of enterprises. Had the enterprises obtained, at the 
same time, the full right to decide on the distribution of their revenue
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(which had suddenly increased as a result of price rise), the workers’ 
councils might have apportioned the bulk of the extra revenue to their wage 
funds. There are many reasons why this could have happened. Workers' 
councils had just been established and had no experience regarding wage 
determination, investment requirements, etc. The excess demand for consumer 
goods and the backlog demand, built up in the post-war years as a result of 
low wages, could also stimulate a sharp increase in wages. As investment 
expenditure was financed by the central authorities and did not depend on 
the performance or internal resources of the enterprise, the managers had 
very good reasons to keep as little as possible in the enterprise and pay 
the rest in salaries and wages.
The result was that the State continued to retain its control over the 
distribution of the enterprise revenue among various uses. The level and 
composition of investment was still determined by the State which appropriated 
a part of enterprises revenue for various funds under its own control. The 
investment expenditure of enterprises (for expansion or replacement), after 
being approved by the appropriate government agency, was financed out of 
these funds and as such had nothing to do with the performance of the firm.
The State control over the distribution of revenue was exercised
through the so-called 'rate of accumulation and funds'1 2from which the size
of the wage fund could be calculated. In the Yugoslav terminology, the
Accumulation and Funds of an enterprise refers to the total made up of
social contributions and taxes paid by the enterprise and the funds left at
its own disposal. The rate of accumulation and funds was defined as the
ratio of 'accumulation and funds' to 'wage fund’. The rate was fixed by the
annual federal plan. In essence, the rate determined what proportion of
the net income of the enterprise (defined as the gross revenue less 
2operating costs ) could be distributed to the employees and what proportion
1 Sometimes called the 'saving-wage bill rate'.
2 Operating costs include the cost of raw material, semi-finished innuts
fuel, other material and depreciation.  ^ '
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would be appropriated by the State. Only a very small part of the latter 
would remain in the enterprise.
In determining the rate of accumulation and funds several factors were 
taken into account. As the basic wage rates for each category of worker 
was still determined by the annual plan, the rate of accumulation and funds 
must have been chosen in such a way that a reasonably similar wage 
structure would be produced in different industries and enterprises. 
Application of a single rate to all industries would have led, among 
other things, to highly differentiated income patterns for workers of 
different enterprises and industries. The rate of accumulation and funds 
had to vary if the aim of maintaining a given scale of wages with rough 
precision was to be achieved. The desire for relative equality was not the 
only consideration in the determination of the rates. The need to link 
the workers’ earnings to the performance of their respective enterprise in 
order to stimulate productivity,^ as well as the need to control the level 
of wages and therefore consumption must have been taken into account too.
Table 1, below, shows the rate of accumulation and funds for different 
sectors and some selected industries. The variation of the rate across the
Table 1 - Rates of Accumulation and Funds for Different Sectors and 
Selected Industries in Percentages
Sector or industry 1952 1953
Average for all sectors 113 116
Manufacturing & Mining 582 509Agriculture 19 19Construction 103 105Transport 215 126Catering & Tourism 76 76
Selected Industries
Electric Energy 564 475Coal 282 263Oil 1355 1137Ferrous Metallurgy 366 499Textiles 1051 1270
Source: L.Sirc (1975),pp.52 and 54
1 B. Horvat (1976), p,18l) — -------—
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sectors and industries was meant to be the recognition of the fact that the 
distribution of enterprise net income between workers and the State need 
not be the same in all activities.*
The problem with the above scheme was that it implied that all 
enterprises in a single industry could be treated equally and subjected 
to the same rate of accumulation and funds. Obviously differences in 
capital intensity, technology of production, level of employment, etc., 
varied greatly from one firm to another in each industry and the application 
of one rate to all of them would have created large differentials between 
the wage funds of different firms, and consequently the personal incomes 
of employees of different firms. Therefore, for 1953, different rates were
applied to the different enterprises in each industry. Some examples of
. . 2 these variations are:
Production of ordinary nails at Jesenice enterprise 3200 per cent
Production of ordinary nails elsewhere about 700 per cent
Cotton weaving mills in Slovenia 1512 per cent
Cotton weaving mills in Macedonia 419 per cent
The procedure for distribution of the enterprise net income was then:
i) to apply the rate of accumulation and fund to the net income, ii) to
determine the portion to be distributed among the employees as wages, and
iii) to determine the portion to be appropriated by the State.
The workers' remuneration, as before, depended on their basic wage
and a possible bonus. The former in turn depended on the category of skill
and qualification to which each worker belonged and the rate of pay for
each class. The classification of the work force according to their skill
and the rate of basic pay for each skill category was still determined
1 To give an example of the meaning of the rate of accumulation and funds 
the situation in manufacturing and mining and agriculture may be exclaimed 
In 1952 for every 100 dinar allocated to wage fund, the manufacturing and 
mining enterprises had to allocate 582 dinars to 'accumulation and funds'
i.e., only about 15 per cent of the net income could be allocated to wage' 
fund. The situation in agriculture was totally different. The agricultur­
al enterprises could allocate up to 84 per cent of their net income to 
wage fund.
2 L. Sire (1975), p.57
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centrally. After the basic wages were paid out of the wage fund, the 
remainder could be distributed as bonuses by the enterprise organs of 
management. This is roughly the same method as was operative in the 
previous period except that it had changed qualitatively. Firstly, the 
total wage fund had become partially dependent on enterprise performance 
since the output and price were decided at the enterprise level. Secondly, 
the wage fund could now be large enough to pay out not only the basic 
rates of pay but also a considerable bonus. Thirdly, an enterprise with 
poor performance might have ended up with a wage fund not sufficient to 
cover the basic rates of pay of its work force. This clearly demonstrated 
the acceptance of the principle of the dependence of wages on the perform­
ance of the enterprise. During this period and subsequently, there have 
existed legislations guaranteeing minimum wage for workers of all enter­
prises. If an organisation was making heavy losses to the extent that 
its wage fund was insufficient to pay out the minimum legal wage, then the 
State would subsidize it up to that point. The minimum legal wages, 
however, were far below the basic wages.
In terms of workers' incomes, therefore, several possibilities could 
arise, and two extremes of which should be discussed. First, the possibility 
that the enterprise would perform poorly due to unfavourable market 
conditions, obsolete equipment, etc., and as a result the wage fund would 
be small, maybe too small even to cover the minimum legal wages, thus 
requiring state subsidy. The second possibility was that of a successful 
enterprise making a large income as a result of its own performance and/or 
favourable market conditions and ending up with a large wage fund well 
above the enterprises in a similar line of activity. The basic wages, as 
fixed by the annual plan, were paid out first and the rest was distributed 
as bonuses. The workers in each category of skill in the second type 
of enterprise could earn incomes several times that of similar workers in 
the first type of enterprise. In order to prevent large differentiation
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the government imposed a progressed tax on the wage fund of enterprises 
in which the average monthly wage of the whole enterprise was in excess 
of 9000 dinars.1 Clearly, if the enterprise had sufficient numbers of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers on its payroll who received low wages 
and kept the average wage down, it could afford to pay very high wages to 
its more skilled workers and highly qualified staff without subjecting 
itself to a tax. Thus many employees who received more than 9000 dinars 
could go untaxed.
During this period the possibilities for wage differentiation within 
the enterprises and between enterprises were enhanced. On the one hand, 
the total revenue (and therefore the wage fund) was now related to the 
enterprise performance vis-a-vis price and output. This opened up the 
possibility of divergences between different enterprises. Of course 
this divergence was meant to be wiped out by the imposition of different 
rates of accumulation and funds. But it was almost impossible to fix 
the rate so precisely and accurately that the final wage scale would be 
uniform across the country. It was impossible because of: i) the lack 
of complete knowledge of the performance of each and every enterprise a 
year ahead, ii) the inexperience of the planning agencies, iii) the 
administrative difficulties involved, and most important of all, iv) the 
fact that a certain degree of differential between enterprises was actually 
considered desirable. This type of differentiation was to some degree 
exacerbated by the discovery of certain loop-holes in the system of fixing 
rates. The difficulties in determining the rate of accumulation and funds 
produced conditions in which the rate fixing authorities could exercise 
a certain degree of arbitrariness and, therefore, favouritism. As
Bicanic pointed out, the rates sometimes depended "on the 'puli' of the
2managers and their VIP friends."
On the other hand, the distribution of bonuses and the use of 12
1 L. Sire (1975), p. 57.
2 R. Bicanic (1973), p. 105.
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practice of avoiding progressive tax on high incomes also lent 
themselves to further income differentiation. Bonuses are essentially 
meant to be based on the performance of the individual worker as well 
as his production unit. But in Yugoslovia, in addition to performance, 
the bonuses were also linked to scarcity, i.e., the skilled workers 
and qualified staff could receive large bonuses by virtue of their 
being in short supply leading to competition between different enter­
prises. This, then, contributed to the expansion of income differen­
tials not only between different categories of workers in each enter­
prise but also between the workers of different enterprises, industries 
and regions.
To sum up the developments of this period: the significant step in 
the direction of granting autonomy to the enterprises was the transfer 
from the central planning agency to the enterprise management of the 
power to decide on output and prices. This meant that the enterprises 
could influence and determine their own gross revenue. In the sphere 
of distribution of this revenue, the central control, in the main, con­
tinued to remain in force. By determining the total wage fund (through 
the fixing of the rate of accumulation and funds), the skill classification 
of the work force and the basic wage rate for each class of labour, the 
central authorities could exert considerable influence in the formation 
of workers’ earnings. The influence of the enterprise was limited to 
the distribution of bonuses whose size had become much more important 
than the previous period. But as Paj points out, as far as the basic 
objectives of self-management - the transfer of decision making power to 
the work force - was concerned, the system of accumulation and funds 
"did not mean any major progress towards strengthening the role of 
producers in income distribution."* One important consequence of develop­
ments in this period was the acceptance and emergence of wage differentials 1
1 I. Paj (1970), p. 68.
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between workers of different skills in each enterprise as well as between 
workers with same skill working in different enterprises.
2. The Profit Sharing System (1954-57). From 1954 the system of 
"accumulation and funds" was abolished and replaced by the profit 
sharing system. The new system can be regarded as an extension of 
enterprise autonomy and an application of the principle of leaving as 
large a share of revenue as possible at the disposal of the enterprises. 
The major changes that took place in this period were:
i Extension of the enterprise autonomy over output-price decisions, 
ii Relegation of the power to decide on wage structure, (subject to 
some constraints) to the enterprise organs of management, 
iii Explicit recognition of the dependence of workers’ earnings on the 
performance of their enterprise, and 
iv Relegation of the power to decide on wage differentials within each 
enterprise to its management.
Of course, as we indicated earlier, in the previous period too 
the workers’ remuneration partly depended on the enterprise’s economic 
performance. But this dependence was not formally acknowledged as 
payments to workers over and above those specified by the national wage 
scale were in the form of bonuses or other fringe benefits. In 1954, 
the government came round to acknowledging the dependence of the workers' 
income on the performance of the enterprises in which they were employed 
and, for this purpose, introduced a new category of income: profit.
The employees of each firm were to receive over and above their pre­
determined fixed wage, a portion of enterprise profit. The State and 
the enterprise would apportion the rest of the profit (thus the system 
of profit sharing). We shall discuss shortly the system of wage deter­
mination, but first let us discuss the three-way distribution of enter­
prise profit.
The ’profit’ of each enterprise was defined as the difference between
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the gross revenue of the enterprise and its operating costs and contractual 
obligations.1 An important development was the treatment of the total 
fixed wage bill as a component of total costs in enterprise calculations.
In other words, the Yugoslav firms began to treat wages in exactly the
same way as the capitalist firms. The two types of firms also shared
a similar concept and definition of profit in this period. The profit 
was then divided into the following components: 
i Federal tax on profit (50%)
ii Contribution to the budgets of local governments (district and 
commune)
iii Supplement to workers' fixed wages, and
iv Enterprise funds.
The division was first of all affected strongly by item (i), i.e., 
the 50 per cent federal tax on profits in favour of the federal budget.
The second item was determined by the commune and district authorities.2 
The third and fourth items were determined statutorily by the government. 
There was some room for manoeuvereas the federal plan fixed the range 
within which the third item could vary (8-16% of fixed wage fund).3 
The district authorities, in consultation with the commune and the enter­
prise, and by considering the performance of the enterprise, decided on 
the exact proportion in each individual case. The enterprise's own 
funds were of significance since their formation was the beginning of 
independent investment financing by the enterprises. Of course at this 
stage the bulk of investment was still determined by the federal, 
republican and communal social plan and financed out of the investment
1
3
2
Operating costs were defined above. The contractual obligations 
.ist of interest (6»  on fixed capital (introduced in « 5 0 * and tax' 
fees for Bembership m  économe associations, turnover tax' (produc“ m
detaillater IheSe lte”s “i U  be « “ nsseiî in greâûr
District and Commune are territorial and administrative divisi™« v ,
£ \ æ s s leÆ - , .  î r i 8 t r i "  -  *■z
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funds at the disposal of the government. The enterprise's own funds 
constituted only a small proportion of resources available for investment.
The reforms in the sphere of the formation and distribution of 
enterprise revenue developed the autonomy of enterprise management by: 
i) making the total revenue and therefore total profit closely linked 
to enterprise performance, ii) making the supplementary part of the 
earnings of workers (their share of enterprise profit) dependent on the 
enterprise performance, and finally, iii) providing a small, but expan­
ding, fund for investment activities at the disposal of the enterprise 
and linking this also to the performance.
By this time the workers' councils had obtained a great deal of 
power including, from 1954, the right to participate in appointing the 
directors of enterprises. The above reforms provided new opportunities 
for their participation and helped expand the sphere of their work.
The determination of workers' wages was slightly more complex.
The total wage was the sum of two independent parts, the fixed wage and 
the variable wage. The enterprise participated in the determination 
of both components but was subjected to strict supervision by the State. 
In terms of fixed wages, in 1954, all workers were divided into four 
categories of skill (highly skilled, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled) 
and a nominal or accounting wage was determined for each category. The 
difference with the previous period was that the categories of clas­
sification had reduced from 9 to 4. The determination of a wage rate 
for each category of worker in each enterprise was left to its own 
workers' council subject to the restriction that the average wage of 
workers in each category did not exceed the accounting wage for that 
category set by the State. It is clear that wages for various workers 
in each category were not the same since the conditions of work, their 
experience, seniority, etc., were different. The autonomy of the 
workers' council had extended to deciding the fixed wage of the workers 
in different categories. The accounting wages imposed by the plan in
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1954 for the four categories were; 12000, 8000, 7000, and 6000 dinars 
per month. The local commune was empowered to increase these figures 
by up to 20 per cent depending on the conditions in which the enterprises 
operated.* Since the classification of workers into different categories 
was done by the enterprise management, one can claim that the deter­
mination of fixed wage rate had been largely transferred to the enter-
4
prises themselves. The central control on the average wage of each 
category meant that the State could control the total wage bill in the 
economy, and therefore the level of national consumption. This was 
particularly necessary for, as we discussed in Chapter One, if the 
enterprises had full control over the use of revenue for wage payment, 
they would have been able to allocate a much larger share to the wage 
fund which could have had serious macroeconomic implications.
The variable wage was the supplement to the fixed wage from enter­
prise profits, i.e., it represented the share of each worker in the 
profit. As we mentioned before, the size of the variable wage was 
affected by both the State (through its determination of the proportion 
of profit that could be distributed to workers) and the enterprise itself 
(through its performance in the market). Its distribution among 
various workers was decided by the workers' council on the basis of the 
fixed wage of individual workers, their individual performance and the 
performance of their production unit. The size of total variable wages 
in 1954 was 4.8 per cent of the total profits and gradually increased to 
9.2 per cent by 1957. On average the variable wage, usually called the
thirteenth pay slip, amounted to the equivalent of one (sometimes two
2and occasionally more) months of fixed wages.
In 1955, there was a small change in the system of determination 
of fixed wages. The accounting wage for the four categories of workers 
were abolished and a new constraint in the form of a guideline for
1 I. Paj (1970), p. 71.
2 R. Bicanic (1973), p. 106.
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distribution was announced. In practice this meant that the workers' 
council had to prepare the wage schedule (denoting the classification of 
the employees into nine categories again and the fixed wage rate for 
each worker), and then obtain the approval of the local trade union 
council and the local commune on this wage schedule.*
What were the implications of the system of enterprise revenue dist­
ribution in the 1954-57 period? Firstly, enterprise control on the 
formation of its gross revenue was strengthened. Secondly, the deter­
mination of fixed wages (which were the main component of workers' 
earnings) were left to enterprise management subject to certain cons­
traints (such as the observance of the accounting wages or the approval 
of the trade union council and communal authorities). Thirdly, the 
size of the variable wage was dependent on the success of the enterprise 
operation as measured by its profit. Fourthly, by the allocation of 
a small proportion of profit to enterprise internal funds and leaving 
this fund at the disposal of the enterprise management for investment 
purposes, the first step towards independent investment financing was 
taken. Fifthly, the method of determination of fixed and variable 
wages created the necessary conditions for differentiation of earnings 
within the enterprises and between the enterprises. This was the 
expression of the fact that the workers' councils had, now, obtained 
the right to decide on the level of differentials between different 
categories of workers in each enterprise. Each of these two types 
of earning differentials must be discussed in more detail.
The sources of earning differentiation for workers of similar skill 
working in different enterprises were: i) the difference in the market 
performance of different enterprises which could affect the profit and 1
1 In principle this system was very similar to that of 1954 with one 
constraint replacing another. Here the guideline took the form of 
linking the wage rises to changes in capital-labour ratio and workers' 
productivity. For details of these guidelines, see S. Pejovich (1966), 
p p .  73—75.
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therefore the variable wage component of the earnings, and ii) the 
difference in the fixed wages of workers of a particular skill category 
who worked in different enterprises, as decided by the councils and 
approved by the communal authorities and trade union councils. The 
first source is the significant one while the second source played only 
a marginal role in the development of wage differentials. The mono­
polistic position of some enterprises, the preferential treatment given 
to some industries (in the form of tax cuts, subsidies, artificially low 
priced raw materials, etc.), the regional location of some enterprises 
(affecting their raw material supply or market) as well as the efficiency 
of the production process led to some enterprises performing better than 
others. In other words, the size of profit and therefore the variable 
wage fund was much greater in some than in others. The variable wage 
in some enterprises amounted to as high as 75 per cent of the annual 
fixed wage (i.e., the equivalent of eight monthly pay slips).1 The 
second source of differentiation, i.e., the fixed wages for each 
category, also helped, though to a smaller extent, to enlarge the 
differentials between enterprises. In theory, of course, the fixed 
wage was to relate to skill and qualification, with due consideration 
given to the conditions of work and the experience of the worker, and 
not to performance. In practice, however, the competition between 
various enterprises to attract skilled workers led to conditions encou­
raging the circumvention of guidelines for fixed wages and the introduction 
of considerations other than skill in the determination of the wage 
schedule. This was particularly so in the case of skilled workers who, 
as Pejovich has put it, could "write their own tickets."1 2
The point is that the enterprises had a vested interest in reducing 
the size of their profit and in increasing their fixed wage fund, as 
the profits were heavily taxed by the State. Increase in fixed wage
1 Loo, oit.
2 S. Pejovich (1966), p. 99.
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fund could be achieved by fictitiously upgrading the skill category of 
some workers and choosing a very wide range for each category so that 
high wages could be paid while at the same time the ’average wage' res­
trictions could be observed too.1 234 (This last step also had implications 
in regard to inter-enterprise wage differentials that will be discussed 
shortly.) An ILO investigation, for example, showed that the total
earnings of the highly skilled category of workers in 35 different coal
. 2mines ranged from 13000 to 20900 dinars per month.
The workers' councils, as we pointed out in Chapter One paid con­
siderable attention to questions relating to the workers' wages and 
income distribution. Their objectives during this and the preceeding 
period were dominated by the desire to increase wages as much as possible 
(very much like the Ward-Vanek type of objective function). This, in 
turn, implied that there was room for wage differentials between the 
enterprises to grow as a result of their different bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the local authorities.
As far as wage differentiation between different categories of skill 
in each enterprise was concerned, the sources were; i) difference in 
fixed wages between different skill categories, and ii) difference in 
variable wages paid out to different skill categories. The government 
had accepted that there should be a certain degree of wage differential 
between different categories and its guidelines clearly reflected this 
acceptance. The actual differentials in the fixed wages, however, 
were greater due to the scarcity of the skilled and trained personnel.^
1 B. Horvat (1976), p. 181; Jan Vanek (1972), p. 72; and H. M. Wachtell
(1973), p. 103.
2 ILO (1962), p. 137.
3 The guidelines for 1954, spelled out in terms of accounting wages of 12, 
8, 7 and 6 thousand dinars, show the accepted level of differences.
4 While the total wage of highly skilled labour could reach as high as 
18000 dinars per month, as was the case in the coal industry in Croatia 
or Ferrous Metallurgy in Slovenia, the total wage of unskilled workers 
reached as low as 4000, as was the case in Food Industry in Montenegro 
(compared to accounting wages of 12000 and 6000 for the two categories’ 
in 1954). -SGJ (1955), pp. 288-289.
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The variable wages, which were decided upon by the enterprise management 
without government intervention, contributed more significantly than the 
fixed wages to earning differentials between different categories. The 
underlying factors were the scarcity of highly skilled workers and 
qualified staff, as well as the significant influence of these two groups 
on the decisions made by the councils. In Chapter One weshowed the 
heavy representation of these groups, especially the upper strata of the 
white collar workers, on the management organs and their gradual domination 
of the decision making apparatus, Table 2, below, shows the
schedule according to which the variable wages were distributed in 1956 
and clearly expresses the dominant position of the upper strata of the 
white collar workers in the determination of this part of workers’ 
earnings.
Table 2 - Variable Wages as a Percentage of Fixed Wages for 
Different Categories of Workers in the Manufacturing and Mining
Enterprises in 1956
skill category variable wage as 
% of fixed wage
All workers 7.7
White collar workers 14.4
High and higher level of professional education 14.0Intermediate level of professional education 10.6Primary level of professional education 8.6Lower level of professional education 7.9
Blue collar workers 7.0
Highly skilled workers 9.1Skilled workers 7.1Semi-skilled workers 6.9Unskilled workers 5.4
Source: H. M. Wachtell (1973), p. 108
While the percentages show a difference of about 3:1 between the 
highest and the lowest paid group, the actual earnings of the two groups 
out of the enterprise profit was even more differentiated as these per­
centages had to be applied to fixed wages which themselves were already 
polarized. The system of revenue distribution in this period, in short
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provided a fertile ground for the development of earning differentials 
between and within enterprises for fixed as well as variable wages.
What was the role of the State in the three-way division of the 
enterprise revenue? By engaging in various forms of price control 
(fixing prices of certain commodities or fixing the upper limits for 
some others), the State influenced the formation of enterprise revenue 
in the first place. The State also influenced the fixed wage fund 
through various policy measures, such as the annual federal plan, and by 
relying on institutions such as the trade union councils and local 
authorities, which had to approve the enterprises' wage schedules.
The degree of effectiveness of these policies, of course, depended on the 
power of the enterprise management and its bargaining strength, the 
importance of the enterprise for the local economy, etc. The outcome of 
the negotiation between the enterprises and their respective local 
governments was bound to vary widely from one case to another. The 
State could in the last resort influence the variable wage fund and 
the funds at the disposal of enterprises by varying the size of these 
components in favour of the federal, district or the communal government. 
Although the State had committed itself to workers* management and decen­
tralized market economy, this did not mean that it would allow complete 
enterprise autonomy over wages. As long as the management of the 
economy was entrusted to the government, it could not allow the wage 
system to be handled bywrkers' councils alone as this would have affected 
the whole macroeconomic performance of the economy. The government 
could not be indifferent to the workers' councils wanting to allot a 
greater portion of net earnings to the workers' incomes, since such a 
tendency could seriously affect the level of wages in the economy and 
therefore the level of prices, consumption and investment.
By 1957, the workers' councils had acquired a great deal of experience 
and were demanding more autonomy. The First Congress of Workers' Councils
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in 1957 demanded that a greater share of enterprise revenue be placed 
at the disposal of the workers’ councils for division between enterprises 
and their employees.1 The government, having finally completed the 
investment projects of the ill-fated First Five-Year Plan and also 
enjoying the successes of several years of very rapid economic growth, 
was in a position of strength to proceed with its policy of further 
decentralization and the granting of greater autonomy to the organs of 
management of enterprises. This implied yet another change in the 
system of revenue distribution.
23. The Income Sharing System (1958-60). The changeover to this system, 
was semantic, more than anything. The category of ’wage' was regarded 
as implying the old wage-labour relation and the category of ’profit’ 
was associated with capitalist enterprises. As a result, the workers’ 
earnings were to be called ’personal income’ and the division of enter­
prise net earnings between the State, the enterprise and the work force 
was to be termed 'income sharing'. The determination of the level of 
personal incomes, however, remained the same, i.e., the main part of the 
earnings was decided in advance in the enterprise wage schedule and 
approved by the outside authorities while the supplementary part was paid 
out at the end of the year. There were, of course, some actual changes 
too. The enterprises were authorized to form their own fixed and
working capital funds out of which a certain amount of investment could 
be financed. The type and magnitude of the State appropriations also 
slightly changed.
The three-way division was now based on ’net income’ which was 
defined as the gross enterprise revenue less costs and contractual 
obligations. The wages were no longer considered part of contractual 
costs. Therefore the new category ’net income' was equal to the total
1 B. Horvat (1976), p. 182.
2 Some enterprises such as those in industry, transport and communication
• S d  i n r & r 1* ?  s y s t e m  i n  1 9 5 8  *h i u
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of the 'profit' as defined in the previous period and the workers' fixed 
wage fund.
The net income was then divided according to the following schedule: 
i) Contribution to social investment funds1, replacing the federal tax 
on profit. This progressive tax (with the marginal rate going as high 
as 70 per cent)2 was paid into the federal, republican and communal invest­
ment funds to finance the investment projects approved by these 
authorities.
ii) Gross income of the employees to replace the sum of fixed and 
variable wage of the previous system. Unlike the previous period, the 
gross incomes were subject to a progressive income tax (with the marginal 
rate going as high as 40 per cent). This was called 'the contributions 
on personal income' and was collected by the federal, republican and 
communal budgets.3 There were, of course other levies applied to gross 
incomes but they existed in the previous period as well (the more impor­
tant ones being contributions to the Housing Construction Fund and to 
Social Insurance).
iii) Enterprise funds, now composed of fixed capital fund, working 
capital fund, welfare fund and reserve fund.
The new arrangement, though largely similar to the previous one, 
implied that enterprise autonomy as regards the distribution of revenue 
had increased to a small extent. Firstly, the three-way division of 
net income was not based on the statutory proportions handed down by 
the governeent. After the contribution to social investment funds 
(item i above) was paid out, the enterprises could decide on the division 
of the remainder between (ii) and (iii) as they saw fit, though still
1 In Yugoslav fiscal terminology, the terms 'tax' and 'contributions' 
are basically synonyms. The former is usually applied to incomes 
derived from property ownership (such as land tax or tax on rent) while 
the latter is applied to income from labour.
2 For the schedule of tax on net incomes see S. Pejovich (1966) t> 97
3 Jbid., p. 99. * F* *'*
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subject to the approval of the communal authorities and trade union 
councils. Secondly, the new category of personal income reflected the 
acceptance by the government of the need to make workers’ income more 
heavily dependent on the enterprise performance. Thirdly, the formation 
of fixed and working capital funds meant that enterprises could indepen­
dently decide on a portion of their investment requirements without 
going to the authorities of the local or higher level governments.
The decentralization of investment decision (even if only partial) was 
an important step in the development of enterprise autonomy. Through 
deciding on the investment projects, the enterprises could also affect 
the size of revenue at their disposal in the future periods.
The appearance of taxes is another aspect of income distribution in
the period after 1954 and increasingly since 1958. Under the system
of central planning, there was no need for taxes in the public sector
as the allocation of resources, wages and prices were determined by the
central planning agency. With the decentralization of decision making,
the introduction of market determined prices and the granting of autonomy
over wages, prices and part of the investment to the enterprises, the
State relinquished its complete control over resources and this was
coupled with the appearance of taxes. The taxes also indirectly affected
the actual division of the net earnings. Taxation of personal income
(with up to 40 per cent marginal rate) was a means of discouraging the
enterprises from distributing their income too heavily in favour of
personal incomes since, at such high rates, such a decision would have
amounted to handing over their earnings to the government. The part
of net income remaining within the enterprise was subject to the capital
tax (interest on fixed and variable capital) of only 6 per cent whereas
handing it to the workers would have made it subject to a much higher
tax. The efficient enterprises found themselves in a situation biased
♦
towards further investment and expansion. The system had, within it, a
built-in bias of the type discussed in the previous chapter. On the 
other hand since income tax was shared by the budgets of the local and 
republican governments, their interest lay in having a large personal 
income fund. This could be assured by the local governemnt being less 
stringent when it came to approving the wage schedule of the enterprises.
In terms of the earnings of the work force, the new system was 
different from the previous one in some respects. In theory, the shift 
from one category of earnings (wage) to another (income) was based on the 
view that granting of autonomy to enterprises meant that the final step 
was taken in transforming state-controlled enterprises to workers' par­
tnerships. The income derived from partnership is, to some extent, 
an uncertain quantity due to the fact that the partners do not control 
all the variables involved. This is a characteristic attributed to 
'profit' when it is regarded as a return to risk. The category of 
'wage', however, implies a contractual relation, with no uncertainty 
and no risk. The distribution of the net income in the new system was 
meant to signify that the Yugoslav firms were moving towards partner­
ships. As the exact volume of the 'personal incomes fund' depended on 
the annual level of output and the calculation of all taxes and cont­
ributions based on annual performance, it could not be known until the 
annual production period had ended. The workers would receive monthly 
payments in the form of advances on their final earnings until the 
result of the annual operation was fully known. The thirteenth pay slip 
would be the difference between their total personal income and the sum 
of their twelve monthly advances. This view, however, is the formal 
aspect of the introduction of new categories and of the change. In 
reality, most of the previous practices continued. The monthly payment, 
supposed to be advances, were regarded as 'basic wage', the thirteenth 
pay slip was regarded as a share in the profits (or additional income 
to employees). More importantly, the bulk of employees' earnings
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retained the character of 'wages’ rather than 'profit'. From 1961, the 
official date has ceased to give the break-down of incomes into basic 
wage and thirteenth pay slip. Instead they provide information on total 
personal incomes. But the actual practice of the enterprises is far 
from incorporating these ideas into accounting procedures and distributive 
practices. As Wachtell points out, the enterprises still treat the 
monthly pay slip as basic wages and as a component of costs and deduct 
the total of basic wages along with other cost items from the revenue to 
reach the profits, part of which is handed to the employees as a supple­
ment to their incomes.*-
The determination of personal incomes in this period was much the 
same as before. The only difference was the improvements in the system 
of classification and evaluation of each worker's contribution to output. 
While in the previous periods job classification was based on broad 
categories, now the use of job evaluation techniques coupled with the 
finer classification of the work force enabled the enterprise management 
to assess the performance of each employee more accurately. These 
assessments were then to be used as the basis for remuneration. A finer 
classification obviously meant an increase in wage differentials within 
different categories of workers in each enterprise. At the same time 
different methods of job evaluation began to develop. The wage rate was 
to depend on various factors such as skill, experience, education require­
ment, responsibility, physical effort, mental effort, working con- 
ditions, etc. The most common method of job evaluation was the so-called 
•point system'. This method involved assigning a certain number of 
points to every criteria that affected the wage rate. The total of
1 H. M. Wachtell (1973), p. 101. Wachtell's assertion can be supple­
mented by another evidence yet. Extracts from the 1967 and 1968 
Annual Accounts of the Worker-Managed Enterprises include the item 
"personal incomes charged to costs" in exactly the same sense as 
-pointed out by Wachtell. See Jan Vanek (1972), p. 253
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these points for all the relevant criteria constituted the price tag 
on each job. An example of the application of this system is given in 
Table 3, below. It represents the points assigned to each of the
criteria for wage determination, of a sample of jobs in a textile factory.
Table 3 ~ Sample of Job Evaluation by Point System
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General Manager 100 170 150 190 10 100 10 730
Technical Manager 100 140 140 160 10 90 10 650
Works Manager 100 130 100 120 10 90 30 580
Sales Manager 100 130 100 140 10 90 10 580
Book-keeper 100 100 50 90 10 80 10 440
Foreman 80 60 40 50 10 40 40 320
Skilled weaver 50 40 - 40 35 30 40 235
Semi-skilled spinner 30 20 - 20 30 10 40 150
Lorry Driver 80 60 - 70 30 40 40 320
Cleaner 20 10 - 10 40 10 40 130
Source: R. Bicanic (1973), p. 109
According to Bicanic in this factory of 2800 workers, some 400 different 
jobs were evaluated according to this system.*"
The above schedule does not include any points relating to bonuses 
and premiums for such actions as lowering costs, safety, increasing 
productivity, etc. A separate schedule formulates the distribution of 
premiums.
An important aspect of the point system as shown in Table 3 is the 
role it plays in increasing income differentiation within each enter­
prise. This is done by attaching different weights to different 
criteria which, at the same time, are associated with different skills.
We shall return to this shortly.
As far as the two types of income differentiations are concerned, 
the ’income sharing period’ is essentially similar to the previous 'profit
.1 R. Bicanic (1973), p. 108.
sharing period'. Except that in this period, the need for personal 
income to depend on the actual performance was stated explicitly. 
Accordingly, there was greater reliance on profit as a stimulus to raise 
productivity. This aspect was important particularly in developing 
income differentials between different enterprises. In order to point 
out the importance of profit share (the thirteenth pay slip) in the 
workers' earnings, the situation in three different enterprises is shown 
in Table 4. The figures on basic wage and supplements from profit are 
taken directly from the income statements of the three enterprises.
Table 4 - The relationship between Earning Components 
(1000 dinars) in three Different Enterprises
Earnings
Metalna
Tovarija Pol- 
joprivrednih 
Sprava
Vaga
1958 1959 1958 1959 1959
Basic wage 288 282 187 177 278
Additional pay from profit 142 145 52 75 -54*
Additional pay as a pro­
portion of basic wage (%) 49 52 28 42 20
* This means that in the next period, the workers' earnings will be 
reduced by this amount.
Source: S. Pejovich (1966), p. 102
The second type of differentiations, i.e., that within each enter­
prise continued to persist and even expand to some extent. The wage 
schedule determined by the 'point system' such as that shown in Table 3 
was one source of this type of differentiation. As one can see from 
this table, the criteria which mostly applied to lower level employees 
carried smaller weights than those which are mainly related to the 
management strata. For example the criterion of 'conditions of work' 
or ’physical effort' applying basically to workers on the shop floor and 
in harsh environments received points between 10 to 40, while the 
criterion of 'responsibility' carried weights of 10 to 190. The scale 
was clearly tilted in favour of the managerial strata. In view of our
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discussions in Chapter One concerning the dominant position of this 
strata on the enterprise management organs, this bias should not be 
surprising.
Another source of inter-enterprise differentiation was the dist­
ribution of the 13th pay slip. Although the nature of this was supposed 
to be different in the post-1958 period (i.e., a residual earnings for 
coop members rather than a bonus for hired labourer), in practice its 
distribution remained subject to the same considerations as before.
Table 5 represents the size of the 13th pay slip as a percentage of the 
basic wage in 1959 and 1961 in the enterprises of the Manufacturing and 
Mining sector for different categories of workers.
Table 5 - The Thirteenth Pay-Slip as Percentage of the Basic
Wage for Different Categories of Workers in Mf' g. and Mining
Skill category 1959 1961
All workers 13.9 9.7
White collar workers 18.1 12.7
High & Higher levels of professional education 20.6 14.1
Intermediate level of professional education 16.6 11.8
Primary level of professional education 14.0 10.2
Lower level of professional education 11.7 8.2
Blue collar workers 13.2 9.4
Highly skilled workers 16.7 11.8
Skilled workers 13.3 8.6
Semi-skilled workers 13.1 8.2
Unskilled workers 9.1 6.7
Source: H. M. Wachtell (1973), p. 108
According to the above table, the more successful the enterprise, 
the greater would be the wage differential between the professional staff 
and the unskilled workers. The uneven distribution of supplements is, 
more than anything else, the reflection of the unequal distribution of 
influence between the two groups of employees on the decisions of the 
management organs - a point explained in detail in Chapter One.
By 1960, the Yugoslav society was ready for another major shake up
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in the form of new reforms in all fields of social, economic and political 
life. The system of distribution of enterprise revenue and wage deter­
mination also underwent some changes. But before moving to the third 
period of our analysis (the post-1960s), we must sum up the developments 
in the fields of revenue distribution, wage determination and income 
differentiation in the transition period of 1952-60.
During this period the enterprises gained increasing autonomy in 
three important fields. Firstly the formation of enterprise revenue 
became a matter within enterprise competence via decisions on price and 
output. Though some prices were still subject to legal ceilings, and 
sometimes freezes, the majority of producers had acquired the power to 
influence their own revenue.
Secondly, by the end of this period, the enterprises had obtained the 
right to form their own working capital and fixed capital funds to 
finance part of their investment. Although the size of these funds were 
still small and the bulk of investment, together with its composition, 
was still controlled by higher level authorities, the formation of capital 
funds at the enterprise level was the first step towards independent
investment financing. The experience gained in the last years of this/
period was to help the management of enterprises to familiarize them­
selves with new problems and new outlets for decision making.
Thirdly, the determination of wages was partially left to enter­
prise management while the imposition of some kind of constraint (such 
as average wage for each category of skill or the need to obtain the 
approval of the commune or the trade union councils) was to guarantee 
that wages remained in line with the performance of the work force and 
the enterprises, as well as with the overall macroeconomic policies of 
the government. The basic part of the wages (called accounting wage or 
fixed wage or basic pay in different sub-periods) was under the influence 
of the State through its wage guidelines. The basic considerations in
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its determination were that workers’ pay should be related to their 
qualification and skill, and that the differentials between different 
category of workers should be relatively small. The distributive 
feature of this wage system was that the level of wages had no direct 
relationship to the conditions of supply and of demand for labour of 
different categories. Wage guidelines were prepared centrally while 
actual employment and distribution of labour to various enterprises were 
not done centrally. Instead labour was employed by individual enter­
prises in some form of decentralized quasi-market. In was quasi-market 
because the price of labour had little to do with conditions of supply 
and demand. There was, of course, no problem in enforcing the wage 
schedule in that section of the market dealing with unskilled and semi­
skilled labour due to the excess supply of these types of workers. 
However, the section of the wage schedule which dealt with skilled labour 
and qualified personnel could not be easily enforced due to the shortage 
of these types of labour and the excess demand for them. The result, 
as we indicated above, was various attempts by the management to circum­
vent the wage guidelines and pay the highly qualified and highly skilled 
employees higher wages than was allowed. In this connection, the status 
of bonuses became of great significance. Unlike the basic wage (which 
was based on qualifications and skills), the bonuses were meant to depend 
on the performance of the enterprise and its units. Bonus payment was 
to be a method of rewarding the employees of efficient enterprises. In 
practice, however, the bonuses were used as a means of attracting the 
type of labour in short supply which was needed by the enterprise. As 
we showed in Tables 2 and 5, the distribution of the bonuses were highly 
tilted in favour of the dominant section of enterprise employees.
Another aspect of the national wage schedule was the difficulty it 
could create when applied to different parts of the country. Yugoslavia 
was, and still is, a very heterogeneous country consisting of regions
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with varying degrees of socio-economic development. The payment of 
basic wages according to one national schedule meant that the economic 
differences between the regions were, in effect, ignored. The con­
ditions of market, the demographic characteristics, the qualification of 
the labour force, as well as many other factors which influence the 
formation and distribution of enterprise revenue, varied between dif­
ferent regions and any system of remuneration had to take these factors 
into account in order to be sound and equitable (which was deemed to be 
an over-riding factor). The developments in the last sub-period, 
partly removed this restriction by putting the determination of wage 
schedule at the enterprise disposal. The result of this, as one may 
expect, was an expansion of inter-regional wage differentials. In 1956 
the average wage in Manufacturing & Mining in Slovenia was 109 per cent 
of the national average while the average wage in Montenegro and 
Macedonia were 94 and 84 per cent of the national average. By 1959, the 
Slovenian wage had increased to 116 per cent of the national average 
while those of Montenegro and Macedonia had reduced to 83 and 79 per cent 
respectively.*
The relegation of a certain degree of autonomy over the formation and 
distribution of revenue was accompanied by growing differentiation in 
earnings. While during the previous period the enforcement of national 
wage system, accompanied by emphasis on moral incentives, had limited the 
spread of wages, the measures taken during this period allowed this 
spread to grow. Not only did wage differentials expand between dif­
ferent categories of workers in the same enterprise, but also the 
earnings of similar category of workers in different enterprises grew.
If the heterogeneity of the country is taken into account, one can see 
that the ground was paved for the expansion of the inter-regional ear­
ning differentials too.
1 H. M. Wachtell (1973), p. 135.
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C. The Self-Management Period (1961 Onwards)
Further development of the system of self-management in Yugoslavia 
required some basic changes to take place in various spheres of economic 
and social decision making. Among these was the need to enable the 
management to handle and decide on a larger number of issues related to 
enterprises. Until the late fifties, the concern with wages took a 
significant part of the time of the workers* councils. Decentralization 
of decision making and improvement in the system of workers' management 
meant that decisions on more important issues such as investment 
financing, long term credits and loans, integration, etc., had to be 
transferred to the enterprises too. These, in turn, required new 
measures to be implemented in the related fields (such as reforms in the 
banking system). The 1961 reforms were meant to introduce and imple­
ment the necessary measures for further development of self-management.
In some spheres, however, as a result of the intervention by the opponents 
of the reforms, the implementation of new measures were strongly resisted 
or blocked. The 1965 social and economic reforms, therefore, came as 
a major clean up operation that swept aside all opposition and consolidated 
the arrangements introduced in 1961 as well as instituting new measures.
As far as the formation and distribution of enterprise revenue is con­
cerned, the important measures introduced in this period were:
i. Improvements in the system of price determination which helped to 
align prices to market forces. Particularly important was the abolition 
of an artificially low ceiling on raw material prices and the ending of 
most subsidies to enterprises whose products were subject to price con­
trol. The improvement in the price system enabled the enterprises to 
have more influence on the formation of their revenue.
ii. From 1961, the enterprises no longer needed to obtain the approval 
of the communal authorities or the local trade union council for their 
wage schedule. This measure, in effect, left not only the determination
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of the earnings of the employees to the workers' council, but also 
entrusted the councils to distribute the net income between the enter­
prise funds and the personal incomes.
iii. From 1961, the banking system began to deal with the economic 
organizations in their own locality directly and to extend credit for 
short and long term purposes to them on the basis of their own credit 
worthiness. The enterprises had (since 1958) accumulated their own fixed 
and working capital funds for the purpose of independent investment 
financing. The 1965 reforms in the banking system removed even the 
geographic restriction on the activities of the banks and enabled them 
to extend credit for almost any purpose to enterprises anywhere in the 
country. The bank itself as an independent profit-oriented enterprise 
was to be responsible for the success or failure of its credit operation. 
The significance of this measure (in conjunction with step iv below) was 
its effect on the level and composition of independent investment under­
taken by the enterprises,
iv. From 1963, beginning with the General Investment Fund, all social 
investment funds began to be abolished and their assets transferred to 
the banks. This had a three-fold effect. Firstly, the central control 
on the level and composition of investment was dismantled. Secondly, 
the banking system was endowed with a considerable amount of resources 
with which to satisfy the demand of the enterprises for investment loans. 
Thirdly, the size of the State appropriation from enterprise revenue 
could be greatly reduced. The implications of this measure shall be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
In this section we shall first discuss the system of income dist­
ribution as it developed during the self-management period. The main 
problem in the field of income distribution was that, in addition to the 
acceptance of various strata of the employees, the State authorities had 
also te be satisfied with the arrangement in a general sense. These
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various agents, as we shall see shortly, do not always possess mutually 
consistent preference schedules. While the interest of the enterprise 
and some of its employees may lie in apportioning larger resources to 
enterprise funds, that of the majority of the workers may lie in a 
larger personal income fund. The government will then have to arbiter. 
The types of government intervention in the formation and distribution 
of revenue are therefore discussed as well. We shall then investigate 
the developments in the methods of wage determination in the recent 
period, paying special attention to the collective agreements which were 
to be reached by the enterprises and the republican governments.
Finally, various types of income differentiation (within enterprises, 
between enterprises, between industries and between regions) will be 
discussed.
1. Distribution of Enterprise Revenue. During the self-management 
period, the system of distribution of enterprise revenue underwent 
several changes. Firstly, the State ceased to appropriate any part of 
the net income or profit of the enterprises directly. The contribution 
to social investment funds (item i,p,138), was therefore abolished.
After all, with the abandoning of the social investment funds, it was 
only natural that enterprises would cease paying contributions for them. 
This was done in two stages. In 1961, the progressive taxation was 
replaced by a flat tax of 15 per cent and in 1965 it was abolished 
altogether.1 2
Secondly, straight taxation became the dominant form of the state
appropriation from the social product of the enterprises. Progressive
income tax changed to a flat tax of 15 per cent on gross personal incomes 
2in 1961. A separate tax was also imposed to finance the educational 
activities of the local commune.
1 B. Horvat (1976), p. 182.
2 S.-Pejovich (1966), p. 99.
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Thirdly, the fixed and working capital funds of the enterprises 
were merged into one to facilitate the use of these funds for different 
needs of the enterprises.
The income statement of a typical enterprise as submitted to the 
Social Accounting Service would now include the following items and 
categories.
1. Gross Revenue (including sales, increase in inventories, etc.)
2. Operating Costs (including raw material, feul, semi-finished inputs 
and depreciation)
3. Obligations
3a. Contractual Obligations (including interest on credits and 
payments for other bank services, insurance premiums, cont­
ributions to economic chambers and associations and similar 
payments)
3b. Statutoty Obligations (including interest on business funds, 
contribution for exploration, renewal and maintenance of ore 
resources, water contributions, contributions for Skopje1, etc.)
4. Net Income (Gross revenue less operating costs and obligations) 
divided into:
4a. Gross Personal Income, consisting of
(i) Net Personal Income
(ii) Contributions on personal income and contributions for 
education^
(iii) Social Insurance Contributions
(iv) Labor Exchange Contribution^
4b. Enterprise Funds, consisting of:
(i) Business Fund
(ii) Reserve Funds (legal and voluntary funds) 123
1 This was a fund designed to help in rebuilding of the city of Skopje 
shattered by earthquake in 1963.
2 The first part is the usual income tax and the second part is the levy 
used to finance the educational activities of the communes.
3 A contribution of 0.5 per cent levied on the personal incomes since 
1965 in favour of the communal and republican Labour Exchange Bureau 
which use the money to finance part of the unemployment benefits and to 
help the jobless to find new employment. See I. Paj (1970), p, 76.
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(iii) Welfare Fund (sometimes called the Collective Consumption 
Fund)
(iv) Other Funds
In order to get some idea of the magnitude of various component 
parts of the 'enterprise funds', the following table represen­
ting the situation in the sixties can be studied.
Table 6 - Percentage Distribution of 
Enterprise Funds, 1962 to 1966*
Industry or 
Branch Yr.
Business
Fund
Legal
Reserve
Fund
Voluntary
Reserve
Fund
Welfare
Fund
Other
Funds
All branches 1962 38.8 13.2 11.7 22.3 14.1
(in Socialist 1964 48.8 8.0 7.3 21.2 14.7
sector) 1966 56.5 7.7 7.3 25.5 2.9
Note * totals may not add up to 100 due to rounding
Source: Jan Vanek (1972), p. 236
As can be seen from Table 6, the Business Fund is the largest 
and most important of the enterprise funds. It is the amal­
gamation of the working capital fund and fixed capital fund 
which had been set up since 1958. The former was used for 
financing the cost of material, production in progress and pay­
ment of incomes while the latter was used for financing of the 
long and medium term investments. Amalgamation gave the 
enterprises the freedom to use operational capital for expansion 
purposes and vice versa. Other funds were set up to help enter­
prises in urgent need of resources and to provide for the
welfare needs of the enterprise employees.^ 1
1 The Legal Reserve Fund is designed to save enterprises in specifically 
defined emergency circumstances. When the size of the fund reaches a 
statutory minimum, the annual contribution is reduced. Some indus­
tries experiencing particular difficulties, such as railways, get 
exemption from part or most of.the required contribution. Since the 
emergencies in which the Legal Reserve Fund can be used are very 
specific, most enterprises have developed their own Voluntary Reserve 
Fund. The resources in this fund can be used under any kind of 
emergency. The contributions to the Welfare Fund (or the Collective 
Consumption Fund) was set up to provide for the collective needs of 
the members of each enterprise such as housing, catering, holiday 
facilities, training schemes, etc. Since it directly benefits the 
members of the enterprise, its size has remained relatively stable and 
rather high.
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The distribution of enterprise revenue, as discussed above, is 
schematically represented in Figure 1,
Figure 1 ~ Distribution of Enterprise Revenue
The most important decision in the sphere of distribution is the 
division of the net income (item 4 in the above discussion, p.151) into 
Gross Personal Income (item 4a) and Enterprise Funds (item 4b). The 
problems associated with this division have dominated the whole of the 
self-management period. Although this decision has been, in principle, 
left to the enterprise management and workers' councils, the govern­
ment has been watching it closely with great care. The government's 
interest stems from the significant impact that this division can have 
on the macroeconomic variables such as price and wage levels, consumption,
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investment, growth rate, etc. The decision on the division of net 
income is, to a large extent, influenced by the preferences and the 
relative strength of the different strata of the work force. On the 
one hand, as we pointed out in Chapter Two, the particular structure of 
property rights in Yugoslovia - with the restriction that property rights 
over the plough back investment can be enjoyed only for the duration of 
employment - weakens the incentive for internally financed investment.
The workers whose expected duration of employment is long would also 
have longer planning horizons than those with a shorter expected duration 
of employment, i.e., the two groups would have markedly different pre­
ference schedules.
On the other hand, the extent of information and knowledge about 
the working of the system as a whole and the degree of involvement in 
the work of an enterprise also influence the planning horizons of the 
employees.
On the basis of the discussion in Chapter One concerning the in­
difference of the bulk of employees towards the affairs of their enter­
prise and the inability of the members of workers' councils to analyse 
the submissions of the technical/managerial experts, we can expect a 
large section of the work force (certainly the older, the young and the 
uneducated,and the dissatisfied) to insist on higher levels of personal 
income at the expense of investment. This conforms to the myopic 
behaviour of the type envisaged by the Ward-Vanek models. For various 
reasons, also discussed in Chapter One, the technical/managerial strata 
would be in favour of a division of net income with a bias towards 
higher enterprise funds.1 These members of the firm resemble the 
executives of modern corporations who are interested in achieving the 
maximum rate of growth for their firms. The difference between the 
two being the type of constraints to which they are subjected. While
1 Similar position, only in much stronger form, has been arcued bv 
•P. J. D. Wiles (1977), p. 85. y
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the managers of a capitalist corporation, for example, must provide 
their shareholders with a reasonable dividend payment, the Yugoslav 
executives must provide their employees with a satisfactory wage payment.
In Chapter Two we referred to this as the "income distribution constraint".
In addition to the asymmetry of workers' attitudes towards wages 
and investment and the existence of different preferences among the 
different strata of the work force which influence the division of 
enterprise net income, the post-war period, and particularly the self­
management period, has also witnessed the exertion of a constant pressure 
for higher earnings from the employees. Among the reasons for such 
pressure, the following three need further elaboration:
i The possibility of relying on external financing. With the develop­
ment of the banking system, relatively cheap credit became available 
to enterprises and, as we shall discuss in greater detail in the 
next chapter, the proclivity towards greater reliance on external 
financing strengthened.* In other words, if investment expen­
ditures can be financed with external loans, more resources can 
become available for distribution to the employees, 
ii The effect of the migration of the scarce type of labour. Although
Yugoslavia has been a labour surplus economy in the whole of the 
post-war period, it has continually suffered from the shortage of 
skilled and qualified personnel. Emigration of the Yugoslav 
workers to the Western European countries has had the two-fold effect 
of easing the general labour surplus and, at the same time, inten­
sifying the shortage of highly qualified workers. This outflow 1
1 According to Furubotn and Pejovich an increase in the personal incomes 
fund and a corresponding decrease in the enterprise fund has been 
the natural outcome of the particular property rights pattern of the 
labour-managed firm for which external financing has become possible 
see E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich (1973), pp. 280-281. On this question 
also see Jaroslav Vanek (1973), pp. 140—146 where he argues that the 
internal financing actually interferes with the efficiency of the 
labour-managed firms and proposes complete reliance on external 
financing.
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becomes very significant when we consider the magnitude of the 
migration involved. In 1966, the number of Yugoslav workers 
abroad was estimated to be about 300,000 (about 8.3 per cent of the 
total employment); in March 1971, the population census put the 
number of migrant workers at about 700,000 (about 17.3 per cent of 
the total employment); and by the mid-seventies the migration reached 
an all time high of 1.2 million. In 1966, there were 5000 
university and college graduates and 25,000 skilled workers among 
the migrants. The number of these two categories had reached 
roughly 10,000 and 112,000 by March 1971.1
Of course there has always been a shortage of highly skilled and 
qualified employees in Yugoslavia, but the migration of these 
specific types of labour meant that the shortage has been aggravated 
and the pressure to increase the remuneration of these workers 
intensified. The pattern of migration has also meant that the 
incomes of the technical and professional staff have been affected 
differently than the incomes of the unskilled workers.
iii Dependence of workers' earnings on the going-wage in other indus­
tries. As we shall discuss shortly, the commission of the workers’ 
council responsible for preparation of pay-schedule takes into 
account many factors in arriving at the wage rate for each of the 
employees. One of the significant criteria considered by the
2commission is the going-wage rate at other enterprises in the region.
Naturally, some enterprises by virtue of their financial superiority
*
take the lead and offer higher wages. They are then in a better 
position to attract the highly skilled workers and professional 
staff from other enterprises. Berkovic has shown that industries *2
-1 G. Macesich (1969), p. 222; M. Begtic (1972), pp. 17, 19 and 22;
NLR, Jan-Feb. 1976, p. 25, quoting NIN, the Belgrade weekly; and SGJ (1972), 
pp. 80, and 89. The data for employment shows . . the number of
people formally entered into employment relation and as such does not 
include the self-employed peasants.
2 ' H. M. Wachtell (1973), chapter 5.
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such as electric power generation, oil extraction and processing, 
and chemicals, for instance, pay higher incomes to their employees 
than others.1 2 Horvat has also pointed out that the capital inten­
sive enterprises have been able to improve their personal income 
position by distributing a part of their profits as wages,2 The 
enterprises in the less successful industries must then follow 
these pace-setters. The workers in a low-wage enterprise or 
industry would certainly put pressure on the council to improve 
their personal income to the level of high wage industries. Many 
of the enterprises investigated by various researchers, did point 
out these pressures by maintaining that one of the main factors 
in their wage decisions was the level of wages in other industries.3 4
Whatever the outcome of the above considerations, the distribution 
of the net income between the enterprise funds and personal income fund 
has had to be acceptable also to the government. Since the government's 
main responsibility has been the management of the whole economy, it 
was natural for it to be sensitive to the pattern of division of net 
incomes of enterprises. A large wage increase can lead to changes in 
the general price level, consumption, investment, balance of payment and 
other macroeconomic variables which may not be acceptable to the govern­
ment. The transfer of power to fix prices and wages to the enterprise 
management have, under the particular Yugoslav conditions, led to the 
familiar wage-price spiral. Wage and price increases tend to spread 
from one sector to another. Workers' councils have been sensitive to 
wage differentials between different enterprises and industries and 
this has meant that, if the conditions permit, they will use the simple
method of price increase to raise their wages to the level of leading 
4enterprises. However, some enterprises, for a variety of reasons,
1 E. Berkovic (1969), p. 83.
2 B. Horvat (1971a), p. 117.
3 H. M. Wachtell (1973), pp. 105-106.
4 See, e.g., S. Popov (1972), p. 80.
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could not increase their prices to finance wage increases and this
resulted in an expansion of the inter-enterprise and inter-industry wage 
differentials.
There were, therefore, ample grounds for the government stepping in 
to bring the enterprise management and the work force into line. The 
interventions usually took two forms: either putting a ceiling on prices 
and control of wages, or limiting the rate of increase of wages and 
prices.1 Thus immediately after the 1961 reforms, the increased 
allocation of net income to the personal incomes fund in 1961 and 1962 
necessitated the imposition of guidelines for distribution linking wage 
increases to the increase in labour productivity and capital labour ratio.2 
The 1965 reforms led to such a sudden increase in price level that, only 
two weeks after the announcement of the reforms, the imposition of a 
price freeze and, later, price ceilings became necessary. The seventies 
witnessed the introduction of social agreements on personal incomes, a 
kind of voluntary agreement entered into by enterprises and the govern­
ment (to be discussed shortly). This phase is particularly significant 
as the central government has gradually retreated to the background and 
its role has been relegated to the republican governments. This is one 
of the results of the Constitutional Amendments of 1971 which were to 
further develop the political and economic decentralization.
It may be argued that government intervention as discussed above is 
an interference in the autonomy of enterprises and may threaten the 
system of self-management. The government may seem to have followed a 
contradictory policy towards enterprises by increasingly granting more 
autonomy in the determination of the level of wages, prices and invest­
ment, and then intermittently withdrawing or weakening that autonomy 
by imposition of wage and price controls, and sometimes freezing the
1 Other forms of intervention such as freezing of certain enterprise 
funds or blocking them in banks have also been sometimes used.2 # S. Pejovich (1966), p. 74.
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enterprise funds to prevent them from financing new investment. The 
point is that the government could not leave everything up to the enter­
prises and at the same time keep the macroeconomic variables under its 
own management. The limits on the extent of self-management were not 
formally fixed and as a result the government let things develop under 
their own momentum until circumstances forced it to impose limits on 
self-management at particular times and under particular conditions.
In fact one can say that the government was not fully aware of the 
implications of the independent decision making by the enterprises. It 
only realized,ex -post, that price rises, wage increases, inflation, 
etc., were some of the effects of the new system. As such it had to act 
to bring the macroeconomic variables under control. It must, of course, 
be emphasized that the interventions by the government have always been 
of a temporary character, for permanent controls would be contradictory 
to the principles of self-management and may undermine its basis.
So far we have discussed various reforms which aimed at increasing 
the share of revenue left at the disposal of enterprises, various 
attempts by the work force to appropriate a larger portion of the net 
income in the form of wages, and the methods of state intervention aimed 
at keeping the distribution process in line with the requirements of the 
overall management of the economy. What was the final result of the 
attempts of the three parties involved (the government, the enterprise 
and the workers) in the distribution process? How far did the workers 
succeed in appropriating a greater share of the revenue? How far was 
the autonomy of enterprises extended over the distribution of their 
revenue? Did the share of the State appropriation of the enterprise 
revenue reduce significantly?
Table 7 represents the summary of the three-way distribution of 
enterprise social product.
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Table 7 ~ Distribution of the Social Product Between the Govern-
ment. Enterprises and the Work Force in the Social Sector of
Economy (%)
Year Government & Enterprises** Net Personal Income
Community* of: Work Force
1959 57.2 17.7 25.1
1960 56.7 17.9 25.4
1962 52.0 21.7 26.3
1964 45.6 26.4 28.0
1966 38.1 27.9 34.0
1968 40.6 24.2 35.2
1969 42.5 21.0 36.5
1970 41.2 21.7 37.1
1971 37.8 25.7 36.5
1972 38.9 25.1 36.0
1973 40.0 25.4 34.6
1974 38.7 27.7 33.6
1975 39.0 26,5 34.5
Notes: * Including all taxes and contributions levied on 
enterprises as well as the work force.
** Sum of depreciation and enterprise funds only.
Source: The data for 1959-1968 is compiled from-1. Paj
(1970), p. 82 and p. 85. The data for 1969-75 
is from SGJ (1971), p. 115; SGJ (1972), p. 121;
SGJ (1973), p. 129; SGJ (1975), p. 143; SGJ (1976), 
pp. 145 and 147; and SGJ (1977), p. 149.
The change in the division of the social product between the three 
parties during the period under consideration (1959-75) is striking.
The share of government agencies and community as a whole decreased from 
57 per cent to 39 per cent of the total. These resources were trans­
ferred roughly equally to the enterprises and the work force. The 
share of the workers seems to have stabilized by mid-sixties with gome 
short term variations (sometimes significant) occurring all through 
the period. The increased share of the enterprises has been mainly 
devoted to their business funds and reflects their greater reliance on 
their own funds for investment expenditure. However, the change in the 
pattern of the distribution of the social product and specially the tran­
sfer of resources from the government to the enterprises does not imply 
a change in the pattern of use of the social product. This is because 
following the granting of autonomy over investment expenditure to
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enterprises, a large proportion of investment activities were no longer 
handled by the government but by the enterprises, and the investment 
resources began to appear under enterprise funds rather than under the 
government controlled funds. In a sense, this part of the change, 
depicted in the above table, is due to a reclassification of the invest­
ment expenditure and does not imply anything about changes in the pattern 
of use of the resources.
The part of resources transferred from the State to the workers, 
however, is different. Not only does it mean that the agent app­
ropriating the resources has changed but it also implies that the 
pattern of use of this part of the social product has changed in favour 
of personal consumption. In terms of the end use, therefore, the 
major impact of the autonomy granted to the enterprises has been on 
that portion of the social product allocated to personal incomes. We 
have already discussed the reasons which explain how the transfer of 
power over the determination of wages, from the State to the workers’ 
councils, has led to an increase in the earnings of the employees.
Apart from the above consideration, Table 7 also shows that: 
i. The autonomy over the distribution of the social product has been 
greatly relegated to the enterprise management. While in 1959 the 
management was responsible for distribution of A3 per cent of the 
social product, by 1975 they were exercising effective influence over 
61 per cent of the total output.
ii. The pressure from workers, as well as various other considerations 
mentioned above, have indeed led to a significant increase in the 
proportion of social product going to the personal incomes of workers. 
The increase in this proportion was particularly sharp in the post­
reform period until 1971 after which it began to decline slightly.
From 1966, as a result of their newly gained independence, the councils 
suddenly began apportioning a larger share of the output to wages
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(from 28 per cent in 1964 to 34 per cent in 1966) and the increase 
continued until 1971 (37.1 per cent). Then, the intervention by the 
State in the form of social agreements on incomes halted the rapid growth.1 
The increase in the share of personal incomes in the social product was 
not uniformly divided between various sections of the work force and in 
the course of this period significant income differentials began to 
appear. But before discussing this aspect, the development of the process 
and methods of the determination of the actual wage levels should be 
discussed.
2. Determination of Wages. Although the system of determination of 
wages or personal incomes has undergone numerous changes in the post-war 
period, nevertheless, it is claimed that the underlying principles 
throughout the period has been the Marxist distribution formula of 
"from each according to his ability, to each according to his work."
During the central planning period, the wages were determined by the 
central plan and depended on the skill and qualification of the worker 
concerned. It was implicitly assumed that different workers, of the 
same skill category, would exert equal effort in their job and therefore 
had to be remunerated equally. During the transition period, wage 
determination was gradually transferred to the workers' councils (subject 
to certain guidelines and restrictions). Here the guidelines were 
meant to reflect the need for equal remuneration for equally qualified 
workers while the enterprise autonomy would determine the actual con­
tribution of the workers (the bonus or variable wage). In the self­
management period, the central guidelines were abolished and the whole 
issue was left to the enterprises. The principle of "remuneration 
according to work", however, continued to dominate the discussions on 
wage policy be it among academics or in trade associations, economic
1 see, e.g. M. Vujacic (1977), p. 53
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chambers or policy making circles. But the basic problem, which inciden­
tally has been ignored, is that a precise wage schedule cannot be derived 
from the formula "to each according to his work" alone if the workers are 
to be compensated by cash or any other single medium of exchange. There 
are two reasons for this: firstly, work is heterogeneous and there is no 
natural way of comparing different kinds as there is no standard unit by 
which different kinds of work can be measured. If various types of 
labour are to be measured by a common standard unit, then it is necessary 
to have a ranking of different kinds of work based on some assumption 
about the relative importance of different types of jobs. The formula 
"to each according to his work", however, does not furnish such a ranking. 
Instead, it is the planning authorities or the enterprise management 
(depending on what period one is talking about) who decide on the ranking 
of different jobs in terms of importance, and therefore remuneration. 
Secondly, the domain of the application of the formula is not clear.
The formula can be applied to individual enterprises or to larger units 
such as the industry, the region or the whole country. In the former 
case, provided some assumption is made about ranking, all workers of 
similar skill in each enterprise would be remunerated equally whereas in 
the latter cases it is the workers with similar skill throughout the 
whole industry, or region or the whole country that would be remunerated 
equally. Traditionally, the latter consideration has dominated the 
Marxists view of the subject. In Yugoslavia too, during the central 
planning period and earlier part of the transition period, this same view 
was dominant, expressed through the central determination of wages. But 
gradually, as enterprise autonomy over wage determination expanded, the 
units of production became the domain of the application of the 1
1 See B. Horvat (1971a), pp. 179-185 for a summary of the discussions 
among the Yugoslav economists on the ’validity* or 'applicability* of 
this principle in the self-management conditions.
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formula. Methods of job evaluation, point system, time and motion 
study, etc., are all examples of the attempts to determine the contribution 
of each individual worker to output or net income. From the early 
seventies though, some attempts have been made to formulate the wage 
guide lines on the level of each constituent republic rather than on the 
level of each enterprise. (We shall come back to this point shortly.)
In preparation of the wage schedule, or the "Rules for the Dist­
ribution of Personal Incomes" as it is officially known, factors other 
than to each according to his work" are also considered. Market con­
ditions and particularly the pay schedules of other enterprises in 
similar lines of activity are examples of these other factors. In this 
way the element of scarcity is indirectly introduced into wage deter­
mination. In other words, the earnings of a specialist will not only 
depend on his contribution to the enterprise functioning (leaving aside 
the difficulties involved in measuring his contribution and comparing 
it with that of other employees), but is also affected by the shortage 
of his expertise. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to deter­
mine the contribution of either characteristics to his earnings.
The actual method of determination of personal incomes has changed 
very little during this period. Every year, a sub-committee of the 
workers’ council considers each job in the enterprise and prepares a 
draft job evaluation and wage schedule for the next year with the aid of 
time and motion study and other experts. The schedule is then adjusted 
according to the market conditions, i.e., by comparing the pay scale 
with the going wage m  other enterprises of the same industry,and region 
as annually published by the Confederation of Trade Unions. Herein 
lies another peculiar aspect of the 'labour market' in Yugoslavia.
The effect of market conditions on wages is asymmetrical in that the 
wage level is affected only in conditions of labour scarcity and not in 
those of labour surplus. For example the wages of technical and skilled
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labour have increased on the grounds that higher wages have been necessary 
to keep this kind of labour and to attract it from other enterprises.
On the other hand the wages of unskilled labour did not decrease on 
the grounds of its abundance. In other words, wages are flexible 
upwards but inflexible downwards. This is obviously linked to the 
particular structure of the Yugoslav economy and labour market where 
the unemployed workers cannot bid the wages down as the decision to fire 
some workers or lower the wage of a considerable proportion of the work 
force is socially and politically unacceptable.
After the above considerations, the draft of the wage schedule is 
distributed to all members of the work force as well as other interested 
bodies such as the trade union branch, commune authorities, etc. These 
other bodies study the draft and prepare an analysis, criticisms and 
suggestions. Then an enterprise meeting is called in which the general 
work force as well as external bodies participate. The draft proposal 
is discussed and various proposals and modifications are considered.
The meeting then adopts the pay scale as the "Rules for the Distribution 
of Personal Incomes" which is a binding decision and needs no one else’s 
approval.1 The method of actual receipt of income by the workers 
remained very similar to that already discussed. At the end of each 
month, every worker receives an income based on the estimated output as 
well as his wage rate. At the end of the year, if the enterprise has 
made a profit, i.e., if there is any left-over from the gross revenue 
after subtraction of costs, obligations, allocation to enterprise funds 
and wages already paid, then the workers will receive their residual 
income in the form of 13th pay slip. But if the enterprise has made a 
loss (i.e., if the workers have already received an income in excess of 
their ex-post determined personal incomes), then the excess receipts
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will be charged against them in the next production period.* In this 
method lies an important features of the behaviour of the Yugoslav 
enterprises. Although in theory the workers share the net income of 
the firm (subject to uncertainty, risk, etc.) and in fact they do press 
for higher wages continually, in practice the earnings are not com­
pletely uncertain. In the main, the wages of all members are decided 
in advance with minor adjustments left to be performed at the end of 
the accounting period. In terms of our discussion in Chapter Two 
concerning the objectives of the labour-managed firms, the actual 
procedure of wage determination, as discussed above, corroborates 
Horvat's argument that in the labour-managed firm the incomes of the 
workers are essentially fixed in advance and that the income per head 
maximization process - as envisaged in the Ward and Vanek models - is 
largely of a theoretical and not a practical nature. When the wages 
are relatively predetermined, all that enterprise management can aim 
for is to maximize the net income less fixed wages.
Obviously, the procedure for determination of personal incomes does 
not mean that the government ceased to be concerned or to intervene in 
the determination of final level of personal income. The form of 
intervention, nevertheless, has slightly changed. Along with the 
transfer of power in the fields of wage and price determination and 
level of investment from planning agencies to the enterprise organs of 
management, there was also a transfer of the power of intervention 
from the central government to the republican governments. The 1971 
Constitutional Amendments were significant steps in this direction as *23
1 V. Dubey (1975), p. 318. The 1966 Law on Employment Relationship 
specifies the method of wage payment to the workers as follows:
"1. A worker's income shall be fixed by the (collective) on the basis 
of the money available for distribution of final income;
2. In the course of a year, a workersshall receive advances on his 
personal income on the basis of current result of work operation*
3. A worker shall be entitled to minimum personal income irrespective 
of the organization's work and operation". (This is the statutory 
minimum income guaranteed by the State and is usually very low)
See Institute of Comparative Law (1967), p. 36. For an example of
the guaranteed minimum income levels see H. M. Wachtell (1973), p . 101
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they empowered the republican authorities with making important fiscal 
and monetary decisions. The income distribution arrangement and par­
ticularly the wage policy of enterprises were now to be overseen by 
the republican instead of the federal government. The inflationary 
situation of the early seventies and the increased pressure for large 
wage increases led to a new type of intervention called the "Social 
Agreement on Incomes". This was a voluntary agreement on specific 
guidelines for payment of personal income, entered into by the 
republican government, the enterprise associations (representing the 
enterprises in each industry) and enterprises themselves. The agree­
ment, in essence, has been an arrangement to prevent too rapid an 
increase in the level of personal incomes. All republics by now have 
developed some kind of social agreement and succeeded in varying degrees 
to implement them.
The basis of the social agreement is to link the earnings of the 
employees of each enterprise to their productivity as well as to the 
average earning and average productivity of all enterprises in the 
republic. In other words if the productivity (measured in simple terms 
of output per worker) of the workers of an enterprise exceeds the 
republican level of output per man, then the average earning of the 
employees of that enterprise could also exceed the republican average. 
The Social Agreement is meant to determine: i) the form of this pro­
portional relationship, and ii) the way in which different categories 
of workers are to enjoy the fruit of their higher than average pro­
ductivity. In this way the Social Agreement can also .influence the 
inter-enterprise as well as the intra-enterprise income differentials.
As an illustration of the type of arrangement for income dist­
ribution, we shall discuss the Social Agreement on Incomes in Croatia 
in the Appendix to this chapter.
Although the Social Agreement seems to provide limit, to the demand
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for wage increase, it has had significant implications for policy 
towards the earnings of different categories of workers. Firstly, it 
has implicitly sanctioned, and in a way consolidated, the wage differen­
tials between different categories of workers in each enterprise by 
providing a specific ranking of the importance, as well as a coefficient 
of comparison, for different categories of workers (as in Table 11 in 
the Appendix). Secondly, the use of the recent pattern of income 
distribution and wage structure in the enterprises as the basis of the 
standard income per head of the work force is not without objection. 
There is no reason to believe that the recent pattern has been correct, 
appropriate or desirable enough to be used as the basis for future
income determination. The arrangement, again, consolidates the previous 
pattern with all its undesirable aspects such as income differentials, 
the imprecise nature of the relationship between performance and 
remuneration, etc. Thirdly, while the Agreement intends to link the 
personal incomes of the employees to their qualification and their 
average output, it fails to take note of other factors outside, as well 
as, inside the enterprise that can affect the output per head while 
having nothing to do with workers' qualifications or their efficiency. 
With prices determined in predominantly oligopolistic markets, some enter­
prises will have extra income by virtue of their market position rather 
than the qualification of their workers. Some enterprises are highly 
capital intensive, and can produce a larger output per head without 
having better quality workers or more efficient production. Without 
exerting any more effort or being any more qualified, some workers end 
up with higher earnings than others for the simple reason that they 
work for the more capital intensive firms or for firms enjoying a 
particularly favoured market position. A built-in system of earning 
differentials is thus part and parcel of the Social Agreement on Incomes.
This brings us to the last part of the discussion of the self-
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management period, i.e., the different types of income differentiation.
3, The differentiation of incomes. In the self-management period, 
income differentials have been developing: i) between various categories 
of workers in each enterprise; ii) between the average worker of enter­
prises in the same industry; iii) between various categories of workers 
in different industries; iv) between the average worker of different 
industries; and v) between the average worker of different regions.
As before, the sources of differentials are two-fold: firstly the dif­
ference between the performance of different enterprises in the market 
which leads to a different level of net enterprise income and net 
personal income in different industries and regions; secondly, different 
arrangements within each enterprise with an unequal bargaining position 
for different categories of workers which lead to income differentials 
between different strata of the work force in each enterprise.
As far as the first two types of differentials are concerned the 
only available data is the partial survey of some 179 enterprises in 
Belgrade area carried out in 1966 and 1967. According to this survey, 
the ratio of the earnings of the highest paid to that of the lowest paid 
employees varied between 1:2.5 and 1:8 with 1:4 being the most frequent 
ratio.1 2 It is interesting to observe that the Social Agreement on 
Incomes as implemented in Croatia in the early seventies, actually allows 
a similar differential between the most qualified and least skilled 
employees (see Table 11 in the Appendix to this chapter).
In terms of the income differentials between the enterprises in the
same industry, the partial survey mentioned above showed that for the
metal manufacturing enterprises in the Belgrade area the ratio of the
2highest to lowest average personal income was 1:2.37.
It is impossible to draw any significant conclusion, from the above
1 E. Berkovic (1969), p. 82.
2 . Ibid., p. 83.
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results, about the trend of the differentials or even their actual 
extent over the whole economy or even in a particular sector of the 
economy. More detailed information is necessary to make a definitive 
assessment of the pattern of income differentials. As for other types 
of differentials, fortunately, comprehensive data is available on the 
average personal incomes of the workers in different categories of 
skill, different industries and different regions. These data can be 
utilized to investigate the trend of inter-skill, inter-industry and 
inter-regional income differentials.
a . Inter-skill income differentials. Here we shall make use of the 
available information regarding the average monthly personal income of 
the workers in different skill categories. Table 8 represents this 
information for the workers engaged in economic activities for selected 
years from 1959 to 1974.
Table 8 - Index of the Average Monthly Personal Income of 
Different Categories of Workers Engaged in Economic Activities
(Percentages)*
1959 1964 1967 1971 1974
All workers 100 100 100 100 100
White collar workers
"Advanced level of professional educ'n. jl.96 204 196 198 187Higher level of professional education 175 156 159 148
Secondary level of professional educ'n. 120 141 115 112 112
Lower levels of professional education 89 104 89 87 87
Blue collar workers 
Highly skilled 153 140 128 128 126
Skilled 105 108 94 92 95
Semi-skilled 81 86 78 77 79
Unskilled 66 77 72 69 69
Ratio of extremes 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.7
* The average monthly net personal income of the workers employed in the 
whole of economic activities, for each year, is assumed to be 100 and 
then that of different categories is expressed as a percentage.
Source: SGJ (1960), p. 257; SGJ (1966), p. 284; SGJ (1970), p. 266; 
SGJ (1973), p. 288; and SGJ (1976), p. 305.
The dispersion of personal incomes can be seen by the extent to which
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the data for each year departs, in either direction, from 100, The 
average white collar employee with an advanced level of professional 
education has continually received nearly twice as much as the average 
employee in the economic activities while the unskilled labourers have 
been receiving only about 70 per cent of the national average. Table 
8 shows that the trend of inter-skill earning differentials (represented 
by each horizontal line in the above table) follows a somewhat 
oscillating path and is different for different categories of workers. 
Between 1959 and 1964, the relative position of medium and lower grade 
workers improved slightly. On the contrary the relative position of 
those employees with high and higher levels of professional education 
and that of the highly skilled workers slightly deteriorated. This can 
be explained by referring to our discussion in Chapter One where we 
showed that in this period the representation of the lower grade workers 
increased on the organs of management. The increased representation of 
these groups could have been a major factor in the improvement of their 
relative earnings. Also the introduction of compulsory wage guidelines 
in 1963 (as a reaction to the rapid wage rise following the liberalization 
measures of 1961)* prevented the wages, particularly the wages of the 
upper strata, from rising too rapidly and therefore contributed to the 
marginal reduction of the differentials. From 1964 to 1967 the relation 
was marginally reversed. Although the highly educated employees 
suffered a slight fall in their relative earnings, the blue collar 
workers’ position deteriorated even more with respect to average peronal 
incomes so that the ratio of extremes marginally increased. From 1967 
to 1971 the dispersion became slightly wider due to the improvement of 
the position of the top two groups at the expense of the last group 
(the unskilled workers). During the seventies the situation was again 
marginally reversed and the spread narrowed slightly.
1, D. Milenkovitch (1971), p. 171.
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In the self-management period, as a whole, one can conclude that 
the extent of differentiation of personal incomes between different 
categories of workers engaged in economic activities did not change much.
The periodic change in the relative position of various categories 
is the result of several factors which simultaneously influence the 
earnings of each category of workers. The influence of the technical/ 
administrative strata, shortage of the highly qualified personnel, 
pressure from the workers’ councils who are most clearly concerned 
about the earnings and the performance of the enterprise in the market 
are some of these factors. Table 8 actually represents the sum of two 
different types of income differentials mentioned before. A part of 
the differential is due to the differences in the quality of the labour 
performed while another part is due to the performance of different 
enterprises in the market. It is, of course, impossible to separate 
the two as this requires highly disaggregated data. As a note of caution 
it must be emphasized that the data in Table 8 shows the average 
personal income of different categories of workers in all branches of 
economic activity. As such the differences between various branches 
(and even enterprises within each branch) are concealed. Just to give 
an example, while in 1964 the ratio of the two extremes of personal 
income was 2.6, the printing industry had a ratio of 2.1 and the Textile 
industry had a ratio of 3.6. In 1967, the ratio ranged from 2.3 
(Ferrous Metallurgy) to 3.4 (construction); in 1971 from 2.2 (Tobacco 
industry) to 3.4 (Construction); and in 1974 from 2.3 (Manufacturing of 
Metals) to 3,0 (Construction). Still, the situation within enterprises 
or within the non-economic activities could have been more divergent.^" 1
1 As Ekonomska Politika. July 26, 1971 reported, in 1969 the highest per­
sonal income in the country was 2700 per cent higher than the lowest. 
Director of a scientific institute with 6141 and a Serbian pilot with 
6122 dinars per month were the highest paid workers while an unskilled 
hotel worker with 224 and a railroad cleaning lady with 281 dinars per 
month (both in Kosovo) were the lowest paid ones. Strangely enough, 
both of the lowest wages were below the legal minimum wage rate. * 
Certain sections of the employees in non-economic activities such as those 
engaged in banking and insurance and employees of social organizations 
have also been receiving salaries 50 to 70 per cent higher than tht average worker in Manufacturing & Mining. See E.Berkovid (1969),pp.85-86.
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Income differentials between different categories of workers âre 
usually influenced by the extent to which the management personnel 
receive non-wage incomes. There is no exact data available on this 
type of remuneration, but according to Dirlam and Plummer the directors 
and executives of the Yugoslav firms receive fringe benefits such as 
generous travel allowance, car, expense accounts, etc.1 Since the non- 
managerial, non-administrative members of the work force do not 
ordinarily receive such fringe benefits, the inter-skill income differen­
tials are actually widened as a result of such benefits.
b. Inter-Industry Income Differentials. Since the data on average 
net personal incomes are available for workers in various industries in 
the Manufacturing & Mining sector, we can take this sector as the basis 
for investigation of inter-industry income differentials. We shall 
express the average personal income in each industry as a percentage of 
the sectoral average (i.e., the average personal income in Manufacturing 
& Mining) so as to point out the relative position of different indus­
tries and their trend over time. Table 9 represents the situation 
from 1959-76, ( see next page for Table 9).
From a simple comparison of the personal incomes j.n different indus­
tries in each year, two kinds of industry stand out clearly. First 
is the group of industries which have continuously paid out higher than 
average personal incomes. Among them the electric power, petroleum, 
iron & steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, printing & publishing, and film 
making industries occupy the prominant position. The second group 
includes tobacco, leather & footwear, textile, timber & wood products 
and building material industries which have continually paid out lower 
than average incomes to their workers. Two factors separate these two 
groups of industries. Firstly, the former group is associated with 
such characteristics as modern technology and high capital intensity, 1
1 J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), p. 31.
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whereas the latter group covers the more traditional and technologically 
less advanced branches. The former group includes industries with 
some of the highest rates of industrial concentration (petroleum, ferrous 
metallurgy and shipbuilding)^" while the latter group includes the more 
competitive types of industries.
Table 9 - Average Net Personal Income of the Workers in Different 
Industries in Manufacturing & Mining (%) 1959-1976*
Industry 1959 1963 1967 1970 1973 1976
Manufacturing & Mining 100 100 100 100 100 100
Electric power 116 136 158 150 138 140
Coal & coke 114 107 95 99 112 119
Petroleum 120 135 164 148 155 154
Ferrous metallurgy 124 116 111 112 114 112
Non-ferrous metallurgy 111 111 126 113 111 112
Non-metallic mineral products 97 90 89 92 91 91
Metal products 117 111 102 103 99 105
Shipbuilding 125 133 140 138 134 126
Electric equipment 106 106 100 103 96 101
Chemical products 112 116 119 111 109 112
Building materials 84 84 93 96 96 92
Timber and wood products 80 79 75 88 90 86
Paper products 106 113 98 105 100 103
Textile 85 81 80 77 85 78
Leather & footwear 96 90 89 84 91 83
Rubber products 122 104 105 95 94 96
Food products 89 91 99 97 100 99
Printing & publishing 104 120 127 128 114 117
Tobacco 81 85 87 83 97 99
Film making 125 131 139 147 128 132
Ratio of extremes 1.6 1.7 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.0
Relative deviation ** 14.2 17.0 22.4 20.2 16.7 17.6
* Average monthly personal income of all workers in Manufacturing & Mining 
sector in every year is assumed to be 100 and that of the workers in 
each industry is expressed as a percentage of the sectoral average.
** This is equal to the ratio of standard deviation to the mean.
Source: SGJ (1960), p. 259; SGJ (1966), p. 277; SGJ (1970), p. 265;
SGJ (1973), p. 284; SGJ (1977), p. 311.
Secondly, the proportion of highly skilled and qualified personnel is 
much greater in the work force of the former group than in that of the 
latter. The result is that, ceteris paribus, the former group, 
enjoying a better market position, can have a more profitable performance 1
1- See H. M. Wachtell (1973), p. 191 for some measures of concentret-' Also see S. Estrin (1978). concentration.
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and faster rates of growth.* They can finish their financial year with 
higher net incomes, and as they are able to rely on external finance 
and have a better access to external resources, they can afford to dis-
, 2tribute higher personal incomes.
The differentials between different industries are thus due to the 
two factors mentioned before. The varying performance of different 
industries and the greater concentration of the scarce type of labourers - 
the highly qualified and skilled - in some industries than others lead 
to the differentials between the average earnings of the employees of 
different industries.
Another aspect of the inter-industry income differentials is its 
trend in the sixties and seventies. Here, the trend is not uniform 
and several fluctuations can be observed. From 1959 to 1967, the 
differences between the high-wage industries and the low-wage industries 
expanded. This can be seen from several angles. The relative position 
(relative to the average) of electric power, petroleum, non-ferrous 
metallurgy, shipbuilding, chemicals, printing & publishing,- and film 
making industries improved, while that of the coal & coke, non-metallic 
minerals, building materials, textile and leather & footwear industries 
deteriorated. This resulted in the expansion of differentials between 
these industries. The expansion is also reflected in the increase in 
the two measures of dispersion calculated in Table 9. The ratio of 
extremes, showing the highest average wage to the lowest, increased from 
1.6 to 2.2. The relative deviation also increased from 14.2 to 22.4.
At least part of this expansion in income differentials must be due to
1 Petroleum, chemical products and electric power industries were among 
the fastest growing industries since 1960 while tobacco, coal & coke, 
leather & footwear, textile and building material had the lowest rates 
of expansion (sometimes even negative), SGJ (1976), p. 187. See also
V. Dubey (1975), p. 115.
2 The tendency for the capital intensive industries to pay out higher 
personal incomes by distributing part of the return to capital as wages 
has been pointed out by many investigations, among them, V. Dubey (1975)
• p. 238 and B. Horvat (1971a), p. 119
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the increased reliance on market forces to determine prices and the 
increased autonomy of the workers' councils to decide on wages and 
investment. This trend was particularly strong after the 1965 reforms 
when, eventually, strict price control had to be introduced. From 
1967 to 1973, the general trend discussed above was slightly reversed 
and the income differentials between the two groups of industries was 
marginally reduced. The range of dispersion and the relative deviation 
indicators also slightly reduced. The most important factor for this 
reversal must be sought in several government interventions to curb 
price rises and impose guidelines on allocation of personal incomes 
particularly in the seventies. From 1973 onwards, the trend seems to 
have reversed again and the difference between the modern industries on 
the one hand and the traditional industries on the other, expanded again. 
Nevertheless, it is too soon to make a definitive judgement about this 
period. We can only see that the measures of dispersion have taken a 
turn and begun to increase.
The change in the relative position of the two groups of industries 
above should not, of course, be generalized to all branches as the 
relative position of many industries changed in ways different from 
the general trend during various sub-periods. The particular con­
ditions of these industries such as the market for their products, were 
as important factors for their wage policy as were the internal factors 
such as the performance and productivity of their work force. For 
example, in the deterioration of the relative position of the ship­
building industry since the late sixties, the world wide depression in 
this field must be taken into account, and the recent improvement of 
personal incomes in the coal industry must be partly associated with 
the effects of the energy crisis which led to an increase in the demand 
for coal.
The important point here is that income differentials do not just
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arise from differences in the quality of the workers in particular 
industries. Instead, due to the particular method of wage determination 
and the Yugoslav labour market, they are closely linked to the position 
and performance of the enterprises in the market and their profitability. 
As long as the system of income sharing is in operation, no amount of 
liberalization and economic reforms will lead to a change in the struc­
ture of the labour market to make it more responsive to wage differen­
tials. *
c. Inter-Republican Income Differentials. The available data on the 
breakdown of the income differentials in six republics allows us to 
analyse the differentials in the earnings of each category of worker 
across various republics. In this way, we can be sure that inter­
republican differentials are totally due to the varying performance of 
the enterprises in different regions. Table 10 shows the republican 
average net personal income per month for three different categories of 
employees: those with advanced professional training, highly skilled and 
unskilled workers, (see next page for Table 10).
Each column of Table 10 shows that in some of the republics, the 
personal incomes paid out to the workers of each particular skill, 
exceeds the national average while those in some other republics fall 
short of the national average. The divergence from the national 
average reflects the income differentials across the republics. Sig­
nificantly, almost always, the personal incomes distributed in Slovenia 
and Croatia are much higher than the national average while in Macedonia 
and Montenegro personal incomes have always remained below the national
1 Several authors have studied the inter-industry wage differentials in 
Yugoslavia. While they have generally pointed out the underlying 
tendency for the expansion of wage differentials, some of them maintain 
that further improvements in labour market will narrow down the differs 
tials. The experience of the late sixties and early seventies 
shown in Table 9, however, does not support this view. See E '
(1969); H. M. Wachtell (1970) and (1972), pp. 548-551, and (1973? 
pp. 138-140; and S. Popv (1972). V
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average. Personal incomes in Serbia have also remained below average 
though not as low as those in Montenegro and Macedonia. The situation 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been closer to the national average. These 
results, of course, should be expected. The republics of Slovenia and 
Croatia are more developed,vith more advanced industry and commerce, with 
a more developed market-oriented economy, with a longer history of
Table 10 - Average Net Personal Income of Different Categories of 
Workers of Various Republics, Economic Activities Only (%),
1964-1974*
skill category and region 1964 1967 1970 1974
Employees with Advanced 
Professional Education
Yugoslavia
Croatia
Slovenia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Serbia
Macedonia
Montenegro
Highly Skilled Workers
Yugoslavia
Croatia
Slovenia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Serbia
Macedonia
Montenegro
Unskilled Workers
Yugoslavia
Croatia
Slovenia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Serbia
Macedonia
Montenegro
100 100 100 100
97 111 107 105
130 122 129 117
104 90 97 98
94 97 87 95
83 89 84 85
92 91 95 95
100 100 100 100
132 111 113 109
125 121 119 113
100 96 100 101
92 95 89 95
85 86 86 86
86 85 92 93
100 100 100 100
116 103 105 109
130 118 121 113
85 90 98 92
90 99 95 97
84 87 86 89
83 89 92 90
* The national average personal income for each 
category, in each year, is assumed to be 100 and 
the republican personal incomes are expressed as 
percentage of the national average.
Source: SGJ (1966), p. 486; SGJ (1970), p, 467;
SGJ (1973), p, 499; SGJ (1976), p. 513.
industrial experience and with more efficient enterprises and management 
personnel. They also enjoy a superior position vis-a-vis their
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competitors by being nearer to the markets for their final products.
The enterprises in these two republics can, ceteris paribus, perform 
better and end up with higher net incomes and therefore distribute larger 
personal incomes than the enterprises in the less developed regions.
The differential was particularly large in the early sixties (for 
example, see the situation in 1964, Table 10). The trend of variations 
in the republican personal incomes can be observed by looking at each 
of the horizontal rows of Table 10. Clearly in the period from 1964 
to 1967 (and sometimes to 1970), the dispersion between the republican 
personal incomes reduced. The personal incomes in Slovenia and Croatia 
as well as those in Macedonia and Montenegro move towards the national 
average. In the late sixties and early seventies the situation seems 
to have stabilized with a certain degree of dispersion remaining. Since 
we are considering the differentials for each category of skill 
separately, the remaining differentials are only due to the difference in 
the performance of enterprises in different republics. Of course, 
like Tables 8 and 9, the above table also suffers from the fact that it 
shows the republican average personal income. As such a greater degree 
of dispersion which can exist within each republic has already been 
levelled out. Theoretically, one may expect that with the improvement 
in the labour market, the inter-republican income differentials would 
gradually diminish. The workers in the low-income industries would 
be expected to move to the high income industries and firms and the 
large differentials would eventually level out. However, the par­
ticularity of the Yugoslav labour market .is that the unemployed workers, 
or the low paid employees, cannot bid down the going wage of those. 
already employed in the prosperous and high income industries. Besides, 
with the largely underdeveloped social and economic institutions, the 
labour market in the less developed regions (LDRs hereafter) also 
suffers from very low mobility particularly in the case of the less
qualified workers. This factor tends to perpetuate the persistence of 
the income differentials across republics.
To sum up: During the self-management period the locus of decision 
making was further transferred from the central government to the enter­
prise workers' councils and other organs of management. Two aspects 
of this transfer were of particular importance: the increased indepen­
dence of enterprises in influencing the formation of their revenue and 
the increased autonomy over the uses to which the revenue could be put. 
Economic reforms of 1961 and 1965 improved the system of price formation, 
reduced the number of commodity prices subject to controls and left 
most of the decisions on price level to enterprises. In terms of the 
distribution of the net income between the government, the enterprise 
and the employees, the enterprises gained complete autonomy over the 
determination of the level and composition of investment, on the one 
hand, and the classification of the work force and their pay structure, 
on the other. The most significant step taken by the government since 
the introduction of the Yugoslav 'road' was the dismantling of the 
machinery of central determination, allocation and financing of invest­
ment from 1963 onwards. Since the investment decisions were trans­
ferred to enterprises, the government could afford to appropriate a 
smaller proportion of the social product of the enterprises in the form 
of taxes and contributions. As a result the share of the government 
in the three-way division of the social product fell and the shares of 
the enterprises and the employees increased. This, of course, was in 
line with the self-management principle of leaving as much of the social 
product as possible to the enterprises themselves.
In the area of wage determination, in the self-management period, 
the enterprises gained full autonomy on deciding the earnings of their 
employees. These earnings became totally dependent on the performance 
of the individual worker and that of his enterprise. This created the
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necessary conditions for the development, and even widening, of different 
kinds of income differentiations. In the period leading to the 1965 
reforms and immediately afterwards, the three types of income differen­
tials (inter-skill, inter-industry and inter-republic) widened. After 
a small reduction in the differentials in late sixties, they seem to 
have stabilized.
D. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have been concerned with the effects of the 
implementation of self-management principles in the fields of income
distribution and_wage determination in Yugoslav enterprises. During the 
central planning period, and to a large extent during the transition 
period, the decision making power was vested in the hands of the govern­
ment. Division of enterprise revenue into three portions for enterprise 
employees and the State was done according to the annual social plans 
which reflected the preferences of the planning authorities. The 
level of wages and investment expenditure only marginally depended on 
the performance of the enterprise. During the transition period, 
various steps were taken to increase that portion of wages and investment 
expenditure which was linked to the profitability of enterprise operation 
This meant that on the one hand the size and importance of the bonus 
payments (the thirteenth pay slip) increased, and on the other hand a 
certain proportion of net. enterprise income was allowed to remain in 
the firm as fixed and working capital funds which could be used for 
investment financing independently. Through various methods, however, 
the State continued to retain the decisive position in the field of 
income distribution. This position was necessary due to the particular 
behaviour of the Yugoslav-type labour-managed firms. From the time the 
workers' councils obtained the power to influence wages,.they did not 
hesitate for a moment to press for higher remunerations. They used
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all the legal means at their disposal, as well as some illegal ones, 
to increase the wage payments. Benefiting especially from this situation 
were the highly skilled workers and professionals who were in great 
demand and short supply. The basic reason for the continued government 
intervention was the interest in the overall management of the economy, 
particularly the control over wages and prices and the need to ensure 
that sufficient resources were channelled to investment.
The demand for further relaxation of State control, granting further 
autonomy to the enterprises and increasing the share of the resources 
left at the disposal of enterprise management, came not only from certain 
sections of the national and regional leadership but also from certain 
sections of the population (specially in the more developed republics) 
and from a large proportion of the enterprises and their organs of 
management. Bitter struggles took place over these issues in the early 
sixties. In economic terms, the outcome of these struggles were the 
1961 and 1965 reforms supplemented by various measures decided upon in 
the intervening years.
The principal guideline underlying the self-management period was 
that the locus of decision making power was to be transferred from the 
State to the enterprises. This required the enterprises to enable 
themselves on the one hand to decide on the division between investment 
and personal income funds and, on the other, to determine the level of 
personal incomes of the employees and the level and composition of 
investment. We showed that the distribution of the social product 
between the three parties changed considerably during this period. The 
share of the government, as one should expect, fell and the share of 
other agents increased. Although in terms of control over resources 
the change was important, in terms of the use to which the resources 
were to be put the change was less significant. Part of the reduction 
in the share of the State was clearly distributed as income and led to
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an increase in consumption. But the other part of the reduction, 
appropriated by the enterprises, was spent on investment expenditure as 
the State would have done.
In the area of wage determination, the autonomy of enterprises 
expanded to the fullest possible extent. The management organs of each 
establishment became responsible for deciding on the ranking and 
classification of different employees and on respective pay levels.
The expansion of the autonomy of enterprises was accompanied by an 
increase in the share of social product allocated for personal incomes.
Many factors were responsible for this trend. The particular structure 
of property rights in Yugoslavia, the disincentive to invest in one’s 
own enterprise, the concern of the bulk of the employees with higher 
present incomes and their apathy and lack of involvement are some of the 
contributing factors.
Unlike the self-employed labourer whose relations with his firm cannot 
be revoked without affecting his status as a self-employed person, the 
relationship of a Yugoslav worker to his enterprise is a purely commer­
cial one which can be revoked at any time by the worker - at least as 
soon as he finds another prospective employer paying a higher personal 
income - without affecting him or his status as worker. The commercial 
nature of the relation of workers to their enterprises in Yugoslavia is 
quite similar to that of workers towards their firm in capitalist 
economies. Higher wages are as likely to lure a Yugoslav labourer as 
they are the labourers of a capitalist firm. Given the possibility of 
labourers changing their enterprises, they are likely to adopt a myopic 
view towards the benefits of investment and treat such benefits - which 
are spread over a long time in future - as irrelevant to their present 
position.
The gaining of complete autonomy over the division of net income 
between the enterprise fund and the personal income fund and over the
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system of division of the latter fund among the employees did not 
mean that the State withdrew from this scene altogether. As long as 
the government has the responsibility for the management of the economy 
as a whole and as long as it is interested in such macroeconomic 
variables as wage and price level, consumption, investment, trade 
deficit, etc., it cannot remain indifferent towards the decisions made 
by the workers' councils. An inflationary wage-price spiral changes 
the composition of dfemand and output in favour of more consumption 
goods and less investment goods and will also affect the balance of 
payment as well as many other macro-variables. This is the reason 
why we have witnessed periodic intervention by the government in a way 
that seems almost to contradict the self-management principles. Imposi­
tion of price ceilings, limits on pay rises, and in the most recent 
form, engaging enterprises in agreements on incomes policy are examples 
of intervention by the State.
Although there was a general increase in the share of enterprise 
revenue going to wage fund, the increase was not uniformly distributed 
among all workers. In the previous period, the existence of a national 
wage scale (even for the fixed wages) meant that the difference between 
the earnings of workers of each skill category who work in different 
enterprises would be small and, mainly, centred on bonuses (or variable 
wages) which linked their earnings to the performance of their enter­
prise. In the present period, the national wage scale was done away 
with and the whole of earnings became dependent on enterprise perfor­
mance. Besides, as the performance of different enterprises (par­
ticularly in different regions) was very varied, the increase in 
wages was not uniform across different enterprises, industries and 
regions. As a result, a considerable degree of income differentiation 
developed between workers of different skill categories, workers of 
different enterprises and different industries. Given the difference
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between Yugoslavia's different regions (in terms of the level of 
economic development, demographic characteristics, social and cultural 
attributes), the income differentials between different regions also 
expanded. The persistence of income differentials are essentially 
due to the difference in the performance of different enterprises 
(due to different levels of capital intensity, different techniques of 
production and different market powers), shortage of certain types of 
labour and the particular characteristics of the Yugoslav labour 
market where the personal incomes in a prosperous enterprise cannot be 
reduced even if the unemployed workers are willing to work for lower 
wages. The measures taken in the early seventies to control the 
overall level of wages, though not directly aimed at reducing these 
differentials, did have the effect of partially halting their expansion.
Appendix to Chapter Three 
The Social Agreement on Incomes in Croatia
The basis of the Croatian agreement is to link the earnings of the 
employees of each enterprise to their productivity (measured in output per 
man terms) as well as to the average earnings and productivity in the 
whole republic. It consists of: (a) ranking of different types of skills 
and qualifications, (b) a scale by which workers of different skill categor­
ies can be compared with each other, and (c) a scale determining the 
percentage wage increase allowed for each category of workers due to 
increased productivity. Briefly, the procedure is as follows:
Each enterprise is supposed to divide its work force into ten standard 
categories according to skill and qualification. The skilled worker is 
taken as the standard unit of labour (numeraire) and other categories are 
compared and quantified in terms of this standard unit by means of a 
coefficient which indicates the importance of various categories in terms 
of the standard unit of measurement (i.e., the skilled worker). These 
equivalents or coefficients are given in Table 11.
Table 11 ~ Standardization of the Work of Various Categories of Workers 
in Terms of the- -Work of a Skilled Worker According to the Social 
Agreement oh Incomes in the Croatian Republic
Skill group Equivalent of skilled worker
Doctor of science 2.533
Specialists and masters of science 
Workers of 'high' professional
2.200
education
Workers of 'higher' professional
2.033
education
Workers of secondary level professional
1.533
education
Workers of lower level professional
1.133
education 0.800
Highly skilled workers 1.400
Skilled workers 1.000
Semi-skilled workers 0.767
Unskilled workers 0.667
Source: V. Dubey (1975), p.351
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This table, indirectly, also fixes the range of dispersion of wages 
and provides a ranking of different types of labour. This is the type of 
extra assumption needed to change the formula "to each according to his 
work" into a workable wage guideline. It is a method of ranking the 
importance of different categories of workers and, additionally, comparing 
them. Before proceeding with the method of application of the Social 
Agreement, some observations on the above table are necessary. The 
coefficients of comparison are clearly linked to the years of education 
or training, i.e., the characteristic of the workers and not with the 
performance of these agents in production - however that may be measured. 
There is again the implicit assumption that the factors relating to 
performance (such as the degree of responsibility accepted by a worker, 
conditions of work, attitudes towards work, required and exerted effort, 
etc.) carry equal strength for workers of each category and as such 
there is no need for them to be explicitly taken into account.
Using the coefficients given in Table 11 And the number of employees in 
each category, the enterprise can calculate the size of its work force in 
standardized unit - called the 'standardized work force' ( L ) T h e  
agreement, then, puts forward guidelines as to how the personal income per 
unit of standardized work force (W/L) can be linked to the gross enterprise 
income per unit of standardized work force (Y/L). In other words, roughly 
speaking, they indicate how the output per man and income per man can be 
linked. The gross enterprise income (Y) is defined as the sum of enterprise 
funds, personal income fund and depreciation. (It is equal to item 4 of 
the scheme on p.l51plus depreciation). The problem is, however, to take 
into account the performance of all enterprises in the republic as well.
For this purpose, in each enterprise, a relation is devised between (W/L)
1 The notations are: L, total standardized work force; W, total personal 
income of the work force; and Y, total gross income of the enterprise 
(siam of the enterprise funds, personal income fund and depreciation) .
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as a percentage of the republican (W/L) on the one hand and (Y/L) as a 
percentage of the republican (Y/L) on the other. In other words, for 
example, if the (Y/L) of the enterprise in question is 25 per cent higher 
than the republican (Y/L), then the personal income of the standardized 
worker (W/L) can be 20 per cent higher than the republican (W/L). A higher 
rate of performance compared to the republican average will allow higher 
income per head to be distributed. The exact formula of the relationship, 
as summed up in Table 12, is also a part of the Social Agreement.
Table 12 - Relation Between Gross Enterprise Income per Head of Standardized 
Work force (Y/L) and Personal Income per Head of Standardized Work Force 
~(W/L) in Each Enterprise and their Comparison with the Republican Performance 
according to the Social Agreement on Incomes in the Croatian Republic
Y/L as percentage 
of the republican 
average
Maximum W/L allowed as a percentage of 
republican average
100-125* 100 + 0.8 for each additional % point of Y/L from 100 to 125
126-150 120 + 0.40 II II II II 126 to 150
151-175 130 + 0.20 • II tl II 151 to 175
176-200 135 + 0.16 II II II II 176 to 200
201-250 139 + 0.12 •1 II II II 201 to 250
251-300 145 + 0.08 •1 II II 251 to 300
301-400 149 + 0.04 II II II II 301 to 400
over 400 153 + 0.02 It II II over 400
* This reads: If the Y/L in the enterprise is 100 to 125 per cent of the 
republican Y/L, then the W/L in the enterprise can be 100 per cent of the 
republican W/L plus 0.8 per cent for each additional percentage point of 
Y/L from 100 to 125.
Source: V. Dubey (1975), p.352
As an example, if enterprise gross income per unit of standardized work
force has reached 350 per cent of the republican average, then the personal
income per head of the standardized work force could be as high as 151 
(= 149 + 0.04 X 50) per cent of the republican W/L.
For the enterprise producing below the average republican Y/L, a 
different set of tables would determine the functional relationship between 
Y/L and W/L. These schedules also are part of the Social Agreement.
In devising the above schedules (Tables 11 and 12), the data on the 
productivity and personal incomes in the recent years have been used. This
- 18? -
was done in order to prevent a sudden sharp rise or fall in the incomes 
of the employees of each enterprise.
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Chapter Four
Methods and Sources of Investment Financing
The methods and sources of investment financing in Yugoslavia have 
been closely geared to the system of the distribution of enterprise 
revenue. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the gradual transfer 
of decision making power from the centralized planning apparatus to the 
enterprises was accompanied by the appearance of such problems as the 
division of the net enterprise income into investment fund and personal 
income fund, the determination of the level and composition of investment 
in each enterprise and deciding on the sources of financing the 
investment expenditure. Obviously, the question of the determination 
of investment is closely related to the discussion of planning and 
banking systems and their variations in different periods and, as such, 
is outside the scope of the present thesis. Here, we shall concentrate 
on the sources of investment financing in different periods in order to 
demonstrate another aspect of the decentralization of decision making.
In this chapter we are specifically concerned with such questions as:
How are the internal funds of the enterprises used? What is the 
significance and importance of various sources of investment financing?
How did the transfer of the decision making power affect the level and 
composition of investment and its regional distribution? What is the 
extent and form of the state intervention in the allocation of 
investment funds in different enterprises and different regions? All 
of these questions are closely associated with the transfer of the 
locus of decision making from the State to enterprises. Under central 
planning there was no problem of investment financing. The central 
planning agency which decided on the level, composition and distribution 
of investment between different sectors and enterprises, also provided 
the funds out of which investment projects could be financed. In 
other words, once the total level of investment was decided on, sufficient
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resources were set aside for its finance. But as the power of the 
central 'planning agencies in the field of investment began to weaken, the 
enterprises themselves had to start thinking about how much investment to 
undertake and how to finance it, i.e., they faced a set of completely new 
problems. It may also be argued that the transfer of investment 
decisions to the enterprise management has, in fact, affected the level 
and composition of investment in the economy, as well as its regional 
distribution. The transfer of the locus of investment decisions implies 
a change in the criteria used to assess investment projects and to decide 
on the volume of investment. Under central planning the revenue (or 
profit) of an enterprise does not play any part in the determination of 
the level of investment in that enterprise. With the decentralization of 
investment decisions, however, the revenue earned by an enterprise becomes 
an important determinant of investment expenditure because the enterprise 
has to finance its planned investment wholly (or at least partly) out of 
its own earnings (and if necessary borrow the remainder on the basis of 
its expected profit). There is no reason to expect that the final level 
and composition of investment realized in this way would be the same as 
that decided centrally by the planning authorities. The linking of the 
investment expenditure of enterprises to their performance and expected 
profitability (which was a direct result of the transfer), leads one to 
expect considerable differences to develop between different industries 
and regions. In fact, as we shall show, the financing of investment out 
of the internal resources and bank credits (which also depend on the 
enterprise expected profitability) meant that considerable differentiation 
could emerge across various republics. Since Yugoslavia is a hetero­
geneous country with large regional differences and rivalries, the 
transfer meant a bias in favour of investment in the more developed 
regions. As the more developed regions (MDRs), like Slovenia and 
Crotia, possess more developed industry, agriculture, transport 
facilities, etc., the enterprises in these regions have been able to
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finance a much greater share of their investment expenditure from their 
internal resources and bank credits than the enterprises in the less 
developed regions (LDRs). The LDRs, on the other hand, have continued 
to depend on the State subsidies and, in fact, only by State intervention 
has the shortage of internally generated funds been compensated.
In general, investment expenditures can be financed in a number of 
ways. The government can finance investment expenditures out of 
taxation or other fiscal revenues; the enterprises can do it by using 
their own internal funds or by borrowing from external sources such as 
banks; and the private producers can undertake investment out of their 
own saving. The securities market, which is an important medium of 
raising funds for investment in the developed capitalist economies, is 
only in its very initial stages of development in Yugoslavia and its 
contribution to investment financing is almost insignificant although the 
implications of its development are quite serious. The investment 
expenditure undertaken by each of the above methods is financed through 
some form of financial intermediary or institution. Before discussing 
the changes in the methods and sources of investment financing, it is 
necessary to explain the nature of the financial institutions which have, 
at one time or other, played a part in the financing of investment.
Later on we shall discuss the contribution of each source and the 
changes over time in each of these sources.
i. The Budget. The federal, republican or communal budgets have 
financed a considerable proportion of post-war investment expenditure.
The budgetary revenue stems from various taxes and contributions levied 
on the enterprises and individuals by various levels of government, 
ii The Social Investment Funds. These are various types of funds set 
up after 1952 for the explicit purpose of financing investment. They 
were set up at all levels from the federation to the commune, and some­
times for specific purposes. These funds, like the budget, were under
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full control of the State. They operated in such a way that the level 
and sectoral distribution of investment would be in accordance with the 
centrally determined investment plans. The most important of these 
funds was the General Investment Fund which was formed on the federal 
level and was run by the Yugoslav Investment Bank. Its resources came 
from payment of interest on the fixed and working capital of the 
enterprises and from repayment of loans granted in previous periods.
Other social investment funds were financed by allocations from the 
governmental level at which the funds operated. Most of the social 
investment funds were abolished from 1963 onwards. The major 
remaining fund is the Fund for the Accelerated Development of the LDRs 
which is run by the federal government.
iii The Enterprise Funds. The enterprises have always been allocated 
a portion of their final profit for their own internal use. The size of 
this portion has varied considerably in the last three decades. Until 
the late fifties, the internal funds were very small and were used for 
minor improvements in the work of enterprises. However, from 1958, 
when the enterprises were authorized to form their own fixed and working 
capital funds by allocating part of the enterprise net income for this 
purpose, the importance of the internal funds grew. This was because 
they could now be used for financing the short and long term investment 
projects which were decided on by the enterprise management. Of course, 
as we shall explain later on, the enterprises were far from completely 
free to use these funds as they saw fit. From 1961 these two funds were 
amalgamated into a single business fund and restrictions on the use of 
the fixed capital fund for short term needs and on the use of the working 
capital fund for long term investment were also removed. The internal 
funds gradually became independent of State control and, specially since 
1961, they have been transferred to the domain of enterprise control.
The components of the enterprise funds as well as the importance of each
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component have already been discussed in Chapter Three (Section C).
iv Depreciation Fund. During the whole post-war period the enter­
prises have had to leave aside a certain part of their gross revenue as 
capital consumption allowance. These allowances have formed the 
Depreciation Fund, the authority over which has varied in the course of 
time. The depreciation funds have been used, at different times, for 
different types of outlays such as repairs, replacement of fixed assets, 
new investment, etc.
v Bank Credit. With the 1961 and 1965 reforms, the banks were 
transformed from state agencies to independent, profit-oriented credit 
institutions. They have been able to accept deposits of different 
kinds and extend loans to their customers. The extension of credit to 
an enterprise is decided by the management of the bank on the basis of 
the profitability of such a transaction which, in turn, depends on the 
credit-worthiness of the customer in question.
vi Private Resources. Although the private sector has always been 
considered as a significant part of the overall economic activity in 
Yugoslavia, it has hardly received any attention where questions such 
as investment financing are concerned. To finance their planned 
investment, those engaged in private activity have had to rely on their 
own savings. This is particularly important in agriculture where the 
bulk of the land, peasants and output are in the private sector and do 
not receive any help from the State or the banks for their financial 
needs.
In addition to the above sources of investment financing, which are 
more or less common to all East European economies, some more unorthodox 
methods of financing have been introduced in Yugoslavia in recent years. 
Floating bonds and initiation of joint ventures with the participation 
of foreign firms are examples of such unusual practices in this 
'socialist1 market economy.
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Having explained the different institutions through which invest­
ment expenditures are financed, we can now look at the changes in the 
nature and significance of each source while the locus of investment 
decisions was being transferred to the enterprises.
A. The Central Planning Period (1947-51)
During this period, questions such as the determination of the 
level of investment and its sources of finance were not within the 
competence of the enterprises as the enterprises were merely technical 
units of production, very much like a 'plant' of a modern corporation, 
completely subordinate to the central planning bureau in the same way 
that a 'plant' is controlled from the corporation headquarter.
Decisions on the level of investment and its distribution between 
different sectors and even different enterprises were made by the 
planning authorities. The allocation of investment funds was unrelated 
to the performance of the enterprises and only reflected the priorities 
set out by the Plan. The enterprise 'profits' (revenue less operating 
costs and wages) flowed directly into the State budget which was the 
principle institution for financing the investment projects. There was 
no obligation on the part of the receiving enterprise to pay back the 
investment resources provided by through the budget.^-
Apart from the State budget, depreciation fund was the only other 
institution in this period out of which some investment in the public 
sector was financed. The method of calculation and the rate of 
depreciation charges were determined by the federal government. About 
70 per cent of the depreciation charges were paid into the "central 
depreciation fund" under the control of the central government while 
the remaining 30 per cent, constituting the "enterprise depreciation 
fund" remained in the enterprise but could only be used for repairs.^ 12
1 Yugoslav Survey (1963), pp. 2156 and 2166
2 V. Ginoski (1968), p. 101.
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The bulk of the depreciation fund was used by the central government 
according to provisions made by the State plan.
The only source of investment outside government control was the 
resources of the private sector. These were the personal savings of 
the individuals engaged in private activity, mainly in agriculture, and 
for which no data is available. However, due to the intensification 
of the collectivization drive (from mid-1948), the confiscation of big 
estates, the general backwardness and poverty of the peasantry and the 
strong anti-capitalist attitudes and policies of the government, it is 
likely that few individuals undertook the risk of using their personal 
savings for expansion of facilities that could have been easily taken 
over or confiscated. Therefore the size of the investment expenditure 
out of private resources must have been very small.
As a whole, during the central planning period, the mechanism of 
investment financing was quite simple. The State budget was the 
principle source of finance with the depreciation fund playing a 
subsidiary role; both according to the State plan. Enterprises had 
nothing to do with decisions about the structure of investment. As 
such, they were not concerned with the method or the source of finance.
B. The Transition Period (1952-1960)
The transfer of the decision making power from the government to 
the enterprises was much slower in the field of investment than in the 
field of wage determination. On the one hand this was due to the 
inexperience of the newly developed workers’ councils and their 
inability to handle problems relating to investment expenditures. On 
the other hand, the pressure for wage rises which had built up as a 
result of the increased freedom of the workers’ councils meant that 
sufficient investment might not be realized in the economy if the 
investment decisions were also relegated to the councils. As a result, 
it took a long time, and repeated trials, before the State could
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effectively withdraw from decision making regarding the level and 
composition of investment and its financing.
Before discussing the sources of investment financing, we should 
briefly point out the mechanism and method of allocation of investment 
resources during the transition period. Although in this period the 
system of planning did not include compulsory output quotas and material 
use any longer, it continued the practice of central allocation of invest­
ment resources. The decision on the level of investment as well as its 
sectoral and regional distribution was made centrally on the basis of 
annual or five-year social plans.^ The distribution of investment funds 
between the enterprises of each industry, however, was relegated to the 
banks and various funds. This was done in two major ways. A small 
proportion of the resources earmarked for investment was left at the 
disposal of federal banks to be allocated to enterprises in a specific 
sector or industry through "auctioning". These resources were lent to 
those enterprises that could offer the highest interest rate. Host of 
the investment resources, however, were allocated to enterprises through the 
social investment funds. The allocation was to be carried out on a 
competitive basis. The enterprises requiring funds for investment applied 
for a loan to any of the social investment funds (mainly the General Invest- 
emnt Fund). The fund, facing a situation of excess demand for its resources 
used criteria such as the interest rate the applicant was willing to pay, 
the repayment period, the social benefits of the project (increase in local 
employment or foreign exchange earning), etc., in deciding which 
applicants were to receive loans. Later on (particularly from 1958) 
the applicant's participation in the financing of the investment project 
also became a criterion for allocation of funds. The implication of
1 Occasionally, the Plan provided for direct allocation of resources to 
specific enterprises. The big land reclamation and irrigation 
project in Vojvodina was, for example, financed this way. G.W.
Hoffman and F.W. Neal (1962), p. 249.
2 For the mechanism and details of 'investment auction' and the funds 
allocated by this method, see E. Neuberger (1959).
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this criteria and the conditions for its development will be discussed 
shortly. The main point is that the State intended to make the 
allocation of funds between enterprises (not sectors) market oriented 
and related to the performance of the production units. The Law on 
Investment Auction (1953) and the Law on Loans to Commercial Enterprises 
from the General Investment Fund (1954) were explicitly introduced to 
regulate the investment activity on a competitive basis.* However, as 
the number of criteria to be used by the creditor increased, and as the 
weight which was to be attached to each criterion was unknown, the 
process of allocation became increasingly less objective. Political 
considerations began to influence the decisions made by the Funds and 
led to the mushrooming of what are known as "political factories".
The regional rivalries were particularly evident and strong. As Horvat 
points out, once an important investment project was financed in one 
republic, other republics followed suit and financed similar projects 
without considering the economic justification for such expenditures.
The basic problem was that the investment expenditure did not depend on 
the performance of the enterprises and the enterprises had nothing to 
lose from heavy investment, even if it was not economically viable.
The implementation of self-management principles required developing 
a link between the investment expenditure and performance of each firm 
on the one hand, and the sovereignty of the organs of management over 
investment decisions on the other. Towards the end of the period under 
consideration (1958) some steps were taken in this direction, but the 
introduction of decisive measures had to wait until the mid-sixties. 
Although the transfer of investment decisions to enterprises was slow, 
the process of decentralization resulted in some limited change in the 
importance of various sources of financing.
1 S. Pejovich (1966), pp. 18-20.
2 B. Horvat (1976), p. 221.
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The first step in the direction of decentralization of investment 
decision was the separation of the machinery of investment from the 
budget and its transfer to social investment funds at various levels. 
Although some investment projects continued to be financed by the budgets 
of various governmental levels, the share of budgetary contributions 
declined rapidly. In 1952 the financing of investment project was done 
through the Fund for Basic Capital Development according to the annual 
social plan. This was a completely centralized fund under the control 
of the federal government. In 1952 about 98 per cent of investment in 
the social sector was financed by the State funds, 95 per cent of which 
were through the Federal Fund for Basic Capital Development.* Decision 
on the level of investment in each enterprise was still taken by the 
State agencies without any repayment obligation. From 1953 onwards, 
other social investment funds began to develop in the economic activities 
sector. (Investment in non-economic activities was still financed out 
of budget.) The largest and the most important of these funds was the 
General Investment Fund set up in 1954, followed by the Housing 
Construction Fund set up in 1955. A repayment obligation was then 
introduced on the investment expenditures financed out of these two 
funds (with some exceptions for projects like roads, railway lines, 
etc.). There were of course other sources of investment such as
2budgetary resources whose loans were without repayment obligation.
Also from 1954 the enterprises were required to pay an interest charge 
of 6 per cent on their fixed capital irrespective of the source of 
finance of their assets. This levyv was later on (1958) applied to 
the working capital as well. The interest charged on the fixed and 
working capital flowed into the General Investment Fund (the most 
important component of the social investment fund) which was also
1 Yugoslav Survey (1963), p. 2167 and B. Horvat (1976), p. 219.
2 Yugoslav Survey (1963), pp. 2156-2157.
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supplemented by a part of the turnover tax and some State contributions. 
During the transition period, the social investment funds constituted 
the most important source of investment financing.
Table 1, on the next page, shows the contribution of various 
sources of finance during the transition period and most of the self­
management period (until 1970).* For most years from 1952 until 1963 
(the last year of the operation of the General Investment Fund), the 
social investment funds accounted for morev.than half of the investment 
financing. Since these funds were run according to the preferences of 
the planning agencies, as reflected in the investment plan, they can be 
classified under government controlled sources in Table 1. The share 
of budget in investment financing, which was most significant in the 
central planning period, declined rapidly and stayed at a low level of 
4-6 per cent in the course of the transition period.
The banks in this period did not constitute an independent source
of investment financing and, as Table 1 shows, no investment was
financed from their credit resources. Although from 1956 the
administration of the General Investment Fund was legally relegated
2to the Yugoslav Investment Bank , and although other social investment 
funds handled their lending operations through one of the banks, 
nevertheless, the banks were not credit creating institutions. They 
were not guided by profitability considerations in their operations and 
they did not decide on the allocation of the resources at their 
disposal independently. By and large, the banks followed the criteria 
provided by the planning agency for allocating the investment funds 
among different enterprises. Therefore, we cannot talk about investment 
financed by the banking sector in this period since the banks were not
1 The publication of the information enabling us to construct Table 1 
ceased after 1972 when the data for 1970 was given. We shall try to 
construct a similar but slightly different table for the post-1970 period later.
2 This was done by passing of the Law on Investment Loans (25 July 
1956), see S. Pejovich (1966), p. 18.
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Table 1 - The Sources of Financing of Gross Investment (Percentages)
Year
Non-government sources 
(at enterprise disposal)
Government sources 
(at government disposal )
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l Total
1952 1 - - 5 6 69 7 18 94 100
1953 10 - - 6 16 59 4 21 84 100
1955 16 - - 6 22 46 6 26 78 100
1956 14 - - 6 20 47 5 28 80 100
1958 17 - - 7 24 53 5 18 76 100
1959 15 - - 6 21 59 6 14 79 100
1960 19 - 1 7 27 53 5 15 73 100
1961 21 13 1 8 43 53 4 - 57 100
1962 30 4** 3 8 45 52 3 - 55 100
1963 26 5 9 8 48 50 2 - 52 100
1964 24 5 29 8 66 32 2 - 34 100
1965 26 5 32 13 76 22 2 - 24 100
1966 33 4 35 17 89 10 1 - 11 100
1967 28 • • 36 22 86 13 1 - 14 100
1968 28 • • 39 19 86 13 1 - 14 100
1969 26 • • 43 18 87 12 1 - 13 100
1970 25 • • 44 17 86 13 1 14 100
* The depreciation fund, as discussed in the text (pp. 77-78) and 
shown above, was under government control - and sometimes 
administration - until 1961 when full control over them was 
transferred to the enterprises. Since 1967, no separate data 
is available for the depreciation fund.
** From 1962, a part of the depreciation fund was added to the
business fund and the data shows that part of investment which is 
financed directly out of depreciation funds.
*** Beginning in 1964, the resources of the abolished social invest­
ment funds were transferred to the banks. This accounts for the 
sudden rise of the share of bank resources in the financing of 
investment. Also from 1966, the resources of the Housing 
Construction Fund were transferred to the banks.
+ Including the depreciation of the assets of the private sector.
++ These funds are too numerous to be named. During each period 
one or two of them were the principal ones. Just to mention a 
few, the General Investment Fund, the Fund for Investment of the 
Federation and other Socio-Political Communities, the Fund for 
Exploration Works, and the Fund for the Accelerated Development 
of the LDRs.
.. Data not available.
Source: Data for 1952-53 from Jugoslavije 1945-64. p , 85; for 1954-58 
from SGJ(l96QX p. 180;- for 1959 from SGJ(1966X P* 118; for 
1960-68 from SGJ(l970), p. 112; and for 1969-72 from SGJ (l97^
p. 112.
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in a position to finance any project on their own accord or on the basis 
of their deposits. In fact the banks should be regarded as an integral 
part of the planning agency and not as an independent economic 
organization.
The depreciation fund was another important source of investment 
financing on which State control gradually loosened. The division of 
depreciation charges into a unified state depreciation fund and an 
enterprise depreciation fund continued until 1954 when a new method of 
calculating depreciation was introduced and the custody of depreciation 
funds was changed.^- While in the pre-1954 period depreciation was 
charged on the basis of output, it was now to be computed, rightly so, 
on the basis of the estimated value of the assets. The unified 
depreciation fund was also abolished and enterprises were to keep their 
own depreciation funds. Although the custody of these funds changed 
from the State to the enterprises, the authority of the State over them 
did not change accordingly. The depreciation funds were to be kept in 
separate bank accounts; they had to remain in these special accounts for 
at least three months before they could be used; they could only be used 
for fixed assets. But the most serious restriction on the use of these 
funds was that they could be frozen in the banks by a government decision. 
According to Ginovsky, the bulk of depreciation funds was usually frozen 
and could not be used by the enterprises. The blocked portion was, as 
a part of the capital of the central bank, used by the government in 
pursuing its policy. As such, one can argue that the depreciation 
funds, despite being formally relegated to the enterprises, remained 
under State control. The rate of depreciation coupled with blocking 
were in fact used as policy instruments to control the direction, timing
1 V. Ginovsky (1968), pp. 101-103.
2 During the fifties when this provision was in force, according to Paj, 
there were occasional enterprises which used their depreciation funds 
for new investment. But this was by no means a prevalent practice
I. Paj (1970), p. 69.
3 V. Ginovsky (1968), p. 102 and R. Bicanic (1973), p. 130.
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and the level of investment undertaken by the enterprises and to ensure 
the realization of investment plans. The nature of the control of the 
State over the depreciation funds was of course different from that over 
the social investment funds. In the case of the latter, the State 
could fully determine their level and distribution in different 
industries. In the case of the former, however, the State could control 
its timing but could not decide on its distribution between different 
enterprises and industries. This was an important departure from the 
position under central planning when the government had, more or less, 
complete control over this source of finance. Table 1 also represents 
the change in the share of depreciation fund in the period under 
consideration. For the reasons already mentioned, the depreciation 
fund, in this period, is classified as part of the resources controlled 
by the government.
The budgetary contributions, the social investment funds and the 
depreciation funds were sources of investment financing which were 
controlled by the government. The sources of finance free of 
government control during the period under consideration were the 
enterprises’ internal funds and the resources of the private sector.
As mentioned in Section IB of this chapter, since 1954 when the 
distribution of enterprise revenue was carried out according to a 
’profit sharing system’, the enterprises received a share of their 
profit, however small, out of which some of their investment expenditure 
could be financed. The 1958 reforms in the sphere of income distribution 
and implementation of an 'income sharing system' enabled the enterprises 
to form their own fixed and working capital funds for the explicit 
purpose of investment financing. Although the share of investment 
financed out of enterprises' own funds increased from 11 per cent in 
1953 to 19 per cent in 1960 (see Table 1), it is doubtful whether the 
actual control of the enterprises over these funds also increased at the
- 204 -
same rate. As we mentioned before, during this period, particularly 
in the second half of the fifties, the distribution of investment funds 
between enterprises of each sector was to be carried out on a 
competitive basis. The General Investment Fund and other social 
investment funds received applications for loans from different enter­
prises, and used criteria such as interest, the repayment period, social 
benefits and the degree of participation by the enterprise in 
distributing their available funds. Towards the end of this peridd, 
the criterion of internal participation had become the only objective 
criterion which was based on the actual performance of the enterprise 
and expected profitability of a project. What happened was that by 
using their own funds as part of the resources for financing a certain 
investment project - which was approved by the State controlled social 
investment funds - the enterprises actually allowed part of their 
resources to be bound to the preferences of the planning authorities 
(which were manifested in the way in which the resources of the social 
investment funds were allocated). In other words, by requiring some 
internal participation, the State controlled more of the resources than 
was reflected in the magnitude of the social investment funds.* Of 
course, it must be emphasized that the internal funds were allocated 
as deemed fit by the enterprise management and even in the case of 
them being 'bound up' with the loans from the social investment funds, 
this was done by the decision of the workers' councils. The nature of 
State control over the internal funds of enterprises was quite different 
from that on the social investment funds or even the depreciation funds. 
For this reason, Table 1 has classified the contributions of the 
enterprise internal funds as part of the resources outside the sphere of 
government decision making.
1 On this point also see B. Horvat (1976), p. 221.
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The resources of the private sector, used for investment financing 
did not change much during this period. They were mainly used in 
agriculture and handicrafts where private activity were prevalent.
To sum up: the policy during the 1952-60 period clearly showed that 
the end of central planning and the granting of a certain degree and kind 
of autonomy to the enterprises did not mean that the government was 
going to stop making investment decisions. Although the enterprises 
were allowed to keep their own internal funds and although the 
depreciation funds were to be kept and handled by the enterprises 
(though in separate accounts), nevertheless, the State continued to 
decide on the level and composition of investment through the social 
investment funds, primarily, and the budget, secondarily. The practice 
of blocking the depreciation funds accounts ôf the enterprises gave the 
State additional control over the timing of the investment while the 
requirement of internal participation enabled it to have some control 
over the enterprises' internal funds. As Table 1 shows, from 1952 to 
1960, though the enterprise controlled share of resources used for 
financing increased (from 6 to 23 per cent), nevertheless the bulk of 
resources continued to remain under the control of the State (from 94 
to 73 per cent).
C. The Self-Management Period (1961 onwards)
Self-Management principles required that the locus of investment 
decisions be transferred to the enterprise organs of management in the 
same manner as was done for the workers' personal incomes. This, in 
turn, meant that enterprises had to seek sources of finance for their 
planned investment independently, that is, they had to use either their 
own internal funds or be able to borrow money from banks. These 
requirements were made possible only by the introduction of the 1961 and 
1965 reform measures. The measures affecting the system of investment
- 206 -
financing were:
i Changes in the Status of Banks. The reforms transformed the banks 
from mere state agencies to independent credit institutions whose lending 
operations were no longer subordinated to the requirements of the State 
plan. On the contrary, the lending operations began to be performed
on the basis of profitability and credit worthiness of the customers.
The 1965 reforms also removed the geographic restriction that limited 
the banks' credit operations to their own locality and enabled them to 
extend loans to enterprises anywhere in the country. The banks used 
the sight deposits of the enterprises, social organizations and 
government, and the saving deposits of the population, as their loan 
capital, in very much the same way as the banks in other market 
economies. They were also subject to similar forms of government 
control and supervision such as the imposition of limits on interest 
rate, reserve requirement, etc.'*'
ii The Abolition of the Social Investment Funds. Although through 
the above measure the nature of banking operations and the relations of 
banks to enterprises had theoretically changed, the actual possibilities 
open to banks, in the early sixties, were still greatly limited. The 
investment resources at the disposal of banks which could be loaned out 
according to the banks' preferences and decisions were very small. This 
was due to the fact that the bulk of investment resources were 
appropriated and held by various social investment funds. This 
limitation, however, was removed from 1963 onwards with the abolition of 
these funds and the transfer of their resources to the bank capital.
The General Investment Fund was abolished at the end of 1963 and other 
social investment funds were gradually abandoned. This measure provided 
the banks with a considerable proportion of investment resources in the 
economy and enabled them to become,effectively, a major source of
1 For details see J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), p. 70; R. Goldsmith 
(1975) and J.J. Hauvonen (1970).
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investment financing. It amounted to the transfer of decision making 
power over a considerable volume of resources from the State to the 
banks. The abolition of the funds also meant that the governments at 
various levels could reduce the size of their appropriations from the 
enterprise revenue and leave a larger share at the disposal of the 
workers' councils.
iii- Change in the System of Control over Depreciation Funds. The
restrictive practice of freezing the bulk of the depreciation funds in
banks was abandoned in I960*, though other practices such as keeping
separate accounts and enforcing a minimum time limit of three months
on the use of these funds remained in force until 1966. Clearly such
practices were not in accordance with self-management principles and had
to be changed, but nonetheless, in principle, control over the
depreciation funds was handed to the workers' councils from 1961 without
any restriction on their use (replacement, repair or new investment in
fixed or working capital). In 1966, the determination of the rate of
depreciation and the method of its computation were transferred to
enterprises (subject to some legal minimum rates for different types of
assets). The depreciation funds were no longer required to be
2deposited in separate accounts. In fact from 1967, the depreciation 
funds were regarded as part of the enterprises' own funds for investment 
financing (see Table 1) and no separate data were given for the 
investment expenditures financed by these funds.
The introduction of these policies led the organs of management to 
achieve the largest degree of autonomy since the introduction of the 
new economic system. The concrete meaning of 'self-management' for 
individual enterprises was that they could influence the volume of
1 V. Ginovsky (1968), p. 102.
2 These measures were legally introduced in the Enterprise Depreciation 
Act of July 1966, see Ibid., p. 104.
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resources at their disposal (total revenue) and its distribution.
These measures of autonomy became possible ’.only after the 1961 and 
1965 reforms. Particularly important among these measures was the 
ability of the enterprises to decide on the level and type of investment 
according to their own needs, and to finance such investment on the 
basis of their own earnings and credit position. Relegation of 
decisions regarding the level and composition of investment to the 
enterprises also had a significant impact on the power structure within 
the enterprises. If the investment decisions were to be made at the 
enterprise level, then new talents and expertise were required to 
undertake the new tasks such as investment analysis, project evaluation, 
risk analysis, management accounting, etc., to ensure the successful 
functioning of the firm. This meant a greater reliance on the abilities 
of these experts and, because of the scarcity of such professionals, 
the inevitability of giving them a bigger voice in the running of the 
firm despite their numerical weakness. As we showed in Chapter One, 
from the beginning of the sixties the representation of the professional 
managers and technicians on the organs of management began to increase. 
Concomitantly in this period the relegation of new areas of decision 
making to the enterprise management took place.
The implementation of the 1965 reform measures affected the nature 
and importance of various sources of investment financing, resulting in 
a major shift of the locus of investment decisions from the State to 
the enterprises.
From 1964, i.e., the year after the abolition of the General 
Investment Fund and the transfer of its resources to the Yugoslav 
Investment Bank, there was a sharp fall in the share of investment 
financed out of the social investment funds, accompanied by a sudden rise 
in the share of investment financed by bank credits. As Table 1 shows, 
in 1964, the investment financed from the former source declined by 18
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per cent while that financed by the latter source increased by 20 per 
cent. The change was not merely a nominal one but a change in the 
locus of control over resources and. in the criteria applied to their use. 
When the commercial banks take charge of these resources, they would 
use them only on the basis of profitability and the strength of the 
borrower's credit position. Before this, however, the resources of 
the social investment funds were loaned primarily on the basis of the 
preferences of the planning authorities expressed in the social plans, 
and, such considerations as profitability did not play an important 
role. After 1964, the fall in the importance of the social 
investment funds continued as the rest of them were gradually abolished. 
The most important remaining fund, controlled by the federal government, 
is the Fund for the Accelerated Development of the LDRs which was formed 
after the 1965 reforms and has continued to finance a small proportion 
of the total investment up to now.
After 1964, the importance of bank credits continued to grow so 
that by 1970 the banks financed some 44 per cent of total gross 
investment in the economy (see Table 1). The increased reliance on 
the bank credit is an important development of the post-reform economic 
behaviour of the Yugoslav enterprises and should be looked at in 
conjunction with the role played by the enterprises' own funds. The 
share of these funds reached its maximum of 33 per cent in 1966 and then 
began to taper off. As we argued in Chapter Three, the workers' 
councils were biased in favour of distributing a higher portion of the 
enterprise net incomes as present income and against using it to 
finance investment. The Yugoslav enterprises have constantly been 
facing pressure for higher personal incomes from their workers. When­
ever the general situation in the economy was ripe, the workers' councils 
managed to increase the personal incomes. We also mentioned that the 
leading industries, enjoying larger net incomes, could afford to
-  210 -
distribute higher personal incomes and leave less for the internal funds. 
This was made possible only as the result of the opening up of the 
possibility of external financing, i.e., using bank credits for the 
financing of investment expenditures. The investment which is financed 
by external resources is not at the expense of current personal incomes 
of the work force and so long as it is profitable it has no adverse 
effect on thè level of personal incomes now or in the future. The 
reliance on bank financing led, immediately after the reforms, to the 
distribution of higher personal incomes and a reduction in the share of 
net income left for the enterprises. Table 7 (in Chapter Three) clearly 
shows that the share of social product left for the enterprises 
increased in the early sixties, reaching its peak in 1966 and falling 
afterwards. The result was that the share of investment financed out 
of the enterprises’ internal funds also declined after 1966 (see Table 1). 
This trend, however, was partially reversed during the seventies, a 
process which is not shown in Table 1 due to the discontinuation, after 
1970, of the data on which this table is based. Nevertheless, a similar 
set of data based on alternative information regarding the origin of 
resources used for investment in the social sector alone has been used to
Table 2 - Distribution of Sources of Investment Financing (%)
Year EconomicOrganizations
Non-economic
Organizations Banks
Government
Units
1966 39 7 39 15
1969 28 6 49 16
1970 27 6 51 16
1971 27 7 51 15
1972 30 8 42 20
1973 33 9 40 19
1974 35 10 37 18
1975 36 11 37 16
Source : Indeks, no. 5, May 1968; and no. 12, Dec. 1976, i>. 48.
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compile Table 2, which shows the distribution among the enterprises, 
banks and government units of the sources of investment financing in the 
social sector since the mid-sixties.
By 1971 the share of enterprise financed investment had reached its 
lowest point in this period (27%) while the share of the bank financed 
investment had reached its all time high (51%). The State intervention 
in the economy, which was aimed at preventing the enterprises from 
distributing their net incomes too heavily in favour of personal incomes, 
changed this trend. The intervention took the form of, firstly, the 
abolition of interest on the capital assets of enterprises and, secondly, 
the introduction of the Social Agreement on Incomes. The enterprises 
could no longer allocate their net income as freely in favour of 
personal incomes as before. As a result, the trend was reversed so 
that by 1975 the share of economic organizations in investment financing 
rose to 37 per cent, though it has not reached itsi previous peak of 39 
per cent (in 1966) yet.
The Yugoslavs expected that, firstly the 1965 reforms and secondly 
the measures taken in the seventies would lead the enterprises to 
become the major source of investment financing. But as one leading 
economist has put it, these measures failed to create sufficient 
conditions for the economic organizations to become the dominant source 
of financing.* This was partly due to the fact that the various levels 
of government still controlled a sizable share of resources, and partly 
to the fact that the Yugoslavs had underestimated the role that a 
relatively independent banking system could play in the financing of 
investment expenditures.
Going back to Table 1, we still need to discuss briefly the share 
of the budget and the private sector in the financing of investment.
The investment financed directly out of budget reduced to an insignificant 
level during the sixties as the result of the requirement that the State
should withdraw from direct involvement in investment activities. The 
i - M. Vujacic (1977), pp. 53-54. ------ ------------
-  212 -
investment activity of the federal government was particularly restricted 
by the third amendment to the Constitution and the legislations in 1967 
which limited the investment undertaken by the federal government to 
those projects and activities specified by the law or by the social 
plan.*
The share of investment financed out of private resources, on the
contrary, increased significantly during thè sixties. The increase was
particularly striking after the 1965 reforms when it was explicitly
recognized that the parts played by the private sector in agriculture,
crafts and catering sectors were complementary to those of the social
sector. This recognition meant that the private producers were further
assured that their investment would be safeguarded by the State. The
Amendment XXV to the Constitution, passed in 1971, was a further
emphasis on the importance of the place occupied by the private sector
2and a further assurance to the private producers.
Before ending the discussion of the sources of finance during the 
self-management period,the regional implications of the changes in this 
period, as briefly pointed out in the introduction to this Chapter, 
should be analysed. During the central planning period and, to a large 
extent during the transition period, the regional distribution of 
investment was carried out according to the plan. With the State intention 
of pumping more investment into the less developed regions, and with the 
investment resources controlled by the State agencies, it was possible 
to earmark and direct the resources into the LDRs. However, with the 
transfer of the locus of decision making to the enterprises and as a 
result of the new situation in which the investment decisions largely
1 For details see Jan Vanek (1972), p. 58 and S. Sekulid (1970), pp. 9-10.
2 Yugoslav; Survey (1971a), pp. 13-14. Interestingly enough, this 
Amendment left the determination of the sphere and scope of the 
activities of the private producers to the republican and provincial 
authorities. Before 1971, however, the federal Constitution had 
explicitly delineated the work of the private sector.
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depended on the present or expected profits of an enterprise, the 
mechanism of regional allocation of investment was necessarily altered. 
One would be led to expect, that if the investment expenditure of each 
enterprise (or each region) is related solely to its own operations, 
then the LDRs, with many shortcomings in the quality and quantity of 
their resources and at a low stage of development, would necessarily be 
at a disadvantage in comparison with the more developed areas. In fact 
one would expect that the volume of resources generated by the LDRs for 
investment purpose would fall as a result of the transfer of investment 
decisions to enterprise level and that the distribution of investment 
resources between various regions would also be subject to change.
Results such as these would have been totally unacceptable in 
Yugoslavia. With the deep rooted problem of nationalities, no central 
leadership could have afforded to embark on a programme which would lead 
to a serious fall in the share of investment going to the LDRs. To 
avoid such consequence, it was necessary for the State agencies to 
make up for the shortage of resources over and above the volume generated 
by the enterprises in the LDRs. In other words, along with the self­
management measures we find that the share of investment financed by the 
LDRs themselves is far below that of the more developed areas while the 
share of investment financed through various government controlled 
funds and agencies is much greater for the former. Only in this way 
could the regional distribution of total investment, regardless of the 
source of .'finance, remain roughly stable. Let us look at the data 
now. Table 3 summarizes the regional distribution of investment as well 
as the distribution of the major sources of financing the investment
expenditures.
Here, we have selected the two advanced republics of Croatia and 
Slovenia, the two less developed republics of Macedonia and Montenegro, 
and the very underdeveloped autonomous province of Kossovo to illustrate
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Table 3 - The Distribution of Investment and Sources of Finance in 
Selected Republics* (Percentages)
Year SFRJ Croatia Slovenia Montengro Macedonia Kossovo
A. Regional. Distribution of Total Investment
1959 100 23 12 3 6 n.a.
1964 100 23 14 3 13 n.a.
1968 100 24 12 2 7 4
1972 100 24 14 4 7 3
1975 100 22 20 3 6 4
B. Proportion of Total Investment in Each Region Financed
by Enterprises' Internal Resources
1959 32 35 43 11 18 n.a.
1964 32 37 36 20 11 n.a.
1968 37 41 43 23 22 15
1972 38 47 46 12 24 11
C. Proportion of Total Investment in Each Region Financed
by Bank Credit
1959 - - - - - —
1964 31 35 39 19 26 n.a.
1968 47 52 51 40 51 34
1972 43 46 45 36 39 13
D. Proportion of Total Investment in Each Region Financed
by the Social Investment Funds
1959 58 55 51 80 73 n.a.
1964 25 19 15 57 41 Had*
1968 9 1 1 32 16 48
1972 12 1 0 49 31 72
* The data for 1968 and 1972 in Sections B, C and D show the situation 
for investment in fixed assets and not for total investment.
Source: SGJ (1961), pp. 424-28 (for 59); SGJ (1966), p. 471 (for 64);
SGJ (1973), pp. 477-81 (for 68 and 72) and SGJ (1974), p. 506 
(for total investment 68 and 72); and SGJ (1977), p. 508.
various points made above.
In Section A of the above table we can see that the distribution of 
investment between the five selected areas has remained relatively 
stable over time. A first glance may give the impression that the 
structural changes experienced by the economy (the most important 
aspect of which was the transfer of investment decisions to individual 
enterprises), did not affect the share of investment going to each area. 
In other words, the preferences of the planners, reflected in the
allocation of resources of the social investment funds, may seem to have 
coincided with those of the individual enterprises. Obviously this is 
not the case and an analysis of the Sections B-D of Table 3 shows that 
such impression is wrong. Firstly, take Section B of this table which 
represents the proportions of investment financed out of the enterprises' 
own funds in different regions. Here we can clearly see that the 
reliance on own resources was much greater in Croatia and Slovenia than 
it was in the LDRs. Secondly, taking Section C of Table 3 which shows 
the extent of reliance on bank credits for investment financing, we can 
see that the more developed regions managed to obtain a greater share of 
their investment expenditures from this source than did the LDRs,
Sections B and C of Table 3 link the investment expenditure in different 
regions to the profitability (current or expected) of their enterprises. 
If investment decisions had been totally decentralized, (i.e., the 
internal resources and bank credits were the only sources of investment 
financing), the less developed regions would have ended up getting a 
much smaller share of total investment, from 1964 onwards, compared to 
the previous periods. It is here that the State’s rescue operations 
unfold. Section D of Table 3 shows the share of investment in each 
region financed by social investment funds which have been under the 
control of various levels of government. Here, we can see that - 
particularly after 1964 - Croatia and Slovenia practically stopped using 
these funds as sources of finance while the LDRs continued to depend on 
them for financing anything between one-fifth to four-fifths of their 
total investment. This is how the State managed to keep the 
distribution of total investment between various regions relatively 
stable during the pre-1965 and post-1965 years.
To sum up the discussion on the sources of investment financing: 
along with the transfer of the locus of investment decisions from the 
State to the enterprises, the sources of investment financing controlled
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by the State gradually diminished. The transfer was very slow and 
lasted until the early sixties. During the central planning period 
there was no such problem as finding sources of investment, as the level 
and composition of investment were determined by the State Plan and 
financed out of the budget. During the transition period, especially 
the latter part of it, investment decisions were gradually transferred 
to the enterprises. Nevertheless, during this period, the State 
continued to retain effective control over the level and sectoral distr­
ibution of investment and left the distribution of investment.between 
enterprises of each industry to be decided by the social investment funds 
on a competitive basis. This was the first attempt to make investment 
dependent on the performance of the enterprises and the profitability of 
their investment projects. With the 1961 and 1965 reforms, the enterprises 
gained autonomy over investment decisions and also became responsible for 
finding sources of finance for their planned investment. The commercial­
ization of banks and the transfer of the resources of the abolished social 
investment funds to the banks enabled them to become an important element 
of the new system of investment financing. The share of government 
controlled resources declined from 1964 onwards while that of the enter­
prise controlled resources (including the banks') sharply increased. The 
pressures applied by the workers' councils for extra wages (discussed in 
Chapter One) and the structure of property rights (discussed in Chapter Two) 
meant that a smaller proportion of net incomes was left for investment.
This created a bias in favour of external financing. In the relatively 
free period after'the 1965 reforms, the workers' councils took advantage of 
the situation and approved the distribution of higher personal incomes.
The result, shown in Table 1, was a fall in the share of internal 
resources accompanied by a rise in the share of bank resources used for 
investment financing. There were two possible outcomes to these 
tendencies: a continuous increase in personal incomes and/or adoption of
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ambitious investment programmes which were heavily dependent on external 
resources. Both outcomes,-.if unchecked, could have intensified the 
inflationary situation with which Yugoslavia has been beset for more 
than a decade.
Concern for the management of the economy in general was the reason 
for government intervention in the early seventies which resulted in 
the introduction of the Social Agreement on Incomes and the slow down in 
the rapidly rising personal incomes. A secondary effect was the rise 
in the share of internal financing accompanied by a fall in the share 
of banks credits used for investment financing. Table 2 also shows 
this reversed trend.
Geographically, the transfer of investment decisions to the 
enterprises meant that there was an imminent danger that the LDRs would 
not be able to raise sufficient resources for investment by relying on 
their own performance. In fact, as we showed in Table 3, the share of 
investment expenditure financed by internal funds and bank credits in 
the LDRs were far below that of the more developed regions. This was 
yet another area where the government had to intervene in enterprise 
affairs, this time through the remaining social investment funds and its 
budget (mainly through the Fund for the Accelerated Development of the 
LDRs) in order to supplement the internally generated resources of the 
enterprises in the LDRs so that, at the least, their relative position 
would remain unchanged.
D. Recent Developments in the Field of Investment Financing
In recent years, the attempts by the Yugoslav leaders to improve 
market conditions, to reduce the involvement of the State in the 
economy and, in short, to develop the system of self-management, have 
led to several developments which directly affect the system and 
sources of investment financing. Most important of the recent
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developments, discussed below, are the freedom to float bonds (in 
association with the possibility of developing a securities market) and 
the freedom to pool resources with other enterprises, even foreign 
companies, in order to enter into joint ventures.
1, Floating Bonds. In September 1968, for the first time, the Yugoslav 
automobile firm of Crvena Zastava (assembling Fiats) invited the public 
to subscribe to a preferential loan at 6 per cent interest through the 
banks.^ In 1970, Slovenije Les, a furniture manufacturer in Slovenia, 
announced plans to float an 8 million bond issue, with the bondholders 
having a voice in the distribution of enterprise profits. In 1970, 
other enterprises were allowed to float long term bonds with interest 
rates which were not subject to the same restrictions as bank rates.
Article 5 of the Amendment XXII to the Constitution (passed in 1971) 
states that enterprises may draw on the financial resources of the 
private sector, thus, creating a new outlet for private savings.
Private capital would receive interest and possibly 'other advantages' 
such as a share in the revenue, but not the right to participate in 
management.^ Although legally sanctioned, direct borrowing from 
individuals for investment purposes has been low-keyed so far.
Nevertheless, the implications of this Amendment could be instrumental 
in the development of a securities market. Certainly the Yugoslavs 
have not hidden their interest in and desire for the development of some 
kind of a capital market.5 In 1976 a bill allowing for a 'socialist' 
capital market was approved. The enterprises according to this bill, 
can have access to the capital market through one of the major banks and can 
raise capital by selling shares to other firms, social organizations or
1 M. Lavigne (1974), p. 94.
2 Quarterly Economic Review: Yugoslavia (Q.E.R. hereafter), no. 4, 1969, 
p .  6. Prime Minister Ribicic found it necessary to warn Slovenije *
Les that workers' management should not be endangered due to this 
action.
3 V. Dubey (1975), p. 229.
4 M. Lavigne (1974), p. 96.
5 B. Horvat (1976), p. 223.
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private individuals. Obviously such developments will have very 
important, and possibly serious,implications for the self-management 
system. This is because a securities market is not merely a new and 
additional source of funds, but also a medium of financial investment.
If enterprises are allowed to operate in a capital market, the nature 
of investment undertaken by the firms will change. Like firms in 
modern capitalist economies, they would be able to undertake physical 
as well as financial investment. It can be clearly seen that the 
development of a securities market will require firstly that the 
enterprises are able to receive that category of income called 'interest' 
and, secondly, that they are allowed to buy and sell shares. A 
capital market is not a neutral source of funds applicable to capitalist 
economies as well as economies based on other social systems. A 
capital market can be developed only when enterprises in an economy are 
of a particular type, namely joint stock companies. The establishment 
of a capital market not only helps the mobility of capital assets and 
expands the sources of investment funds, but also requires that the 
enterprises be organized on a 'joint stock company' basis. The system 
of workers' self management may not be exactly compatible with joint 
stock companies which, among other things, can hold the assets of other 
enterprises and engage in takeovers. This is because those who hold 
the shares of an enterprise would necessarily become a new category of 
interested bodies (in addition to the employees of the firm who used to 
be the sole beneficiaries) who would demand certain powers in the running 
of the enterprise. This would bring the situation closer to the model 
of an enterprise as envisaged by the Bullock Committee than to the 
labour-managed firm as conceived by the Yugoslavs. What is important 
is that already some of the measures necessary for the development of 
a securities market have been accepted and implemented.
In the post-1965 reforms period, the reduction of levies and
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contributions on enterprise incomes and the varying levels of efficiency 
and profitability of operations in different enterprises, led to the 
appearance of 'surplus' enterprises on the one hand and 'deficit' 
enterprises on the other. Of course the banking system was to absorb 
the excess funds of the units with surplus and provide credit for the 
units in the red. But on top of that,the 'surplus' enterprises were 
allowed to lend directly to the 'deficit' enterprises and receive a 
mutually agreed upon interest in return.* Although attempts have been 
made to prevent the interest income of the enterprises from being 
distributed as personal income to the employees (except in the banking 
sector), it is clfear that 'interest' is already accepted as a category 
of income and the possibility of successful firms becoming the creditors 
of the less successful ones has already materialized. Besides, the 
safeguards to prevent the enterprises from using interest incomes for
i
the benefit of their employees have not been very tight and successful. 
The enterprises can use such payments for further investment and, in 
this way, merely postpone the distribution of their profits. They can, 
also distribute more of their internal funds as personal incomes and 
use their interest earnings to supplement the reduced internal investment 
funds.
2. Joint Ventures. Another method of creating finance for new 
investment projects has been the pooling of resources by two or more 
enterprises. This method of 'joint venture' - as it is officially 
called - was legally sanctioned by the 1967 legislations which defined, 
though unsatisfactorily, the limits on the powers and the rights of the 
parent companies as well as the workers of the newly established 
enterprise. Once a new enterprise has been set up by pooling the
1 D. Milenkovitch (1971), p. 262.
2 Joint ventures hadbeen possible since the early sixties hot the legal 
limits on the participants discouraged them from entering into such 
partnerships. The removal of the limitations were the object of the 
1967 legislations. See J. Dirlam and J. Plummer (1973), pp. 54-55,
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excess resources of other organizations, the original capital invested
by the partners in the joint venture will be considered a loan to the
new establishment from the parent ones, against which interest will be
paid. The regularity and the length of the period of interest payments
has not been specified. Even the 1971 Constitutional Amendments failed
to sort out these ambiguities. Technically speaking, no enterprise is
allowed to have a permanent share in the profits of another, and the
rights of parent organizations in a joint venture are limited by the
rights of the workers' council of the new enterprise. Besides,
theoretically, as soon as the original invested capital of the parent
firms are paid back, their claims on the enterprise will end. This has
been a serious drawback on the promotion of capital mobility. The
solution was found by lawyers through the loopholes in the regulations
which allow the workers' councils to relegate some of their responsibilities
and functions to another party. In addition to this loophole, as long
as the original invested capital remains unrecovered, the parent
companies' rights and claims will continue to survive.
3. Joint Ventures with Foreign Firms. The legislation in July 1967
enabled the Yugoslav firms to enter into joint venture with foreign
firms.* Subject to certain conditions (such as the approval of the
Federal Secretariat of the Economy, ownership of 51 per cent of the
shares by the Yugoslav side, guarantee of export of about AO per cent of
the output, etc.), the Yugoslav enterprises were now able to enter into
profit sharing agreements with foreign firms and become the vehicle of
2foreign investment. The foreign partner was originally required to 
reinvest or at least deposit 20 per cent of its 'share of profits in 
Yugoslavia. It was later recognized that this limitation acted as a 
deterrent to foreign firms and steps had to be taken to remove it.^ 123
1 M. Sukijasovic (1973), p. 41.
2 V. Dubey (1975), p. 126. Some of these restrictions, such as the 
upper ceiling of 49% on the share of the foreign firms in joint 
ventures, were later relaxed. See, e.g., Q-E.R. f no. 2, 1976, p .  10.
3 Yugoslav Survey (1971b), p. 110.
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Other legislations were introduced in 1971, 73 and 76 to reduce the
restrictions.1 The 1971 Constitutional Amendment XXXV gave wider powers
to the economic and social organizations (including banks) to enter joint
agreements and programmes with foreign firms. At the same time the
XXIInd Amendment expressly guaranteed the protection of the rights of
foreign investors in Yugoslavia, acquired as a result of the joint ventures
2even against legislations passed retrospectively.
The significance of partnership agreements with foreign firms is not 
limited to purely financial matters such as expansion and diversification 
of sources of investment funds. Although financially the importance of 
these agreements lies in the partial removal of the constraint imposed on 
the investment plans of enterprises by the shortage of foreign exchange, 
nevertheless, this may be a minor advantage. The more important advantage 
of partnership with foreign firms lies in the possibility of the import of 
advanced foreign technology into the country. The partnership helps to 
enlarge the technical possibilities of the Yugoslav enterprises,and, over a 
longer period, the new techniques can be diffused in the whole economy.
In fact a glance at the list of the foreign firms and the distribution of 
foreign investment between different sectors shows that the bulk of 
foreign capital has flowed into the automobile and producer goods indust” 
ries in which improved technology is crucial. Amongst the most well” 
known foreign firms which entered into joint ventures with Yugoslav 
enterprises are: Fiat of Italy, Citroen of France, Mercedes-Benz and 
Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz of West Germany (all motor vehicles manufacturers); 
SKF of Sweden (ball bearings); Semperit of Austria (tyres); W B  of East 
Germany (producer of chemical titanium dioxide); the Printing Developments 
Inc. of New York (colour printing). In terms of the distribution of 
foreign investment in different sectors, the bulk of the capital entering 123
1 Q.E.R.. no. 4, 1971, p. 7; no. 3, 1973, p. 13; and no. 2, 1976, p. 10.
2 Yugoslav Survey (1971a), pp. 11 and 26.
3 For details of some of these contracts see S. Miloskovic (1970)
pp. 74-75 and V. Dubey (1975), p. 128. *
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Yugoslavia up until the beginning of 1973 went into the metal using 
industries (50%) followed by the chemical industry (19%), rubber industry 
(7%) and electrical industry (5%).*
Although the absolute size of foreign investment has been very small 
in Yugoslavia so far, its political and social impact has been great.
Most of the foreign firms with whom partnership agreements have been 
concluded are from the advanced capitalist countries. Partnership with 
these firms is a major and decisive step in injecting capitalist relations, 
methods and techniques into the Yugoslav production units. When the 
growth of a firm, its credit worthiness and the income of its workers 
become dependent on the amount of profit it makes, then it is to be 
expected that the management of such firms would be very willing to coop­
erate and enter into partnership with the multinational corporations which 
benefit from advanced technology, know-how and management techniques much 
superior to their own. Such partnerships would help the Yugoslav firms 
to become more competitive (at home and abroad, specially in Eastern 
Europe), gain a wider market, make more profit, distribute higher incomes 
and bonuses to its workers, and even grow faster. Sweezy has rightly 
pointed out that in an economy where profit has become the index of 
success and where the enterprises have full autonomy in their investment 
decisions, "the demand for more trade, more technology, more finance and 
finally more investment from the advanced capitalist countries is bound 
to increase." Such demands will naturally be stronger when the enter­
prises are more advanced and more prosperous. It is not accidental, 
therefore, that 39 per cent of total foreign investment for the 1967-72
period found its way to the most developed republic of Slovenia while
3Kossovo's share was only 0.81 per cent. 123
1 M. Sukijasovic (1973), p. 53.
2 P. Sweezy and C. Bettelheim (1971) n n
3 M. Sukijasovic (1973), p. 53.
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E. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have been concerned with the effects of the 
implementation of the self-management system on the methods and sources 
of investment financing. During the central planning period and, to 
a lesser extent, the transition period the decisions on the level and 
composition of investment were made by the planning agencies who also 
determined the sources of finance. In the first period almost all of 
the investment projects were financed out of the budget of the 
Government while in the second period social investment funds were the 
principle source of investment financing. Through the budget and, 
later on, through the social investment funds the government could 
exercise its control over the allocation of resources between different 
enterprises, industries and regions.
In the self-management period, the locus of investment decision 
making was transferred to enterprises and the responsibility of finding 
the relevant source of finance was put on their shoulders as well. Two 
important measures, initiated m  this period, facilitated this transfer. 
Firstly, the commercialization of the banks and their transformation 
into profit making credit institutions was an important measure in the 
development of a market oriented system of investment financing. The 
banks had to be assured of the borrowers' credit worthiness and had to 
be satisfied that a particular credit was to be used for a project with 
expected profitability. The second important measure, starting from 
1963, was the abolition of the social investment funds and the transfer 
of their assets to the loan capital of the banks. This step had the 
dual effect of increasing the supply of loanable funds at the disposal 
of the banks and, at the same time, reducing the contribution and levies 
on the enterprise revenue which used to finance various funds.
The transfer of investment decisions to enterprises meant that 
investment criteria had also undergone a change. The allocation of
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investment during the central planning period and the transition period 
were based on the priorities laid down by the social plan according to 
the planners' preferences. They were, in the main, unrelated to the 
performance of the enterprises. The sectoral and regional distribution 
of investment resources were decided by the government. But as far as 
the allocation of investment funds between the enterprises of each 
sector was concerned, the large number of criteria ând the vagueness of 
the importance of each criteria, in effect, made the allocation process 
very subjective and opened the possibility of "pull" and "push" by 
various governmental levels as well as the influential enterprises.
With the abolition of the social investment funds the dependence of 
the enterprises on the government controlled funds was replaced by their 
dependence on their own funds and on the banks. The criteria for 
investment decisions were now quite different than before. The 
profitable operation of the enterprise and its credit worthiness became 
the main factors in determining the volume of resources that it could 
amass for investment. The change in investment criteria, it can be 
argued, has been instrumental in changing the level and composition of 
investment. With new criteria applied to investment decisions, there . 
is no reason why the allocation of investment between different sectors 
and regions should be the same as that in the previous period. In the 
particular case of regional distribution we showed that in fact if it 
were not for the continued State financing of a part of investment, the 
LDRs would have suffered seriously. If the investment resources of 
these areas were limited to the volume of resources generated internally 
and the volume of credit they could raise from banks, there would have 
been a serious deterioration of investment activities in the LDRs and 
their proportional share of realized investment would have sharply 
decreased. State intervention through budgetary means and a special 
fund for investment financing in these areas helped to keep the regional
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distribution of total investment relatively stable, if not improve it 
in favour of the LDRs.
The transfer of decision making power over the level, composition 
and methods of financing of investment, and to a smaller extent of the 
determination of wages, to the enterprise management had a significant 
impact on the distribution of power and influence within the enterprises. 
Transfer of new powers to the enterprises meant that certain new 
specialist tasks were to be performed in the enterprises. Analysis of 
investment projects, cost-benefit analysis, capital budgeting, 
management accounting, time and motion study, etc., were among such new 
tasks. These tasks, by the very fact of their specialist nature, are 
usually performed by the higher echelon of the enterprise work force.
The transfer of the locus of decision making to the enterprise resulted 
in an increased reliance on these specialists and, therefore, led to 
the expansion of their domain of power and influence. In Chapter One, 
we have already shown that the representation of the more educated and 
qualified employees on the workers’ councils and management boards has 
been increasing since the mid-sixties. The increased representation 
of this strata on the organs of management coincided with the transfer 
of new, specialist tasks from the State to the enterprises.
Another significant effect of the transfer of decision making power 
to the enterprises has been the diversification of the sources of 
finance and the slow introduction of new methods. The need to diversify 
and expand the sources of investment financing has led the Yugoslav 
government to pass legislations which enable the enterprises to borrow 
from households or other enterprises by selling bonds. It also 
encouraged and facilitated the pooling of resources by several 
organizations - which could even include forcing firms - to establish 
new enterprises. The search for better and more efficient sources of 
finance has been going on and the possibility of the development of a
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stock market has been under investigation for some time now. It is 
true that a capital market will facilitate the task of enterprises 
looking for investment resources and will possibly increase the level 
of available resources. But it is also true that the development of 
a securities market may seriously undermine the principles of self­
management. A securities market can only function if the enterprises 
are allowed to offer a variety of financial assets such as shares and 
bonds for sale. This, on the one hand, implies that enterprises can 
undertake financial as well as physical investment and receive interest 
payment as income on a significant level. On the other hand, such 
measures will require the organization of the enterprises to change in 
order to accommodate the possibility of selling shares and bonds, i.e., 
being organized on the model of joint stock companies. In such a 
situation, holding shares of other enterprises, mergers and takeovers 
could become common practice as they are in the capitalist economies.
The people or the organizations who hold the ehares of other organizations 
will not only expect to receive a dividend on their investment, but will 
also expect to influence the direction of development and other related 
affairs of that organization. A basic tenet of self-management, that 
the enterprises are managed by its workers alone, will thus be 
threatened. Although such measures (as selling shares for instance) 
have not become a common practice in Yugoslavia yet, already there is 
sufficient change in the mechanism of investment financing to cause 
alarm. Interest incomes can be received by the enterprises and there 
is no practical method of preventing it from being distributed to the 
employees. Enterprises pool their excess funds to establish new 
enterprises and, in practice, retain a considerable degree of influence 
and control over their management by virtue of having invested in it. 
Foreign capital is allowed into Yugoslavia and the profits of the 
foreign firms, who certainly operate on a purely capitalist basis, are
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allowed to be repatriated. Never before, in any socialist country, have 
such measures been introduced on such a scale and as long term policies.
Part Two
The Macroeconomic Behabiour
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PART TWO
The Macroeconomic Behaviour
The economic system of self-management not only leads to changes in 
the structure of the enterprises, their income distribution practices, and 
the financing of investment, but also produces certain effects on the level 
of the economy as a whole. In other words, the institution of workers’ 
management, in association with other institutions that have evolved in 
Yugoslavia in the post-war period, has entailed certain macroeconomic 
implications. The object of this Part (Chapters Five and Six) is to 
analyse the behaviour of the Yugoslav economy in the post-war period from 
a macroeconomic point of view. The long term behaviour, i.e., the growth 
pattern of the important macroeconomic indicators as well as the structural 
changes in the economy are discussed in the first chapter of this Part.
The effects of various institutional changes and economic reforms on the 
long term growth pattern are also discussed in this chapter.
The short term pattern of economic behaviour, particularly the 
fluctuations in the revel of economic activity and other important variables 
will be discussed in the second chapter of this Part. As Yugoslavia has 
experienced business cycles sharper and more pronounced than all advanced 
market economies, the relationship between the economic organization and 
this apparant instability will also be analysed.
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Chapter Five
Long Term Growth and Structural Change
In this chapter the long term pattern of growth and the structural 
change in the Yugoslav economy in the post-war period will be discussed.
The post-war period is subdivided into three distinct sub-periods according 
to the form and nature of State intervention in the working of the economy.
In the first - the Central Planning Period (1947-51) - the intervention of 
the State in the economy was direct and all embracing. In the second period 
— the Transition to Self-Management (1952-60) - the type of intervention was 
partly direct and partly indirect, and the scope of intervention limited to 
selected areas of economic activity such as the allocation of investment funds. 
In the last period - the Self-Management Period (1961-75) - the State ceased 
its direct intervention and retreated, in the main, to the background. The 
implementation of various measures aimed at further strengthening of self­
management have not, so far, resulted in the "withering away" of the State as 
it was once hoped. Although the State has stayed in the background, it has 
watched the movement of economic indicators closely, and has retained the 
right to intervene should the automouns economic agents step out of line.
In the first sub-period, the economy was governed along the lines of the 
Soviet model of economic development. The overriding objectives were the 
rehabilitation of the war-shattered economy and the construction of basic 
industries. The economic, political and idealogical considerations forced the 
Yugoslav leaders to abandon the Soviet model and the ambitious First Five-Year 
Plan . These considerations were discussed earlier in the Introduction to Part 
One. Unlike the Soviet economy whose first Five-Year Plan was ’crowned’ with 
success, the Yugoslav version was full of failures and shortcomings. The 
performance of the economy in this period was far from successful and most of 
the ambitious targets of the Plan had to be abandoned.
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In the second period (1952-60), the economy began to manifest 
impressive growth patterns. Most of the economic indicators began to grow 
at average annual rates twice, sometimes more, than in the previous period. 
The major factors for the change in the pattern of growth were: the 
existence of broad based primary industries and infra-structure the 
construction of which had started in the first period, the re-establishment 
of the severed foreign trade links which enabled Yugoslavia to purchase the 
raw material and intermediate goods needed for her development and also to 
pay for them by her exports to new markets, and the abandoning of the 
unpopular forced collectivization programme.
In the third period, Yugoslavia faced modern economic problems of 
inflation, unemployment, and slow rate of growth. As a result of the 
economic reforms of the sixties the formation and distribution of enterprise 
income were completely relegated to enterprise management (Chapter Three). 
The result of this relegation was a rapid increase in the price and wage 
levels. Also the fact that the enterprises had become fully responsible for 
their own profit and loss resulted in their being extra-cautious about new 
employment. Thus, the increase in employment opportunities slowed down 
compared to the previous period. While in almost all less developed 
countires, the bulk of the unemployed move from rural to urban areas in 
search of jobs and better life, in Yugoslavia the unemployed tend to leave 
the country altogether. Migration to West European countries reached the 
striking magnitude of 1.2 millions in the mid-seventies, a level which by 
all standards is too high to be acceptable.
In addition to the overall growth pattern and changes in the sectoral 
structure of the economy, the long term developments in two other fields are 
also studied in this Chapter. Firstly, the regional development problem 
as well as the implications of economic reforms for regional disparities 
and the effectiveness, or otherwise, of the policies employed to reduce the 
gap between richer and poorer regions will be discussed. Secondly, the
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trend of change and the magnitude and importance of the private sector 
in various branches of activity (agriculture, construction, transport, 
catering, etc.) and the effect of institutional changes on this trend 
will be analysed.
I. Long Term Growth Pattern
In the post-war period, Yugoslavia has undergone a very rapid and 
impressive economic and social transformation. In the early post-war 
years, substantial political obstacles and economic bottlenecks were 
faced which resulted in the slow down of the rate of growth of various 
economic indicators. However, after the removal of these obstacles and 
bottlenecks, Yugoslavia became one of the world's fastest growing 
economies1. The rapid expansionary process lasted until the mid-sixties 
when elements of a new long term trend, though at a lower level, emerged.
The successive economic reforms, particularly those of 1952, 1961 and 1965 
led to the gradual transfer of decision making power from the central 
authorities to the enterprises. The effects of these reforms and the 
subsequent transfer of the locus of decision making on the development 
of various macroeconomic variables are discussed in this section. The 
variables studied consist of total output (including that of major sectors); 
employment, unemployment and productivity; aggregate demand (including its 
components); and standards of living indices (including personal incomes, 
prices and cost of living). Table 1, next page, represents the growth 
rates of the major economic indicators during the three periods of analysis. 
The rates of growth of selected indicators are graphically represented.in 
Figure 1.
1 During the 1952-60 period, the rate of growth of the social product per 
capita was the highest in the world while in the 1952-65 period it was 
second only after Japan. Central Committee of the Association of 
Yugoslav Economists (1969), p.ll.
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Table 1 - Average Annual Rate of Growth of Major Economic
Indicators (%)
Indicators
OUTPUT
Total Social Product 
(in constant 1960 prices)
Total Social Product net of Agriculture 
(in constant 1960 prices)
Index of Industrial Production 
(physical output)
Index of Agricultural Production*
(physical output)
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY
Total Persons Employed 
Total Registered Unemployment 
Unemployment of Skilled and Trained Labour 
Labour Productivity in Economic Activities 
(excluding Agriculture)
AGGREGATE DEMAND
Consumption (personal and collective) 
(constant prices)+
Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
(constant prices)+
Exports++
Imports++
STANDARDS OF LIVING
Average Net Personal Receipts (monthly, 
per head of employed persons)
Index of Real Receipts**
Retail Price Index 
Cost of Living Index
1947-
1952
1952-
1960
1961-
1975
2.3 9.8 6.5
5.1 10.4 7.4
6.4 13.5 8.3
-3.5 8.9 2.8
8.3 7.0 2.8ri • 3. • 17.2 9.1n.a. 9.9** 15.4
-1.4 3.3 3.9
I l a S o 6.5 5.8
3.2 11.1 5.98.5 10.9 15.117.6 10.5 16.5
H t â o 10.8X 20.7
Tl a cl o n * a 0 4.8n.a. 2.6 14.2n.a. 4.9 15.0
n.a. Not available
* The first period is based on average 1947-56*100j the second 
period on 1952=100; and the rest on 1955=100 
** Only covering 1955-60
+ The data for 1947-52 is based on 1962 constant prices while 
those of the 1952-60 are based on 1966 constant prices and 
the rest on 1972 constant prices
++ Calculated on the basis of dinar values of exports and imports. 
They are based on the parity value of $1=12.5 dinars for the 
the data up to 1960 and on $1=17 dinars for the remaining years after 1960
x Only for Manufacturing & Mining sector from 1954 to 1959 
xx This is equal to the ratio of the nominal receipts to the 
cost of living index
Sources; SGJ(1955), p. 288; SGJ(1960), pp. 96, 117, 151 and 259; Jugosla-
vi ia 1945-64, pp. 58, 65, 80, 233-235; SGJ(1970), pp. 98, 101, 126, 
T 59 2 0 1, ~259 and 264; SGJ(1973), p. 120; SGJ(1976), pp. 80, 112,
124,135, 156, 187, 231,296,299 and 303; SGJ(1977), p. 138;
Economist (English Edition), 1969,p. 156; SGJ(l9g6^  p . m
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Agricultural Production Labour Productivity
I I Industrial Production 
Total Social Product
I I Employment
Unemployment
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Figure 1 - Average Annual Rate of Growth of Major Economic Indicators
Source: Table 1.
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A. Production
The rate of growth of output in major sectors of the economy has 
changed considerably during the post-war period. Total social product, 
social product net of agriculture, social product in manufacturing and 
construction, industrial and agricultural production, and in fact any 
other sectoral output, show that the rate of growth sharply increased 
following the introduction of the new economic system in 1952, They also 
show that during the self-management period, particularly in the latter 
half of this period, the economy slowed down its rapid expansion. Not 
only did various indices of output undergo variations from one period to 
another, they also experienced sharp changes during each period. The 
causes of these changes will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter when the short term variations will be dealt with. For the moment, 
it will suffice to summarize the main causes as follows.
During the central planning period, the foundations of the econony 
were being built. Investment was concentrated in social overhead capital 
and large scale industries, all with long gestation periods. The backward 
state of the agricultural economy, the large mass of peasant population and 
the inexperience of the new government in economic planning and management, 
coupled with the destruction and chaos created by the War, had made economic 
take-off a difficult task. In addition to the poor initial conditions, 
other calamities were to follow and further hinder the task of economic 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and industrialization. The expulsion of 
Yugoslavia from the Cominform, the severing of trade links with the East 
European countries, and the bad harvests of 1950 and 1952 due to severe 
drought resulted in a poor economic performance. The poor performance 
itself was one of the major factors contributing to the creation of 
favourable conditions for ushering in the economic reforms j breaking with 
the Soviet model and aiming at decentralization and market socialism.
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Particularly hit in this period was the agricultural sector whose 
output reduced greatly in 1950 and 1952 resulting in a negative growth 
rate for the first period. Before the bad harvest of these two years, 
the agricultural production was already hit hard by the collectivization 
drive of 1948 which, unsuccessfully, attempted to do away with small 
peasant production.
Unlike agriculture, other sectors of economic activity experienced 
a moderate growth. Industrial production grew at 6.4 per cent per year 
(see Table 1) while transport and communication grew at an annual rate of 
6.6 per cent and trade and catering at an annual rate of 8.0 per cent1. 
These results should be expected as the main thrust of the development 
efforts was directed at industry and other branches of economic activities.
During the second period, the central control of the economy was 
partly loosened and, parallel with this, the economic affairs were 
increasingly left to the enterprises themselves to sort out. Market 
economy was partially restored and market forces were encouraged to 
influence the determination of prices. In the agricultural sector, the 
unpopular and unsuccessful collectivization drive was abandoned and a 
system of small peasant holding was introduced. This, together with 
increased investment in agriculture and the employment of better tax/ 
price policies with respect to peasantry, greatly boosted the morale - 
and production efforts - in the countryside. More importantly, the 
investment projects planned during the central planning period were 
gradually completed and began to bear fruit. The outcome was that in 
this period the social product grew at an impressive rate of nearly 
10 per cent per annum (at constant prices too). The output of various 
sectors grew at annual rates above 10 per cent as well. The output per 
capita in this period attained the highest rate of growth in the world.
1 J u g o s l a v i i a  1945-64, p.80.
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During the self-management period, however, the rapid growth began 
to slow down and in some cases level off. Of course, part of the reduction 
in the growth rate should be atrributed to the effects of the severe 
recession of the mid-sixties. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the 
rates of expansion of various sectors had declined. This has been due 
to factors on both supply and demand sides. Excess capacities and unemployed 
resources had gradually declined. Bottlenecks had developed as a result 
of the uneven development of various sectors. The rate of growth of 
employment had dropped to one-third of that in the fifties due to the 
introduction of new criteria in the employment policy of the enterprises 
after the 1961 and 1965 reforms. (More on the last point in the next 
section). At the same time the main elements of aggregate demand, i.e., 
personal and collective consumption and gross investment had begun to 
grow at slower rates.
Of all sectors, agriculture still remains the sector with the lowest 
rate of growth. Not only do modern agricultural technology and farming 
methods need to be further encouraged, but also problems such as the 
organization of agricultural production, low rate of return to investment 
and the government's tax/subsidy policy towards the farmers need to be 
studied and improved if this sector is to be put on a par with other sectors.
B. Employment
Although the number of persons employed in economic and non-economic 
activities (excluding the vast number of self-employed peasants) has 
continually increased, the rate of increase has continually declined. The 
decline has been particularly significant in the self-management period.
The wholesale migration of the rural population to urban areas in the early 
post-war years, the job opportunities in the new industries and construction 
projects and, above all, the socialist commitment of the government to 
provide jobs for all able-bodied persons (even at the expense of productivity)
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were the factors that resulted in the sharp rise in employment in the 
first period. Although all these factors became less important during 
the fifties, the system of income distribution through which overmanning 
was encouraged, helped to maintain a high rate of growth of employment 
in the second period (though somewhat lower than during the first period). 
But the economic reforms of 1965 which strengthened the application of 
profitability criteria, and reduced State subsidies to inefficient 
enterprises, as well as the introduction of a new income distribution 
scheme, which made the enterprises responsible for their own loss and 
profit, resulted in a rapid decline in the rate of growth of employment. 
Under the income-sharing system of distribution, the labour-managed firms 
began to exhibit some of their basic characteristics such as resistance 
to excess manning (so prevalent in the fifties) and new employment (see 
Chapter Two). The immediate outcome of this behaviour also was the fall 
in the rate of growth of employment.
The unemployment rate followed a path similar to that of employment,
i.e., sharply rising in the fifties while slowing down in the sixties and
seventies. The initial rise was due mainly to the massive influx of the
peasantry to the cities and their taking advantage of the newly devised
unemployment benefits scheme. Gradually, as the initial migration to the
cities slowed down and the newly developed industries expanded, and most
important of all, as the opportunities for migration to Western European
countries expanded from the early sixties onwards, the rate of growth of
unemployment declined. It should be emphasized, however, that the registered
unemployment is still growing at the very fast rate of about 9 per cent.
Although there has been a continual (though modest) rise in the level of
employment, it has not been sufficient to absorb the natural increase in
the size of work force, new migrants from the countryside and that part of
the labour force which has become unemployed as a result of structural
changes in the economy (such as the use of modern labour saving techniques)1.
1 For the details relating to employment, see R.Livingston (1964') andC.Mesa-Lago (1971).
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A glance at the breakdown of the unemployed according to their skill 
and qualification reveals an interesting, though rather strange, phenomenon. 
Unemployment among the skilled labourers and qualified staff which was 
growing at about 10 per cent per annum in the latter half of the fifties, 
became much more prevalent in the sixties and seventies (15 per cent annual 
growth, compared to 9 per cent for all categories). Considering that the 
Yugoslav economy has consistently been suffering from a shortage of skilled 
and qualified labour force, such rapid rise in the unemployment of this 
type of labour is very surprising. It should, of course, be pointed out 
that this section of the labour force constitutes a small proportion of 
total unemployment. Two reasons can be provided for the rapid rise of 
unemployment among the skilled and qualified personnel. On the one hand, 
there is the frictional unemployment accounting for those who are changing 
their jobs. On the other hand, there are those skilled labourers who 
prefer to benefit from odd jobs of a private nature (services, repairs etc.) 
and draw unemployment benefits at the same time rather than be employed.
At any rate from the beginning of the seventies, the problem of 
unemployment began to attract considerable attention and its solution has 
occupied an important position in the list of priorities and policy 
objectives of the government. The fifth Five Year Social Plan (197075) 
as well as the Long Term Development Plan (until 1985) had the reduction 
of unemployment as one of their main objectives*.
A comparison of the rate of growth of output in the non-agricultural
sector and that of employment leads us to the changes in labour 
2productivity . During the first period, the sharp rise in employment in 
the newly set up and rehabilitated production units coupled with the slow 
growth of output led to a fall in labour productivity. This was due, in 12
1 OECD (1970), pp.38-43; J.Dirlam and J.Plummer (1973), p.168; and 
SFRY Assembly (1975), p.20.
2 Labour productivity in Table 1 is based on the social product in non- 
agricultural sectors (constant 1960 prices) and employment in economic 
activities (excluding agriculture).
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the main, to the fact that most of the new recruits were inexperienced 
workers coming from the rural areas with little knowledge and training 
in modern economic activities. In fact the labour productivity in the 
manufacturing sector fell even more sharply than in the non-economic 
activities as a whole (1.9 per cent per year as compared to 1.4 per cent)1.
In the second period, however, the situation was reversed due to the 
relative improvement in the quality of the labour force as well as to the 
removal of the obstacles to economic expansion. Although the rate of 
growth of employment had declined in this period, nevertheless, the over­
manning tendencies existing in all branches prevented the productivity 
from growing even faster.
In the self-management period, as a result of measures in the field 
of income distribution and as a partial manifestation of the inherent 
resistence to new employment in the labour-managed firms, the labour 
productivity grew even faster.
C. Aggregate Demand
Parallel with the growth of output, the components of aggregate 
demand exhibited a slow take-off in the first period, followed by a rapid 
expansion in the second and a slow-down in the third period. The 
government’s indirect control on the system of income distribution (as 
shown in Chapter 3) had enabled it to keep a firm control on the 
consumption expenditure by controlling wage payments. The government 
could also ensure the flow of sufficient, and continually rising, 
resources to investment funds. As a result, in the second period, while 
consumption expenditure grew at annual rate of 6.5 per cent, the 
investment expenditure expanded at a rate of 11.1 per cent per annum.
1 SGJ (1976), pp.80-81.
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In the self-management period, however, the government’s control 
on the income distribution system of the enterprises and particularly 
on the size of total wages was weakened, and the reduction in the rate 
of growth of output affected the investment expenditure much more 
severely than the consumption expenditure. The autonomy of enterprise 
in distributing their incomes and their determination to provide a 
rising standards of living for their employees meant that the rate of 
growth of consumption reduced only slightly compared to the previous 
period (from 6.5 to 5.8 per cent annually), whereas the brunt of the 
slow-down of the growth of output was experienced by the investment 
expenditure whose rate of growth was almost halved (from 11.1 to 5.9 
per cent- see Table 1).
The main cause of the slow-down in the rate of growth of 
investment must be attributed to the decertralization of the machinery 
of investment funds allocation and the application of new criteria 
(such as profitability) in investment decisions. While in the fifties 
the individual enterprises were mere recipients of funds for investment 
purposes the volume of which did not depend on their efficent operation, 
the situation was drastically changed in the self-management period.
After the abolishing of the social investment funds and the introduction 
of the 1965 reforms, the firms had to raise funds for investment on the 
basis of their own operation and credit worthiness, and were thus 
seriously affected by the profit or loss of their operation. In the new 
situation, the firms had to be more careful and the management had to think 
twice before embarking on a new expansion project. The result was the 
application of more severe profitability rules and the discouragement of 
dubious investment projects which were more common previously1.
1 Large scale investment projects undertaken for political reasons or 
because of regional pressures were frequent in the fifties. The term 
"political factories" has often been used to describe this type of 
projects. More on this later.
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D. International Trade
As a developing country, Yugoslavia has always relied heavily on 
foreign trade as a major vehicle of her industrialization policies. Raw 
material, semi-finished goods, food products, equipment and machinery 
have always been prominent on the list of imported items. Yugoslavia has 
also been very concerned about her export potentials not only as a stimulus 
to her expanding industries but also as a source of earning of badly needed 
foreign exchange. The expanding foreign trade sector, though small, is of 
great significance for the growth of the economy. In the next chapter we 
shall discuss how the foreign exchange earnings act as a ceiling-type 
constraint to the growth of economic activities, and how the major phases 
of expansion have come to an end as a result of the shortage of foreign 
exchange.
In the central planning period, the main trading partners were the 
"people's democracies" of Eastern Europe which imported raw material such 
as ores and minerals and exported the equipment and machinery required for the 
setting up of the new industries. The expulsion from the Cominform and the 
ensuing trade embargo severly affected Yugoslavia's trade and development. 
While the exports more than tripled from 1946 to 1947 and almost doubled 
from 1947 to 1948, they plumeted down in the following years. Only in 1956 
the exports reached their 1948 level again. Similarly, the imports rose by 
almost four times from 1946 to 1947 and almost doubled in the following 
year only to dive down in the years to come1. The agreement by Western 
countries (U.S., U.K., France, Italy etc.)to go to Yugoslavia's aid with 
defence equipment, food and machinery from 1951 onwards (which would save 
her some foreign exchange) only partially relieved the difficulties2.
1  S G J  ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  p . 2 0 1 .
2 For the details of the turn-about in Western „„i*
and their trade and aid agreements see- F W v S  ?iocf?ards YuSoslavia
J.Bombeless (1968), p . io o l  R . O . i r e e Z ;G.W.Hoffman and F.W.Neal (1962), pp.347-354^* pp*^9~35 and 40;
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During the period of transition to self-management and the ensuing 
self-management period, the international trade mechanism was subjected 
to numerous reforms in terms of regulations, quotas, exchange rates, etc. 
The main trend of the reforms has been in the direction of promoting the 
integration of the Yugoslav economy in the world market and the 
strengthening of the international division of labour. This task is as 
yet an unaccomplished one with trade deficits dominating Yugoslavia's 
position,specially in the recent decade. The level of imports began from 
a higher initial position than the exports and grew faster, thus making 
the gap continually wider.
During the fifties, the government's firm control of foreign trade 
enabled it to keep the rate of growth/imports in line with that of exports. 
However, later, particularly in the post-1965 reform period, as the attempts 
at integration in world market resulted in the removal of trade barriers 
and further liberalization of international trade, the trade deficit 
situation deteriorated even further. From 1966 to 1975, exports grew at an 
annual rate of 16.3 per cent while imports reached the record rate of 
expansion of 21.9 per cent1.
E. Standards of Living
One significant consequence of the continued government control of 
wage payments up to the end of the fifties was the relatively slow growth 
of the personal income of the employed population which meant a similarly 
slow growth for personal consumption expenditure. At the same time, the 
government's price policy, although not as restrictive as that in the 
central planning period, had resulted in a very small rate of price increase 
in the fifties. From 1952 to 1960, the retail price index and the cost of 
living index rose at annual rates of 2.6 and 4.9 per cent respectively.
1 SGJ (1976), p.231
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This period of price stability, however, ended with the inauguration of 
the self-management period. The autonomy in the field of income distribution 
gained by the workers’ councils after the 1958 reforms, and consolidated 
by the 1961 and 1965 reforms, resulted in allocation of a greater share of 
net enterprise income to wage funds (as shown in Chapter Three, Table 7).
It amounted to a very rapid rise in personal income per head of the employed 
population, from 10.8 per cent (in the 1954-59 period) to 20.7 per cent 
(in the 1961-75 period). The autonomy of enterprises in the formation of 
their revenue, i.e., freedom to determine the level of output and prices, 
resulted in a rapid rise of the price level as well. The inflationary 
pressure that hit Yugoslavia from the early sixties onwards, coupled with 
the ability of enterprises to freely raise their prices, resulted in an 
increase in the annual rate of growth of the retail price index from 2.6 
(in the second period) to 14.2 per cent (in the third period), and that of 
the cost of living index from 4.9 to 15 per cent» (see Table 1).
Although the development of the social agreement on personal incomes, 
the Yugoslav version of the 'social contract’, introduced in the early 
seventies, did restrict the share of net enterprise income allocated to 
personal income funds, it could not restrict the growth of the personal 
income level itself. A large part of this was, of course, simply financed 
by increase in prices. Similarly, the restrictive anti-inflationary 
measures adopted in the early seventies did not succeed in halting the 
rapid price increases. From 1971 to 1975, the average personal income per 
head of the employed, the retail price index and the cost of living index, 
all, grew at a record rate of just over 20 per cent per annum1. As such 
almost all of the gains in personal incomes had been wiped out by price 
increases. The index of real personal incomes which had an overall 
growth rate of 4.8 per cent per annum in the self-management period, stayed 
almost constant in the 1971-75 period.
1 SGJ (1976), pp. 296 and 303.
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The long term pattern of growth of the major macroeconomic variables 
illustrated in Table 1 and discussed in the above pages, however, does not 
enable us to construct a complete and accurate picture of the performance 
of the economy and the changes in its components in the post-war period.
The measurements shown in Table 1 (and Figure 1) are aggregated for the 
whole economy or for major branches of activity and are averaged over a long 
period of time. They conceal the changes in the structure of the economy 
as well as the short term fluctuations in the level of activity over the 
period under consideration. The development of an economy, as George points 
out, is characterized by changes in its component sectors and industries.*
As different sectors and industries grow at different rates, the economy's 
picture may completely change (especially over a long period like thirty 
years) and such changes cannot be picked up by the long term growth rates of 
major economic indicators. We must, therefore, study and analyse the changes 
in the industrial, sectoral and regional structure of the Yugoslav economy. 
This is the objective of the next section.
II. The Changes in the Structure of the Economy
As different industries, sectors and regions have been growing at dif­
ferent rates, so must their contribution to output and employment in the 
whole economy have changed. The decentralized character of the Yugoslav 
economy, particularly in the self-management period, provided a favourable 
environment in which different types of activity could grow at different 
rates. The changes in the share of each industry, sector and region have 
resulted in a basic structural change in the economy that should be studied 
from several points of view. The most important aspects of the structural 
change are: firstly, the change in the contribution of primary and secondary 
industries to output and employment; secondly, the change in the importance 
of different branches of economic activity (industry, agriculture, tansport,
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etc.); thirdly, the change in the share of different industries comprising 
the manufacturing sector, i.e., the structural change within the manufacturing 
sector; fourthly, the change in the pattern of regional growth and the con­
tribution of different regions to national output and employment; and finally, 
the change in the magnitude and importance of the activities of the private 
sector. Each aspect of the structural changes in the economy will be 
studied in greater detail in the following pages.
A. Sectoral Change- I (Primary and Secondary Industries)
The structural change in the economy is, first of all, reflected in the 
change in the contribution of primary and secondary industries to total 
economic activity. Table 2, next page, shows the change in the share of 
these two sectors in selected years from 1947 to 1975.
It can be observed from Table 2 that we have chosen agriculture, mining 
and quarrying to represent the primary sector and the manufacturing to rep­
resent the secondary sector. The process of industrialization in Yugoslavia 
has resulted in a declining primary sector accompanied by an expanding and 
thriving secondary sector. The decline in the former can be observed in 
terms of both output and employment. The proportion of active population 
engaged in agriculture declined from 73 to 47 percent and the proportion of 
the work force employed in mining & quarrying decreased from 9 to 5 percent 
(of which 3 percentage points were in coal mining alone).1 On the output 
side, the share of agriculture fell from 42 to 16 percent while that of coal 
mining reduced only slightly from 2 to 1 percent and the share of mining & 
quarrying remained at a stable level of 3-4 percent. In the case of the last 
sector, the greater fall in employment (compared to output) represents the
effect of large scale mechanization and the use of modern equipment on the
T The great majority of the agricultural population work on small peasant 
holdings-and, as such, are not regarded as having, entered into any 'emnlov- 
ment relationship . In the case of large cooperatives and state farms 
however, a small number of people have been actually 'employed’, though 
their number is small. In order to have an accurate picture of t h 7  8 
relation between changes in output and labour input in agricuH-„r7  . 
have used the data showing the active population in agriSltnre ani! ► 
the level of employment in this sector. 8 re and not
Table 2 - Sectoral D i s t r i b u t i o n  of O u t p u t  a n d  E m p l o y m e n t  (%)
A. Sectoral Output as Percentage of Total 
Social Product in Constant 1972 Prices*
47 52 60 68 75
Primary Sector
Agriculture 42
Coal mining 2
Mining & Quarrying ** 3
Secondary Sector
Manufacturing *** 16
B. Sectoral Employment as 
Total Employment in tb
47 53 60 68 75
Primary Sector
Coal mining n.a. 5 4 2 2
Mining & Quarrying ** n.a. 9 7 6 5
Secondary Sector
Manufacturing *** n.a. 32 36 40 42
According to Type of Activities 
Economic activities 82 83 84 83 83
Non-economic activities 18 17 16 17 17
C. Active Population in Agriculture as Percentage 
of Total Population According to Census
48 53 61 71
73 68 56 47
33 28 20 16
2 2 1 1
4 5 4 4
18 24 29 33
Percentage of 
: Economic Activities
* Data for 1947 and 1952 are computed by interpolation of other 
data given in 1956 constant prices
** includes coal, coke and metals
*** The output and employment in manufacturing is obtained by
subtracting Mining and Quarrying from the data for 'Manufacturing, 
Mining & Quarrying'
Sources: SGJ (1955), p.86; Jugoslavija 1945-64, pp.58-59, SGJ(1962), 
p.93j and SGJ(1976), pp.80, 103, 113, 134-135
- 248 -
one hand and the increased productivity of labour on the other.
Contraposed to the declining agricultural and mining activities is the 
expanding manufacturing sector. During the period under consideration the 
share of manufacturing in total output doubled from 16 to 33 percent while 
its share in total employment rose from 32 to 42 percent. This reflects 
not only the deepening industrialization of the economy but also the conti­
nued increase in labour productivity in this sector.
The above data also demonstrate the still relatively underdeveloped 
state of the Yugoslav economy compared to industrialized countries of the 
world. In the developed industrial countries, the share of the service sector 
gradually surpasses that of the primary and secondary sectors, and after 
some time the manufacturing sector ceases to be the largest single sector in 
terms of output and employment. Although the absence of complete data on 
the service sector makes any comparison with the industrial countries dif­
ficult, nevertheless, two points can be deduced from whatever data is avai­
lable. Firstly, from 1952 to 1975, the proportion of total employed persons 
engaged in economic activities remained at the high and stable level of 
82-84 percent while those engaged in non-economic activities (the nearest 
equivalent to a service sector) accounted for only 16-18 percent.1 This is 
in sharp contrast to the situation in the industrial countries like U.S.A. 
and U.K. where the service sector has accounted not only for a high share 
of employment, but, sometimes also for an increasing share. In the United 
States, the share of service sector in total employment increased from 47 
percent in 1929 to 58 percent in 1965, and in the United Kingdom this ratio 
increased only slightly from 48 percent in 1924 to 50 percent in 1964.2
Secondly, while in Yugoslavia, manufacturing has gradually become the 
largest single sector in terms of output and employment, the advanced
It should be noted that the ’non-economic activities’ is I----
same as the service sector’. Trade, catering * exactlY the
classified as economic activities. This qualificati«nm\ f°r examPle»are 
not change the fact that employment in the f  ’.h?Wever» does
timed to account for a atabie and ^ ha r ? e * « 11'111« '  has con- 
Cited in K. George(1974), pp. 16-17. & h f * tal « “Payment.
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industrial countries have already reached a stage where this trend has been 
reversed and manufacturing has ceased to be the largest single sector of the 
economy. In the U.S.A., for example, since 1947 the share of manufacturing 
in total employment has been declining.*
B. Sectoral Change- II (Major Branches of Economic Activity)
Another way of showing the structural change is to investigate the distri­
bution of output and employment across broader sectoral categories, thus rep­
resenting any shift of emphasis from one branch of the economy to another. 
Table 3 illustrates the changes in the contribution of major branches of 
activity to total output and employment. Figure 2 represents these changes 
graphically.
Table 3 and Figure 2 clearly show that industry (composed of Manufactur­
ing and Mining & Quarrying) has gradually become the most important branch 
of activity in terms of both output and employment. In the period under con­
sideration, it has grown to absorb almost half of the total employment and 
produce almost two-fifth of the total output. The rapid rate of growth 
of the industrial sector, which has resulted in the rising share of industry 
in total output and employment, has been due partly to the industrialization 
efforts of the government and partly to the increased labour productivity.
The increase in productivity can be' Seen by comparing the changes in the 
contributions to output and employment.
The growth of the share of industry in total output has been totally 
at the expense of the share of agriculture, the contribution of which has 
declined from 45 percent in 1947 to 17 percent in 1975. In Section I of 
this Chapter, we showed that agriculture has been one of the slowest grow­
ing sectors of the economy and this explains the reason for its declining 
share. 1
1 Ibid.,p. 18.
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Table 3 - Change in the Sectoral Distribution of Output
and Employment
47 52 60 68 75
ggntoral Output as % of Total Output (constant 1972 prices)
Industry*
Agriculture, Fishery & 
Forestry
Construction
Transport & Communication 
Trade, Catering & Tourism 
Others **
Industry*
Construction
Transport & Communication 
Trade, Catering & Tourism++ 
Others**
18 22 29 33 37
45 35 30 22 17
13 13 9 11 10
5 6 8 8 8
13 17 18 20 21
6 7 6 6 7
; Total Employment in Econ.Activities-
41 39 43 45 47
12 15 13 11 11
15 10 8 9 8
12 11 10 13 15
7 10 12 11 10
* Consisting of Manufacturing, Mining & Quarrying
** Consisting of Arts & Crafts and Public Unilities 
+ Agriculture is excluded from this section since the labour force 
•employed* in this sector shows only a very small fraction of the 
total labour force ‘engaged' in agriculture. The data for persons 
engaged in agriculture was given in Table 2. *
++ The data for employment in this sector excludes the self-employed
Source: Jugoslavija 1945-64, p.58; and SGI (1976), pp.81, and 112»
W g  other branches of activity, trade, Catering and Tourism U  the 
only one »hose share of output and employment has somewhat increased (from
13 percent and 12 percent of output and employment in 1947 t„ „o 21 percent
and 15 percent of output and >"employment in »m. —^  Catering and Tour­
ism, being an important source of foreign exchano*ge earnings, has received
preferential treatment from the government and' result, has enjoyed
a higher than average rate of expansion (see Figure 2)
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7
Employment Industry
40
30
20
10
Trade, Catering 
and Tourism
Construction
Trans» & Communie.
x ----- — ------- — -------------------- r“
A7 52 60 68 75
W f n TP 2- Changes in the Sectoral Distribution of Output and
Employment (1947-75)
Source* Table 3
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Except industry, agriculture and trade, catering and tourism, the other 
branches of activity have experienced little or no change in terms of their 
contribution to output and employment in the period under consideration. This, 
also, supports our assertion, in the previous discussion, that in the relatively 
underdeveloped state of the Yugoslav economy the industrial sector has 
experienced the most noticeable change while other sectors (construction, 
transport and communication, etc.) have retained their approximately average 
rate of growth. If we take into account the complementary nature of various 
branches of activity such as industry and transport, we can see that the rapid 
expansion of industry has not been matched by the other complementary 
branches. One effect of this situation is the development of bottlenecks that, 
as will be discussed later, limit the potential growth of the economy.
The industrial sector, itself, consists of a large number of industry 
groups of which the conditions of development and patterns of growth are by 
no means identical. It is,therefore, necessary to study some of the more 
important components of the industrial sector. This is the object of the 
following discussion.
C. Structural Change Within the Industrial Sector
Within the industrial sector great diversity has been experienced by 
different industries. Table 4 represents the changing contribution of selected 
branches to total employment and output in industry as well as the rates of 
growth of their output in different sub-periods from 1947 to 1975. During the 
central planning period, the contribution of department II industries 
(producing consumer goods) to output declined while that of department I 
industries (producing capital goods) increased. This is the reflection of the 
priorities guiding the government policies in this period. Development of an 
industrial base from scratch, in a predominantly agricultural country, 
required putting heavier emphasis on producer goods industries. While the
- 253 -
Table 4 - Structural Change within the Industrial Sector
47 52* 60 75,
Output as % of total Industrial Output (constant 1972 prices)
Textiles 19.8 14.5 12.4 11.5Paper and paper products 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.7Food 12.3 8.7 8.6 8.9
Iron and steel metallurgy 2.9 3.6 5.3 4.1Non-ferrous metallurgy 3.7 4.7 4.0 3.7Production of metals 12.2 16.0 20.5 20.0Electric machinery and equipment 0.7 . 1.8 3.6 5.5Chemicals 1.8 2.3 3.8 7.6Shipbuilding n.a. 0.5** 1.2 1.4
Employment as % of Total Industrial Employment
Textiles 12.6 13.7 15.8Paper and paper products 1.3 1.4 2.0
Food 6.7 7.6 8.9
Iron and steel metallurgy 4.7 4.5 3.7Non-ferrous metallurgy 5.9 4.0. 3.5Production of metals 12.5 17.3 19.2
Electric machinery and equipment 2.4 4.3 6.4Chemicals 2.5 4.1 6.0Shipbuilding 0.5 2.0 1.8
Average Annual Rate of Growth of Physical Output (%)
47-52 52-60 61-75
Textiles -0.6 10.6 6.8Paper and paper products 3.5 16.0 10.6
Food -2.8 15.6 7.2Iron and steel metallurgy 7.4 18.5 7.6
Non-ferrous metallurgy 10.0 9.5 7.1
Production of metals 14.6 16.0 8.1
Electric machinery and equipment 29.0 24.5 12.0
Chemicals 6.5 20.8 15.0
Shipbuilding n.a. 7.8+ 9.3
* 1953 for employment figures
** 1956
+ 1956-60
Source: SGJ (1955), p.86j SGJ (1962), p.93; Jugoslavija 1945—64, pp.59.
144-145; SGJ (1966), p.lll; SGJ (1976?,"pp.113, 134-135, 186-187
rate of growth of the total eoclel product and of the induetrial production 
in thin period were ae low a, 2.3 and 6.4 percent respectively (see Table 1),
department I industries enjoyed much higher rates of growth. In fact, while 
consumer goods industries such as textiles and food experienced a drop in their 
ouput, some department I industries enjoyed growth rates from 7 to 30 per cent
per annum. This special emphasis was seen as the only way to bridge the gap 
between the two departments.
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During the second period , this trend was reversed and the emphasis was 
changed in favour of department II industries. Although the producers' goods 
industries continued to grow at high rates, the consumer goods industries 
gradually caught up with, and in some cases even surpassed, them. This, as we 
shall see later, was partly the result of the new stage in economic development 
during which the foundations of modern manufacturing was built and the resources 
were re-channelled from capital goods to consumer goods industries. It was also 
partly the result of the government policy of decentralization and market
socialism whereby the pressure of backlog demand necessitated the increase in 
the volume of consumer goods output.
Despite the increased growth rate of the consumer goods industries, their 
share in total industrial output continued to decline, though; at a slower pace 
Their share of employment, however, slightly increased. This trend which 
continued well into the third period was the result of the lower than average 
labour productivity in some department II industries such as textile, food and 
furniture which included a large number of small, old and inefficient firms.
The third period witnessed not only a general decline in the rate of growth 
of most branches (as was the case with the indicators of overall economic 
behaviour summarized in Table 1), but also a moderation of the gap between the 
two departments and their rates of growth. The general slow-down of the economy 
accounts for the reduction in the rate of growth of the consumer goods industries 
and that, in turn, explains the slower growth of the producers goods industries. 
A comparison of the change in the contribution to output and employment of 
different industries represents differences in the labour productivity and the
extent to which modern production technique, have been introduced to each industry.
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The structural change within the industrial sector has to be explained to a 
large extent by the different rates of technological development in different 
groups. Thus, we notice that the textiles, food and furniture industries which 
can be regarded as the traditional branches of activity have not enjoyed 
the fruits of scientific research equally with such industries as metallurgy, 
shipbuilding, electric industry and chemicals.* Of course we should not 
ignore the great diversity of firms within each branch of industry and the 
significance of such diversity for our assertions in this and previous 
paragraphs. For example within the textile industry, there are firms engaged 
in production of synthetic fibres which are highly efficient, modern and as 
much dependent on technological advances and research as metallurgy or ship­
building. Similar diversities can be found within each of the branches and 
should be kept in mind as qualifications to the statements made about the 
industry groups as a whole.
D . structural Change Within Regions
Yugoslavia is a federation of six republics with considerable cultural, 
social and economic diversity : Slovenia, Croatia,Serbia,Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Montenegro. Furthermore, Serbia - the largest of the six 
republics - is subdivided to the so-called Serbia-proper and the two 
Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metehija which are mainly 
composed of various national minorities. The advanced,rich and industrially 
developed north and north-western section was separated from the backward, 
poor and underdeveloped south and south-eastern section by centuries of wars, 
occupation, hostility and bitterness. Only after the second world war were 
the two sections united in a socialist federation as partners on a par with 
each other, accepting the unequal status of different regions at the start of 
the partnership and the need to bridge theiregional gap through conscious and 
determined efforts. Therefore we observe that the First Five Year Plan (as 
well as the following plans) stressed the need for faster growth of the
K. George makes a similar distinction between "home based" and"science 
based" industries in the case of Britain, K.. George (1974), p.19.1
LDRs by means of preferential treatment in terms of subsidies, taxes, aid and 
transfer of resources.1 The post-war development of the Yugoslav economy, 
in particular the successive economic reforms, have also affected the regional 
diversities in numerous ways. Neither industrial development nor the 
development of other sectors have been homogeneous across the republics. 
Therefore, in addition to unequal starting positions, different republics have 
grown at different rates and experienced different types of structural changes. 
Furthermore, some of the policies adopted for preferential treatment of the 
LDRs have been effective in reducing the regional diversities while others 
have not. The study of regional development, therefore, must be concerned not 
only with the trend and persistency of the regional differences but also with 
the effectiveness of the regional policy measures adopted in various phases 
of socio-economic development.
Although the designation of different areas to developed and underdeveloped
(or developed and insufficiently developed) has varied in different periods, we
shall use the relative designation of "less developed regions (LDRs)" and apply
it to the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovian, Macedonia, Montenegro and the
Autonomous Province of Kosovo, roughly the area to the south of river Sava.^
Even though these areas are hetrogeneous, nevertheless they share many
characteristics and face similar problems that distinguish them from the more
developed regions (MDRs). The relative importance of the LDRs and the magnitude
of the development problem involved can be seen from the following table
showing their area, population and contribution to total output at the present
time. (Table 5 is on the next page).
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For the details of some of the preferential treatment ------------
LDRs, see R. Bicanic (1973) ,pp. 182-184 and B. Horvat (1976)“ J go™:}!3 ^
During the Second Five-Year Plan (1957-61). B o s m * • 
from the list of the LDRs. During the Third Five-Year PlfnV(196rA<irClUdeci 
of Serbia,Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were added to the partS
the 1965 reforms, the less developed parts of the j1 After
the concern of individual republics. In terms of t-he feglons became
list was limited to the above-mentioned S  areas S e ' e T ^  b^ M^ the p. 189. 6as* See V ‘ D“bey (1975),
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TABLE 5 - Area, Population and Output of the Less Developed Areas 
and Their Share in the Yugoslav Totals (%)
Area population Social Product
1000 Km2 % 1000s % bil.din. g
Bosnia-Herzegovina 51.1 20 3977 19 63 13
Macedonia 25.7 10 1756 8 28 6
Montenegro 13.8 5 558 3 9 2
Kosovo 10.9 4 1405 7 10 2
All LDRs 101.5 40 7696 36 110 22
Source: SGJ (1976), pp.70, 369 and 406
The less developed areas which account for 40 percent of the area and 
36 percent of the population of Yugoslavia, produce only 22% of the national 
product. In addition to this economic imbalance, the LDRs also face 
harsher demographic characteristics such as a faster rate of population 
growth and a higher infant mortality rate, which directly lead to lower 
standards of health, education and other social services. Table 6 shows 
some of the demographic/social problems of the LDRs.
Table 6 - Some Demographic andSocial-Characteristics of LDRs, 1971
- -
Rate of nat­
ural rise in 
population,
%
Infant -1- 
mortality 
per T,1000 
""'live birth
Illiteracy, 
% of popu­
lation of 
10 years 
and over
Population
per
hospital
bed
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.50 53.6 22.7 253
Macedonia 1.55 81.9 18.0 185
Montenegro 1.32 34.6 17.2 165
Kosovo 2.86 89.6 32.2 364
All LDRs 1.73 68.2 22.7 236
All MDRs 0.52 31.6 11.7 153
Source: V. Dubey(1975), pp.370 and 191
With a rate of population growth three times higher than the MDRs, the less 
developed areas must grow at rates much faster than the national average 
if they are, someday, to catch up with the rest of the country. The illit­
eracy rate of twice as high as the MDRs, which is jsut one indication (among
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many others) of the lower level of social services available to the LDRs, 
illustrates the amount of extra effort that has to be applied to the social 
aspects of the development process. These aspects, in turn, have direct 
bearing on the economic side.
The basic feature of the regional problem is that the LDRs are charac­
terized by their persistently low per capita incomes. Despite the regional 
development policies of the government, the gap between the LDRs and the 
MDRs does not show any significant sign of being reduced. Table 7 illustrates 
the percapita income of different regions together with their widening gap. *
Table 7 - Per Capita National Income* of Different Regions as
Percentage of National Average
1947 1952 1961 1975
Yugoslavia 100 100 100 100
More Developed Regions
Slovenia 175 192 199 199
Croatia 107 117 121 122
Serbia-proper 96 92 95 99
Vojvodina 110 89 97 116
Less Developed Regions 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 84 87 76 66
Macedonia 62 59 57 68
Montenegro 71 64 68 69
Kosovo 52 49 36 33
Highest/Lowest Ratio 3.4 3.9 5.5 6.1
* In 1960 constant prices
** Ratio of per capita national income of Slovenia to that of Kosovo
Source: SGJ(1955), p.51; Jugoslaviaa 1945-64, pp.87-89; SGJ(197), 
p. 351; and SGJ(1976), pp. 368-369 and 398.
Figure 3, depicting the above table graphically, represents the changes 
in the relative position of different areas. The basic problem of regional 
development is summed up in Table 7 and Figure 3. In spite of all efforts 
in the course of the last three decades, the LDRs have become relatively 
worse off in comparison with the MDRs. While the per capita national in­
come of Slovenia has grown from 175 to 199 percent of the national average, 
that of most LDRs (with the exception of Macedonia ) has fallen in
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l
Figure 3- Changes in Per-Capita National Income of Different 
Regions as Percentage of the Yugoslav Average, 1947-75
Source: Table 7
relation to the national average. Particularly striking is the situation in 
Kosovo where from 1947 to 1975 the per capita national income has fallen from 
about 1/3 to 1/6 of the Sovenian average. All this shows that the gap between 
the two regions, particularly between Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo on the other, has been continually 
widening.
At first glance, it may seem that little effort has been made in the
direction of regional redistribution of resources and little attention has
been paid to the growth of the LDRs. A close examination, however, will show
that the LDRs did not suffer from insufficient attention and from an absence
of preferential treatment.^ One of the objectives of the First Five-Year
Plan was "to ensure speedier tempo of development in the economically backward
2republics and remove all consequences of uneven development". The later 
economic plans also continued to emphasize this point as one of their objectives. 
The investment of funds in control of the federal government were to be the 
vehicle of implementation of preferential policies towards the LDRs. These 
areas were to receive a proportionately higher share of investment than the 
rest of the country. Table 8 and Figures 4-6 represent investment expenditure 
in different regions and can be used to demonstrate the extent to which the 
LDRs received more than a proportionate share of investment.
As panels A, B and C of Table 8 and Figure 4 show, the proportion of 
investment funds flowing into the LDRs has been slightly, although not con­
sistently so, higher than the proportion of work force employed and the 
proportion of social product generated by them. However, through state help,
1 For details of policies towards the LDRs, see B.Horvat (1976),pp.64-68.
2 A. Waterson (1962), p.92.
3 it should be noted that in addition to investment out of federal funds 
(which presently continues through the Fund for Accelerated Development of 
the LDRs, though on a much smaller scale),there has always existed the less 
direct methods of aiding these regions. These methods include budgetary 
grants, tax exemptions, subsidies, etc. B. Srebric(1969), p.116.
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Table 8 - Regional Share of Output, Employment and Investment*
A B C 0 E
Regional Share of Regional Share of Regional Share of Realized Investment Per-Capita Realized
Regions Social Product as Employment Realized Investment as % of ** Investment ++
% of Total** as % of Total as % of Total Social Product (neu Dinars)
1952 1960 1975 1952 1960. 1975. 1947 1952 1960. 1975 1952 1960 1975 1947* 1952 1961 19TS
Yugoslavia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 29 30 27 26 163 576 6331
MDRs 78 79 78 75 76 74 70 67 77 70 25 29 24 26 149 610 7018
Croatia 18 16 17 15 14 14 13 13 13 20 23 26 23 28 143 584 6737
Slovenia 27 27 26 27 26 24 26 20 23 22 21 24 32 38 239 849 15555
Serbia-proper 24 25 24 23 23 25 25 Î34+ $41+ 19 Ì28+ hz+ 21 25 fl33+ 5^7 3+ 4720Vojvodina 9 11 11 10 12 10 6 9 l X. 22 16 V 6240
LDRs 22 21 22 25 24 26 30 33 23 30 49 36 35 25 202 487 5111
Bosnia-Herz. 14 14 13 16 14 14 20 24 12 17 52 33 35 31 237 416 5609
Macedonia 5 4 6 5 6 7 4 5 6 6 32 43 29 15 117 497 4701
Montenegro 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 72 93 44 34 223 951 '6850
Kosovo 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 n.a. n.a. 4 n.a. n.a. 47 14 n.a. n.a. 3522
LDRs as- % of 96 124 85 81Yuqoslavia
* Totals may not add up to 100 due to rounding 
** Current prices
+ The data on investment in 1952 and 1960 are not given for separate regions of the republic of Serbia. The share 
of Kosovo, therefore, appears in the more developed areas and not in the LDRs. This, however, makes little dif­
ference to the overall situation as Kosovo’s share is usually very small.
++ Private sector excluded
x For this year, the exact population estimate is not available and therefore the investment figures are divided 
by the population on 15 March 1948.
Sources: SGJ(1955), pp. 51 and 258; Jugoslavija 1945-1964, pp. 79, 91, and 282; SGJ(1962), p. 418; SGJ(1970), pp.
332, and 353; SGJ(1976), pp. 381 and 406; SGJ(1977), pp. 374-375, 406 and 508; and Hoffman, G.W., and 
Neal, F.W. (1962), pp. 508-509.
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Social Product Employment Realized Investment
Figure 4- Share of the LDRs in Total Social Product, 
Employment and Realized Investment
Figure 5- Realized Investment Figure 6- Per-Capita Realized 
As % of the Social Product in Investment in LDRs and MDRs 
LDRs and MDRs
Source: Table 8.
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the LDRs enjoyed a continually higher investment/output ratio than did the 
MDRs. This is shown in Panel D of Table 8 as well as in Figure 5.* Higher 
investment ratios, of course, could be milsleading indicator of development 
efforts since it does not take into account the demographic characters of 
each region. The investment per capita is perhaps a better indicator of 
the preferential treatment of the LDRs. Panel E of Table 8 and Figure 6 
represent the per capita realized investment in different republics and 
provinces. It is clear from these representations that the less developed 
regions did not always received a 'more than proportionate' share of re- 
sources. In fact, except for the periods of the First and Second Five- 
Year plans, when the government had a much stronger influence over the 
allocation of investment funds, the LDRs have received much less invest­
ment resources per head of population than the MDRs.
With the advent of decentralization and the 'new economic system' in 
the early fifties, the financing of investment was removed from the domain 
of the authority of federal government and largely relegated to the 
republican governments. The federal General Investment Fund provided the 
republics with investment resources with specified sectoral allocation.
The republics, then, would make the final decision on the actual projects.
The tempo of the development of the LDRs was to be accelerated through special 
facilities such as subsidized interest rates, waiving of repayment of the loans 
provided earlier through the General Investment Fund, direct allocation of 
federal budgetary resources to the republican investment funds for the
It must  ^be pointed out, however, that the high investment ratio could 
be sustained by means of grants and subsidies by the State. In Chapter 
Four we showed that a considerable part of investment in the LDRs was 
financed through one of the social investment funds or the budget.
Amongst the LDRs, only Montenegro enjoyed a consistently high per capita 
investment. The small population of this province coupled with the 
individibility of investment in large scale infrastructural projects 
(particularly in the first and second periods) explain the higher than 
average figures.
- 264 -
specific use of the LDRs, and the system of 'guaranteed investment’.*"
Development of local autonomy, increasing importance of the local
investment funds and increasing reliance on enterprises own funds for
expansion meant that the more successful enterprises and the more prosperous
republics would be in a better financial position, and freer to decide on
their investment and expansion policies. Meanwhile the less successful areas
had to rely on the federal and republican funds which were increasingly less
available. To a large extent, the market mechanism was responsible for this
process. In addition, the system of ' guaranteed investment' in particular
and the preferential treatment of the LDRs in general were subjected to \
increasing criticism by the MDRs. Funds allocated to the LDRs were said to
have led to the development of 'political factories' for which political
2pressure far outweighted their economic justification. Even today, some 
economists consider the poor growth performance of the LDRs as being due 
to : the emphasis on the establishment of new (and large) industries without 
taking into account the efficiency in the use of resources, the duplication 
of projects in different regions for purely local interests, and the
3insufficient supply of supplementary services such as transport facilities.
The result of the investment policy in this period can also be seen 
clearly in Table 8. By 1961, per capita investment fell below the national 
average (85 percent of it) and share of the LDRs (excluding Kosovo) in 
total investment plummeted from 33 percent in 1952 to 23 percent in 1960. 
This situation which implied that the LDRs were being left behind, attracted 
the attention of many Yugoslav economists in the early sixties. It was clear 
that if the free operation of market forces was relied upon to apportion the 
resources, the less developed regions would be at a great disadvantage.
1 This facility, introduced during the Second Five-Year Plan, amounted to 
setting aside a certain volume of investment resources for use in the 
LDRs out of the General Investment Fund. See V. Dubey (1975), p.202 ;
B.Srebric (1969). p.117 and B. Horvat (1976) n 662 D. Mil£nkovitch(197l); p . 181. V '* P * ‘
3 m . Gregory(1973), p,228.
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The economic reforms of 1965 led to some basic changes in regional
policy. Most important of all the General Investment Fund was abolished and
with it most of the direct aid to the LDRs, specially the 'guaranteed
investment'. A separate Fund for the Accelerated Development of the LDRs
was established in 1965 and started to work in 1966.^ Not only was a
smaller amount of funds to become available for direct investment in these
regions, but also stricter requirements for eligibility were instituted.
They had to provide a certain minimum part of capital investment before any
of the specialized banks would participate with them in financing a project.
Previously, they used to obtain this minimum by grants or federal aid and
2had to put up a smaller share, sometimes none, of their own resources.
Accordingly, the opponents of the reforms were to be found, in the 
main, in the LDRs. From 1960 when the discussion of economic reforms began, 
a section of party leaders from Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro led by 
Aieksander Rankovic resisted the institution of massive reforms. The 1960 
reforms were largely trimmed before announcement and, even then, were 
continually interfered with. The LCY plenum in 1962 was unable to come to 
a definite compromise decision on the liberalization measures. It was only 
in 1966, with the removal of Rankovic and a large number of other political 
figures that the resistence to the reforms was finally broken. Later on, 
even Bicanic, himself a supporter of decentralization, admitted that the 
supporters and opponents of reforms were divided along nationality lines.
X Realizing the insufficiency of aid to the LDRs, beginning in 1970, 
additional aid, equivalent to 0.09 percent of the social product 
contributed by all enterprises,was earmarked for the development 
of Kosovo, see Z.Jasnic (1974), pp.68-69. For details of the recent 
policies in LDRs, see M. Mladenovic (1978),
2 R. Bicanic (1966), p. 648.
3 p. Shoup (1968), pp.249-250 and 254-258.
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Opposition to the Reform would logically be expected from 
those who are least developed, who have to work most and 
longest to cross the borderline and achieve the level of 
developed lands ; from those who used to get more from the
central moneybag than they put into it ....  The greatest
advocates of the Reform would be those who are most 
developed, who put more into the central bag than they 
got out of it ...
The first advocates of the Reform and the spearhead of it 
were the Slovene Communists. They were joined by the 
Croats and the two now march together. 1
The practical implications of the reforms in terms of the volume of 
investment realized in the LDRs can be seen in Table 8 . Panel E 
demonstrates the fall in the relative position of the LDRs in terms of per 
capita investment during the self-management period. In 1961, the per 
capita investment in Bosnia,Macedonia and Montenegro were, respectively,
72,86 and 165 percent of the national average. By 1975, the situation in 
Bosnia had partly improved (86%), it had remained the same in Macedonia (74%) 
and had deteriorated especially in Montenegro (108%). Although in the forties 
and fifties, it was possible to talk of a 'more proportionate' share of 
investment going to the LDRs, the self-management period witnessed an end to 
this kind of treatment.
We may ask what are the basic causes of persisting regional disparity 
despite high investment ratios in the LDRs ? Among the many factors which, 
at different times, have contributed to the widening of regional differences, 
the following four may be regarded as the most important.
First, the higher rate of growth of the population coupled with the 
particular age structure of the population in the LDRs has resulted in a 
lower percentage of active population (and a higher percentage of dependent 
population) in these regions.1 2
1 R. Bicanic (1966) pp. 644-645
2 In 1953 the proportion of active population in total was 4o% for the LDRs 
and 50% for the MDRs. By 1971, the two ratios had reduced to 35% and 48% 
respectively, i,e.the relative position of the less developed regions had 
deteriorated, see SGJ (1960), p.317 and SGJ (1976), pp.368 and 372.
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Second, the LDRs suffer from low labour productivity. This is due
not only to the lower standards of health care and literacy (Table 6) but also
to the unfavourable sectoral distribution of the labour force. In these areas,
a higher proportion of the population has always been engaged in agriculture
and a lower proportion of the labour force employed in the social sector.^"
2Both of these areas are characterized by low productivity.
Third, although large chunks of investment funds have been channelled 
to the less developed regions, their sectoral distribution has not been the 
same as that in the MDRs. A glance at Table 9, next page , representing the 
sectoral distribution of investment in the 1952-75 period, shows that of the 
total investment in the less developed regions :(a) a lower proportion has 
been allocated to non-economic activities (social,health, education etc.) ;
(b) a higher proportion has been spent on manufacturing and mining ; and
(c) a lower proportion has been allocated to services.
The disregard for the forward and backward linkages between various sectors
has resulted in imbalance between sectors, and the development of bottlenecks
3which have impeded faster growth in LDRs.
Fourth, the price policy of the Yugoslav government, together with 
the increasing effectiveness of the market forces, has also assisted the 
persistence and expansion of the regional disparities. As this factor seems 
to have been the most important of all factors, its further elaboration is
necessary.
1 In 1953, the proportion of population engaged in agriculture was 64% in 
the LDRs and 59% in the MDRs. By 1971 these ratios had reduced to 42% and 
36%. Similarly, the proportion of active population employed in the 
social sector which stood at 33% (for the LDRs) and 40% (for the MDRs) in 
1961, had increased to 40% and 46% by 1971. See SGJ (1960), p.318 ;
SGJ (1970), pp.321 and 332 ; and SGJ (1976), pp. 368, 372 and 381.
2 According to a World Bank report, the output per head in the social 
sector is about five times that in the private sector, V. Dubey (1975), 
p. 195.
3 The Yugoslav economist Srebric has observed that in the LDRs, "the ' 
development of non-industrial sectors was given only nominal support ... 
(and that) industrialization was not always followed by the growth of 
overhead capital.V B. Srebric (1969), pp.115-116.
Table 9- Sectoral Distribution of Total Investment in Different Regions, 1952-75
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1952-6Ö 1961-69 1970-75
LDRs MDRs 'LDRs MDRs LDRs HÖRs
Total Realized Investment 
(bil. dinars)*
Percentage Distribution
Total
Economic Activities 
of which :
Manufacturing & Mining 
(Electric Energy) 
Agriculture
Transport & Communication 
Trade,Catering and Crafts
27.8 85.6 56.1
100 100 100
81.7 68.6 72.5
40.2 25.3 39.6
(13.2) (7.1) (9.5)
10.4 9.0 7.9
13.7 14.3 13.6
4.2 12.9 1.9
151.6 119.1 316.2
100 100 100
70.0 79.0 78.8
22.6 51.7 41.7
(7.7) (8.2) (7.1)
9.2 5.1 4.8
12.2 16.2 15.8
18.3 8.2 11.1
* The data on the 1952—60 and 1961—69 periods are based on constant 1966 
prices while the data for the seventies are based on current prices.
Sources : V. Dubey (1975),p.200 ; SGJ (1972),p.477; SGJ(1973), p.483 ;
SGJ (1974), p.506 ; SGJ(1975), p.499 ; SGJ(1976), p.500 ; and 
SGJ(1977), p.508.
The price control policies (consisting of price freezes,price ceilings, 
etc.) have had different effects on different parts of the country.^- This 
has been due to the differences in the composition of output in various 
regions. The LDRs concentrate on basic industries, power and agriculture 
while the MDRs produce the bulk of manufactured goods. The output of the 
LDRs consists of goods whose prices have often been kept artificially low 
£n order to stimulate the rapid growth of manufacturing. The MDRs, however, 
produce goods whose prices have been least affected by price controls.
In other words, the terms of trade between the two regions has become 
increasingly biased in favour of the MDRs.
In addition to price policies, regional disparities have also been affected 
hy the operation of market forces and the development of autonomous enterprises 
which are responsible for their success or failure.
1 Although the general policy on the formation of commodity prices has been to 
allow the market forces to function freely and determine the price level, 
nevertheless, the prices of a large number of commodities have always been 
affected by a variety of price controls. As late as 1970,for example, price 
regulations affected almost half of the transactions dealing with industrial 
goods and a quarter of transactions involving consumer goods, see S.Govedarica 
(1972),pp.16 and 21. For details of the price system and its developments, 
see D. Vukovic (1966) and Yugoslav Survey(1975),pp.78-79.
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With the lower levels of education, less qualified and less skilled work 
force, lower standards of health, and higher rate of engagement of the work 
force in agriculture, the overall factor productivity and the rate of return 
on investment must have been lower in the LDRs. Lower profits would mean that 
internal resources for investment would be limited and external help — based 
on the enterprise viability and profitability - would be more scarce. 
Enterprises in the LDRs, as a result, would be able to attract a small amount 
of these resources. With the lower income and lower effective demand, the 
possibility of benefiting from economies of scale would be low too. Market 
forces do not reflect the social benefits of investment in poor regions and, 
therefore, any purely "economic" or "rational" investment system, would lead 
to a continuous underinvestment in the low income regions. Long ago, Mihailovic 
and Miljevski argued that market mechanism itself is a cause of perpetuation 
of regional disparities.^ Later on, Horvat argued that :
If within a country there are two regions whose levels of economic
development are separated by a considerable gap, and the market is
left to operate on its own accord, the gap is likely to widen...»
Since this process cannot be tolerated politically, and is
economically detrimental in the long run, something must be done2to control the undesirable effects of the market.
The less developed regions seem to have been caught in a kind of 
'vicious circle' described by development economists. Similarly, their demand 
for aid, grants, etc. resembles those of the less developed countries in 
their discussions with the advanced nations in such international forums as 
North-South Talks and UNCTAD.
■£" ~K. Milhailovic (1964), pp.29-45 and K. Miljevski (1964), pp.7-17. 
2 B. Horvat (1968), p.  85
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In order to reverse the post-war trends in regional disparities, 
attention must be paid to all the four factors mentioned above. Of course, 
some of the barriers in the way of faster growth of the LDRs (such as 
demographic and cultural) are harder to remove in a short period of time 
than others. But at least as far as economic factors are concerned, 
development of more linkages between sectors of each LDR as well as 
between the LDRs and MDRs and transfer of resources in an all round and 
balanced way has been long over-due.
E. Structural Change in Terms of Sectors of Ownership
The new government which came to power after the second world war 
intended to eliminate the private sector of the economy at the earliest 
possible time. By the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, enterprises 
and organizations in manufacturing the mining, banking, insurance and 
wholesale trade were completely taken over by the State (by confiscation 
and/or nationalization) to form the social sector. Gradually, within a 
couple of years, the bulk of other branches was also socialized. It was, 
of course, impossible to bring into the socialized sector the large number 
of small producers, mainly in the agricultural activities and to a smaller 
extent in crafts and retail trade. This section of the private sector 
(containing the self-employed and small producers who employed none or very 
few people) was looked at as the remnant of the old society, a transitory 
phenomena incompatible with socialist development which had to be slowly 
absorbed into the social sector. With the bulk of small producers in 
agriculture, the collectivization programme was embarked on in 1948. But 
by 1951» which was the height of the campaign, only 25 per cent of the 
agricultural land was farmed by the collectives and state farms, leaving 
75 per cent of the land still in private hands'*'.
G.W.Hoffman and F.W.Neal (1962), P.272.
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With the development of the 'new economic system' in the early
fifties, the attitudes towards private activity changed somewhat, with
the abandonment of the collectivization drive as a first step. A
"wholesale exudos" from the collective farms followed which, at the end,
left only 9 per cent of the cultivated land in the social sector^. Even
in the fifties and early sixties, the Yugoslavs maintained that the private
sector would be slowly absorbed into the social sector because of the lack
of conditions for its development and the discriminatory policies against
it. However, the period of self-management, particularly during the
seventies, has led to the recognition of the complementary nature of the
private and social sector (specially in agriculture) and the institution
of limited measures to aid the private farmers. The private peasants are
no longer regarded as aliens to socialism but as an "integral part of the 
2socialist system" ! The discussions preceeding the 1971 constitutional
amendments reflect the increasing attention given to the private producers.
Edvard Kardelj, for instance, pointed out the necessity of recognizing the
equality, in rights and obligations, of the people engaged in personal
labour with workers in other organizations, and the increasing need for
various forms of personal labour in the course of development of the self- 
3managed economy . By 1973, development of the private sector was even seen 
as one method of encouraging self-employment as a means of reducing the 
number of people emigrating abroad. A resolution of the February meeting 
of the Presidency of the LCY maintained that to achieve these objectives, 
is "indispensible... to create more stable and lasting conditions for 
the development of private work with private means of production in line
4with relevant constitutional guarantees and social requirements" .
1 A.Waterston (1962), p.23.
2 B.Horvat (1976), p.170 and N.Sisual (1969), p.37.
3 E.Kardelj (1971), pp.36-37.
4 LCY (1973), p.41.
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The organizations in the private sector (specially in agriculture 
and handicrafts) constitute the bulk of the backward and inefficient 
establishments of the economy. So far, no national effort has been made 
to improve the conditions of labour and efficiency of work in these 
establishments. Also, although the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan explicitly 
took into account the private sector and assigned output targets to it\ 
no national plan has yet endeavoured to allocate some of the resources 
to this sector.
In addition to agriculture, the handicrafts industry has historically 
had a large private sector consisting of small establishments producing 
a whole range of articles and providing different kinds of productive 
services (such as repairs). During the sixties, private activities began 
to flourish in construction, catering and tourism and transport activities 
as well. The overall extent and magnitude of the private sector in 
proportion to the whole economy is represented in Table 10 below.
Table 10 - Share of Private Sector in the Economy(%)
1952 1960 1971 1975
Active Labour Force* 76 60 52 • •
Employment in Economic 
Activities** 3.5 2.8 2.7 2.3
Social Product 26 24 17 15
Realized Investment 15 15 21 24+
* Active labour force in the private sector denotes the difference 
between active population and the sum of persons employed in the 
social sector and persons seeking employment. The bulk of these 
are engaged in small scale agricultural production and, to a 
lesser extent, in various services. The data on active population 
is available for census years only and, therefore, the first two 
figures in the first row represent the 1953 and 1961 data 
respectively.
** Representing the persons entered into employment contract with 
private producers of goods and services. It does not include 
the self-employed,
+ 1974
Sources: SGJ (1955), p.103; Jugoslavija 1945-64, p.80, SGJ (1973),
p.123; SGJ (1976), pp.80, 103, 141, 281; and V.Dubey (1975),P . 392.
1 O E C D(19 70), p. 43.
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The overall magnitude of the private sector, in terms of output and 
the number of people involved is clearly declining. The decline is 
particularly rapid in terms of the labour force. This is due mainly to 
the migration of individual peasants from the mountainous areas with harsh 
conditions to the cities and abroad. The trend of employment in the 
private sector seems to be slightly downward too. The employment figures, 
of course, do not reflect the actual size of the private sector at all 
since the persons entered into an employment relationship constitute a very 
small proportion of the manpower of this sector. The great majority of 
the labour force of the private sector are the small producers, "personal 
labour with personal means of production", as one Yugoslav economist has 
put it1 23. The employment figures represent only those workers that enter 
into an employment contract.
Investment in the private sector has continually increased with the
bulk of the increase in the field of construction (85 and 77 per cent for
21971 and 1974 respectively ). There is no credit facility available to the 
private sector and any investment arises directly from private savings.
Although the highly discriminatory measures of the fifties against
the private sector (in the areas of price control, credit facilities, tax,
etc.) are not practiced any longer, the restrictions on the type of activity
3and the level of employment still exist . Private activity is restricted 
to farming, services, and small business. In agriculture there is a 
maximum limit of 10 hectares (about 25 acres) of farmland and 25 hectares 
(about 62 acres) of woodland on the individual ownership of land in areas 
of average fertility. After much argument, during the 1971 constitutional 
discussions, it was pointed out that the fixed maximum limit on land 
ownership does not enable the small producers in the mountainous areas to 
maintain a reasonable subsistence. Therefore, the size limit was lifted 
and the republican authorities were authorized to determine the maximum
1 N.Sisul (1969),'pp.38-39.
2 SGJ (1976), p.281.
3 V.Dubey (1975), pp.100, 156; J'Dirlam and J.Plummer(1973),pp.11,14,55-6.
- 274 -
level of land holding in their own area . Employment of non-family wage 
labour has been subject to a ceiling of five, with seasonal activities 
(like tourism) exempted from these limits. In recent years there has been
some discussion in regard to raising the limit on the employment in the
. 2private sector as well but so far no major change has taken place .
The magnitudes and development of private activity in different sectors 
have varied greatly. In the following discussions the situation in each of 
the five fields: agriculture, arts and crafts, construction, transport and 
trade and catering is reviewed.
1. Agriculture. With more than half the active labour force in agriculture, 
this sector is the oldest, largest and most important domain of activity 
for individual producers. Considering that more than 50 per cent of the 
private holdings are located in the mountainous areas , the low fertility 
of land and the low efficiency of small scale production has led to the 
continuous de-population of these areas. As Table 11, next page, shows, 
the active labour force in the private sector declined by more than one 
million from the census of 1953 to that of 1971. The proportion of private 
producers in total active labour force has remained high and stable due, 
mainly, to the slow expansion and the low level of employment in the social 
sector.
In terms of the total agricultural output, although the social sector 
has developed very rapidly, the private sector still accounts for a large 
share of the total production. The faster growth of the social sector
E.Kardelj (1971), p.37. Interestingly, only a few months earlier, at an 
LCY Conference, Stevan Doronjski had attacked the lifting of the maximum 
land holding limit in the private sector as incompatible with socialist 
development policy and as undermining the policy of encouraging co-oper­
ation. S.Doronjski (1970), p.80.
In Slovenia, there exists provisions for private activity in almost all 
fields, including industry, though the amount of profit that can be 
extracted is restricted to twice the interest rate paid by the banks
on time deposits. Q.E.R., No.3, (1973), p.9.V. Dubey(1975), p. 154.3
Table 11- Some-Characteristics of Social and Private Agricultural Holdings*
A c t i v e  P o p u l a t i o n  i n  A g r i c u l t u r e  A c c o r d i n g  to C e n s u s ( 1 0 0 0 s ) * *  
T h o s e  e m p l o y e d  i n  s o c i a l  s e c t o r
T h o s e  e n g a g e d  i n  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  ( d i f f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  a b o v e  t w o )  
S h a r e  o f  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n  t o t a l  (?o)
C u l t i v a b l e  A r e a  ( 1 0 0 0  h e c t a r e s )
S o c i a l  s e c t o r  
P r i v a t e  s e c t o r
S h a r e  o f  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  in t o t a l  ( f t )
N u m b e r  o f  }io3dings* * *
S o c i a l  s e c t o r  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ( 1 0 0 0 s )
A v e r a g e  S i z e  of A g r i c u l t u r a l  H o l d i n g s  ( h a / h o l d l n g ) ** *
S o c i a l  s e c t o r  
P r i v a t e  s e c t o r
R a t i o  o f  t h e  a v e r a g e  s i z e  o f  s o c i a l  t o  p r i v a t e  h o l d i n g s
A g r i c u l t u r a l  P r o d u c t i o n  in C u r r e n t  P r i c e s  ( m i l . n e w  d i n a r s )
S o c i a l  s e c t o r  
P r i v a t e  s e c t o r
S h a r e  o f  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n  t o t a l  ( f t )
I n d e x  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  P r o d u c t i o n  ( 1 9 5 5 a 1 0 0 )**'
S o c i a l  s e c t o r  
P r i v a t e  s e c t o r
A u t h o r i z e !  P u r c h a s e s  o f  P r o d u c t s  ( M a r k e t  D e l i v e r i e s ) ^ )
S o c i a l  s e c t o r  
P r i v a t e  s e c t o r
N u m b e r  o f  T r a c t o r s  ( 1 0 0 0 3 ) + +
S o c i a l  s e c t o r  
P r i v a t e  s e c t o r
S h a r e  o f  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n  t o t a l  (•$)
L i v e s t o c k s  (millions)**“*“*
S o c i a l  s e c t o r  
P r i v a t e  s e c t o r
S h a r e  o f  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n  t o t a l  ( f t )
*  T o t a l s  m a y  n o t  e x a c t l y  m a t c h  w i t h  t h e  s u m  o f  c o m p o n e n t s  d u e  to .
r o u n d i n g
* *  T h e  a c t i v e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  t h o s e  w h o s e  
m a i n  a c t i v i t y  l i e  o u t s i d e  a g r i c u l t u r e  b u t  a r e  i n v o l v e d  i n  a g r i c u l ­
t u r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  o n  p a r t  t i m e  o r  s u b s i d i a r y  b a s i s .  T h e  f i g u r e s ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  u n d e r e s t i m a t e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  M a n p o w e r  e n g a g e d  in 
p r i v a t e  a g r i c u l t u r e .  I n  1 9 6 9 ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  
•iriv te a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s  w a s  e s t i m a t e d  a t  (a s  c o m p a r e d
w i t h  4 . 6 9 2 , 0 0 0  i n  1 9 6 6  a n d  4 , 2 0 8 , 0 0 0  i n  19 ? 1  a s  s h o w n  a b o v e ) ,  S G J  
7 0 , 0 . 1 2 6 .  Th e  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  R e c t o r  i n c l u d e s  a l l  m e m ­
b e r s '  o f  t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e s  a n d  t n e i r  e m p l o y e e s  (except t h o s e  i n  t he 
P e a s  m t  ..ork C o o p e r a t i v e s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  b a s i c a l l y  t r e a t e d  a s  'p e r ­
s o n s  e m p l o y e d ,  b u t  s e l f - e m p l o y e d  p e a s a n t s ) .  G Y Y 7 C ,  P - 3 4
19 5 3 1961 1971 1975
5 3 6 0 4 6 9 2 4 2 0 8 _
84 2 3 9 201 -5 2 7 6 4 4 3 3 4 0 0 798 95 9 5 ”
1 2 4 6 8 1 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 2 5 10001
2 5 6 4 1 1 6 0 1484 15 3 59 9 0 4 9 1 7 0 8641 6646
79 89 85 65
8366 5 12 0 2 0 7 3
2 5 6 4 26 1 8 2 6 0 0 -
9 8 201 7 083 .6 3 .5 3 .4 _
27 57 2 08 -
3 2 1 0 79 20 3 5 2 0 8 74493
201 10 4 1 8401 1 9 0 0 4
3009 6 8 7 9 26807 5 5 4 8 9
94 07 7 6 74
93 121 164 179101 2 5 2 6 3 6 7041 2 0 113 »33 145
- 1 0 0 100 1 00
• 3 6 4 7 46
•m 64 53 54
3 9 . 2 9 6 . 7 2 2 5 . 53 3 . 0 2 5 - 7 2 5 . 56 . 2 7 1 . 0 2 0 0
— 16 73 8 9
» 5 .  4 5 . 1 5-4
— 0 . 5 0.^1 0 . 5
— 4 . 9  - 4 . 7 5 . 091 92 92
* * *  T h e  d a t a  f o r ' n u m b e r  o f  h o l d i n g s '  a n d  ' a v e r a g e  s i z e ' o f  e a c h  h o l d i n g  r e f e r  to 
1955» 1 9 6 0  a n d  1 9 6 9  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
♦  T h e  i n d i c e s  f o r  1 9 5 3  a r e  a p p r o x i m a t i o n s  b a s e d  o n  s i m i l a r  d a t a  i n  J u ^ o s l a v i l a
1 9 4 5 - 6 4 , p . 8 0  -----
■M- I n c l u d i n g  a l l  t y p e s  o f  t r a c t o r s .  T h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t he n u m b e r  o f  t r a c t o r s  in t he  
s o c i a l  s e c t o r  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  is d u e  to t he u s e  o f  b i g g e r  s i z e  m a c h i n e s  o n  l a r ­
g e r  f i e l d s  w h e r e a s - t h e  t r a c t o r s  o n  p r i v a t e  f i e l d s  a r e  m a i n l y  s m all. F o r  s i z e  
o f  t r a c t o r s  o n  e a c h  h o l d i n g s  s e e  SGJ74, p . 1 7 3  
S t a n d a r d i z e d  i n t o  5 0 0 K g  p i e c e s ,  S Y Y 7 4 ,  p . 1 4 2
S o u r c e s  S C J Î 1 9 5 5 ) ,  
S G H ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,
82; J ^ o s l a v i . j a  1 9 4 5 - 6 4 . p . 8 0 ;  3 G J ( 1 9 6 0 ) ,  p. 116; 
p p .  1 2 6  a n d  139; S G J ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  pp. 8 5, 141 a n d  1 5 6 ; S C J ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 0 . 1 5 8
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(illustrated by a rise, three times faster, in this sector, in the index 
of agricultural production) has been due not so much to the increase in 
the direct factor inputs, as to the faster rise in productivity. From 1961 
onwards, the level of employment in the social sector actually declined 
and the cultivated area of this sector increased somewhat while the share 
of output in the soical sector increased from 13 per cent in 1961 to 26 per 
cent in 1975, The difference in productivity of the two sectors, or the 
relative inefficiency of the small, private peasant farming can be 
attributed to several factors:
i The absence of credit facilities for private farmers has meant that 
all the limited private investment has come from the savings of individual 
peasants. The social sector on the other hand, has enjoyed the bulk of 
the investment resources allocated to the development of agriculture. From 
1953 to 1960, 38 per cent of total investment in agriculture was applied to 
private holdings. Between 1961 and 1965, this figure was reduced to 26 
per cent and from 1966 to 1970 increased slightly to 29 per cent^.
ii The fragmentation of the private holdings (due to inheritance, for
example) combined with a slow but persistent reduction in the area of these
holdings has meant that the average size of the private holding have
2slightly decreased . On the other hand, the gradual increase in the area 
of social holdings together with the ongoing integration has led to a big 
increase in the size of social holdings. The average size of private and 
social holdings in the post-collectivization period are also shown in
Table 11.
1 V.Dubey (1975), p.155.
2 K.Vandal has demonstrated that the smallest size private holdings (under 
3 ha) which constituted 17 per cent of the area of private holdings in 
I960, increased in number so that by 1969 they accounted for 20 per cent 
of the area of private holdings. K.Vandal (1972), p.99.
-  in  -
Between 1955 and 1969, the average size of cultivable land in social 
holdings has increased from 27 times to 208 times that of the private 
holdings. The relatively low productivity of private farming, stems from 
the small size of plots in this sector compared with the large farms of 
the social sector on which various forms of economies of scale are realized.
iii The low income of the private peasants has not only prevented them 
from purchasing a sufficient amount of implements, but has also been 
responsible for a low level of fertilizer application on the private farms. 
From 1960 to 1975, the total amount of fertilizers used on the social 
holdings increased by 80 per cent, from 150 thousand to 270 thousand tons 
while the amount applied to private holdings increased by only 28 per cent, 
from 145 thousand to 186 thousand tons. This means that the per hectare 
application of fertilizers increased from 134 tons to 450 tons on the 
social holdings and from 14 tons to 52 tons on the private holdings*.
The low productivity of private agriculture was thought of as the 
most important single factor that would force the gradual absorption of 
this sector into the social sector. As mentioned before, in the late 
fourties and fifties, the private sector was regarded as the bastion of 
capitalist tendencies and activities and as in competition with the social 
sector. Discriminatory government policies were thus seen as necessary 
measures in 'restricting capitalism' and strengthening the social sector. 
However, since the 1965 reforms and particularly since the early seventies, 
it has been recognized that the two sectors in fact complement each other. 
The social sector mainly produces the staple commodities like grain and 
oil seeds while the private sector has concentrated on production of cash 
crops like vegetables and tobacco, fruits, meat, milk and eggs. The stress 
in agricultural policy, therefore, has shifted from one of discrimination
V.Acimovic (1977), p.61. The figures are in terms of 'plant nutrients' 
and not actual weights of the fertilizers.
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to one of co-operation between the two sectors. Co-operation, as a
World Bank report notes, "would help to increase the prosperity of
peasant fanners, thus preventing de-population, particularly of the
mountainous areas, and would exploit the private sector’s apparant
advantage in livestock production"^. It is the advantage of the private
sector in such areas as livestock production that has forced the Yugoslav
government to change its attitudes and revert to a policy of voluntary
co-existence and co-operation. Co-operation ranges from trade in inputs
and outputs between the two sectors to provision of services (mainly the
machinery of the social sector organizations ploughing, sowing, harvesting,
threshing and spraying of fruit trees and vineyards of the private sector)
and contracting of joint production (increasingly in livestock breeding
2and less so in grain production) . According to the above mentioned report, 
some 30 per cent of the private producers now use some form of the existing 
co-operation mechanism and as one may expect, the co-operation is more 
prevalent in the more developed regions.
2. Arts and Crafts. This sector deals with production by artisans, of goods
and services in small workshops; it is similar to agriculture in the extent
of private activity. Table 12, next page, represents the ouput, employment
and the number of organizations in this sector according to the type of
ownership. The data in this table covers those establishments whose size have
been large enough to make the owner eligible for tax payment. As a result,
3the very small establishments have been excluded . (This underestimation 
applies to data of Table 11 too).
1
2
3
V.Dubey (1975), p.157.
See, e.g., SGJ (1976), pp.176-177. 
SYY (1976), pp.69-70.
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Table 12 - Private Activity in Arts and Crafts
Total number of establishments 
of which in private sector 
Share of private sector (%)
Total persons engaged (1000s)** 
Persons employed in social sector 
Persons engaged in private sector** 
Share of private sector (%)
Total output (mil.new dinars)
Output in private sector 
Share of private sector (%)
1954 1959 1971 1975
160136 120241 145957 138312
155215 115722 143349 135349
97 96 98 98
303 315 387 464
99 166 194 273
204 149 194 191
67 47 50 41
429* 1294 6474 16784
297* 559 3737 7834
69* 43 58 47
* 1952 ** Including those employed and the self-employed
Sources: SGJ (1955), p.103; SGJ (1961), pp.102,166; Jugoslavia a 1945-64, 
pp.58, 78; SGJ (1970), pp.87, 173; SGJ (1973), p.124;
SGJ (1977), pp.140, 205.
The bulk of the establishments in this sector are in the private 
sector, although the great majority of them employ none or very few people, 
possibly family workers in the main. The establishments in the social 
sector, however, are generally much larger as can be deduced from the 
above table. With 2-3 per cent of the establishments, the social sector 
organizations have been employing 33-59 per cent of the labour force engaged 
in arts and crafts. Also, though small in number, these organizations 
produce a large proportion of total output, reflecting their higher 
productivity.
The level of employment and share of output in the private sector fell 
rapidly during the fifties and early sixties. But with the economic reforms 
of 1965 and further measures to strengthen and stimulate the private 
initiatives adopted in the early seventies, the trend has been partially 
reversed in the last decade.
3. catering. This is one of the sectors where private activity, though 
flourishing, is still underdeveloped. Table 13 illustrates the situation 
in terms of size, output and employment in the organizations of the private
sector
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Table 13 - Private Activity in Catering
1952 1960 1971 1975
Total number of establishments 15422 8371 15826 16673
of which in private sector 3501 3342 11959 12509
Share of private sector (%) 23 40 76 75
Total employment (1000s)* n.a. 77 147 189
of which private sector n.a. 1 9 14
Share of private sector (%) n.a. 1.3 6.4 7.2
Total turnover (mil.new dinars)*** n.a. 1212 17048 28653
of which in private sector n.a. 56 1865 3576
Share of private sector (%) n.a. 4 11 12
Total output (million new dinars) • • • • 40039 103066
of which in private sector neg.** neg. 775 1818
Share of private sector (%) neg. neg. 2 2
* Excluding the owners and family workers of small private establishments 
for which data is not available.
** Negligible
*** Catering turnover refers to the value of basic catering services 
rendered directly to the consumer such as providing food, drinks, 
accommodation and services such as transport, recreation, etc. which 
are rendered within a catering establishment.
Sources: SGJ (1955), p.235; SGJ (1961), pp.222-223; SGJ (1973), p.124;
SGJ (1974), pp.272-73; SGJ (1976), pp.141, 266-267.
As in the case of arts and crafts, private catering began to expand 
from the mid-sixties following the economic reforms. Since then, the small 
private establishments have constituted the great majority of catering units. 
However, in terms of employment, turnover and output, their share has 
remained at a low level.
h. Other Sectors. Other sectors in which private activity has been developing 
rapidly are construction and transport. Table 14 represents the situation 
in these sectors. (Table 14 appears on the next page). In construction, 
the share of the private sector in total sectoral output doubled during the 
fifties and has remained relatively stable since then. In transport, 
however, private activities were almost non-existent during the fifties and 
early sixties. But following the reforms of the sixties, it began to develop.
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On the question of employment, the data of Table 14 somewhat underestimate 
the actual size of the labour force engaged in private activities in 
construction. Individuals engaged in personal labour who do not employ any 
but family workers and the very small producers are excluded from this table. 
Nevertheless, it can be seen that the number of 'employed' persons are on a 
steady, if slow, increase.
Table 14 - Private Activities in Construction and Transport
1952 1960 1971 1975
Construction
Total output (million new dinars) 693 1770 24534 56855
of which in private sector 45 210 3270 6877
Share of private sector (%) 6 12 13 12
Total employment (1000s) 217 316 365 420
of which in private sector ** neg.* neg. 9 13
Share of private sector (%) neg. neg. 2.5 3.1
Transport
Total output (million new dinars) •  • *  . 16655 38047
of which in private sector neg. neg. 1012 2313
Share of private sector (%) neg. neg. 6 6
* Negligible
** Excluding the self-employed small producers
Sources : SGJ (1955), p.103, Jugoslavia 1945 - 64. pp.58,78,80 ;
SGJ(1970), p.87 ; SGJ (1973), p.124 : SGJ (1976), pp.112,141.
III. Summary and Conclusions
The Yugoslav economy has passed through three major phases of development 
each of which has been marked by distinct economic policies and different 
patterns of growth. In this chapter we have attempted to study the effects 
of major institutional changes and economic reforms on the pattern of growth 
of the economy as well as its sectoral and regional constituents. In the 
central planning period, the newly established socialist government embarked
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on a crash industrialization programme programme following, in the main, the 
experience of the Soviet Union in the twenties. In the industrialization 
programme the emphasis was laid on basic industries and infra-structural 
projects. The political and economic problems that resulted from Yugoslavia’s 
expulsion from the Cominform (particularly the severence of foreign trade 
links) coupled with the long gestation period of most of the investment projects 
undertaken in this period, led to a very slow rate of growth. This slow growth 
did not of course characterize all branches of activity. The emphasis on 
industrialization resulted in the fast expansion of industry and construction 
and in the increased share of these two sectors in total output and 
employment. Furthermore, within the industrial sector, the modern heavy 
industries producing capital goods were receiving greater attention and 
enjoyed faster growth than other branches. Meanwhile the insufficient attention 
paid to agriculture, coupled with an unsuccessful collectivization programme 
and severe drought, produced an absolute drop in the level of production.
The second period witnessed a fundamental change in the conditions that 
affected the growth pattern in the previous period. As the investment projects 
of the First Five-Year Plan began to reach maturity, the economy began to 
develop on a new footing with a reasonably strong heavy industrial base and a 
rehabilitated or improved infrastructure. Restoration of trade links with 
foreign countries enabled it to import the requirement for further industrial 
expansion (such as equipment, machinery and raw material). The new economic 
system introduced a number of measures that created an environment favourable to 
rapid growth. The abandoning of the collectiveization programme created renewed 
confidence and enthusiasm among the peasantry and led to a speedy rise in the 
level of agricultural production. The increased degree of freedom of enterprise 
together with the new role assigned to the market also allowed the enterprises 
(and their personnel) to benefit from higher growth rates. The outcome was 
that all major branches of economic activity enjoyed a period of boom. Even 
the consumer goods industries which had been relegated to a secondary position 
previously, received a large share of investment resources and developed at
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very rapid rates. As one might expect, following the expansion of various 
industries, the service sector also enjoyed rapid development. The part of 
service sector that is regarded as 'productive' (such as transport, 
communication , trade, catering, tourism, etc.) grew at a fast pace during 
this period.
The growth of industries and services in the urban areas, the harsh 
conditions of life in the countryside, specially in the mountainous LDRs, 
and the development of a social security system in towns were accompanied 
by a large scale migration of population from the rural areas into the 
cities. With insufficient employment opportunities in towns, the result of 
this migration was a rapidly growing army of unemployed who were largely of 
the unskilled type. The rate of growth of unemployment in this period was 
much higher than that in the first or third period.
Despite the reform measures introduced in the fifties, the State 
continued to hold a firm control over the level, sectoral allocation and 
regional distribution of investment. This meant that such objectives as the 
faster growth of certain branches of the economy or of the LDRs could be, 
to a large extent, accomodated in the social plan. Making use of its latitude 
in allocation of investment funds, the State did manage to pump into the 
LDRs more than their proportionate share of investment resources (in terms of 
per capita investment or investment ratio). The increased doses of investment 
did not, of course, lead to narrowing of the regional differences though it 
did result in a rapid expansion of the industrial and agricultural production 
in these areas, not matched by the development of other sectors.
In the self-management period, Yugoslavia began to face economic problems 
very similar to those of the West European countries : inflation, unemployment, 
recession, balance of payment problems, etc. The economy as a whole, as well 
as its constituent sectors, experienced a general slow down in their growth 
behaviour. This can be attributed to a combination of several factors among 
which the severe recession of the mid-sixties, absence of excess capacity
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(which characterized the industrial organization in the fifties) and the fall 
in the rate of expansion of all elements of demand must be emphasized. The 
industrial sector, and to a lesser extent other sectors as well, continued 
to grow faster than the agricultural sector and, therefore, their share in 
total output increased at the expense of agriculture. The most immediate 
effect of the economic reforms of the sixties was the increased freedom of 
enterprises in deciding on their output and price (formation of revenue), 
level and composition of investment and wage system (distribution of revenue). 
In practical terms, this meant a rapid and gradual rise in the price level 
and, then, in wage levels.
The sixties also witnessed the wave of emigration of Yugoslav workers 
to Western European countries which reached their record high of 1.2 millions 
in the mid-seventies. This flow, of course, had the effect of reducing the 
rate of expansion of domestic unemployment on the one hand, and of creating 
a new source of foreign exchange earnings (so vital to the growth of the 
Yugoslav economy) on the other. For both of these reasons, the government 
actually followed a policy of encouraging the migration of workers, even 
trying to bring it under its control and supervision. Only the recession of 
the mid-seventies in the European countries (particularly in Germany) halted 
the high rate of emigration, though this may prove to be only temporary. 
Despite the large scale of emigration (which amounted to more than 13.5% of 
the active population of the country) unemployment continued to increase.
The slow-down of the economy meant that fewer new jobs could be created.
The abolition of social investment funds and the new system of investment 
financing which was dominated by profitability criterion, along with the 
reduction of the power of the Federal government to undertake investment 
activities, adversely affected the situation in the LDRs. The regional 
differences were further aggrevated as a result of the new criteria for 
investment expenditure. As we showed in Chapter Four, if it were not for 
the help given by the Federal government through the Fund for the
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Accelerated Development of the LDRs and budgetary aid, the enterprises in 
the LDRs would have been in a much worse position as they could not 
generate sufficient investment resources internally.
A secondary effect of the economic reforms of the mid-sixties was the 
change in the attitude of the government towards the private sector. Although 
the private sector had been quite significant in terms of output and 
employment in the whole of the post-war period, it had always been regarded as 
'transitory' and, in comparison with the social sector, treated unfavourably. 
Only in the late sixties and early seventies, did the government begin to 
recognize the fact that private activity will last for a considerably long 
time to come. In fact recently in such fields as construction, transport and 
catering, the size of the private sector (though concentrated in small 
establishments) has been growing. Of course, the main bastion of private 
activity is still the agricultural sector where the government policy of 
attempting to absorb the less efficient private farmers into the social 
sector has go far proved unsuccessful.
- 286 -
Chapter Six
Short Term Fluctuations in the Level of Economic Activity 
$
In Chapter Five we discussed the long term growth pattern of the 
Yugoslav economy and showed that the major economic indicators have enjoyed 
significant and sustained rates of expansion in the post-war period. How­
ever, despite this secular growth, the economy has revealed a considerable 
degree of short term instability. Major indicators of economic activity 
such as ouput, industrial production, investment, exports, imports, etc., 
have been subject to continuous cyclical fluctuations. In this chapter we 
shall demonstrate the cyclical pattern of the growth of major economic 
indicators and attempt to describe some of the factors contributing to their 
fluctuations.
The fluctuations in the level of economic activity - business cycles - 
are of course familiar phenomena and, as a recent writer has pointed out, 
they have been the "central feature of the history of the capitalist 
economies."^ Studies of the development of the American, British and
other developed market economies have established this point without any
t  2 doub t.
Similarly for the socialist countries, despite their comparatively 
shorter history, the economists have been able to identify somewhat 
regular fluctuations in the level of activity. The factors contributing 
to the cyclical movement of the economic indicators in the two systems are 
obviously different and each case has to be analysed according to its own 
merits. The important point about the latter phenomenon, however, is that 
it rightly dispelled the simplistic idea - reputed to be "Marxist" - that 
socialism will usher in the period in which business cycles will cease to 
exist. To this dubious notion the Yugoslav policy makers also subscribed,
1 N. Rau (1974), p.7.
2 E. Lundberg (1968) and J. Cornwall (1972) are examples of such studies.
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at least until recently when they could no longer deny the relevance of 
empirical evidence on the existence of business cycles. What we shall 
be attempting in this chapter is, firstly, to identify the factors that, 
under the Yugoslav economic system, can be regarded as the most relevant 
variables explaining the cyclical behaviour. For this purpose we shall 
begin with summarizing major ideas in the field of business cycles, 
particularly on the fluctuations in the socialist economies. From this 
discussion we shall be able to select those elements that can best explain 
the short term behaviour of the Yugoslav economy. Secondly, by employing 
the usual methods of representation of business cycles, we shall use post 
war data on the growth pattern of major economic indices in order to 
demonstrate their cyclical movements. By using the index of industrial 
production as the most important indicator of the business cycles, 
we shall show the existence of six major industrial cycles in the post 
war development of the Yugoslav economy. Then, by going through different 
phases of the evolution of the Yugoslav economic system - central planning, 
transition to self-management and self-management - we shall use the 
explanatory factors arrived at earlier to explain the particular conditions 
that led to each of the six cycles.
I. The Patterns and Causes of Business Cycles
The study of the patterns of development of Western economies over 
a long period of time has led to the formulation of various ideas and 
theories regarding the forms as well as the causes of cyclical fluctuations 
in the level of economic activity. Although the term "business cycles" 
implies some degree of periodicity and regularity in the fluctuations, 
most economists agree that the term is devoid of these connotations and 
only implies alternate upward and downward movement of major economic 
indicators. There is no need for these movements to be symmetrical or for 
the cycles to be of equal amplitude or duration. A general notion of 
"business cycles", which is as useful now as it was three decades ago, was
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put foward by W.C. Mitchell in the following words:
Business cycles are a type of fluctuation in the aggregate 
economic activity of nations that organize their work mainly 
in business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occurring 
at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by 
similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which 
merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence 
of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business^ 
cycles vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years ...
In the earlier writings on business cycles the main emphasis was on the
identification and demarcation of the cyclical fluctuations in different
economies. The American economy was shown to have been subjected, since
mid-19th century, to fluctuations with average duration of 3 to 4 years.
The so-called "Kitchin cycles" - the forty month cycles first formulated
by Joseph Kitchin - have been attributed to the characteristics of inventory 
2investment.
The British economy, on the other hand, has experienced cycles of much
longer duration since the early 19th century. Marx and Engels observed
the 10 year cycles in 19th century Britain. The French doctor Clement
Juglar formulated the 7-10 year duration "Juglar cycles" by studying the
movement of prices, interest rates and bank balances. Matthews shows
that from 1820 to 1910 the British economy underwent classic cycles of
7-10 year duration. Many economists attribute these cycles to the
interaction of waves of domestic and foreign investment activities in the 
~3last century.
Still further, the study of the movements of prices, wages, interest 
rates, production of major sectors in the United States and several European 
countries led the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratiev to the formulation 123
1 A.F. Burns and W.C. Mitchell (1946), p.3. A similar method is followed 
by Lundberg who also studied the pattern of growth and instability in the 
European and American economies. In order to avoid the regularity and 
periodicity implications, Lundberg employed the concept of "conjunctural 
fluctuations" to represent economic instability. E. Lundberg (1978), pp.4,9.
2 J. Kitchin (1923), pp. 10-16; J. Schumpeter (1935), pp. 7-8; and 
r .C.O. Matthews (1959), pp. 206, 214 and 216.
3 j. Schumpeter (1935), pp. 7-8; K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p.593; F. Engels 
(1880), p. 142; and R.C.O. Matthews (1959), pp. 206, 214 and 216.
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of long cycles with duration of approximately half a century. These
r
cyclical movements are similar to Schumpeter's "long waves of economic 
activity" of which, between the late 18th and early 20th century, three 
major oscillations of 54 to 60 years duration were observed. The long 
cycles, according to Schumpeter, were the result of major entrepreneurial 
innovations: the industrial revolution, the development of steam power 
and the steel industry, railroad construction, and finally the automobile 
industry.1
As economic theory advanced from a static to a dynamic analysis,
new methods of explaining the cyclical fluctuations were also put forward.
According to these methods, the internal characteristics of an economy
and the interrelation between its constituent sectors were the essential
factors accounting for trade cycles. One of the oldest of these methods
goes back to Kalecki who employed a model consisting of: a fixed level of
consumption for wage earners (equal to total wage fund in the economy);
a consumption function for profit earners making consumption dependent on
profit; an investment function also dependent on profit level as well as
the existing capital stock; and an assumption regarding the gestation
2period for the materializing of investment orders. The interaction 
between the consumption and investment functions would, after taking into 
account the time lag between making investment decisions and actual 
production of capital goods, lead to a combined difference-differential 
equation for investment function in the following general form:
dl (t) m
— 2---- -- I (t) - (H + e) I (t-0) (1)
dt 0 ° 0
with IQ(t) representing the investment orders in period t, m and e the
parameters relating investment orders to profit and capital stock, and
■J J. Schumpeter (1935), pp. 7-8; N. Kondratiev (1935). In his tri-cyclical 
scheme, Schumpeter maintained that the US economy was subject to all three 
types of cycles simultaneously. See J. Schumpeter (1934) and (1939).
2 M. Kalecki (1935), pp. 327-344. Kalecki's model bears a strong resemblance 
to the modern Keynsian models. Its novelty, however, lies in the fact 
that it was formulated long before the publication of the "General Theory..." 
See L. Klein (1966), p.224.
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0 is the average time required for the investment orders to materialize 
(gestation period). The solution to this equation will include fluctuations 
in the level of IQ(t) as one of many possibilities.^- These fluctuations 
will then be directly translated into cyclical movements in the level of 
output.
, The next major macro-dynamic model which attempted to explain the
cyclical behaviour of the economy was Samuelson's work on multiplier-
2accelerator interaction. In this model, investment was based on the 
crude acceleration principle that: (a) there exists a 'normal'capital 
output ratio which determines the optimum level of capital stock that 
should be in operation in each period, and (b) the entrepreneurs adjust the 
level of capital stock in their enterprises to the optimum level almost 
instantaneously. Later on more sophisticated and refined variants of this 
model were developed in which such restrictive assumptions as instantaneous
3adjustment of the level of capital stock were relaxed. Instead of the
naive accelerator principle, the investment function in these models was
based on the "capital stock adjustment principle" or "capacity utilization
principle" in which investment activity was seen as a process bringing the
• Aactual level of capital stock to the desired level over a period of time.
The interaction of such an investment function with a Keynsian type 
consumption function (lagged or unlagged) will lead to some form of a 
second order difference equation such as the following:’’
Yt - (b+v)•Yt_1 + v*Yt_2 " A (2)
with Yt representing the level of output in period t; b, the mpc; v, the 12345
1 The exact solution to this type of equation is given in R.G.D. Allen (1959), 
Chapter 8.
2 P.A. Samuelson (1939).
3 For example R.I1. Goodwin (1948) and R.C.O. Matthews (1959).
4 R.M. Goodwin (1948) and H.B. Chennery (1952).
5 For several variants of macro-dynamic models which lead to this type of 
equilibrium condition (embodying cyclical movements), see N. Rau (1974), 
pp. 23-39.
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accelerator; and A, a constant. The solution to such an equation is in 
the general form of:
Yt - c1X1t + c2X2fc + k (3)
and X2 and k depend on the parameters of equation (2) while c^  and c2 
depend on the initial conditions.
Depending on the values of the accelerator coefficient and the marginal 
propensity to consume, equation (3) can lead to any of the following five 
solutions:
(i) Once equilibrium is disturbed, the output may grow exponentially in 
an upward (or downward) direction. This is the case of explosive growth 
(or deceleration).
(ii) Once equilibrium is disturbed, the output may start oscillating 
around some equilibrium level, with the amplitudes of the oscillation 
growing in size. This is the case of explosive oscillation.
(iii) Once equilibrium is disturbed, the output may start oscilling 
movements, but unlike solution (ii), the amplitudes of the cycles will 
continually reduce. This is the case of dampening oscillation.
(iv) Once equilibrium is disturbed, the output will grow exponentially 
but will converge to a new equilibrium level. This is the case of
converging growth.
(v) Once equilibrium is disturbed, the output will grow in an oscillatory 
form with constant amplitudes.
At first glance these solutions, particularly (i) and (ii), seem 
somewhat unrealistic and absurd. Observation of the actual experience of 
various economies shows no indication of an explosive upward and/or 
downward movement of the level of output. The interesting point is that 
the normal values of capital output ratio and marginal propensity to consume 
estimated, for example, for the U.S. economy lead one to expect a solution 
similar to (ii) above*, something which her experience has so vehemently
1 j. Duesenberry.(1958), p.36- - (for estimates of COR) and G. Ackley (1961),
pp.208-266 (for estimates of mpc).
- 292 -
disproved.
It is in this context that the next set of contributions become
significant. If the upward or downward growth or oscillations of the level
of activity in an economy are subjected to limits arising from the character
of that particular economy, then we would observe not the strange
possibilities of solutions (i) and (ii) above, but a fluctuating level of
output with modified and reasonable amplitudes. These limits, the ceilings
and floors or buffers, may include such constraints as the full employment
of the labour force, the capacity of capital goods producing industries,
foreign exchange reserves, minimum endogenous investment, etc.^. A growing
economy whose equilibrium is disturbed and changed into an explosive
growth, as suggested by solutions (i) or (ii) above, would sooner or later
face the ceiling (imposed by full employment, according to Hicks, or the
capacity of capital goods industries, according to Goodwin, or other ceilings)
beyond which it cannot grow. The fact that the growth rate has reduced to
zero or fallen sharply, means that induced investment will sooner or later
(depending on the lag structure) reduce. Thus, the level of output will
begin to decrease and fall below the trend. But the downward movement is
not indefinite either. Induced investment may, at worst, reach zero,
making net induced investment a negative value equal to depreciation
charges» But in any economy there is always some autonomous, or exogenous,
investment with a level independent of the level and changes of the output.
Besides, as there are some industries that will continue to expand their
capacity and production even during a down-swing, a certain amount of 
. 2investment will always take place. This, together with exogenous invest­
ment, will determine the floor below which the output will not fall. In 
different economies the floors and ceilings are different and in our 
discussion of the Yugoslav business cycles we shall try to formulate the
1 J.R. Hicks (1950), pp.95-107; R.M. Goodwin (1951), p.4; R.C.O. Matthews 
(1959), pp.564-565; J. Cornwall (1972), pp.104-109.
2 J. Cornwall (1972), p.103. v
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particular constraints which are most relevant to the Yugoslav conditions.
At this point we should emphasize that the macro-dynamic models 
discussed above can explain the cyclical fluctuations only in a mathematical 
sense. In other words, these models end up with a difference equation 
whose solution contains the possibility of cyclical movements. What we 
need to do is to explain why the interaction of the multiplier and 
accelerator should lead to instability. Only in this context can the 
weakness of an economy and the fact that it is inherently subjected to 
destabilizing forces be shown. Investment plays a dual role: it influences 
the level of income and is, in turn, influenced by that same level of 
income. This situation is resolved, mathematically, by solving the two 
simultaneous equations. But in reality the solution is not so straight 
forward. Each entrepreneur bases his investment decisions on expected 
income rather than on the realized income. The cumulative result of such 
investment decisions across the whole economy is the flow of goods and 
services into the product market and of income into the factor service 
marker. The demand for the products of the economy (dependent on the 
generated factor incomes) may or may not be sufficient to cover the 
aggregate supply. The outcome is a divergence between the actual and 
desired levels of output and investment which cannot smoothly disappear 
by a change in supply or demand or- prices. The properties of the economy, 
specifically the accelerator-determined level of investment (or that 
determined by the capital stock adjustment priciple) will set in motion 
forces that amplify the divergence and result in a rise or fall of both 
indicators. To explain this differently, a divergence between supply and 
demand (or saving and investment) cannot be easily and speedily eliminated 
because of the nature of the organization of the economy. Because of 
specialization and division of labour, a firm can control only the level 
of its own supply not the demand for its output, the latter being determined 
by other firms and/or households. The important point is that the loci
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of determinants of supply and demand for each product are different. In
a planned economy, on the other hand, the supply of and demand for
capital goods are determined in the same place while the supply of consumer
goods is roughly adjusted to the effective demand via control of wages
and salaries. It is this coordination, by way of the central plan, that
opens up the possibility of speedy elimination of excess supply or demand.
(More about this in the next section.) In addition to this, the response
of planned economies to excess supply is different from that of the market
economies. As Goodwin points out, in a free market economy, if the
entrepreneurs set the actual rate of growth below the equilibrium rate of
growth, the economy will experience an undesired pile up of stocks. "The
entrepreneurs," Goodwin maintains, "will then cut back their expansion
rate to avoid further undesired growth in stocks, but, in the next period
this only makes a bad situation w o r s e . F o r  the planner, on the other hand,
"the appearance of unexpected stocks is not a disaster but rather a happy
2chance to increase the rate of expansion."
According to the capital stock adjustment principle, at each point 
in time a certain desired level of capital stock prevails in the economy.
Each entrepreneur would make his investment decisions, independent of 
others, in order to reach this desired level. But if the whole of the 
economy is taken into account, there is no way of presuming that the amount 
of investment undertaken by entrpreneurs as a whole will be equal to the 
difference between the actual and desired levels of capital stock. The 
possibility of overshooting and undershooting exists and, under the 
system of decentralized decisions, there is no way that they can be avoided. 
Overshooting the desired capital stock target will be manifested in a 
reduction in the normal profit rate and subsequently leads the entrepreneurs
1 R.M. Goodwin (1970), p.47. The opposite will happen if the actual rate of 
growth is set above the equilibrium rate and any attempt to replenish the 
depleting stocks will lead to their further reduction. This is a 
simplified form of the familiar Harrod-Domar 'knife-edge* problem.
2 Loc* O’tt.
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to reverse their decisions on expansion. This will require the firms to 
reduce their investment expenditure. Lack of coordination among firms means 
that investment expenditure may be cut even more than is required to reach 
the desired level of capital stock (undershooting). As Matthews has 
rightly pointed out, the working of competition and the lack of coordination 
due to the decentralized nature of decision making are the most important 
reasons for instability.^
There are two other explanations for business cycles that deserve brief 
2attention. Schumpeter has put forward a theory of business cycles based
3on technical progress and the investment booms that follow major innovations. 
Such innovations as the development of the steam engine or the construction 
of railroads in the United States can, however, only elucidate the long 
run cycles of economic activity and not the short run fluctuations. Major 
innovations, Schumpeter maintained, were accompanied by bursts of investment 
in several branches of industry and after gradually seeping through the 
whole economy they brought forth increased investment activities in many 
other branches. The duration and intensity of the cycle would be determined 
by the follow-up investment stimulated by the application of the technical 
progress.
Schumpeter's view of the cycles comes very close to that of another 
school of thought, the 'random shock' school, which takes fluctuations as 
the outcome of purely random disturbances in the economy. Irving Fisher, 
for example, maintained that the cyclical movements in the level of economic 
activity are no different from those experienced by any random statistical 
series generated by weather reports for instance, or gambling results in 
Monte Carlo casinos. In other words, observing cyclical movements -
1 R.C.O. Matthews (1959), pp.38-39 and 57.
2 There are, of course, many other less important explanations of business 
cycles using concepts such as speculation, condition of extreme optimism 
and pessimism, export led fluctuations, etc. We have left out these 
explanations as they are essentially subsidiaries to other major factors. 
R.C.O. Matthews (1959), pp.60-61 and 197,
3 J. Schumpeter (1934) and (1939).
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represented by the fluctuations in the value of an indicator around a trend - 
should not lead to the notion of ’business cycles' any more than observing 
weather reports or gambling results would to those of 'weather cycle' or 
'Monte Carlo cycle'.^
At about the same time, a more sophisticated version of the 'random
shock' theory of the business cycle was put forward by the Russian economist 
2E. Slutsky. He analysed a series of numbers taken from the Russian 
lottery loan and then generated a second series of numbers by finding the 
moving averages of every ten numbers. This latter series, when graphed, 
closely resembled the economic fluctuations iirthe United Kingdon. He 
repeated the experiment on the second series and generated a third series 
of numbers which, when graphed, resembed the fluctuations in the American 
economy. This, of course, was what Fisher had pointed out in 1925, with 
only a small difference. Whereas according to Fisher the fluctuations in 
the level of activity were the effect of random shocks in that period, 
i.e. Y^=f(e^)t Slutsky's scheme amounted to using the random shocks of 
several recent periods in the determination of the fluctuations in each
period, i.e. Y^=f( e^ , e^_^, e t~2* ••••)•
It is necessary to recognize the importance of random shocks in the 
explanation of business cycles. That exogenous factors such as bad 
harvests, wars, major innovations, etc., do influence the level of activity, 
we have little doubt. But such factors are not the sole determinants of 
variations in the level of business activity. The endogenous characteristics 
of the economy and the inter-relation between the constituent branches 
play the decisive role. Any exogenous factor becomes important only in 
so far as it can work through the structure of the economy. In any case 
different economic systems will behave differently when subjected to similar 
external shocks because of the difference in their internal organization.
X I. Fisher (1925), pp.191-192.
2 Slutsky's findings remained almost totally unknown for more than a decade 
until the publication in 1937 of his article in English. See E. Slutsky 
(1937).
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The pure random shock theory cannot of course explain such different 
behaviours since it takes no account of the internal properties of an economy.
The bulk of empirical work on the theories of business cycles have been 
concentrated on the study of the advanced capitalist economies. In recent 
years, however, increasing attention has been paid to the study of the cy­
clical fluctuations in the socialist countries. As Yugoslavia falls in the 
general category of 'socialist economies', it is necessary to review briefly 
the major theoretical developments in the investigation of the business cycles 
of these economies before beginning the discussion of her experience.
II. Cyclical Fluctuations in the Socialist Economies
According to a simplistic variant of the Marxist analysis, business 
cycles are products of the anarchy of production in the capitalist system 
and the disappearance of capitalism leads, ipso facto , to the disappearance 
of cycles. This, obviously, is of no help in analysing why the rate of 
growth and the level of economic activity fluctuates in the socialist 
economies. Neither does it help to find out why the pattern of fluctuations 
are different in different socialist economies. Of course, a number of 
economists argue that the fluctuations in the level of activity in the 
socialist countries should not be called business cycle but merely 
disturbances.1 It is not a rewarding exercise for us to engage in a 
discussion on whether the term business cycle should or should not be 
applied to the macroeconomic behaviour of these economies. What we are 
concerned to do is identify the factors that lead to fluctuations and to 
find out the relationship between these factors and the pattern of 
fluctuations.
In recent years, there have appeared an increasing number of studies 
of the cyclical fluctuations in various socialist countries as well as 
attempts at theoretical formulation of the causes of these fluctuations.
I g . Haberler (1951), pp.375-376; A. Nove (1969), pp.288 and 302; R.D. Porter 
(1969), p.330 and A. Bergson (1951), p.388.
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Broadly speaking, the factors contributing to fluctuations fall within 
the following categories:
i) Conflict of interest between the planners and consumers,
ii) Weaknesses of planning methods and economic policies,
iii) Periodic shocks of one type or another.
Each of these categories will be discussed in some detail in the 
following pages.
j Conflict of interest between the planners and consumers. The first point 
of view, which was put forward first in the mid-thirties and has been 
repeated since by various economists, essentially revolves around the notion 
that planners and consumers have different preference schedules and that 
the 'plan' - as the realization of the planners’ preferences - is 'imposed' 
on the consumers by coercion. According to Ropke, the tendency to over­
invest - inherent in planning - leads to the neglect of consumers and their 
demand structure, and the chronic shortage of consumer goods. The dis­
harmonies resulting from non-proportionate growth of various sectors will 
be hoisted onto the shoulders of the consumers through the coercive medium 
of the 'plan'.^- Two similar but more sophisticated versions of this view 
were put forward by Olivera in 1960 and Brainard in 1974. According to 
Olivera, planning in the collectivist economies is aimed at maximizing 
growth, and that this basic property leads to the separation of the time 
preference schedules of planners and consumers and increasing "consumer 
dissatisfaction". The capital goods industries will receive more attention 
at the expense of consumer goods industries. As workers receive fixed wages 
according to their work, the deterioration of the consumer goods industries 
necessarily leads to changes in relative prices in favour of investment 
goods and a fall in the standards of living. After some time, the social 
dissatisfaction and the tensions that develop, as a result of the deterior­
ation of the consumption sector, force the planners to change their pattern l
l W. Ropke (1936), pp.319-321.
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of decision making. Investment in consumer goods industries increases,
relative prices change in favour of consumption goods, tensions reduce
and the economy begins to grow at a slower pace. But sooner or later the
planners will revert to their old methods and renew their emphasis on the
investment goods sector again. This alternating shift of emphasis on
investment resulting from the planners’ tendency to over-invest leads,
according to Olivera, to cyclical movement in the level of activity.^-
While Ropke held that economic fluctuations "are connected with differentiated
societies, whether capitalist or socialist", Olivera wrote that "cyclical
2growth is connatural with centralized collectivism".
This position was put forward again, most recently by Brainard who
divided the planned economy into a market section dealing with consumer
goods and supply of labour and an administratively planned section dealing
with everything else in the economy. The two sections, Brainard maintains,
are essentially incompatible with each other as the objectives pursued in
each section differ radically. The disequilibrium that would generate as
a result of this incompatibility would be tackled first by further directives
and administrative means and then (as these fail to restore equilibrium)
by reversing the emphasis and enhancing the importance of the market
section. The shifts in policy would result in variation in the level of
activity. In short, the incompatibility of the two sections result in
3the so-called 'policy cycles’.
The existence of inconsistency between the preferences and objectives 
of consumers and planners in socialist countries may be a real problem, 
but extending this argument to the point of generating cyclical fluctuations 
is fairly implausible. After all, even in market economies consumers' 
preference schedules differ from those of the producers and the former group 
would want the relative prices changed in their favour (although a movement
1 J.H.G. Olivera (1960), pp.243-245.
2 W. Ropke (1936), p.322 and J.H.G. Olivera (1960), p.24Sl
3 L.J. Brainard (1974), pp.68-71.
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in this direction would lower the profit in consumer goods industries and 
would lead to a reduction in investment). But this divergence in itself 
does not explain the cyclical fluctuations under capitalism.
As far as the predictions by Ropke and Olivera about the increasing
poverty and suffering of the citizens of socialist countries - subjected to
overzealous planners - are concerned, the actual experience of these
countries shows that, at least in terms of standards of living, they have
enjoyed rapid progress and that the "poverty from shortage of the socialist
crisis", prophesized by Ropke, has not materialized so far.^ " Of course,
at times, the socialist economies have been subjected to hardships of
various types - mostly due to failures in agriculture - but such hardships
as Nove correctly points out, "cannot be regarded as the inevitable
2accompaniment of every species of collectivism". The ups and downs in 
the psychology of citizens, resulting from changes in their standards of 
living, cannot be used as a substitute for the interaction of economic 
forces in generating business cycles.
Furthermore, Olivera and Brainard seem to have ignored the fact that 
socialist countries do not constitute a homogeneous entity but that each 
has its own particularities which may be quite different from those of her 
neighbours. It would be wrong to use one set of factors (e.g., inconsist­
ency of the time preferences of consumers and planners) in an attempt to 
explain the business fluctuations in all socialist countries.
There are obviously some valid points in the arguments of the proponents 
of the notion of "inconsistent planners and consumers time preference".
For example, the point that the choice of wage rate may not be related to 
the choice of growth rate deserves attention. It may be argued that because 
the wage rate is chosen on distributive grounds and not in direct relation 
to the growth rate, there may appear an unsatisfied demand and shortage of 
certain consumer goods. But it is by no means clear why this should result
1 W. Ropke (1936), p.322.
2 A. Nove (1960), p.259.
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in cyclical fluctuations.
ji Weaknesses of planning methods and economic policies. The second
type of explanation of business cycles in the socialist economies, related
to an extent to the first point of view, is based on the weakness of
planning systems and the irrationalities of the planners and policy makers.
The proponents of this view, who come chiefly from Eastern Europe, have not
put forward a general theoretical framework for the analysis of business
cycles. Instead they have discussed in broad terms the cyclical movements
of economic activity in particular countries and attempted to explain these
movements by looking at the practices of policy makers and planners.
Horvat, Goldmann and Brody, for example, have tried to explain the cyclical
fluctuations in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary by using this method
of analysis.^- Goldmann's argument involves the description of the limits
to economic growth on the one hand and the inherent tendency among the
planners to disregard these barriers on the other. He maintains that small
socialist countries like Czechoslovakia face barriers to their growth such
as the capacity of the raw materials and extractive industries. Attempts
to relieve the shortages by imports will in turn set in motion the foreign
2exchange barrier as a secondary limit to growth. The operation of these 
barriers will reduce the growth rate for a period or two, but the "subject­
ivist and voluntarist" tendencies "inherent in the traditional model of
economic planning" will soon lead to new waves of industrialization and 
3investment drive. Goldmann uses the data on cyclical movements in 
Czechoslovakia to establish the existence of cycles with 7-8 years 
duration based on investment booms following a period of slow growth.
While it is correct that the myopia of planners can cause disharmony 
in the operation of the economy, one cannot treat this as an inherent 
characteristic of the planning system. Miscalculations can occur for a
X B. Horvat (1971b); J. Goldmann (1964) and (1969); and A. Brody (1969).
2 J. Goldmann (1964), pp.91-92 and (1969), p.333.
3 J. Goldmann (1964), p.93.
- 302 -
variety of reasons: they may be due to insufficient knowledge of the 
economic factors under socialism or they may be due to the fact that the 
planners do not control all the conditions necessary for realization 
of the plan. The existence and operation of constraints to growth is an 
example of the former, while the state of the weather and conditions of the 
harvest are examples of the latter type of miscalculation. However, 
leaving aside the second type of problem, if planning is undertaken with 
full knowledge of the constraints and the growth rate is chosen after due 
consideration is given to these constraints, there is no reason why an 
economy should experience business fluctuations. The fact that some 
planners in some countries and at various times have behaved subjectively 
and have not taken into account the barriers to accelerating growth, 
cannot be used to explain the cyclical economic movements in all centrally 
planned economies.
The argument put forward by Horvat deals essentially with the 
behaviour of policy makers. Basing himself on the experience of the 
Yugoslav economy, he maintains that the economy is inherently unstable and 
the instability is aggrevated by the policy makers' "dogmatic" refusal 
to admit and recognize the cyclical pattern of growth and, thus, their 
inability to take sufficient and timely counter-cyclical measures.^" The 
notion of a "government stimulated cycles" has, of course, been put 
forward for the Western market economies as well. Matthews, for example, 
has maintained that the deflationary measures taken by the British 
government in the 50s and 60s were usually carried on longer than needed
. . 2and resulted m  further instability. An even stronger point of view
was formulated by Dow who argued that the major fluctuations in the rate
of growth between 1952 and 1965 were "chiefly due to the government
3policy ... (which) went further than intended."
1 B. Horvat (1971b), pp.43, 227 and 234.
2 R.C.O. Matthews (1959), p.129.
3 J.C. Dow (1965), p.384.
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As we shall show later, in Yugoslavia's case, government policies 
certainly did play a destabilizing role particularly in the down-swing 
phases of the cycles. Horvat's analysis, however, falls short of 
investigating the factors whose interactions begin and end each phase 
of the cycle, an analysis which requires giving attention to the internal 
structure of the economy.
jii Periodic Shocks. The third explanation for cyclical movement under 
socialism is that such movements are the results of periodic shocks 
applied to the economy by internal factors (such as major changes, in 
government priorities) as well as external factors (such as weather 
condition, wars, etc.). Alec Nove, a major proponent of this view, has 
pointed out that the fluctuations in the level of activity in socialist 
economies, particularly in the USSR, have resulted from one or more of 
the following events.
a. Variation . in agricultural production due to good or bad harvests. The 
bad harvest of 1921, for example, was a major factor in the crisis of 
1922-23.
b. A drastic,^once and for all, change in the government policy or 
rearrangement of government priorities. The transition to NEP is an 
example of the former and consumer oriented policies during the Malenkov 
period is an example of the latter.
c. A shift of resources to armament due to a change in the international 
situation. The down-swing of 1937-38 was the result of the policy of 
shifting priorities to war industries. A similar, but less serious, situation 
developed in the early fifties during the Korean war.*
Yugoslavia, of course, is somewhat different from the type of "socialist"
1 A. Nove (1969), pp.294-296. Nove adds other factors to this list which 
are excluded here as they appear to be chiefly polemical and/or political 
and void of economic content. One of these factors is the "death of a 
leader" factor. Another one is that the fluctuations in the East 
European countries are the direct result of policy changes in the USSR.
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country for which the above ideas were formulated. For example, due to the 
absence of central planning, the inconsistencies of planners’ and consumers' 
preferences do not affect her macroeconomic behaviour. On the other hand, 
some of the above ideas (such as the implications of periodic shocks 
due to a change of priorities, untimely government policies, etc.) are 
fairly relevant to the analysis of the Yugoslav experience. In the next 
section, therefore, we shall attempt to identify the factors that influence 
the cyclical movements of the economy and whose variations result in a 
fluctuating growth pattern.
III. The Causes of Business Cycles in Yugoslavia
We have already shown, in detail, that the Yugoslav economy has been 
continually changing from a Soviet-type centrally planned economy into a 
decentralized market economy. A glance at factors contributing to business 
fluctuations in market and planned economies (sections I and II above) 
shows that a combination of both sets of factors may be used to explain 
the situation in Yugoslavia. More specifically, the important factors are:
a. Decentralization. As the organization of the economy has slowly moved 
towards a decentralized market economy, the absence of coordination between 
economic units has become more influential. As we discussed in section I, 
in a decentralized economy where each production unit decides on its own 
investment and production plans, the dual role of investment and the 
mechanism of adjusting supply and demand would entail a certain degree of 
instability. The overshooting and undershooting of the capital stock 
targets are inevitable, and once this takes place, the cumulative effect 
of investment - through the multiplier and accelerator - will push the 
economy further away from the trend. Yugoslavia has been increasingly 
subjected to this possibility. In particular in the self-management 
period, with the abolition of the social investment funds and full 
relegation of investment decisions to individual units, the last vestiges 
of coordinated economic growth was done away with.
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b. Ceilings to Growth. While the shortage of labour and the capacity of 
the capital goods industries have been generally recognized as major ceilings 
to growth, their significance varies from one country to another and with 
the level of development of each economy. Unlike the developed capitalist 
countries in which these constraints have been shown to be operative, the 
less developed countries have been subject to quite different limitations.
The full employment ceiling becomes meaningless in those LDCs where both 
open and disguised unemployment are rampant. In Yugoslavia, in addition 
to an increasingly high level of unemployment, the large scale migration 
of the work force to Western Europe, reaching the million mark in the 
early seventies,^- must also be taken into account. While it is true that 
certain kinds of skill and training are in short supply, the full employment 
ceiling (as pointed out by Hicks or Matthews) does not operate.
The shortage of capital goods and the limited capacity of the industries
producing these goods have been regarded by many economists as an important
2barrier to growth. But the shortage of capital goods in the LDCs has always 
been met by imports, and it is here that the most serious constraint faces 
these countries. The LDCs suffer from a permanent shortage of foreign 
exchange which constitutes the major "cooperating factor" (to use Matthews' 
term) in the growth process. Like most of the LDCs, Yugoslavia does not 
have access to an unlimited supply of foreign exchange with which nature 
has endowed some countries, and must finance her imports of raw materials, 
capital goods and the intermediate goods by her own exports. Periodically, 
therefore, as the economy accelerates and the imports increase, or as 
the supply of agricultural goods reduces due to bad harvests (thus 
requiring increased import of such commodities) the economy reaches its 
ceiling and is forced to slow down its pace of growth. As we shall show 
¿n the following section, throughout the post-war period, every upswing in 
the level of activity has been eventually checked by reaching the foreign 
exchange constraint.
1 B. Horvat (1975), p.7.
2 See, for example, R.C.O. Matthews (1968), pp.564-565.
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c. Periodic Shocks. Finally, the level of economic activity in 
Yugoslavia has been subjected to the fluctuating effects of the periodic 
shocks by various endogenous and/or exogenous factors. The major 
reorganizations of the economy in 1952, 1961 and 1965 have left their 
mark on the economy's growth path. The periodic harvest failures, the 
imposition of pro-cyclical government policies and the extension of such 
policies for longer than necessary have also influenced the cyclical 
movement of the level of output.
Having identified the main factors which have, most directly, contrib­
uted to the cyclical fluctuations of the Yugoslav economy, we can now study 
the actual pattern of growth, identify the cycles in each of the major 
sub-periods and analyse the particular factors which have played a dominant 
role in each of these sub-periods.
IV. Economic Fluctuations in Yugoslavia
The Yugoslav economy, in the past three decades, has revealed a high 
degree of instability. Major indicators of economic activity such as output, 
employment, industrial and agricultural production, exports and imports, 
investment, etc. have been subject to almost regular fluctuations. In fact, 
in comparison with other economies both planned and market, Yugoslavia 
has been much less stable and subject to more intense fluctuations.^"
In this section we intend: (a) to show the cyclical fluctuations in 
the level of activity in each of the three major sub-periods viz. central
1 Staller compared the fluctuations in the total output, industrial and 
agricultural production in 7 planned economies, 18 market economies and 
Yugoslavia for the 1950-60 period. Yugoslavia was shown to be the most 
unstable country in the sample in the areas of agricultural and industrial 
production. The countries included in the study, in addition to Yugo­
slavia, were: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, the Soviet Union, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdon, the United States, and West 
Germany. G. Staller (1964), pp.387-90. Later on, using France, Italy, 
Japan, the United States, West Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Horvat repeated this comparison 
for the 1950-64 period. In terms of output, Yugoslavia experienced the 
most intense fluctuations. In terms of industrial production, the intens­
ity of fluctuation was highest after the USA and Japan. B. Horvat (1971b), 
p p .197-199.
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planning, transition to self-management and self-management; (b) to 
identify the limits of each cycle and its expansion and contraction phases; 
(c) to explain which factors, in each particular period, contributed to 
the upswing or downswing and the turning points. The method used for 
describing the cycles is the standard method of representing the fluctuations 
of each indicator from one year to the next around its long term trend 
(i.e., the average annual growth rate of that indicator in the period under 
consideration). Following Matthews, we shall consider each cycle from one 
peak of activity to the next.^
Among the indicators of overall economic activity, we shall use either 
the social product or the industrial production series. While the cyclical 
fluctuations can be observed on both series, we have used the latter as 
the basis of our discussion for two reasons. Firstly, the total output 
indludes the highly unstable share of agricultural production and, thus, 
its fluctuations may be slightly more erratic due to such factors as 
weather conditions. Secondly, and more importantly perhaps, the industrial 
sector is the one sector that is totally and most comprehensively social­
ized with its enterprises organized along self-management lines. The 
fluctuations in the level of industrial production can thus be linked 
(though not directly related) to the development of the system of self- 
management. Figures 1 and 2 show the cyclical fluctuations in both the 
social product (at constant prices) and the industrial production. As we 
pointed out, fluctuations in the level of social product are slightly 
more erratic, especially in the first and second periods when the agricult­
ural sector underwent numerous organizational changes and suffered from 
poor harvests in alternative years. The most important component of the 
social product, also comprehensively placed in the self-management sphere, 
is the industrial production represented in Figure 2. The fluctuations in 
this index can be used to identify the internal factors and the external 
shocks that have contributed to business cycles in Yugoslavia. Using a
1 R.C.O. Matthews (1969).
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Figure 2- Fluctuations of the Index of Industrial Production
Source: SGJ, various issues
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"peak to peak" identification method, we can observe six cycles in the whole 
of post-war period - also indicated in Figure 2.
The particulars of the Yugoslav industrial cycles such as the approximate 
timing of peaks and troughs, and the duration of expansion and contraction 
phases of the six cycles are shown in Table 1, below.
Table 1 - Characteristics of Industrial Cycles
cycle year
_____duration (years)_____
contraction expansion
Cycle I Peak 1948
Trough 1951
Cycle II Peak 1955
Trough 1956
Cycle III Peak 1957
Trough 1958
Cycle IV Peak 1960
Trough 1962
Cycle V Peak 1964
Trough 1967
Cycle VI Peak 1969
Trough 1973
Cycle VII Peak 1974
Trough • •
3
1
1
2
3
4
4
1
2
2
2
1
At this point also, we shall present the graphical description of two 
major factors which significantly contribute to the cyclical fluctuations 
in the level of economic activity. These two factors are investment 
activity and foreign trade transactions. In Figure 3, we have shown the 
movement of total investment as well as its major components (construction 
and equipment, and investment in the manufacturing and mining sectors).
In Figures 4 and 5 we have represented the movement of exports, imports and 
the index of foreign trade deficit (exports less imports). The contribution 
of these factors to cyclical fluctuation will not be discussed here, but 
rather will be pointed out separately at each stage as we study the 
fluctuations in each sub-period.
The importance of various internal and external factors in causing or 
stimulating the cyclical macroeconomic behaviour has changed frequently in 
Yugoslavia. Factors such as investment expenditure, foreign trade
, various issuesSource* SGJ
31
2
31
3
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transaction, change in the priorities of the government, etc., are closely 
bound to the nature of state intervention in the economy. As mentioned before, 
state intervention has passed through at least the three distinctive phases 
of central planning, transition to self-management and self-management.
The significance of the contributory factors must therefore be studied in 
the context of this periodization. Furthermore, as the macroeconomic 
behaviour is an important indicator of the type and the structure of the 
economy under consideration, the analysis of cyclical fluctuations in 
the three major phases will help us understand better the type and the 
structure of the Yugoslav economy and its changes during these periods.
In the remainder of this chapter, therefore, we shall discuss the cyclical 
behaviour in each phase in greater detail.
A. The Central Planning Period (1947-52)
The central planning period covered the first and most erratic of the 
industrial cycles. It coincided particularly with the contraction phase 
of this cycle. During this period, the ambitious First Five-Year Plan 
was embarked on. The over-riding objective of this Plan was the rapid 
reconstruction and speedy industrialization of the economy. The central 
allocation of resources through the Plan - including the central allocation 
of investment funds to branches, industries and even enterprises - was 
to guarantee that the economy would grow in the direction determined 
by the Plan. But starting from the second year of the Plan, the economy 
began to experience major disturbances the shock effect of which continued 
to survive for a long time. These disturbances resulted from the dispute 
between Yugoslavia and other East European countries and was accentuated 
by the poor performance of the agricultural sector due to droughts as well 
as untimely policies. The development of these factors and their effect 
on the behaviour of the whole economy is briefly described below.
1. The Dispute with the Cominform
The political rift between Yugoslavia and her East European allies 
which led to her expulsion from the Cominform on 28th June 1948 affected
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the performance of the economy in two major ways. Firstly, the 
economic blockade imposed on Yugoslavia by East European countries 
severely interfered with her foreign trade and, therefore, with the 
industrialization programme. Secondly, the political tensions which 
developed between the former allies necessitated a change in the 
allocation of investment resources with defence industries receiving 
an increasing share at the expense of industrialization programme. 
a. Interference with Foreign Trade. From 1945 onwards, and especially 
with the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, the Yugoslav economy 
was very closely linked to the economies of the USSR and other East 
European countries. The linkage was essentially through foreign trade and 
was supplemented by Soviet aid and credit. But beginning in late 1948, 
the USSR, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and then others began, 
one by one, severing their trade links with Yugoslavia. By 1952 trade 
with former allies had come to virtual standstill. Table 2 represents the 
changes in the geographical pattern of foreign trade in the period of 
central planning and shows the effect of the Cominform economic blackade.
Table 2 - Changes in Geographical Pattern of Foreign Trade
(1947--52) (%)
country of origin 
or destination 1947 1948 1949 1952
Imports (c.i.f.)sirEastern Europe 56 46 14 -
US, UK and W. Germany 9 9 28 46
Other countries 35 45 58 54
Total 100 100 100 100
Exports (f.o.b.)
Eastern Europe 53 51 13 -
US, UK and W. Germany 3 9 36 53
Other countries 44 40 51 47
Total 100 100 100 100
Including the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland,
Bulgaria, Albania and East Germany.
Source: ESOE. 1953, p.112.
1 For details of. the dispute see R. Bass and E. Marbury (1959); R.O. Freedman 
(1970); F. Claudin (1975); and S. Clissold (1975),
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The East European countries were the main source of the raw material, 
machinery and equipment required for industrialization and, as such, the 
reorientation of trade was not an easy task. Although it was possible to 
find other countries that could supply her with needed imports, her 
foreign exchange reserves were draining rapidly. Disruption of trade had 
resulted in a fall in the output of all sectors and had affected exports.
An increase in urban population and the subsequent rise in domestic 
demand for agricultural commodities also meant that the planned export of 
these goods could not be realized. In any case, the agricultural goods 
- previously exported to Eastern Europe - could not be easily marketed 
in Western Europe where heavy exchange limitations and quantitative 
restrictions on imports prevailed.* The sharp contraction in the level 
of exports could not be matched by a similar fall in the level of imports. 
Not only the requirements for industrialization programmes heavily 
depended on the imports, but the newly created need for defence spending 
(to be discussed shortly) also consisted of a significant import component. 
The change in the imports, exports and trade balance in this period is 
shown in Table 3.
Table 3 - Change in the Volume of Foreign Trade (mil. dollars)
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Exports 297 199 154 179 247
Imports 306 295 231 383 373
Trade deficit 9 96 77 204 126
Source: Jugoslavija 1945-64. p.197.
The foreign exchange constraint seriously restricted the growth potential
of the economy and although by late 1949 the United States provided
Yugoslavia with $20 million (followed by other grants in cash as well as
2agricultural goods later ), the economy was severely affected by the
1 M. Aleksic (1956), p.18; and J.V. Mladek, et al. (1952), p.419,
2 For US aid and loans in this period, see G.W. Hoffman and F.W. Neal (1962), 
pp.347-51. For details of the changes in the attitudes of Western 
governments, notably the U.S.A., U.K., and Italy, see F.W. Neal (1958), 
pp.6-7; J. Bombeless (1968), p.110; and R.O. Freedman (1970), pp. 29-35,
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disruption.
b. Increased Importance of Defence Industries. Another consequence of the
dispute with the Cominform was the building up of tension in various
East European capitals and on Yugoslavia's northern and eastern borders,
necessitating a rapid increase in defence expenditure. There are conflicting
views on whether or not Yugoslavia was actually threatened by external
invasion and internal disorders, but what is certain is that military
spending rose sharply after 1948.* According to Avsenek, the political
situation forced Yugoslavia to establish between 30 and 35 new defence
facilities in central provinces, employing some 35000 workers and producing
a variety of arms, explosives, tanks, armoured vehicles and other defence 
2equipment. Tito estimated that the rearmament and construction of war
industries during the latter part of the First Five-Year Plan cost
3Yugoslavia nearly $1407.5mdollars. Table 4, below, shows the change in 
the share of defence expenditure in national income in the period of 
tension.
Table 4 - The Share of Military Expenditure in National Income (%)
Year 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Share 8 7 11 14 20 24
Source: ESOE 1953, p.112.
The trebling of the share of defence between 1948 and 1951 meant that extra 
pressure was exerted on the already scarce resources (including, particularly, 
the foreign exchange) needed for the industrialization programme. The 
slow-down in the economy due to the disruption of foreign trade was
aggravated by the redirection of resources to defence industries.
1 For details about^Sccusations and counter accusations, alleged troop 
build-ups on various sides, suppression of pro-Cominform elements at 
home and other issues related to the increased military spending, see 
R.O. Freedman (1970), p.35; S. Clissold (1975), pp.58, 243; F. McLean 
(1957), p.359; S. Talbot (1974), p.181; G.W. Hoffman and F.W. Neal 
(1962), p.146; J. Bombeless (1968), p.29; A. Rankavii (1953), p.67;
F. Claudin (1975), p.507 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of FPRY (1951),
2 I. Avsenek (1957), p.302.
3 J.B. Tito (1959), Vol. VII, p.240.
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2. Problems in Agriculture
During the period under consideration, agriculture constituted the 
most important single component of total output, accounting for 25-33 per 
cent of the social product in constant prices.^" Difficulties in this field 
could, and in fact did, affect the whole economy in several ways. In 
addition to satisfying the urban population and producing raw material for 
industries, the agricultural sector accounted for a significant share of 
the export earnings of the country which was crucial in financing the 
imports. The major problems that affected the agricultural sector in 
this period were: the collectivization campaign initiated in January 1949, 
the serious drought of 1950 and the allocation of insufficient resources 
for investment in agriculture.
The collectivization drive was part of the general drive to stamp out
capitalism by the new government. Although it was originally intended
to "persuade” and "encourage" the peasants to join the cooperatives, a
variety of measures devised by the State turned the campaign, in practice,
into a programme forced on the peasantry. The discriminatory policies
in the fields of taxation, availability of credit, delivery quota, and
provision of machinery and fertilizer squeezed the profits out of the
private sector and forced an increasing number of individual peasants
into the cooperatives. The campaign was completely opposed by the peasantry
whose disapproval and lack of cooperation were manifested in the decimation
of live-stocks and a fall in productivity. By 1951, the height of the
collectivization drive, only 20 per cent of the agricultural land was held
2by the cooperatives.
Despite the acceleration of collectivization, no comparable effort was
1 Jugoslavija 1945-64. p.80,
2 For the situation in agriculture and the implementation of the collect­
ivization programme as well as the reaction of the peasantry to this 
programme, see: D. Milenkovitch (1971), pp.63-64; G. Macesich (1969), 
p.211; G.W. Hoffman and F.W. Neal (1962), p.272; R. Bicanic (1957), p.73j 
B. Horvat (1974), p.51; F.W. Neal (1958), p.190; ESOE 1953, pp.112, 116; 
R. Brashich (1954) p.56 and (1957), pp. 241-242; and S. Clissold (1975), 
p.205.
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made to channel new investment into the agricultural sector and to improve
the methods of production. In the whole of the 1947-51 period, agriculture
(which accounted for about J of the total output) received only 7 per cent
of the investment resources.^ And as a UN report pointed out, little
attention was paid to utilization of economies of scale, prevention of
fragmentation of land and other aspects of improving the performance of the 
2socialized sector.
Agricultural production was, in addition to untimely policies and 
insufficient attention, hit by a major drought in 1950. The combined 
effect of all these elements can be observed in Table 5.
Table 5 - Index of Agricultural Production (1952=100)
Year 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Index 120 138 135 101 142 100
Source: Jugoslavija 1945-64, p.97.
The decline in agricultural production had two basic and related
undesirable effects. It led to a fall in the exports of agricultural goods
on the one hand and a rise in their imports on the other. While in 1948,
the agricultural sector made a positive contribution (exports minus imports)
of 17 billion dinars ($1=300 dinars) to the foreign exchange reserves,
by 1949 this had declined to nil and by 1951 it was turned to a negative
3contribution of 20 billion dinars. The outcome was an intensification of 
pressure on the already tight foreign exchange reserves and meant a further 
withdrawal of some of the resources from vital industrial projects.
One of the consequences of the disruption of foreign trade and of 
the draining of foreign exchange reserves was the abandonment of the goals 
of the First Five-Year Plan and its replacement by a much smaller Key 
Investment Programme in December 1950. These projects were retained
1 Government Office of Information (1947), pp.37-39.
2 ES0E 1953, p.116.
3 Jugoslavija 1945-64, p.97.
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because they could prove effective by: (a) removing the bottlenecks;
(b) yielding quick returns, and (c) helping the balance of payment problem.^
The reduction in the level of investment (14% between 1949 and 1950 for
2total investment and 11% for productive investment ) had a cumulative 
effect on the level of output as well as on the industrial production and 
was responsible for part of the recessionary slow down of the economy.
3. Reorganization of the Economy
From 1950 onwards, the government embarked on major reorganization of 
the whole economy. Yugoslavia was to become a "self-managed", rather 
than an "administratively planned" economy. The "new economic system", 
as it is known, was to be based on decentralization of the decision 
making apparatus, a reduction in State's power of intervention in the 
economy, on assumption of increased role for market and independence of 
enterprises from planning agencies. The reforms came at a time when the 
economy was experiencing a down-swing and, by contributing to the state 
of uncertainty and confusion which was then prevailing, played an 
additional part in the deepening of the recession. The reorganization of 
the enterprises, the abolishing of central planning and other elaborate 
State apparatuses, the establishment of a market oriented price system 
and the implementation of other aspects of the new system involved an 
adjustment period of at least two years and had a negative effect on the 
rate of economic growth."^
To sum up the behaviour of the economy in the central planning 
period, several factors seem to have been important. Although central 
planning was to do away with cyclical movements of the economy, the 
particular combination of factors led to a serious recessionary period.
The disruption of foreign trade due to the economic blockade by
1 For the new programme, see R.O. Freedman (1970), p.29; A. Waterston 
(1962), p.17; Borba 14 December 1950, quoted in The N.Y. Times
15 December 1950; and ESOE 1953, pp.113-114.
2 SGJ(1975), p.82. The percentages are in constant 1966 prices.
3 D. Milenkovitch (1971), p.67 and B. Horvat (1971b), p.178.
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the Cominform countries resulted in the abandoning of a large number of 
investment projects and a slow down in the rate of growth. The slow 
down in investment expenditure (and actual reduction between 1949 and 1950) 
affected the output through the multiplier and accounted for part of the 
overall slow down. The redirecting of resources away from the industrial­
ization programme to finance the increased defence expenditure on the one 
hand and increased import of agricultural goods (coupled with a fall in 
exports of these goods) on the other hand, meant that additional pressure 
was put on the foreign exchange reserves and the retardation of the 
economy was further aggravated. The policies and measures employed 
by the government also played their part in the recession. Inadequate 
knowledge of economic planning, embarking on the collectivization 
campaign on political grounds, allocation of insufficient resources to 
agriculture and the initiation of the Yugoslav model of 'market socialism* 
were indeed responsible for deepening the slow down. As pointed out in 
the previous section, a combination of factors - as expounded by Hicks, 
Matthews, Nove and Horvat - were responsible for the fluctuating level 
of activity in this period. The foreign exchange constraint, accentuated 
by untimely State intervention, seem to have been the dominant factors.
B. Transition to Self-Management (1952-60)
This period, as pointed out in the previous chapter, was characterized 
by quick recovery from the ill-effects of the previous period and by 
rapid economic growth. The transition period coincided with the expansion 
phase of the first cycle, followed by two short cycles of two and then 
three years duration. The economy began from the low trough of 1951 and 
after a rather long upswing (4 years), experienced three peaks in 1955,
1957 and 1960 (see Figure 2). The cyclical movements during this period 
were very mild and short, reflecting on the one hand the improved 
coordination of various activities (especially the allocation of investment 
which was predominantly under central control) and on the other the
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absence of any erratic external shock. The fluctuations in the level of 
industrial production, however mild, still need to be explained in terms 
of the factors discussed earlier.
While the investment expenditure at the beginning of this period 
(and until 1956) was on a general down swing (see Figure 3) and so was 
the level of industrial investment, the level of total activity was, 
nevertheless, expanding. This means that the central control of investment 
resources and the coordination of allocation of resources to various branches 
interfered with (or possibly postponed) the usual relationship between 
investment and output (via multiplier and accelerator). The growth of the 
economy in this period was due essentially to the gradual maturing of 
investment projects undertaken in previous periods, otherwise the sluggish 
investment of 1952-56 would have adversely affected the growth of output.
But as the old projects were gradually completed, the influence of the 
present level of investment on output increased. The slow down of the 
activity in 1955-56 was, therefore, most probably due to the reduction 
in investment expenditures (Figure 3). After 1956, with the introduction 
of the Second Five-Year Plan which entailed a general expansion of invest­
ment expenditure, including that in industry and construction (Figure 3), 
was responsible for the rapid growth of the whole economy.
The reason behind the three downturns of 1955, 1957 and 1960 should 
be sought in the foreign trade sector. In all these three years, the 
index of foreign trade deficit (Figure 5) reached a high point meaning 
that the foreign trade constraint was reached and the expansion of the 
economy curtailed. As the pressure on foreign exchange reserves was 
buidling up, further imports of raw material, intermediate goods or 
capital equipment became difficult and the output began to slow down.
Horvat maintains that the imports have usually reached their peak one 
quarter after the industrial production, due to the lag between the reduction 
of import orders and the actual fall of imports (i.e., imports fall when
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the . economy begins to slow down but due to previous orders the actual 
level of imports falls one quarter later).* Of course, the use of 
quarterly data makes such observations possible but as we have not had 
access to finer data of this type and have used, the rougher annual data, 
the peaks of imports and industrial production cycles coincide (see 
Figures 2 and 4).
The transition period began with a long phase of expansion. This
expansion was due to several factors including: the gradual completion of
the investment projects of the First Five-Year Plan and especially the Key
2Investment Programme , the establishment of the new economic system with
a large degree of autonomy granted to enterprises (Chapters Three and
Four) and a fundamental change in the agricultural policy - the abandonment
3of the forced collectivization drive. But alongside economic growth, 
two related problems began to emerge. Firstly, the expansion was accompanied 
by an increase in imports. In 1955, despite a good harvest, the import 
of agricultural goods increased by 36% and that of manufactured goods 
rose by 16%.^ The exports, however, did not match the rise in imports 
and thus the pressure on foreign exchange reserves increased. Secondly, 
as a result of greater emphasis on capital goods industries (a continuation 
of policies of the First Five-Year Plan, reflected in the selection of the 
projects of the Key Investment Programme) and insufficient attention paid 
to consumer goods industries (especially food) and agriculture, a 
shortage of various commodities appeared in the market."* The increased
1 B. Horvat (1971b), pp.158-159.
2 A. Waterston (1962), p.17.
3 The number of Peasant Work Cooperatives declined from 6804 in 1951 to 
4225 in 1952 and 1165 in 1953. The number of coop members reduced from 
2 millions in 1951 to 1.5 millions in 1952 and 193 thousands in 1953.
1951 was the year when the campaign was at its height. B. Horvat (1974), 
p.45. For the abandonment of the campaign, see also A. Gruchy (1966), 
p.853. At the same time it should be pointed out that the agricultural 
production in constant 1960 prices increased by 45% in 1953 and 24% in 
1955. Jugoslavija 1945-64, p.69.
4 Jugoslavija 1945-64, pp.97 and 142.
5 In 1952-53, 66% of investment was allocated to metal making, . metal 
using and chemical industries while only 6% was allocated to the food, 
beverages and tobacco industries. S. Pejovich (1966), p.69.
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effective demand could not be satisfied and inflationary pressure began 
to build up. Inflation was partly fueled by the ability of the enterprises 
to determine or influence the price of their products. This was a field 
in which the enterprises had obtained a certain degree of independence 
after 1952 and were using it to raise the price level to conform with 
market conditions. The easy credit policy of the government reflected in 
the rapid rise of short and long run credits granted to enterprises also 
strengthened the inflationary pressure. In 1955, the retail price index 
of agricultural goods rose by 21% and the cost of living index by 13%.*
Inflation became, in fact, a basic characteristic of the expansionary 
phases of the Yugoslav industrial cycles. The anti-inflationary measures 
that were needed to cope with this problem contributed, to varying degrees, 
to the ensuing slow down. This will become clearer in the rest of the \ 
present discussion.
After reaching a peak in 1955, the economy began a phase of contraction.
The anti-inflationary measures that were decided on in the previous year
succeeded in reducing the rapid growth of the price level and the cost of
living index. These measures included the imposition of price controls
and credit restriction. Already in 1954 the government had realized that
the determination of prices according to supply and demand would lead to
large price increases, and had therefore begun imposing price ceilings on
certain key commodities. But by 1955 the situation had become intolerable
and forty new commodities, comprising one half of the total value of
industrial raw material and intermediate goods became subject to price 
2control.“ The blocking of enterprise funds in banks, coupled with the
introduction of the Law on Reserve Requirements (18 July 1956) and the
imposition of a 30% required reserve ratio on bank balances strengthened
3the anti-inflationary policies of the government.
1 Jugoslav!ja 1945-64, pp.233, 235,
2 J. Monthias (1959), pp.293-305,
3 S. Pejovich (1966), p.21 and B. Horvat (1971b), p.179.
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During 1956 also, preparation was made for the Second Five-Year Plan 
(1957-61) which included a major shift of emphasis from producer goods 
industries in favour of the long ignored consumption goods industries and 
agriculture. Not only did the share of investment in manufacturing decline 
and that of agriculture and non-economic activities increase considerably 
after 1956, but also, concurrently, the distribution of investment in 
manufacturing changed in favour of consumer goods industries. The invest­
ment in non-economic activities has a long lag and its effect is transformed 
to the economic activities some time later in the form of increased 
productivity. Table 6 summarizes the change in the pattern of investment.
Table 6 - Change in the Pattern of Investment in 
Manufacturing and Mining and Agriculture (%)
Year 1955 1956 1957
Total Investment 100 100 100
Manufacturing & Mining 49 43 35
Agriculture 6 8 10
Non-economic activities 16 18 23
Total Investment in
Manufacturing and Mining 100 100 100
Ferrous and Non-ferrous metallurgy 21 19 13
Non-metal products 5 5 3
Chemicals 11 7 5
Paper products 2 2 3
Textile, leather and footwear 5 5 6
Food and tobacco 5 10 11
Source: SGJ(1960), p.233.
The new emphasis on consumer goods was to a large extent responsible 
for increasing the supply of these goods on the market and taking the 
pressure off prices.
The slow down of the economy in 1956 (Figure 2) was short and the 
amplitude of the down-swing very small. The deflationary policies which 
came into force in 1955 and during 1956 were not pursued for too long 
and together with the easing of foreign exchange reserves (due to a slow
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down in imports and a rise in exports*) created sufficient conditions for 
the turning point to be reached.
The expansion phase of the second cycle was also short, only one year. 
The main element in constraining the expansion must have been the shortage 
of foreign exchange again. The volume of these reserves, built up during 
the previous contraction phase, was not too large and with the very large
rise in imports (nearly 30% including a 59% rise in the import of industrial
2goods ) and an approximately 90% rise in foreign trade deficit, the 
industrial production reached its third peak in 1957 and the contraction 
phase of the third cycle began.
In 1957 a new system of income distribution, namely the income 
sharing system, was introduced (the details of this system are discussed 
in Chapter Three). In this system the enterprises gained increased 
freedom in deciding on the distribution of their net earnings among 
various uses, on the level of personal incomes and on the level and composi­
tion of a part of investment. The new system consisted of a basic 
redefining of wages and bonuses as well as the introduction of fixed and 
working capital for the enterprises. Its implementation was not easy 
and in fact enterprises in manufacturing and mining, transport and 
communication and forestry implemented it only in 1958. The adjustment 
to the new system was accompanied by some confusion and difficulties and 
may have had some influence on the slow down of the growth, thus strength­
ening the effects of the foreign exchange constraint.
The new system of income distribution worked as a major incentive 
for the management of enterprises and, as the employees of each enterprise 
were to be the direct beneficiaries of better performance, it stimulated 
profitability calculations and a more rational use of resources. The 
general increase in investment (particularly in non-economic activities,
1 Exports of manufactured goods increased by 22% and their imports by 2% 
during 1956. This was partly responsible for the improvement in the 
foreign trade situation. Jugoslvija 1945-64, p.142,
2 Loa. ait.
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as shown in Table 6) which had been going on for some time started to show
its effects too. The economic policy was also generally expansionary:
the credit for working capital rose by 13% from the first quarter of 1958
to the first quarter of 1959 and by 21% in the next year; demand deposits
grew by 50% and 17% over the same periods; the total money supply grew by
an average of 20% per annum from 1958 to 1961; and the consumer credit
increased by 33% in 1959 and 17% in 1960.^ The combination of these factors
resulted in the resumption of the expansionary phase of the third cycle.
Two phenomena accompanied the upswing. Firstly, as Figures 4 and 5 show,
the foreign trade deficit deteriorated with imports rising faster than
exports (particularly the industrial goods whose imports and exports rose
2by 36% and . 18% in 1960 ). This resulted in the setting in motion of the
foreign exchange barrier and the fourth peak of the industrial cycles
was reached in 1960. Secondly, the expansionary policies at home coupled
with increased imports resulted in rapid inflation again. In 1960, the cost
of living index as well as the retail price of the agricultural products
3increased by 10% (as compared with 1% in 1959).
To sum up the situation in the transition period (1952-60), we can 
see that the economy pulled itself out of the recession of 1951-52 and after 
reaching a peak in 1955 experienced two more cycles in 1955-57 and 1957-60. 
The fluctuations (especially in 1952-56 period) seem to have had little 
direct relation to the level of investment expenditure. , This was due to 
the fact that in the transition period, the volume and composition of 
investment was still largely controlled and coordinated by the government 
and the enterprises could not strongly influence the level of investment 
according to their own performances. In other words, investment was not 
determined by the level of income (or output) in each enterprise or by 
industry but by a set of national priorities which were influenced by
1 B. Horvat (1971b), p.124; Jugoslavia 1945-64, p.238; and M.Vuckovid 
(1963), p.368.
2 Jugoslavija 1945-64, p.142.
3 Ibid-* pp.233, 235.
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many considerations (not necessarily economic). On the other hand, 
fluctuations seem to be directly linked to the level of foreign exchange 
reserves. All three peaks (1955, 1957 and 1960) were reached when the trade 
deficit was at its highest (or near the highest point), with imports far 
surpassing the exports. Interestingly, in this period the rise in the 
imports of industrial goods played a more significant role in the deterior­
ation of foreign trade balance than did the import of agricultural. . 
products.
The implementation of the new economic system and the increased role 
of the market meant that in the up-swing when the economy's purchasing 
power expanded, prices could rise rapidly through the decision of the 
increasingly independent enterprises. This, coupled with the expansionary 
policies of the government in the sphere of credits, especially in 1957 
and 1960, led to inflationary pressures making themselves felt in Yugoslavia. 
The relatively stable growth of the economy after 1952 was interrupted by 
rapid price increases in the two expansionary phases of 1956-57 and 1959-60. 
Inflation had just begun to be a permanent feature of the economic system.
C. The Self-Management Period (1961^onwards)
The self-management period covers three industrial cycles (4th, 5th 
and 6th), longer than the previous ones and with larger amplitudes. The 
most violent fluctuation since the first cycle occurred in this period 
during the 1964-69 cycle. The characteristics of this period, enforced by 
the 1961 and 1965 reforms and other legislations were:
a. The decentralization of investment decisions to enterprise level. With 
the abolition of the Social Investment Funds as the last vestige of 
central control of investment resources and the extension of enterprise 
autonomy to the area of investment financing, the importance of variables 
such as market expectation, profitability and loss calculations, etc., 
increased significantly. This resulted in a changed relationship between 
output and investment. While in the previous period (when central control
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of investment was in effect) a change in investment induced by variations 
in output could have been prevented by the authorities through the use of 
investment resources at their disposal, the post-reform period witnessed 
the dismantling of such a mechanism of intervention. The investment-output 
relationship became market determined, subject to the same uncertainties 
and possibilities of overshooting and undershooting as other market 
economies. The State can, of course, still influence the level of invest­
ment but only so far as its discretion over fiscal and monetary tools 
allows.
b. The development of autonomous commercial banking. With the abolition 
of the Social Investment Funds and the transfer of their resources to the 
banks, and the assumption by the banks of full responsibility for profit 
and loss of their operations, the era of commercial banking started in 
Yugoslavia. In a short period, the banks became the most important source 
of finance outside the enterprises. The banking system, with its ability 
to influence the money supply and other liquid assets, was to be the 
vehicle of the government's credit and monetary policies. The instruments 
to be used for such purposes were: the reserve requirement, interest 
rates on various kinds of deposits, conditions of credit (upper limits to 
size of loans to enterprises or households) and selective channelling of 
credit to specific sectors of the economy. Beginning in this period , 
monetary policy gradually became the pricipal means of controlling the 
level of investment (and to a lesser extent its composition) which was 
decided upon by individual enterprises.
c. Reducing the distortions of the price system. In the course of the
post-1952 reforms, the price system had undergone many improvements and
an increasing number of commodity prices had become market determined.^-
Nevertheless, two basic gaps have survived in the price system. Firstly
the gap between the prices of manufactured goods on the one hand and those
1 Periodic inflations, however, have reversed the general trend and, at 
different times, led to increases in the number of administratively 
controlled prices.
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of raw materials, industrial inputs, public services and agriculture on 
the other. While the prices in the former branch have been determined 
primarily in the market, those of the latter have generally been fixed by 
the state price commissions. The result has been a continuous distortion 
of the price system with one group of prices having been kept artificially 
low while the others have been allowed to change according to market 
conditions. Low prices in raw materials, services and agriculture means 
low profit, a low degree of self-financing of investment and greater 
reliance on and need for State subsidies. Although in the 1965 reforms, 
and several times later, attempts were made to align the two groups of 
prices and reduce their distortions, these attempts have not been totally 
successful.
The second gap in the price system is that between domestic and 
international prices. Liberalization of foreign trade, reduction of 
restrictions imposed on foreign trade and several currency devaluations have 
been undertaken in order to facilitate the integration of the Yugoslav 
economy into the international markets and the international division of 
labour. Reduction of distortions between domestic and foreign prices has 
been expected to improve the competitiveness of the Yugoslav exports, make 
imports less attractive* and increase foreign exchange earnings which are 
needed to finance the vital imports of capital goods and raw materials.
As we have already pointed out, foreign exchange is an important 'cooperating 
input' in the growth of the Yugoslav economy and foreign trade policies 
must be oriented towards ensuring sufficient build up of reserves if 
economic growth is not to be impeded. As in the case of the first 
distortion, numerous measures have been taken to close the second gap too.
In the periods when the balance of payment has been in. surplus (or in 
mild deficits), bigger steps in the direction of more liberal trade have 
been taken. But in periods of heavy deficit (and there has been quite a 
few such periods), restrictive measures have reappeared to prevent rapid
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outflow of foreign exchange.
All three cycles of the self-management period, as we shall see 
shortly, share the following general feature. The growth of the economy 
is accompanied by reduction in foreign exchange reserves (due to increases 
in imports) on the one hand and the build up of inflationary pressure on 
the other. The upper turning point is reached when the foreign exchange 
constraint is met. At the same time, anti-inflationary measures adopted 
to halt the price rise, lead to the curtailment of investment activity 
(usually through strict monetary/credit policies), consumption expenditure 
(usually through tight fiscal policy) and/or government expenditures. The 
slow down of the expenditure leads to the slow down of the whole economy.
The duration of the contraction phase will depend on how long the 
restrictive government policies persist. Either reflationary policies 
are adopted to avert the danger of a recession, or the economy hits its 
natural floor (provided by that level of expenditure which does not 
change with output). The lower turning point is generally accompanied by 
expansionary policies which gradually lead to increased demand, larger 
imports, smaller exports, deteriorating balance of payment and rising 
prices. The structural problems such as rigidities, frictions and 
inefficiencies in the formation and implementation of policies are also 
conducive to rising prices. At the same time, reforms as well as other 
untimely interventions create uncertainties, confusions, lags and 
difficulties of adjustment which only help to prolong the contraction phase 
of the cycle. The particular features and some of the underlying causes of 
the three industrial cycles of 1960-64, 1964-69 and 1969-74 can now be 
discussed.
1. The Fourth Industrial Cycle (1960-64)
As pointed out before, the expansion phase of the third cycle (1958-60) 
ended in mid-1960 with the foreign exchange constraint having been reached. 
At the same time the counter-inflationary measures employed from late 1960,
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aimed at curbing the price rise, also helped the slow down of the economy. 
These policies included restricting the monetary and credit expansion 
with direct bearing on investment expenditure, as well as the postponement 
or abandonment of some public building projects.^- Investment in manufact­
uring and mining and construction as well as total investment slowed 
down as a result of the restrictive policies (see Figure 3). The rate of 
growth of output, already slowed down because of the shortage of a 
complementary factor input (foreign exchange), was further reduced by the 
fall in investment. In addition to monetary/fiscal measures, direct
methods of price control such as imposition of ceilings on the price of
2certain foodstuffs and services were also used.
The contraction phase of this cycle coincided with the economic 
reforms of 1961 (formulated in 1960 and implemented in 1961) and was ; 
lengthened by its effects. The aims of the reform were: further develop­
ment of the decentralization of decision making, reforming the price 
system and reduction of distortions in price structure, decentralization 
of the credit system, development of semi-independent communal banks, 
liberalization of foreign trade through abolishing multiple exchange rates
and establishing a unified and devalued exchange rate, and the replacement
3of ad-hoc restrictions on trade by a system of custom tariffs. The new 
banking system was to be responsible for extension of short term credit 
for working capital to enterprises while the Social Investment Funds were 
to remain the source of long term credit for investment. Neither enter­
prises nor banks were accustomed to this methodic division and distinction 
between different kinds of credit. The outcome of the confusion was the 
interchangeable use of short and long term credit, shortage of working
1- ESOE 1960, Chap. I, p.55 and ESOE 1962, Part I, Chap. II, p.47,
2 D. Milenkovitch (1971), pp.109, 169-171. These ceilings were to be 
imposed by communal councils,
3 Official exchange rate of the dinar was devalued from 632 per one US 
dollar to 750 from January 1, 1961. In practice, however, many industries 
benefitted from preferential exchange rates. For the 1961 reforms see 
ESOE 1960, Chap. I, p.56; ESOE 1961, Chap. I, p.45; and D. Milenkovitch 
(1971), pp.122-123.
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capital and a high degree of illiquidity and mutual indebtedness in the 
economy.^ While the downturn of the cycle was not precipitated by the 
1961 reforms, the length of the contraction phase and its amplitude was 
adversely affected by the reforms.
The lower turning point was reached in the middle of 1962. The upturn
took place partly because the existing volume and rate of growth of
investment (and other components of domestic demand) did not warrant any
further decline (the floor), and partly because the restrictive policies
2of the last one and a half years were abandoned from mid-1962. Thus 
began the expansion phase of the fourth cycle. This phase witnessed the 
stepping up of expansionary activities in two directions.
Firstly, through State intervention, arrangements were made for mutual 
clearing of debts so that by the end of 1962, accounts payable were 70% 
lower than the previous year and the ratio of trade credit to enterprise 
sales reduced from a peak of 17.9% in September 1961 to 12.1% in December 
1962.3
Secondly, the enterprises and communal banks soon adjusted themselves 
to the new credit system and, making use of the prevailing easy monetary 
policy, stepped up the investment activity in all fields (see Figure 3) 
and this, in turn, stimulated the expansion phase of the cycle. The 
acceleration of the growth of the economy was accompanied by the two 
familiar consequences mentioned before: deterioration of balance of 
payment and inflation.
The growth of industrial production as well as other sectors of the 
economy, coupled with the relatively more free foreign trade, resulted 
in a rapid increase in the level of imports (industrial and agricultural 
goods) which was not matched by a corresponding rise in the level of 
exports. In fact, even though in 1962 and 1963 exports had played an
1 Accounts payable in the enterprise sector increased by 50% from end of 
1960 to the end of 1961. B. Horvat (1971b), pp.124 and 182.
2 ESOE 1961, Chap I, p.47.
3 L.D. Tyson (1977)''p.287 and B. Horvat (1971b), p.125.
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important tole in the recovery, inflation made them less competitive and 
by the end of 1963 and 1964, their growth rate was dwindling (see Figure 
4). In 1963 the imports of agricultural goods increased by 62% (exports 
by 28%), while in 1964 the imports of industrial goods rose by 35% (exports 
by 15%). Balance of payment deficit deteriorated by 35% in 1963 and a 
further 61% in 1964.^
The second consequence of the expansion phase and growth process was
inflation. The expansion of the economy together with easy monetary and
credit policies resulted in the rapid increase of various monetary
indicators (money supply, total liquid assets, etc.) as well as various
components of demand (especially investment). Both factors contributed
to the development of an inflationary situation. In 1964 the producer's
price of manufactured and agricultural goods increased by 5 and 24% (in
1963 the corresponding rates were zero and 10%), the cost of living index
by 12% (against 6% in 1963), and personal incomes by 26% (against 19%
2in 1963). As a U.N. report correctly pointed out, the expansion of
demand, particularly the fast rate of growth of investment expenditure has
3been the principal factor underlying the inflation. From September 1964, 
therefore, an anti-inflationary policy was embarked on in the hope of 
curtailing investment and, to a lesser extent, consumption. This 
policy consisted of the following measures: the blocking of 25% of the 
liquid assets of enterprises, an increase in the required reserve ratio 
on bank deposits from 20 to 30%, a reduction in consumer credit and the 
blocking of 15% of budgetary revenue.^
The draining of foreign exchange reserves acted as a brake and 
slowed down the rate of growth. The slow down was further encouraged by 
the monetary and fiscal measures of 1964. The upper turning point was 
therefore reached.
1 Jugoslavija 1945-64, pp.97, 142 and 197.
2 ibid.i pp.64, 230-231 and 235.
3 ESOE 1964, Chap. II, p.66.
4 Ibid, j P-67.
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2. The Fifth Industrial Cycle (1964-69)
This cycle coincided with the 1965 socio-economic reforms and under 
its influence became the most erratic of all cycles since the establishment 
of the new economic system in 1952. The contraction phase began with a 
deterioration in the balance of payment and counter inflationary policies 
adopted in September 1964. As these policies did not seem to be able to 
control the rising prices, further restrictions were deemed necessary.
In January 1965, a series of measures aimed at slowing down the investment
expenditure of the enterprises were decided upon. These measures were
\
then followed by the general price freeze of March 1965. Although in 
this way the inflationary pressure was checked by mid-1965, the period of 
relative price stability was to be very short lived. The 1965 reforms 
(July 1965) were to herald in a new wave of inflation.
The 1965 reforms aimed at eliminating some of the structural short­
comings of the economy (such as the dual price structure) and transforming 
those features of the system which were incompatible or inconsistent with 
the principle of self-management and enterprise autonomy. In order to 
remove price anomalies, steps were taken in two different directions: the 
liberalization of foreign trade (to narrow the gap between domestic and 
international prices) and allowing the prices of raw materials, agricultural 
goods and services to rise (to narrow the gap between these products and
manufactured goods). The price freeze of March 1965 was therefore lifted
\
towards the end of July. But the consequence of price reforms was very
drastic. Between July and August 1965 the retail price index increased
from 118 to 148, prices of agricultural products by 32%, transportation by
26%, construction by 22% and various services by 45%, while the industrial
2goods prices increased by only 14%. The rapid price increase enabled
1 ESOE 1965, Part I, Chap. II, pp.97-98. A major problem at this.time was 
the shortage of working capital and increased illiquidity and indebtedness. 
The January 1965 decisions, therefore, included measures aimed at pro­
hibiting enterprises from spending more than 80% of their investment 
outlays on fixed assets, and establishment of a special reserve (10%
of investment outlays of each enterprise) to meet excess costs.
2 Ibid., pp.99-100
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-and at the same time compelled - the workers' councils to use their
newly acquired power to push up wages (see Chapter Three for details).
The nominal personal incomes increased by 35% in 1965, though due to
price increases real personal incomes rose by only 4%.* Barely two
weeks after the initiation of the reforms, the increases in prices and
wages forced the government to intervene again and impose price ceilings
on some commodities. These ceilings remained in force until June 1966 when
2some of them were gradually removed.
The restrictive credit/monetary policies initiated in late 1964 and 
1965 (mentioned at the beginning of this section), continued throughout 
1965, 1966 and 1967, though it took some time before the inflation was 
tamed. By then the slow down had developed into a full scale recession. 
Table 7, below shows the volume of monetary aggregates and credit in the 
economy in the post-reform period.
Table 7 - Annual Rate of Growth of Money and Credit (%)
Year MoneySupply
Mx*
Liquid
Assets
m 3**
Credit to Enterprises Consumer 
Credit +Total
Working
Capital
Fixed
Capital
1965 4 13 • • 16 • • -23
1966 5 6 18 27 16 -15
1967 -2 2 14 14 14 -23
1968 24 18 18 17 19 66
1969 12 15 17 18 17 15
1970 18 16 18 17 19 42
1971 14 14 14 13 15 1
1972 38 36 15 19 12 -9
1973 37 32 17 27 8 28
1974 26 23 11 6 16 54
1975 32 29 25 29 22 51
Notes: * = Total means of payment, i.e., currency in circulation,
sight deposits and floats
** M^ = Total liquid assets consist of M^ plus savings and 
restricted deposits 
+ End of Year
Sources: SGJ(1970), p.256; SGJ(1974), p.298; SGJ(1976), p.291; Indeks, 
no. 5, May 1968, p.46; no.12, Dec. 1972; and no. 5, May 1976, 
p.46
3 SGJ(1970), p.264
4 G. Macesich (1969), p.222 and ESOE 1966, Chap. I, p.61
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The tight money policy of 1965-67 can be clearly observed in the above
table. The money supply  ^ increased by 4, 5 and -2% in 1965, 1966
2and 1967; and total liquid assets by 13, 6 and 2%. Consumer credit
declined by 23% in 1965, 15% in 1966 and 23% in 1967. In the sphere of
enterprise credit, however, the government was not equally successful, as
can be seen in Table 7. This can be explained by, on the one hand, the
willingness of the banks to lend to enterprises according to the merits of
each case and, on the other hand, the system of automatic right to credit
, 3that existed in Yugoslavia at the time. In 1966, some of the short­
comings and inconsistencies of the credit system (like guaranteed credit) 
were removed, making pursuit of a tighter policy possible. The growth of 
various types of credit, therefore, slowed down in 1967 (see Table 7).
The essential point here is that because the control of inflation was 
seen as supreme, anti-inflationary policies were regarded as necessary even 
in 1966 and 1967 when the recession was well under way. The policy makers,
it seems, did not believe that the economy was experiencing a cyclical 
4fluctuation.
As a result of the restrictive measures of 1965-67 and as a reflection 
of economic slow down (influence of output), the investment expenditure 
slowed down from die peak of 1964 and in some branches (notably manufacturing 
and mining) continued for quite some time (see Figure 3). The sluggishness 
of investment expenditure, as an OECD report in 1967 put it, was the most 
important reason for the stagnation of production.^ The economic reforms
1 Mj, the total money supply consists of currency in circulation and those 
deposits of households and work organizations that can be used on sight.
2 M3, the total liquid assets^is the sum of money supply (M-^ ) and all other 
deposits (savings and restricted). For definitions of the monetary 
aggregates see D. Dimitrijevic and G. Macesich (1973), p.241.
3 Government agencies and enterprises had an automatic right to obtain credit 
once they could satisfy certain pre-set conditions. At the same time com­
mercial banks had sufficient liquidity guarantee from the National Bank, 
ESOE 1966, Chap. I, p.60. This system was of course incompatible with the 
requirements of an independent banking system and eventually had to be 
scrapped.
4 At the end of 1966, a National Bank report pointed out that although the 
restrictive measures had succeeded in limiting the expansion of money 
supply, "their restrictive effect was not sufficient" and they must 
continue; B. Horvat (1971b), pp.184-185.5 Quarterly Economic Review (QER, from now on), no.4, 1967, p.4.
-338 -
of 1965 created institutional changesl to which the enterprises could adjust 
only after some time. This, coupled with the frictions and confusions 
resulting from the reforms contributed to a further slow down of the 
economy.
The trough of the fifth industrial cycle was reached in the third
quarter of 1967 and from late 1967 the restrictive policies were gradually
abandoned, starting with the easing of conditions on consumer credits and
a hint at reflation in 1968.'*' An important factor contributing to the
turning point (in addition to the still strong investment floor) was the
significant consumer demand generated by the generous wage policy of the
enterprises. Total consumption (in constant prices) increased by 7% in
1967 while the social product and industrial production rose by 2% and 
2-2% respectively. The expansion phase of the cycle followed the familiar 
pattern. The easy monetary/credit policy (see Table 7) and relative 
stability in foreign trade transactions facilitated the growth of the 
economy. The stimulus for growth was provided by investment and consumption 
expenditures."^
The expansion of 1968 and 1969 took place in an atmosphere of relative 
price stability (particularly in 1968) as the prices of basic industrial 
raw materials and services were largely under control- But as Table 8 
shows, these prices began to accelerate from 1969. The producers_' price 
of industrial and agricultural goods increased by 3% and 6% in 1969 
(against 0 and -3% in 1968), the retail prices of these two groups by 7 and 
5 per cent (against 5 and 2% in 1968), the cost of living index by 8%
1 Ibid. t p.5 and ESOE 1967, Chap. I. pp.94-95,
2 SGJ(1974), p.142. It should be noted that the generous wage policy 
coupled with enterprises' ability to borrow from banks created a serious 
state of illiquidity and mutual indebtedness from mid-1967. This also 
had an adverse effect on investment. See V. Dubey (1975), p.259.
3 The rate of growth of investment in this period was not very high 
(especially in Manufacturing & Mining) due to the decline in output (as 
well as industrial activity) and appropriation of a bigger share of the 
output cake in the form of wages. The behaviour of industrial invest­
ment is probably a major reason for the short expansion phase of this 
cycle.
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(against 5% in 1968), and nominal personal income by 15% (against 10% 
in 1968).
Table 8 - Annual Rate of Growth of Prices and Incomes(1966-75) (%)
Year
Producers ' Price of Retail Price of cost of
living
index
Average Net 
Personal Income 
nominal real 
receipts receipts
Manufac­
tured
goods
Agricul­
tural
goods
Manufac­
tured
goods
- Agricul­
tural 
goods
1966 12 17 26 20 24 38 11
1967 3 -3 5 2 6 14 7
1968 0 -3 5 2 5 10 4
1969 3 6 7 5 8 15 6
1970 10 18 9 13 11 18 8
1971 16 25 14 17 16 22 5
1972 10 24 18 16 17 17 2
1973 12 24 17 21 20 16 -5
1974 30 14 30 16 21 28 6
1975 22 14 26 23 25 24 -1
Source: SGJ(1970), p.264; SGJ(1976), p.298; and SGJ(1977), pp.303, 305-6, 
and 310-
The expansion also resulted in a gradual rise in the level of imports 
unmatched by extra exports. The inflow of foreign capital in the form of 
loans (British and World Bank) and foreign investment compensated the trade 
deficit in 1968. In 1969, however, the deficit reached an alarming size. 
Imports of agricultural goods rose by 25% while that of industrial goods 
rose by 18%.^ In October 1969 the interest on sight and time deposits
were raised to attract more foreign exchange into the Yugoslav banking
„ 2 system.
The deterioration of the foreign trade situation coupled with the 
effects of the slow-down in industrial investment in 1966-69 period 
(Figure 3) were the main factors responsible for reaching the upper 
turning point of the fifth cycle in 1969. Certain structural problems 
such as the low growth of basic industries compared to that of manufacturing
industries (due to the inability of the former to raise their product prices
1 SGJ(1970), pp.126 and 154.
2 The Yugoslav workers working abroad usually keep deposit account in 
foreign currency with Yugoslav banks and can draw on their deposits at 
home and abroad. The above measured was aimed particularly at this 
group of depositors. See QER, no. 4, 1969, p.9.
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in the face of rising input costs) also acted as brakes on the expansion 
of the economy. The developments in the following year, especially 
further deterioration of balance of payment made the slow-down certain.
The fifth cycle was one of the longest and most erratic industrial 
cycles in Yugoslavia. The contraction phase was prolonged by the effects 
of economic reforms of 1965. The stabilization of the situation after the 
reforms and their long term effects helped the economy to recover from 
the recession. The wage/price spiral and the foreign exchange ceiling, 
however, set the mechanism of slow-down in motion.
3. The Sixth Industrial Cycle (1969-74)
The last cycle in the self-management period was somewhat different 
from all previous ones. It was a prolonged but mild cycle with small 
amplitude. Early in the downswing phase there existed a possibility of 
an upturn (early 1971), but the factors which could bring about a turning 
point were not strong enough and contraction continued (Figure 2). The 
relative stability of the movements of the economy (reflected in small 
amplitude of the cycle) was due to two major factors. Firstly, the govern­
ment embarked on a massive intervention programme to control markets, 
prices, incomes and foreign trade even though this meant a partial reversal 
of self-management principles.*- Secondly, the absence of untimely reforms 
and changes of strategic priorities prevented the economy from erratic 
movements reminiscent of the mid-sixties.
The characteristics of this cycle were::tapid inflation, temporary improve 
ment (followed by deterioration) of balance of payment, sluggish investment 
and enterprise illiquidity. The control of inflation is particularly 
significant in the Yugoslav economic system since rapid price/wage spiral 
can destabilize the economy from several directions (overheating of the 
markets because of an increase in government spending and investment demand,
1 Horvat maintains that in the first half of the seventies, the enterprise 
autonomy was reduced to its "lowest point since 1955", as a result of 
the State intervention. B. Horvat (1975), p.ll.
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increase in enterprise indebtedness and illiquidity, etc.).'*' As the 
inflationary pressure in Yugoslavia has been due to a variety of reasons, 
the anti-inflationary policies have also varied from one period to another. 
Among the most relevant factors contributing to inflation, we can mention : 
the growth of excess demand (enterprises, government agencies, and house­
holds) , wage rises in excess of productivity, structural deficiencies 
accounting for the slow growth of supply, devaluations of 1971, 1973 and 
1974, and increased defence spending (following the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and increased political tensions in the Balkans). In the 
early seventies (1970 and 1971), the anti-inflationary policies were 
primarily concerned with controlling the excess demand. By 1972 the 
enterprises had shifted to the regulation of personal incomes and by 1974 
attentions were concentrated on the structural shortcomings of the system.
The contraction phase of the cycle started with the shortage of foreign 
exchange and the deflationary measures of late 1969, followed by the 
stabilization programmes of 1970-71. It was also partly due to the
reduction in agregate demand in the foreign sector. In 1970 the balance
2of payment deficit increased by 81% and contributed to the slowdown
of the economy. The dominant view, in this period, regarded the inflation as
3a "demand-pull" type and, as a result, the anti-inflationary measures 
4included : the imposition of a higher deposit requirement for imports 
(April 1970) ; the introduction of a valorem tax of 5% on all imports
1 Particular attention should be paid to the following aspects:
i) Wage and price increases result in a rise in the government revenues 
through income tax and turnover tax. Considering the dominance of the 
'balanced budget philosophy' and the fact that the State revenue is 
distributed to autonomous lower units, an increase in the revenue will 
automatically lead to increased expenditure and overheating of the 
markets. K. Bogeov (1969), p.100 and B. Horvat (1971a), p.157.
ii) Wage increases not financed by price rises (because of price control), 
makes self-financing of investment difficult, increases the credit 
requirement of the enterprises, and their indebtedness and illiquidity.
iii) Inflation makes exports less competitive and imports more attractive 
and results in deterioration of the already tight balance of payment and 
retardation of growth.
2 SGJ(1974), p.237.
3 OECD(1972), p.17.
4 QER, no.14, 1970, pp.3-5; OECD(1972), pp.51-52; and V. Dubey (1975), p.17.
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(July 1970); increasing the restrictions on consumer credit; the imposition
of price freeze on some commodities such as flour, sugar, oil, fat etc.,
and making the prior approval of the relevant government agency necessary
for any price change (October 1970); the extension of these controls on
prices for a further three months (January 1971); the imposition of a
maximum limit of 11% on the rise of personal incomes in the first three
months of 1971 (December 1970); the introduction of "social agreement on
incomes"^ (December 1971); and the immobilization of a portion of federal
2revenue in separate bank accounts (1971 and 1972).
At the same time, monetary and credit restrictions were also introduced
3so that the investment and government spending may be restrained (Table 7). 
Enterprises with liquidity problems were regarded as the particular target of 
restrictive policies since they were seen to be contributing to inflation 
by embarking on investment projects without having first secured sufficient 
financing. In June/July 1971 these enterprises were prohibited from under­
taking new investment before having sorted out their debts. They were also 
prohibited from obtaining investment credit from banks. In July 1972, it 
was decided that from January 1973 enterprises would have to reduce their 
personal income payment by about 10% to pay back some of their debts and 
increase their liquidities.^
The effect of these policies was that from 1970, investment expenditure 
began to slow down (Figure 3) while the growth of consumption expenditure was 
stabilized at its previous level of 8%^, and thus the rate of growth of the 
economy slowed down (Figures 1 and 2). While the slow-down in 1970 was due 
to the slow-down of exports accompanied by sharp rise in imports, the
1 The social agreements on income is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
2 The expenditure limits over the previous year was 10.8% in 1971 and 14% 
in 1972. The federal revenue in excess of the maximum expenditure limit 
was ’sterilized’.
3 The growth of money supply (M^) and other liquid assets (M3) in 1972 showed 
a sudden rise, despite restrictive policies (see Table 7). This was due
to the large trade surplus in current accounts in 1972. More on this 
later.
4 OECD(1972), p.52 and OECD(1973), p.52,
5 SGJ(1974), p.142.
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continuation of contraction phase in 1971 and 1972 was due to the slow-down 
of other components of aggregate demand. Despite the slow-down of the economy, 
inflation continued to remain the number one economic problem. Despite 
direct price control measures such as freezing the prices in November 1971 
for a six month period^", the wholesale and retail prices and cost of living 
index continued their rapid growth in 1970 and 1971 (Table 8). At this 
point the attention of the policy-makers was drawn to other explanations 
of inflation.
By now, a large group of economists and policy-makers regarded the
2inflation to be of the 'cost-push type'. Others regarded the structural 
deficiencies of the economy to be responsible for the inability of the 
aggregate supply to match the demand. Firstly, therefore, measures were 
taken to regulate and slow down the personal income payments. In December 
1972, the personal income of workers in non-economic activities was frozen
3for six months (affecting about 30 per cent of the work force) , while
further stress was put on the implementation of the social agreements on
personal incomes. Secondly, the lack of balance between agriculture,
services and basic industries on the one hand and manufacturing industries
on the other, was to be sorted out be selective expansion of those sectors
which had suffered from inconsistent and inefficient price control. This
particular step also helped to assuage the fears of a recession expressed
by some observers after three years of slow-down. In 1973 and 1974, some
of the administered prices were allowed to increase to restore some kind
of balance between various activities, even though this contributed to
4inflationary pressure. The Federal Executive Council announced measures 
of reflation aimed selectively at the "priority sectors", (i.e. those 
suffering from price distortions and other bottlenecks) such as energy, 
basic materials, transport and agriculture. These measures supplemented
1 OECD(1972), p.52,
2 OECD(1973), pp.8 and 15.
3 OECD(1974), p.45.
4 0ECD(1974), p.5 and OECD(1975), p.42.
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by others during the year, included: stimulation of economic investment 
particularly in the primary sectors, freeing some of the blocked enterprise 
accounts, reduction or the abolishment of deposits required for imports, 
deferring payment of custom duties on imports destined for the priority sect­
ors, easing of the conditions on obtaining foreign loans for the develop­
ment of the priority sectors, reduction of deposit requirements on invest­
ment projects*", and reduction of the proportion of investment financing
coming from internal resources of the enterprises (self-financing require- 
2ments). Although these measures were effective in checking the slow 
down and bringing about the turning point of the cycle, they were unsuccess­
ful in slowing down the inflation. Despite the fact that in February 1973
a decision was made to roll back the prices to their 1972 (December) level
3and freeze them for six months , nevertheless, as Table 8 shows, the 
wholesale and retail prices and cost of living index continued to grow at 
rapid rates in 1972, 1973 and 1974. The growth of nominal personal income, 
though still considerable, slowed down slightly in 1972 and 1973 so 
that the growth of real personal incomes was sharply checked in 1973 when 
they declined by 5% (Table 8).
The end of the contraction phase was also aided by the improvements 
in the foreign trade balance in 1972-73. The 'current account ' was
4actually in a surplus in both 1972 and 1973. Having built up this surplus, 
the expansionary programmes could proceed without the usual bottleneck 
of foreign exchange availability.^ The Resolution on Economic Policy for 
1974, passed by the Federal Assembly in December 1973, continued to 
emphasize the reflation of the economy. The reflation was to take place
1 This is one of the tools often used by Yugoslav authorities to 'regulate' 
the volume of investment. Enterprises are required to place in frozen 
accounts guarantee deposits (about 10% of the estimated cost of the 
project) until the completion of the project.
2 OECD(1974),pp.48-9 and 52; and OECD(1975), p.40.
3 OECD(1974), p.46.
4 Ibid. t p.14, Table 2.
5 The main reasons for improvements in the foreign trade situation were: 
slow down of production, lower pressure of domestic demand, devaluation*of 
1971 (twice) and 1973, increased tourist earnings and remittences from 
the Yugoslav workers abroad and increase in the number of joint ventures 
with foreign businesses.
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by stimulation of investment and consumption expenditure and by measures 
to increase the share of productive investment (particularly in the priority 
sectors). Later on in the year, measures aimed at the restoration of the 
easy credit policy such as the removal of restrictions on consumer credit, 
the reduction of required reserve ratio on sight and time deposits were 
also decided upon.^
As a result of the expansionary policies, the rate of growth of
investment (in real terms) began to increase from 1974; total investment
by 9%, investment in Manufacturing & Mining by 19%, expenditure on equipment
by 40% (Figure 3). Total consumption expenditure (in real terms) also
. 2increased by 7% after two years of stagnation. The year 1974, thus
witnessed the turning point and the expansionary phase of the sixth 
industrial cycle (Figure 2).
The anti-inflationary programme continued, though mistakenly, to 
concentrate on the structural aspects of the inflation and therefore the 
need to develop the supply side, particularly in the priority sectors.
This was in line with the economic policy pursued from late 1973 onwards, 
i.e., a reflationary programme. But as experience has shown, in a situation 
like Yugoslavia where the pressures of demand, the effects of international 
trade and the ability of producers to alter their price level coexist 
with the structural problems, any reflationary policy would be inflationary. 
As Table 8 shows, the rate of growth of prices and the cost of living 
index continued to grow in 1974.
The balance of payment situation also changed very rapidly. The 
improvements in foreign trade in 1972 and 1973 made further liberalization 
of trade possible and this brought about a rapid rise in imports unmatched 
by the rise in exports. The expansionary measures of the years 1973 and 
1974 resulted in an unexpectedly fast decline of foreign exchange reserves, 
certainly faster than was envisaged. The imports of industrial goods
1 OECD(1974), p.53 and OECD(1975), pp.43-48.
2 SGJ(1976), p.136.
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increased by 38% in 1973 and 65% in 1974 while those of the agricultural
products rose by 60% and 72% respectively in the two years. The trade
deficit widened by 67% in 1973 and 173% in 1974.  ^ The movement of exports
and imports can be seen in Figures 4 and 5. The sharp rise in imports in
1973 (and to a lesser extent in 1974) was partly due to the shortage of
rainfall leading to the lowering of reservoir levels and a reduction in the
production of electric energy. This resulted in large cutbacks in power
production and increased dependence on the import of coal and oil (as
2substitutes for hydroelectric power) as well as other goods. The 
quadrupling of the oil prices was another reason for the sharp rise in 
imports.
The expansion phase of this cycle thus came to an end in 1974 with
the deterioration of the foreign trade situation and the operation of
foreign exchange constraint. At the same time, inflation continued to
remain the number one economic problem. The speed-up of growth in 1974
was achieved at the cost of soaring prices and a widening trade gap. The
slow-down of production in 1975 eased the pressure on foreign exchange
reserves and the index of foreign trade deficit began to decline (Figure
5). The slow-down of production became definite as stabilization became
3the keynote of 1975 economic policy.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Short term fluctuations in the level of economic activity occur in 
capitalist as well as in socialist economies, though the factors contrib­
uting to the fluctuations are different for each particular economy. 
Although recently some attention has been paid to the cyclical pattern of 
growth in socialist countries, most of the work on the subject is related
to, and based on the experience of, advanced capitalist economies.________
1 SGJ(1976), pp.156, 183 and 231.
2 In December 1973, of 16 reservoirs in'the country, seven were totally 
dry and six were dangerously low. QER, no.l, 1974, p.7.
3 Only after the anti-inflationary policies of 197S and 1976 (composed 
of a high dose of discretionary measures) did the inflation begin to 
slowdown. Sfee QER, no.l., 1975, p.3 and OECD(1976), pp.18-20,
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Yugoslavia, being a ’hybrid’ economy, shares some features of her economic 
system with capitalist economies and some with socialist economies. There­
fore the destabilizing factors of both economic systems find fertile ground 
for operation in Yugoslavia. In fact, in her short history, Yugoslavia 
has manifested sharper business cycles than any of the developed capitalist 
countries or the European socialist countries.
The experience of market economies shows that the working of competition 
coupled with the absence of coordination between the activities of decentral­
ized decision making units in the spheres of production and consumption, 
lead to business cycles. The cyclical movement is the result of the over­
shooting or undershooting of optimum capital stock level when making 
investment decisions. This mathematically, is represented by the multiplier- 
accelerator interaction. The movements of the economy are then modified 
by the operation of ceilings and floors that prevent the economy from 
indefinite expansion or contraction.
In a planned economy, however, distortions of this type are expected 
to disappear if the planners have complete knowledge of all relevant 
variables and if they do not behave subjectively with regard to the 
constraints imposed on the economy from within and without. The investment 
activities are coordinated centrally and so is the supply of consumer 
goods, producer goods and effective demand. The possibility of overshooting 
and undershooting the investment or growth targets are therefore less 
likely. As far as the existence and operation of constraints to the growth 
process are concerned, most of the socialist economies are subject to some 
major constraints of one form or another. The operation of these buffers 
does indeed produce some form of cyclical fluctuation depending on other 
properties of the economy. The consequence of disregarding the barriers to 
growth have been pointed out by various contributors to the subject at 
least with regard to the USSR and Czechoslovakia.
But in addition to the mechanism of investment decision, allocation
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of investment to various sectors and the working of the internal factors, 
there is also the possibility of external forces affecting the growth 
pattern. Periodic shocks, random or otherwise, affect the movement of the 
economy and can produce cyclical behaviour. Of course in the final analysis, 
the external factors have to work their way into the system through the 
internal properties, i.e., the consumption and investment functions, lag 
structure and other relevant parameters. An excellent mechanical example 
provided by Kendall illustrates this point: the vibrations experienced 
by different automobiles travelling on a bumpy road differ widely 
according to the type of the car and the effectiveness of its shock 
absorbers.* In the same way, different economies (and more so, different 
systems) behave differently towards a similar external shock as their 
structure and mechanism of reacting to an external shock differ.
In terms of the experience of the socialist countries, most of the 
relevant contributions have emphasized the role played by external 
factors. Particular periodic shocks such as changes in priorities and 
development strategy (transition to NEP in the USSR, for instance), 
economic reforms and sudden shifts of resources towards armament industries, 
result in fluctuations in the level of activity with its duration and 
amplitude depending on the extent of the change brought about by the shock.
The Yugoslav economy was shown to have experienced six industrial 
cycles in the post-war period with durations varying from 2 to 7 years.
The importance of various factors has changed as the economic system has 
undergone numerous changes and reforms. While,in the central planning 
period the influence of periodic shocks was predominant, the self­
management period witnessed the increasing importance of market and the 
decentralization of investment decisions. The main factors behind the 
economic instability in Yugoslavia have been:
a. Decentralization of decision making and lack of corrdination between
1 M.G. Kendall (1959), p.423
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units. During the fifties the impact of this factor was small due to the 
limited scope for autonomous decision making by enterprises as well as 
the existence of central control on the level and composition of investment. 
But after the abolishing of the social investment funds and further 
devolution of investment decisions, the importance of this factor grew.
While the absence of central planning may have saved the economy from 
consequences of irrational and voluntarist methods, it also left the 
economy susceptible to the possibility of overshooting and undershooting 
investment targets. In this process, the role played by investment 
expenditure becomes crucial. In the pre-1963 period, the relationship between 
industrial production and investment was not a straight forward one to one 
correspondence type, and the effects of expanding or contracting the output 
on investment expenditures were far from clear. In 1952-55 period, when the 
output was progressively expanding, investment expenditures were falling 
while in the 1956-60 period when the economy was fluctuating, investment 
expenditures were growing constantly. But with further improvements of the 
self-management system and further transfer of the locus of decision making 
to enterprises, the relationship between investment and output became a 
market determined relationship. As output expanded, investment expenditures 
also expanded (with some lag) and helped further expansion of output (via 
multiplier). Similarly in the downswing, the growth of investment was slowed 
down, easing further contraction of the activity until the level of induced 
investment reached a minimum and the lower turning point was arrived at.
The above argument is further supported by the fact that in the course 
of the development of self-management, the investment expenditures have 
become much more sensitive to variations in the level of economic activity. 
This is because the dominant sections of the enterprise management have 
become increasingly biased towards high-investment and rapid-growth 
policies, as discussed in Chapters One and Three. Any increase in the 
level of aggregate demand or any improvement in the market position of
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an enterprise would act as a stimulus for its managers to increase 
investment.
b. Constraints to growth. Foreign exchange was shown to be the principal 
barrier to the growth process during’ the expansion phases of all six 
cycles. In the process of expansion the emphasis on imports increases while 
the growth of exports tends.to decline - or at least remain lower than
that of imports. The imports of industrial goods increase as the industrial 
production speeds up while the imports of manufactured consumer goods and 
agricultural products grows as the domestic demand builds up. Exports 
cannot rise at the same rate because, firstly, the international market may 
not^be booming like the domestic market and, secondly, some exporter may 
find it more profitable to switch to domestic market (particularly if 
there exists some room for manipulation of prices). The outcome is a 
deteriorating balance of payment deficit which slows down the growth of 
the economy and brings about an end to the expansion phase. Only when 
the economy slows down, the pressure on foreign exchange reserves is 
eased. We have shown that all six industrial cycles were subject to 
this barrier and that after the reorganization of foreign trade in 1952, 
the movement of the index of imports was almost fully synchronized with 
that of the industrial production.*
Other constraints such as the capacity of basic industries (energy, 
metallurgy, etc.) have occasionally posed as bottlenecks to growth as well. 
In 1969 and 1974 the upper turning point was reached as a combined effect 
of foreign exchange constraint and other bottlenecks.
c. Periodic shocks of different forms. The first cycle was principally
brought about by external factors (though.the influence of foreign....
1 In 1966 the imports as well as trade deficit experienced an additional 
peak (unmatched by the industrial production). The reason for this, 
however, was that the devaluation of 1965 and the liberalization of 
imports had resulted in a sharp and short rise in imports. In 1969, 
the severe deterioration of foreign trade deficit, strengthened by 
other bottlenecks led to the slow down of the economy while the trade 
gap continued to expand for a short while longer. These are the only 
two exceptions to the above statement.
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exchange constraint was operative). The dispute with the Cominform 
(resulting in a severing of foreign trade) brought about the slow-down of 
the economy while the untimely collectivization drive (basically a 
political intervention), bad harvest, increased allocation of resources to 
defence industries, and, more importantly, the massive reorganization 
of the economy on the basis of self-management aggrevated the situation 
and prolonged the slow-down.
Economic reforms were another type of external shock which affected 
the cyclical pattern of growth. The 1961 reforms, which did not go 
very deep, sustained the contraction phase for only a short time. The 1965 
reforms, however, were much more thorough going and therefore the adjust­
ment of the individual economic and non-economic units to the new 
conditions took a much longer time. The result was that the duration of 
the downswing was lengthened considerably and the contraction phase was 
turned into a serious recession.
d. Economic policies of the government. With regard to the role of 
government, in addition to the formulation and launching of reforms, even 
its basic annual economic policy has affected adversely the cyclical 
movement of the economy. As the expansion phases of the cycles have been 
characterized by an excess demand situation, and because of the permanent 
tendency of the enterprises to use their freedom of action in raising 
prices (a result of increasing the scope of market forces), inflation has 
been a major accompaniment of the cyclical movements. The anti-inflation­
ary policies, therefore, have been embarked on either at the last stages 
of expansion or just after the turning point and, in either case, have 
contributed to the slow-down. This was shown to be the case with the 
deflationary measures of 1955, 1960, 1964 and 1969. The problem, 
however, has been one of the extent to which anti-inflationary policies 
are pursued. At times the fight against inflation has so preoccupied 
the policy-makers that the anti-inflationary measures were allowed to
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remain in force at the cost of prolonging the slow-down. Policies in 
1964-7 and 1969-73 were examples of such tendencies.
Of course when the diagnosis of inflation changed from a "demand 
pull" to a "cost push" and then to a "structural" one, the anti-inflationary 
policies ceased to be deflationary. It was a fortunate coincidence that 
the change of notion occurred in the trough of the cycle (1973) and the 
solution to the structural inflation was in fact expansionary, thus 
helping the revival. Needless to say, by the end of 1974 the inflation 
had got worse and restrictive stabilization policies had,again,to be 
embarked on.
Another aspect of the government's fiscal and monetary policy was 
that the process of decentralization and development of self-management 
system had reduced its effectiveness and efficiency. The devolution of 
fiscal and monetary powers to lower units of administration (republics 
and autonomous provinces) meant that, firstly, the federal government 
had little control on the revenues and expenditures of the lower units 
and, secondly, even if the federal government did want to go through the 
elaborate mechanism of enforcing a certain type of policy, the administra­
tive lags would be prolonged. Furthermore, the dominance of a balanced 
budget philosophy in the thinking of policy-makers was to act as an 
automatic "destablizer" built in the system.
The economic system built according to the model of "decentralized 
market socialism" and along the principles of self-management is highly 
unstable. As these principles have been increasingly implemented in 
economic, social and political spheres, the economic system has been 
subjected to an increasing number of destabilizing factors. At the same 
time the ability of the federal government to cope with the cyclical 
pattern of growth has been greatly weakened by the emergence of autonomous 
enterprises, banks and lower levels of administration and government.
As the last industrial cycle clearly illustrates, an austere stabilization
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programme aimed at dampening the fluctuations in the level of activity 
can be embarked on by imposing tight guidelines on wages, prices, 
investment plans, financing practices and other relevant variables. But 
the government can initiate such a programme only, and only if it is 
willing to restrict some of the powers of economic, social and political 
organizations, i.e. if it is prepared to limit or even reverse the 
application of self-management principles.
As far as the future pattern of growth is concerned, no fundamental 
change can be expected. The foreign exchange constraint, that so 
seriously limits the expansion phase of the cycles, does not seem likely 
to be eased in the near future. This is because there is no reason to 
expect a considerable increase in the exports earnings, the remittances 
of the Yugoslav workers working abroad or the tourist inflow which would 
significantly surpass the import requirements.
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Concluding Remarks
What is the nature of the economic system based on workers' self-manage­
ment as it is practiced in Yugoslavia? What are the factors that distinguish 
this system from the capitalist economic system? How significant are these 
factors in influencing the behaviour of the economy on micro and macro levels? 
How has the structure of the Yugoslav economy changed in the course of the 
implementation of the system of seIf-management?
These are the main questions with which this thesis has been concerned. 
Before discussing these questions, however, it is essential to emphasize one 
major factor in the evolution of self-management. In order to explain why 
the Yugoslav 'road' was chosen, we have to rely more on political and ideo­
logical factors than on directly economic factors. The dispute with the 
Cominform and its consequences (expuléion from the organization, severence 
of foreign trade with the East European countries, increased need for defence 
expenditure, etc.) in conjunction with the specific ideological line which 
had developed in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, should 
be regarded as factors much more significant than the poor performance of 
the economy under the Soviet model of centralized planning. The poor perfor­
mance of the economy was due to many factors and the experience of central 
planning was too short and limited to be blamed as a major factor. In fact, 
the dominance of the political and ideological position of the proponents of 
the Yugoslav 'road' has continued to be the most important driving force in 
the further development of the system of workers'management up to the present 
time. These proponents have pushed forward various economic reforms despite 
the significant resistence from other sections of the LCY (such as the Ranko- 
vic faction in the early sixties and the nationalist factions in the early 
seventies). Besides, the persistence of a high-growth and high-investment 
mentality can only be explained by the exertion of strong political pressure 
from the advocates of se 1 ft-management.
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In the first part of the thesis we examined the organizational struc­
ture and the behaviour of the Yugoslav enterprises with reference to areas 
such as : the distribution of decision making power, the industrial and labour 
relations, the objectives of the firms, the distribution of enterprise revenue, 
the determination of wages, the determination of the level and composition of 
investment, and finally the sources of finance. The following conclusions 
emerged from the study of these areas: the hierarchical nature of the enter­
prise organization; the polarization of the enterprise into an influential 
minority composed of the technical/managerial strata and a largely powerless 
majority made up of the bulk of the work force in lower skill and qualifi­
cation categories; the dominance of the views and objectives of the influen­
tial executive strata on the organs of management; the existence of economic 
and political factors for deepening this division of labour and consolidating 
the position of the upper echelon; the dependence of the earnings of the work 
force on the performance of individual enterprises, resulting in the emer­
gence of factors such as the availability and age of capital equipment, tech­
nology and market structure as the determinants of earnings; the differentia­
tion of the earnings of employees on the basis of the industry and location 
of the enterprise and along the same lines as those of the distribution of 
influence; and finally, the dependence of the level of investment on the 
performance of individual enterprises, resulting in the emergence of grounds 
for differentiation amongst enterprises, industries and regions in terms of 
the amount of investment resources they are able to amass.
These issues are, of course, closely inter-related and continually 
reproduce each other. The prosperous enterprises in the more developed re­
publics can, not only, afford to offer higher wages and better fringe benefits 
but are also in a more favourable position to borrow from banks and embark 
on high-growth policies. They are able to use more modern equipment and tech­
nical processes which, in turn, result in increased productivity, faster 
growth and an ability to provide better working conditions and higher remune-
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ration for their work force. At the same time the larger, more developed 
and complex organizations have to depend increasingly on the expertise of 
the technical/managerial strata. This consolidates the position of this 
strata and ensures the domination of their objectives and goals over those 
of the other members.
On these issues, how different is the Yugoslav economy from a capita­
list economy? The pattern of ownership is certainly an area of significant 
difference. At least in the industrial sector, the individual ownership of 
the means of production is completely abolished. Legally, a firm is owned 
by the Society and its control is relegated to its workers. Due to the par­
ticular organizational structure and distribution of power, however, the 
general work force has little to do with the running of the firm and its real 
control. The control is, in fact, concentrated in the hands of a small group 
of professional technical/administrative personnel, the executive strata or 
the Yugoslav equivalent of the "technostructure" -to borrow Galbraith's 
phrase. They run the day to day affairs of the enterprises, prepare plans 
for future work, prepare technical and financial analyses of the operations, 
etc. In its practice, this strata is motivated by specific objectives of its 
own: economic, social and psychological. Higher earnings, security of employ­
ment, prestige, power, prospect of higher posts in the socio-political 
structure and similar desires are some of these objectives. The executive 
strata is highly growth oriented since rapid growth satisfies most, if not 
all, of these objectives.
In this respect, the 'self-managed1 enterprise is hardly different from 
the capitalist corporation. The shareholders of a corporation are very much 
on a par with the workers of the Yugoslav enterprise. They are legally em­
powered to supervise the work of the executives and censure them if necessary. 
But, in practice, they are in no way able to exercise effective control . 
or supervise the executives. The technical/managerial strata of the 
Yugsolav enterprise can be compared with the "technostrucute" of the
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capitalist coroporation. They have similar objectives and pursue these objec­
tives in similar ways. Although they wield great power within their firms, 
their discretion, however, is not unlimited. They are able to pursue their 
goals as long as certain constraints are satisfied. Here lies one difference 
between the two types of firms. The capitalist corporation’s executives are 
constrained by the conditions of the stock market and the possibility of 
take-over or dismissal if their share prices (or profits) fall below a cer­
tain level. Their Yugoslav counterparts will face threat of censure and 
industrial action if they do not provide their work force with sufficient 
personal incomes.
There are two more major differences between the Yugoslav enterprise and 
the capitalist corporation that need to be pointed out. Firstly, in addition 
to performing an economic function, the Yugoslav enterprise also has a 
political role to play. The majority of the members of the technical/mana- 
gerial strata are members of the LCY and act as the vehicle for adopting 
the League's policies in the economic sphere. At times, they make decisions 
for purely political reasons even though economic justification for these 
decisions may not be strong or convincing. The high-investment policy and 
the growth bias of the Yugoslav enterprises are examples of the effects of 
the political factor.
Secondly, although the majority of the labour force is deprived of any 
significant influence in the decision making process, this does not mean that 
they are in exactly the same positon, viz. the management, as the workers of 
a capitalist corporation. Through rotation of the membership of the workers' 
councils, management boards and other lower level organs of management, the 
workers of the Yugoslav enterprises are much better informed about the opera­
tion of their enterprise than their capitalist colleagues. Their knowledge 
of -the enterprise functions must be looked at as an extra constraint on the 
management of enterprises.
The hierarchical nature of the relations within the enterprises has
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resulted in a system of industrial relations which is becoming increasingly 
like that in the capitalist countries. The system of workers'management, it 
was hoped, would lead to the expansion of democracy at the place of work and 
an increase in employee participation in decision making. There were even 
legal stipulations by which the representation of white collar workers on the 
management organs was limited to only one quarter of the membership. But the 
actual practice of the system has not justified the initial optimism. The 
relations within the enterprises have been hardly democratised, and at the 
same time, there have emerged employee indifference and apathy towards their 
enterprises together with manifestations of a deteriorating system of labour 
relations such as increased labour turn-over, absenteesm and strikes. When 
the Yugoslav workers go on strike, the obvious question is: against whom?
On the surface it seems as if they are striking against themselves -the 
trustees of the society. But in reality, their strike is similar to those 
of their colleagues working in capitalist firms, i.e., for higher pay and 
better working conditions. The fact that they are worker-managers makes no 
difference to them at all.
It should be emphasized here that the effects of the adoption of the self­
management system on the hierarchical nature of the organization and the 
resulting industrial and labour relations are not the same in all enterprises. 
Certainly, as the enterprises grow larger and technically more complex, the 
scope for the participation of the production workers in decision making be­
comes more and more limited. However, in small enterprises, the wide know­
ledge of the work force about the operation of the firm as a whole puts them 
in a position where they can exercise effective control on the management 
organs.
One of the most important considerations, when comparing the self-managed 
firm and the capitalist corporation, should be the autonomy of either type 
of organization and the isolation in which their affairs are decided upon.
Both organizations are independent of outside patronage or interference. They
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are responsible for their own expansion programmes, including finding the 
sources of financing their investment expenditures. They decided on their 
own individual wage rates and market prices. In doing this, they have to 
take into account the market conditions, i.e., the price of similar goods, 
the wages of workers in other industries, etc. This independence, has been 
further strengthened in Yugoslavia due to the existence of imperfect product 
and labour markets. In the advanced capitalist economies sellers' 
markets are less prevalent and the determination of wages is more market 
oriented. In Yugoslavia, however, the determination of wages is more closely 
linked to the performance of individual enterprises and, as such, seriously 
affected by sellers' markets and imperfections.
The fact that each enterprise decides on its own affairs in isolation 
from others underlies the development of earning differentials in Yugoslavia. 
When the earnings of workers are linked to the performance of their enterr 
prises, then factors such as capital intensity, capital labour ratio, the 
modernity of technical equipment and processes and market imperfections will 
also exert influence on the earnings of the work force. As these factors 
vary widely from one enterprise to another and from one region to another, 
the ground is prepared for income differentials to appear. This, of course, 
corresponds to the hierarchical nature of the organization and serves the 
existence of an all-powerful elite of technical/managerial executives.
The relegation of full autonomy could have meant that severe differences 
would develop among different regions particularly in terms of the amount of 
resources which became available for investment out of internal resources.
The less developed regions would suffer greatly as they, in no way, could 
raise internal resources like the more developed regions. These are the 
grounds for intervention by the State. Through the annual budget and special 
social funds for the LDRs, the State has been able to supplement the intern­
ally generated resources of the less developed regions. However, the impor­
tance of this factor should not be exaggerated, since many capitalist
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countries also have strong regional development policies whereby they pump 
in extra resources to their less developed areas, resources that would not 
be generated through the normal functioning of the market system.
The implementation of self-management has reached its most alarming 
level in the field of investment financing. The possibility of financial 
investment, in the form of bonds and possibly shares, by individuals or 
enterprises in some, form of a stock exchange is a major departure from the 
principle that property incomes must be gradually limited and replaced with 
income from labour. Another departure is allowing the enterprises to use 
their excess funds, jointly with other establishments, to set up a new enter­
prise (joint venture) and receive part of its profit as returns to their 
initial investment. The government's attempts to improve capital mobi­
lity requires and necessitates the possibility of financial investment to 
become popular and widespread. The investors, then, would have to be 
offered a say in the affairs of the enterprise as well as a share in their 
profits. Both of these requirements are contradictory to the principles of 
self-management and can undermine the whole system.
Another similarity of workers' self-management with the capitalist 
system, which also has important macroeconomic implications, is the absence 
of coordination between various prodction units. As a result of the deve­
lopment!' of self-management and the continuous decentralization of the decision 
making machinery, the central planning apparatus has had to be dismantled 
altogether and central control over the allocation of investment resources 
through the social investment funds has had to be relinquished. This has meant 
that the development of individual firms and industries is to a large extent 
left to their own market position and economic efficiency. There is little 
opportunity left for the government to encourage or discourage the growth of 
particular firms or industries. The market forces, in this way, become domi­
nant and all-decisive in the determination of the direction of development.
In the second part of the thesis the behaviour of the economy as a whole
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was analysed and such areas as the long run growth pattern, the structural 
change and short term fluctuations were investigated. The conclusions that 
emerged from this part of the thesis were: the existence of conditions for 
rapid and sustained long term growth of the economy as well as of the rates 
of unemployment and inflation; the emergence of tendencies stimulating and 
encouraging structural change in favour of the more developed regions; the 
development of regional differentiations as a result of the decentralization 
of the economy; the consolidation and stabilization of the private sector 
and the recognition its permanent and complementary relation to the social 
sector; the existence of major fluctuations in the level of economic activity; 
and the emergence of serious destabilizing factors in the system of self­
management.
In the post-war period as a whole, Yugoslavia has enjoyed rapid and 
sustained economic growth accompanied by a rise in the standards of living.
But alongside these improvements, there have also appeared some adverse deve­
lopments which, at times, have overshadowed the achievements of the system 
of self-management.
Despite the long term growth records, the Yugoslav economy has performed 
rather poorly in terms of providing work for its labour force. The high rates 
of unemployment seem to have persisted irrespective of whether the economy 
has been in conditions of contraction or expansion and, what is more important, 
the- rate of unemployment has been on the increase. This, coupled with the 
large scale migration of the Yugsolav workers to Western Europe, passing the 
one-million mark by the mid-seventies, subject the correctness of the Yugoslav 
•road' (and all of its institutional accompaniments) to another serious 
question. This basic tenet of socialism, expounded by various Marxist leaders, 
that every citizen has the right to work, does not seem to tally with the 
Yugoslav experience. The reason should be sought in the particular rigidities 
of the Yugoslav-type labour market and the particular structure of property 
rights in labour-managed firms. Strangely enough, the employment of the
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Yugoslav workers abroad, instead of raising alarm, among the policy makers 
has been welcome as it has reduced the burden of domestic unemployment on the 
one hand and eased the pressure of foreign exchange constraint on the other.
The decentralization of the decision making process to the republican 
and enterprise levels has had two major consequences. Firstly, it has reduced 
the ability of the federal government to determine (and, later, influence) 
the orientation of the economy and the direction and pace of its development. 
The legislation in the early seventies explicitly barred the federal govern­
ment from undertaking investment projects on its own accord (except, of course, 
in specified and approved cases). Secondly, as the process of self-management 
has been bound with regional unevenness, the position of the less developed 
regions and their share of the national resource cake has been threatened and 
the inter-republican transfer of resources has been tightened. With the in­
crease in the role of the republican authorities and enterprises, the amount 
of resources that flows automatically into the LDRs would have been greatly 
reduced had it not been for the intervention by the federal government through 
the Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Less Developed Regions. The 
resources of this fund have been used to make up for the shortfall in the 
internally generated resources. Even with this kind of intervention, the 
LDRs have not been able to grow significantly faster than the MDRs and the 
gap between them has continued to survive. The existence and widening of 
this gap has created a lot of mistrust and bitterness in the LDRs, directed 
not only against the MDRs but increasingly against the whole practice of 
self-management which, in their eyes, is politically linked with the MDRs.
This bad feeling also creates conditions for furthering disillusion, apathy 
and dissidence towards the Yugoslav 'road' to socialism. The surfacing of 
sharp struggles over the question of localism and nationalism in the early 
seventies was only a manifestation of such developments and is to be expected 
on an even larger scale in future.
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The Yugoslav economy, in spite of long run sustained growth, has mani­
fested a high degree of short term instability. In fact, the fluctuations 
in the level of total output, industrial production and agricultural produc­
tion have been sharper than those in the advanced capitalist countries or 
in the planned economies. The factors underlying economic instability con­
sist of: the absence of coordination between economic units; the increased 
sensitivity of investment, brought about by the development of seIf-management, 
and the accompanying growth bias; the operation of various constraints in 
the form of ceilings and floors; external shocks (such as the expulsion from 
the Cominform); and the untimely government policies and economic reforms.
The absence of coordination between economic units and therefore the possi­
bility of overshooting and undershooting is the most important cause of 
cyclical fluctuations under self-management. The existence of ceilings and 
floors such as the availability of foreign exchange, the capacity of capital 
goods industries, the availability of skilled manpower; and the minimum level 
of national expenditure will then determine the timing and the amplitude 
of the cycles and their various phases. In Chapter Six, we showed that the 
availability of foreign exchange is the most important single factor deter­
mining the limits to economic growth and expansion phases of the cycles.
Unlike the capitalist economies, however, the Yugoslav government has 
not been able to implement effective and timely counter-cyclical policies.
In fact, it has been demonstrated that the untimely application of economic 
reforms (1950, 1961 and 1965), in the recession phase of the relevant cycles, 
made the recession longer and more severe. The prevalence, until recently, 
of the 'balanced budget' philosophy meant that the government's fiscal 
policies were subject to a built-in 'destabilizer' which could only exacer­
bate the situation by reducing the aggregate demand in the contraction phases 
and increasing the pressure on prices in the expansion phases.
The implementation of self-management principles necessitated the 
devolution of economic and political powers (including areas such as fiscal
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and monetary policies) to the constituent republics. Firstly, therefore, 
the resources at the disposal of the federal government, with which it 
could influence the level of aggregate demand, gradually reduced. Secondly, 
in circumstances where comprehensive national policy measures had to be 
embarked on, the consultation with the republican fiscal and monetary autho­
rities and the need for obtaining their cooperation and consent, resulted 
in the prolonging of the administrative lags. Both of these consequences 
reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of the government’s stabilization 
policies. However, the experience of the early seventies has shown that 
it is possible for the federal government to embark on effective stabiliza­
tion policies only if it is prepared to take back, from enterprises as well 
as the republics, some of the powers it had granted them earlier. That is 
to say, if it is willing to restrict the application of self-management 
principles.
It should be emphasized at this point that the issue of training the 
workers for managerial functions has not been taken up seriously in the 
whole course of the development of the Yugoslav 'road'. Nor have the 
theories of the labour-managed firm paid any attention to this issue. These 
theories generally assume that managerial functions can be performed by the 
workers'representatives without much difficulty. While this assumption may 
be correct in an economy at a lower stage of social and economic development, 
such as a peasant economy, it is totally inappropriate in an industrial 
society with highly developed division of labour coupled with technically 
complex processes of production concentrated in large production units. The 
idea that workers on the production line can change their role every two 
years or so and fill in the managerial slots is, at this stage of the deve­
lopment of the Yugoslav economy, somewhat premature and naive. The technical, 
financial and administrative management of modern enterprises are specialist 
fields and the personnel required for such posts need long years of profes­
sional training and practical experience. As we pointed out in Chapter One,
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the unfamiliarity of the bulk of the work force with management techniques 
has been the basis of the development of the existing division of labour 
and locus of decision making power with all the ramifications. If the 
workers are to be seriously involved in the affairs of the enterprises and 
participate actively in their running, then they must be slowly groomed and 
prepared for such functions. It is, therefore, necessary to develop a 
purpose-built long term programme for education of the work force in such 
areas as accounting, production management, cost control, investment analy­
sis, etc. Only then can one talk of active and conscious participation by 
the workers in the management of enterprises. It is ironical to note that 
the question of training has been raised but recently, and then in some 
West European countries only -in the context of the discussion of employee 
participation in management.
Finally an important aspect of the Yugoslav 'road' to socialism is the 
nature of the social relations that have developed in the course of traver­
sing this 'road'. Relations between the agents of production and the means 
of production exist, and are continually reproduced, at the level of produc­
tion, i.e., at the place of work. These relations are reflected, among other 
things, in the nature of the division of labour between those who plan the 
production process and its related activities and those who put these plans 
into operation, ie., the direct producers. Alternatively, one can talk of 
the division of labour between the administrative tasks and the performance 
tasks or, as is common in the Marxist writings, between mental and manual 
labour. Under capitalism, this type of division of labour represents not 
only the technical but also the social division of labour and is a reflection 
of the existence of classes. Under socialism, while the technical division 
of labour will necessarily survive, the social division of labour along the 
above lines must begin to break down. This will be reflected in the reduc­
tion of privileges and benefits associated with supervisory and managerial 
tasks, in the reduction in the gap between the earnings and other benefits
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received by different strata of the work force, and in the growing real 
participation of the production workers in the decision making process. In 
the writings of Marx and Lenin, this is known as the "restriction of the 
bourgeois rights"1 2, and is regarded as an indication of the breaking up of 
the social division of labour. This procès must,of necessity,be a conscious 
one which workers must consciously understand and participate in. But if 
conscious measures are not taken in order to begin and speed up the destruc­
tion of the old social relations, and if a strata of privileged technical/ 
managerial elite with influential positions at the place of work take over 
the supervision and control of the production process, then the direct pro­
ducer would be placed in a subordinate position and the old relations of 
domination of one group by another will be reproduced. At the same time, 
this type of relation at the enterprise level will give rise to and conso­
lidate similar relations produced at the level of society. The hierarchical _ 
organizations, the higher and increasing earnings and the privileges of the 
upper strata of the hierarchy, the fact that the effective control over the 
means of production rests in the hands of this strata are manifestations of 
the reproduction of the old social relations and, as Bettelheim has rightly
pointed out, constitutes "the objective basis of the existence of the 
2bourgeoisie". The economic reforms of the East European type (which have 
found their most extensive application in Yugoslavia) create the conditions 
for enhancing the position of the technical/managerial strata by expanding 
their control and discretion over the lower strata of the work force as well
1 K. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme", in K. Marx and F. Engels(1973), 
Volume 3; V.I. Lenin, "A Great Beginning" and "The State and Revolution", 
in V.I. Lenin(1975), among many other writings. Some of the relevant 
sections of these works are reprihted in K. Marx, F.E. Engels and V.I. 
Lenin (1975), especially pp. 6, 17-22 and 35-36. Ironically, the discus­
sion of 'the restriction of bourgeois rights' has never gained currency 
in the political or intellectual circles of those countries where the 
initial steps for the construction of socialism were taken. (The only 
exception to this general trend was the widely held forums and discussions 
on the subject in China during the decade following the Cultural Revolu­
tion.)
2 C. Bettelheim(1974), p.94
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as over the means of production. They will, in effect, behave as if the 
means of production were their "corporate property"^.
Alongside these developments, one can also observe other offsprings of 
the re-emergence of the old social relations. The interests of the power­
ful technical/managerial strata are served by all those measures that im­
prove productivity, efficiency, profit and growth. The import of foreign 
capital, technology and know-how and the legislations sanctioning foreign 
investment by the capitalist multinationals are some of the measures that 
serve such interests. The transfer of technology and, therefore the oppor­
tunity to learn from the advanced experience of foreign firms in technical 
and managerial skills, help to strengthen the position of the executive 
strata and consolidate the relations that have hitherto developed under 
self-management. The fact that in this process, capitalist multinationals 
find a foothold in Yugoslavia and that their operations will result in the
production of capitalist relations, seems not to have caused any worry or
2concern among the Yugoslav leaders. As in the case of previous issues, 
the most serious aspect of the question of foreign investment is its growing 
trend over time and the fact that the government is still actively seeking 
the expansion of joint ventures between the Yugoslav and foreign firms.
The system of self-management has been beset with difficulties. It has 
not succeeded in solving problems such as unemployment and inflation. Neither 
has it fulfilled hopes of resolving social conflict. The developments that 
ensued from the implementation of self-management, have necessitated govern­
ment actions which undermine the very bases of the system. Self-management, 
then, has hot been able to act as the panacea for the social and économie 
ills which it was once hoped to be. 12
1 "Corporate property" under the Yugoslav conditions is paralel to "indi­
vidual property" under capitalism. For a detailed application of this 
line of analysis and this concept to the conditions of the Soviet Union, 
see C. Bettelheim (1974)»especially pp. 69-113, and (1976), especially 
the Preface. Also, in this regard, see P. Sweezy and L. Huberman(1964).
2 Outside Yugoslavia, however, these developments have cast serious doubts
over the correctness and validity of the Yugoslav 'road' as an alternative 
to socialist construction, see c.Pettelheim and P. Sweezy (1971),’pp. 3-14.
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